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Abstract 
Algeria in France: War and Defeat in Republican Culture 
 
The contention of this thesis is that the Algerian war of 1954-62 and Algeria’s subsequent 
independence have had a significant and lasting impact on the nature of French 
republicanism, and to a much greater extent than the historiography currently recognises. 
The Algerian war essentially altered the notion of French citizenship in a way which 
undermined the republican ideals of universalism and assimilation. By reconsidering the 
war and its aftermath within the broad context of French history since 1789, I argue that 
the founding of the Fifth Republic was not simply the culmination of French political 
history; it did not mark the end of the Revolution. Instead, it was itself a revolution and 
presented a fundamental challenge to republicanism’s original ideals of universalism and 
assimilation. 
 
This thesis is a cultural history in the sense that its source material is derived primarily from 
novels and films, but its conclusions are socio-political. I identify an idiom of republican 
culture and trace the trends of republican historic and artistic representations of war and 
defeat. The basis of this study is longitudinal in the sense that it considers themes that have 
been present through modern French history. The three grandest themes are covered by 
the three chapters: citizenship, republicanism and the guerre franco-française. By considering 
these themes in relation to republican cultural representations of the Algerian war, this 
thesis identifies how the revolution in republicanism has been concealed and the history of 
the Franco-Algerian relationship has been rejected. This rejection has subsequently allowed 
the extreme right to control the race and immigration agenda because to challenge it 
requires a recognition of the revolution which occurred between 1959-1962. 
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Introduction 
The Algerian War and French Republicanism 
 
I am not a prisoner of history. 
I should not seek there for the meaning of my destiny. 
- Franz Fanon 
 
The contention of this thesis is that the Algerian war of 1954-62 and Algeria’s subsequent 
independence have had a significant and lasting impact on the nature of French 
republicanism, and to a much greater extent than the historiography currently recognises. 
The Algerian war essentially altered the notion of French citizenship in a way which 
undermined the republican ideals of universalism and assimilation. Yet the period is 
consistently placed in the shadow of the Vichy era in terms of its importance in shaping 
modern France. By reconsidering the war and its aftermath within the broad context of 
French history since 1789, I argue that the founding of the Fifth Republic was not simply 
the culmination of French political history; it did not mark the end of the Revolution. 
Instead, it was itself a revolution and presented a fundamental challenge to republicanism 
and its original ideals. 
 
The timing of this thesis is not without significance. The election of Marine Le Pen to the 
leadership of the Front National and the ban on covering the face in public places, aimed 
specifically at the hijab and the niqab, in the spring of 2011 only serve to illustrate the 
continuing concerns of race, immigration and assimilation that have troubled France, 
particularly since 1962. Stefan Berger’s assertion that ‘[i]t was simply impossible to write 
any history with the contemporary politics left out’, in relation to writing national histories 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is no less true today and I do not deny the 
influence of the present on this thesis’s formulation.1 Within the academic sphere, the 
thesis has taken much inspiration from Todd Shepard’s historical-legal study The Invention of 
                                                
1 Stefan Berger, Mark Donovan and Kevin Passmore, 'Apologias for the Nation-State in Western Europe 
since 1800', Stefan Berger, Mark Donovan, and Kevin Passmore (eds), Writing National Histories: Western 
Europe since 1800 (London, 1999) p. 6. 
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Decolonization as well as the culturally-based work of Benjamin Stora.2 I also write in 
reaction to much of the scholarship that has stemmed from Henry Rousso’s The Vichy 
Syndrome, which has attempted to apply the methodology of amnesia and obsession in 
relation to the French reaction to the Algerian war.3 
 
Through a study of legal documents pertaining to Algeria and French citizenship from 
colonisation in 1830 until the present day, Shepard contends that: 
 
[w]hat I will term, ‘the invention of decolonization’ was a stage in the 
forward march of history, of the Hegelian ‘linear history with a capital H.’ 
This allowed the French to forget that Algeria had been an integral part of 
France since the 1830s and to escape many of the larger implications of that 
shared past. Through this forgetting, there emerged novel definitions of 
French identity and new institutions of the French state. The French 
political system was radically transformed. In most ways, what resulted in 
France resembles a counterrevolution, one that curtailed both the protection 
of liberties and the possibilities for securing equality and fraternity that 
earlier generations of revolutionaries had struggled to expand.4 
 
By studying the legal status of Algerians and Algeria in relation to France, Shepard has 
shown how Algeria as an historical part of France was rejected by the Fifth Republic in 
order to avoid the challenges such a recognition would force in terms of citizenship and 
equality. By inventing a narrative of decolonisation, in which Algeria simply reached a stage 
in its History that allowed it its independence, France was effectively able to ignore the 
many issues which the war itself had brought to the fore and reject any claims to French 
citizenship made by Algerians.5 The intention of this thesis is to take Shepard’s conclusions 
further. I will argue that the Fifth Republic, under the guise of the decolonisation of 
Algeria, altered the very fabric of republicanism. Such a change was not limited to the legal 
                                                
2 Todd Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France (London, 2006); 
Benjamin Stora, La Gangrène et l'oubli: la mémoire de la guerre d'Algérie (Paris, 1991); Benjamin Stora, Imaginaires de 
guerre: Algérie - Viêtnam, en France et aux Etats-Unis (Paris, 1997); Benjamin Stora and Mohammed Harbi, La 
guerre d'Algérie : 1954-2004, la fin de l'amnésie (Paris, 2004). 
3 Henry Rousso, The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944, trans. Arthur Goldhammer 
(London, 1991) [1987]. 
4 Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization, p. 2. 
5 In relation to citizenship, this work owes much to Patrick Weil’s study. Patrick Weil, Qu'est-ce qu'un Français ? 
Histoire de la nationalité française depuis la Révolution (Paris, 2002). 
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minutiae of the political regime but has been present and perpetuated in culture, thus 
becoming part of the public imagination. Ideas of citizenship, assimilation, universalism 
and revolution were and are altered to excuse the attack on republican values which the 
Fifth Republic oversaw. 
 
The Vichy period holds a prominent position in French political, public and historic 
imaginations, and it dominates the landscape of the twentieth century. Nicholas Atkin 
claims that the ‘Nazi occupation of 1940-44 remains the most traumatic episode in 
contemporary French history’, whilst Timothy Baycroft compares it to the Revolution of 
1789 in terms of its place in the popular imagination, ‘central in the invented history of the 
French nation.’6 Many of those who have written about the Algerian war and France, 
particularly those working in the field of memory studies, have drawn parallels with the 
Second World War and, particularly, the syndromic metaphor of Rousso’s in relation to the 
Vichy era.7 This comparative plotting is not politically innocent as it undermines the 
importance and impact of the Algerian war.8 I hope to redress this imbalance through a 
longitudinal approach which illustrates the impact the Algerian war had on French 
republicanism both as a political and a socio-cultural idea. Vichy’s prominence in the public 
sphere has concealed the revolution of 1958-62. 
 
This thesis will use cultural sources – cinematic films, novels and paintings – initially to 
understand how republican artistic culture helps to draw and bolster a republican narrative 
of history in relation to turning points in modern French history. From there and through 
the same mediums, I consider how republican artistic representations of the Algerian war 
conform to and deviate from this contextual base in such a way that suggests both a 
revolution in republicanism and a concealment of that revolution. Republican artistic 
culture is understood, for the purpose of this thesis, as an artistic artefact whose narrative 
                                                
6 Nicholas Atkin, 'Renewal, Repression and Resistance: France under Nazi Occupation, 1940-44', Martin S. 
Alexander (ed.) French History Since Napoleon (London, 1999) p. 244; Timothy Baycroft, France: Inventing the 
Nation (London, 2008) p. 2. 
7 Anne Donadey, 'Une Certaine idée de la France: The Algerian Syndrome and Struggles over French Identity', 
Steven Ungar and Tom Conley (eds), Identity Papers: Contested Nationhood in Twentieth-Century France 
(Minneapolis, 1996); Martin Evans, 'From Colonialism to Post-Colonialism: The French Empire since 
Napoleon', Martin S. Alexander (ed.) French History Since Napoleon (London, 1999) p. 412; Elizabeth Ezra, The 
Colonial Unconscious: Race and Culture in Interwar France (London, 2000) p. xii; Neil MacMaster, 'The Torture 
Controversy (1998-2002): Towards a 'New History' of the Algerian War?', Modern and Contemporary France 10 
(2002) p. 450; Alison Murray, 'Women, Nostalgia, Memory: Chocolat, Outremer and Indochine', Research in African 
Literatures 33 (2002) p. 235; David Prochaska, 'That was Then, This is Now: The Battle of Algiers and After', 
Radical History Review (2003) p. 133. 
8 This idea is developed in Chapter 3. 
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supports the dominant republican narrative of French history.9 This introduction now 
divides into four parts. An historical overview of the Franco-Algerian relationship since 
colonisation provides the necessary background. This is then followed by two sections on 
methodology: the first focuses on approaches including the notion of republican culture, 
the second expands upon the source base and how it is utilised. The final section provides 
synopses of the chapters. 
 
 
I.I Historical overview: France and Algeria, 1830-1962 
Whilst each chapter of this thesis begins with a historiographic overview, these are themed 
accounts in relation to citizenship, republican universalism and the guerre franco-française. To 
ground the source material and argument historically, it is worth providing a roughly 
chronological account of the Franco-Algerian relationship. Algeria was invaded by France 
in 1830 under Charles X in a futile attempt to maintain power. He was deposed the same 
year and the July Monarchy under Louis-Philippe established Algeria as a colony. The army 
was instrumental in the control and running of the territory, with almost a free hand, for 
the next forty years. Early on, it was considered ripe for cultivation and quickly became a 
settler colony. From 1834 it became part of the national territory and its population 
became French subjects.10 It took seventeen years of brutal repression to snuff out the 
resistance led by Abd-el-Kadar.11 
 
In 1848, ‘as a sign of its commitment to the values of 1789’, the Second Republic declared 
Algeria to be an extension of France.12 Its three new départements sent deputies to the 
Chamber in Paris. This move, legitimated as being about republican universalism by a 
government whose rallying cry was universal male suffrage, was primarily a security 
concern as many of the burgeoning settler population were not French in origin, but 
Spanish and Italian. The change in status in 1848 was to secure their loyalty to the French 
state. This mass naturalisation and enfranchisement did not apply to the non-European 
population who remained subjects; Algeria was France, Algerians were not French. 
Napoleon III, whilst not undoing the incorporation of Algeria into France, did consider it a 
                                                
9 This is expanded upon later in the introduction. 
10 Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization, p. 20. 
11 Robert Aldrich, A History of French Overseas Expansion (Basingstoke, 1996) pp. 27-28; Pierre Goubert, The 
Course of French History (London, 1988) p. 244; Evans, 'From Colonialism to Post-Colonialism', p. 394. 
12 Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization, p. 20. 
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different territory: an Arab Kingdom of which he was head, an understanding which did 
little to endear him to the settlers.13 
 
The situation of the settlers themselves is worth a little further consideration given that 
Philip Dine does not exaggerate when stating that ‘[w]ithout the pieds-noirs there would have 
been no Algerian war.’14 Despite Napoleon III’s 1863 law which confirmed Algerians’ 
rights to land, by the end of the decade around a third of their property had been 
appropriated by the French state and much was redistributed to the settlers. Algerians 
themselves were forcibly moved to reservations. By the end of the Third Republic, settlers 
had taken over around forty percent of land previously possessed by Algerians.15 The 
settlers themselves began predominantly as farmers, cultivating vineyards or the more 
traditional produce of figs or olives. Whilst many had Spanish and Italian origins, some 
settlers had emigrated for political reasons; participants in the June Days in 1848 were 
‘exiled’ to Algeria and many Alsatians relocated there in order to remain French following 
German annexation in 1871. The latter benefited from 100,000 hectares of land being 
confiscated on their behalf by the Third Republic.16 By 1954 there were roughly one million 
settlers in Algeria, ‘[s]ome of them were wealthy and arrogant colons, but many of them 
were lower-middle-class people, very ordinary people.’17 By the mid-twentieth century, 
most of these ordinary people had sold off their farms to the colons and lived in the coastal 
cities of Algiers, Oran and Philippeville.18 Despite this urbanisation, hastened by the 
                                                
13 Aldrich, A History of French Overseas Expansion, pp. 93-94. 
14 Philip Dine, Images of the Algerian War: French Fiction and Film, 1954-1992 (Oxford, 1994) p. 146. Pied-noir is a 
colloquial term for a European settler in Algeria. 
15 Aldrich, A History of French Overseas Expansion p. 218. 
16 By 1914, 12-15,000 Alsatians had moved to Algeria; between 1882 and 1908 45 percent of the Foreign 
Legion, based in Oran, were Alsatian. Karine Varley, Under the Shadow of Defeat: The War of 1870-71 in French 
Memory (Basingstoke, 2008) pp. 102-103. 
17 Antoine Prost, 'The Algerian War in French collective memory', War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century 
(Cambridge, 1999) p. 162. Stora cites figures which suggest the majority of the settlers lived in cities even by 
1872. Benjamin Stora, Algeria, 1830-2000: A Short History, trans. Jane Marie Todd (Ithaca, 2001) p. 22. 
18 The terms grand colon and petit blanc are often used in the literature, but seemingly also by settlers themselves, 
to distinguish between an extremely wealthy group who owned very big commercial farms, and Prost’s 
‘ordinary people’ who held much smaller farms or made their living in the cities having sold off their land. It 
seems to be a common theme in the sources which I have studied that the petit blancs see the grands colons as 
the prime cause of the war because of their appropriation of land and their derogatory treatment of the 
landless Algerians who worked it. Whilst there may be a little truth in this, it conveniently avoids the fact that 
the land sold to the grands colons had first been seized by the petit blancs and suggests that racism was only a 
fault of the rich landowners, which does not hold true. Regardless, by the beginning of the war, just 6,385 
Europeans owned 87 percent of land in Algeria. Irwin M. Wall, France, the United States, and the Algerian War 
(London, 2001) p. 10. 
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economic crisis of the interwar period, the connection to land remained central to the 
settlers’ ideology and culture.19 
 
As well as the influx of refugees from the lost provinces, the Third Republic also marked a 
new beginning for Algeria’s Jewish population who were granted, en masse, French 
citizenship by the Crémieux Decree of 1871. The rhetoric used to legitimate the position of 
Algeria reverted back to the Second Republic’s mission civilisatrice and the Crémieux Decree 
became an example of assimilation, rather than something that could suggest that 
republican France considered a non-national group of people as a distinct collective. Whilst 
support for colonialism was somewhat sporadic in the early Third Republic, and was 
strongly criticised on the right of the Chamber for diverting effort away from recovering 
Alsace and Lorraine, the empire, particularly Algeria, became vital for prestige and military 
manpower.20 For the supporters of empire like Léon Gambetta and most notably Jules 
Ferry, it became ‘a crucial part of an emerging national-republican message’; rather than a 
business enterprise akin to the British Empire, the French were spreading supposedly 
universal republican values through a humanitarian and civilising project.21 
 
With the re-appropriation of Alsace and Lorraine following the Treaty of Versailles, and 
the legacy of the colonial soldiers’ efforts on the Allied side, the Third Republic became 
much more overt in its celebration of the empire.22 By the time of the Colonial Exhibition 
of 1931, the empire was known as Greater France and had become much more prevalent 
in popular culture.23 For the settlers in Algeria, the Third Republic was considered the 
                                                
19 Azzedine Haddour, Colonial Myths: History and Narrative (Manchester, 2000) p. 14. This connection is very 
evident in my sources, particularly in books by Jean Pélégri and Jules Roy, both former settlers. 
20 Anthony Clayton, The War of French Decolonization (London, 1994) p. 3. 
21 Edward Berenson, 'Unifying the Nation: Savorgnan de Brazza and the Third Republic', Barbara L. Kelly 
(ed.) French Music, Culture and National Identity (Woodbridge, 2008) p. 18; Alice L. Conklin, A Mission to Civilize: 
The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930 (Stanford, 1997). 
22 Patrick Weil has argued that until the return of Alsace and Lorraine, ‘la germanophobie avait 
« chloroformé » l’approche racialiste de la politique de l’immigration ou de la nationalité…[parce que] puisque 
c’est au nom de la race et de l’ethnie que l’Empire allemand avait annexé l’Alsace-Lorraine, le combat pour 
récupérer les provinces perdues rendait délicate la défense de l’identité nationale au nom de la race française.’ 
Weil, Qu'est-ce qu'un Français ?, p. 81. 
On the impact of colonial soldiers see: Joe Lunn, 'Les Race Guerrieres: Racial Perceptions in the French 
Military about West African Soldiers during the First World War', Journal of Contemporary History 122 (1999); 
Keith L. Nelson, 'The "Black Horror on the Rhine": Race as a Factor in Post-World War One Diplomacy', 
Journal of Modern History 42 (1970). 
23 Martin Evans, 'Culture and Empire, 1830-1962', Martin Evans (ed.) Empire and Culture: The French Experience 
(Baskingstoke, 2004) p. 10. On the empire in popular culture see: Raymond Bachollet, ed., Négripub. L'Images 
des Noirs dans la publicité depuis un siècle (Paris, 1992); Catherine Hodeir and Pierre Michel, L'Exposition Coloniale: 
1931 (Paris, 1991); Pascal Blanchard and Armelle Chaterlier, eds, Images et colonies: Nature, discors et influence de 
l’icongraphie colonial liée à la propagande colonial et à la representation des Africans et de l’Afrique en France, de 1920 aux 
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golden age.24 The Second World War brought the empire into the political limelight, and 
also lent suggestion to the idea that the Third Republic, and the French public, did not 
consider Algeria to be an ‘integral part of France’ akin to Corsica or Brittany after all. With 
the Nazi advance forcing Paul Reynaud’s government to Bordeaux in June of 1940, a 
debate was held on whether to continue the fight from North Africa. As Julian Jackson has 
assessed, by this time such a solution was technically unfeasible; the debate itself was 
political, a stand-off between Reynaud’s republic and the honour of General Maxime 
Weygand’s army.25 Moving the government to Algiers was clearly not analogous to moving 
to Bordeaux (or next, to Vichy). Whilst hardly the first time there had been a stand-off 
between the Third Republic and the professional army, this time the army won the toss. 
France, including North Africa under the administration of General Charles Noguès, 
capitulated. 
 
Noguès remained staunchly loyal to Marshal Pétain and the sinking of the French fleet by 
the British at Mers-el-Kébir in July 1940 sealed the opinion of many against renewing an 
alliance with Britain. By 1942, Algeria remained under Vichy control whilst much of the 
rest of the empire had become Gaullist.26 It did not fall into the hands of the allies until 
invasion by America in November of that year. Charles de Gaulle did not arrive until May 
1943, whereupon he set up the Comité français de libération nationale which essentially acted as 
a government in exile, drafting reconstruction plans, controlling an army and even granting 
women suffrage.27 The importance of Algerian loyalty to the Vichy regime and de Gaulle’s 
hesitation in setting up a government-like organisation until his installation in Algiers does 
suggest some recognition of Algeria’s unique political position. However, both these 
elements also carried key strategic factors and when Pétain had the opportunity to move 
his government to Algiers rather than become essentially powerless following the Nazi 
invasion of the Free Zone, he still chose to remain on the European side of the 
Mediterranean.28 
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The bulk of de Gaulle’s Free French army in the run-up to Liberation was made up of 
black and North African troops.29 In the autumn of 1944, in an order direct from de 
Gaulle, General Jean de Lattre’s First French Army was ordered to ensure a blanchissement 
of its troops. Myron Echenberg outlines de Gaulle’s own reasoning, as set out in his 
memoirs, for such a policy: 
 
It was essential that young Frenchmen be given a taste of victory, a share in 
the Allied success in ridding France of its shame and humiliation. Equally 
important, the Partisans [the internal Resistance movements] were often 
Communist-led, and de Gaulle hoped that the military discipline of regular 
army service would serve a dual purpose of controlling these groups and 
separating them from their political leadership.30 
 
Yet for all his internal security concerns, de Gaulle’s reasoning was racial. That is not 
necessarily to suggest that this was based on de Gaulle’s own racism, but on his 
understanding of the racism of his countrymen for whom Greater France could never be 
France; the republican ideal of colour-blindness was distinctly rejected in this policy. Those 
demobilised from de Lattre’s army joined the thousands of freed African POWs residing in 
camps in the south of France awaiting a return trip home. Rather than being issued back-
pay and discharged like their white counterparts, they ‘languished in camps because 
shipping space proved difficult to obtain’.31 African servicemen were no longer a priority. 
 
The story of decolonisation is often begun with reference to colonial troops’ participation 
in the Second World War, but the story of the Second World War rarely considers the 
treatment of the colonial soldiers. This is particularly evident in France wherein the Second 
World War historical narrative is frequently periodised as 1940-1944. As such, the Algerian 
uprising in Sétif on 8 May 1945, the day the armistice was signed, rarely exists in such 
histories; it appears neither in Jackson’s nor Kedward’s histories and is included only in the 
chapter on the beginnings of the Algerian war (dated from 1954-7) in Charles Sowerwine’s 
study of France from 1870.32 Maurice Agulhon at least mentions it in both periods, a 
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sentence a piece.33 Yet the protests, which actually occurred in many Algerian cities, were as 
much related to the previous war as they were the coming one. Indeed, banners carried the 
slogan, ‘Down with fascism and colonialism’. Political radicalisation had been growing in 
Algeria during the Vichy era, and the influx of demobilised soldiers into an already 
underemployed environment, which was suffering from famine after a poor harvest, 
ignited the protests.34 In Sétif, the police fired on the demonstrators who retaliated by 
attacking Europeans. The violence spread to the countryside in Constantinois and the 
French army retaliated with summary executions and bombs. 103 Europeans were killed. 
The estimates for Algerian deaths range wildly from 300 to 45,000.35 The FLN cites this 
date as the beginnings of the liberation struggle; de Gaulle was in power. 
 
France, until 1999, had no official date for the beginning of the Algerian war because it was 
not recognised as such. ‘Les évènements’ served as an alternative; to call it a war, rather 
than an internal dispute, would be to recognise Algeria as a separate state and the FLN as a 
legitimate force.36 Generally speaking, the war is considered to have run from 1954 to 1962 
although in the final year it was primarily a conflict against the extreme-right terrorist 
organisation, the OAS, as the French government and the FLN were in peace negotiations 
at Evian. The war began with a series of simultaneous attacks on 1 November 1954, and 
the release of the newly-formed FLN declaration which read: 
 
Indépendance nationale par : 1. La restauration de l’Etat algérien souverain, 
démocratique et social dans le cadre des principes islamiques, 2. Le respect de 
toutes les libertés fondamentales sans distinction de races et de confessions.37 
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Whilst the FLN was new, Algerian nationalist movements were not, this was simply the 
first to have enough support, organisation and determination to harm the French state. 
Surprise terrorist-style attacks and guerrilla warfare remained central to the FLN’s strategy 
throughout the war, and its main victims were Francophile Algerians rather than settlers, 
although the latter received much greater publicity. The French republic retaliated by 
various means, from the ‘speeding up’ of social policy and infrastructure apparently 
designed to aid assimilation, to rounding up entire villages and placing men, women and 
children in internment camps with no freedom of movement.38 A state of emergency was 
declared in 1955. 
 
There are several incidents which particularly stand out in the war. The first is the 
Philippeville massacre of August 1955 which Irwin Wall considers to be the war’s first 
turning point.39 It began with the murder of 71 French and 61 Algerians in Philippeville 
and Constantine by the FLN who incited locals to join in, ‘some of these being long-
serving and trusted employees, so adding to the horror.’40 It was clearly a deliberate attempt 
to incite heavy reprisals, which were forthcoming by both the army and vigilante groups in 
their thousands, as indiscriminate as the FLN had been. As a result, the FLN saw a boost 
to morale and recruitment, no doubt due to both disgust at the retributions and fear of 
being considered a moderate and thus an FLN target. The Governor-General in Algiers, 
the Gaullist Jacques Soustelle, moved from a position of attempting to address the 
inequalities of Algerian society as a way to halt the nationalists, to one of firm repression.41 
Philippeville essentially exacerbated the political polarisation of Algerian society. 
 
In February 1956, Guy Mollet, the new premier, visited Algeria only to be heckled by 
settlers in what Clayton has called ‘the first overt display in Algiers of demagogue-inspired 
colon street power.’42 A divide between Paris and Algiers was becoming evident. A month 
later even the Communists voted in favour of granting Mollet special powers to regain 
order. The year also witnessed the first conscripts being sent across the Mediterranean, 
numbering roughly half a million consistently over the following eight years, and the 
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disastrous Suez Crisis which had a significant effect on both France’s prestige and the 
army’s morale. The year ended amidst the Battle of Algiers. What began with tit-for-tat 
killings quickly escalated with the bombing of the Algerian Casbah area by a settler group, 
followed by the placing of bombs in cafés and the Air France offices by FLN women 
disguised as Europeans. General Jacques Massu took over police powers in Algiers and, 
armed with 8,000 paratroopers, successfully tamed the city with textbook counter-
insurgency measures including a systematic use of torture.43 The French intellectual 
community, particularly but not restricted to those on the left, began to speak out publicly 
and in the mainstream media against French policy in Algeria, especially in relation to 
torture.44 In December 1956, General Raoul Salan, ‘France’s most decorated soldier’ as well 
as ‘an extremely well-developed political animal’, became Commander-in-Chief.45 
 
On 8 February 1958 French forces air-bombed the Tunisian village of Sakiet Sidi-Youssef 
on the Tunisian-Algerian border, killing 69 people including 21 children.46 Photographs of 
the destruction, including that of a Red Cross vehicle, were front page news in France.47 
The events of Sakiet were an example of the increasing autonomy taken by the army 
without direction from Paris which, alongside Massu’s takeover of civil authority in Algiers, 
saw an increasing concern that the republic was losing control of the army. At the same 
time the army felt the politicians were attempting to curb their successes.48 A joint political 
and military crisis was escalating which would bring down the Fourth Republic. 
 
The legalities of de Gaulle’s take-over of power are complex and are frequently concluded 
on the basis of which side of the political spectrum the assessor sits. The bedrock of his 
support came from the settlers and the professional army in Algeria, where Massu and 
Salan were presiding over a Committee of Public Safety, a revolutionary reference clear to 
everyone. A Parisian demonstration on 28 May in defence of the Fourth Republic ‘was 
only a pale image of the huge parade that had on 12 February 1934 marked the people’s 
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will to save the Third Republic.’49 Premier Pierre Pimflin’s resignation and President René 
Coty’s appointment of de Gaulle, secured by a majority of one vote in the Chamber of 
Deputies, was certainly in response to the concern over the army’s power; paratroopers had 
landed in Corsica on the 24 May and the threat of invasion was tangible. De Gaulle, 
revelling in ambiguity, managed to be the figurehead for Algérie française on one side of the 
Mediterranean and the return of civil power on the other. 
 
Having been given powers to rewrite the constitution, de Gaulle’s first objective was to 
restore civil authority in Algeria. The makeup of his first cabinet included members from 
across the main political spectrum including former premiers Mollet and Pflimin, as well as 
André Malraux as, briefly, Minister for Information.50 The majority were loathed in Algeria, 
but this did not dampen de Gaulle’s welcome when he arrived in Algiers on 4 June and 
made his famously ambiguous statement, ‘Je vous ai compris’ to the cheering crowds. A 
referendum was held on de Gaulle’s newly-written constitution in September 1958. On the 
mainland, 80 percent of an almost 85 percent turnout voted in favour; in Algeria, wherein 
universal suffrage was granted for the first time with Algerians voting on the same level as 
the settlers in a freshly-granted franchise, a similar turnout produced a 97 percent vote in 
favour.51 The Fifth Republic was declared in January 1959. 
 
De Gaulle now appeared to go through several stages in his policy towards Algeria. Initially 
brought to power to keep Algeria French, he began by following an assimilationist line 
through the Constantine plan, a five-year programme of economic and social development 
as well as granting citizenship including suffrage to all men and women of Algeria, 
regardless of origin. In September 1959 he spoke of self-determination for the first time, 
which was met warmly by a war-weary French population including the conscripts, but was 
considered a betrayal by the settlers and professional army alike. Even the Gaullist Massu 
spoke out and was immediately removed from Algeria. In January of 1960, Barricades 
Week saw the members of the professional army and the settlers revolt, through a general 
strike which degenerated into violence. The revolt was quick to crumble and enabled de 
Gaulle to be granted special powers for a year.52 When, in November of 1960 (by which 
time he was in conversation with the FLN) de Gaulle included the words ‘Algerian Algeria’ 
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and ‘Algerian Republic’ in a speech, violence was somewhat predictable. General Maurice 
Challe, the current Commander-in-Chief, resigned in protest in January 1961 and went 
underground to set up the OAS, ‘dedicated to the “elimination” of de Gaulle and any 
others who would abandon Algeria’.53 In April 1961, Challe along with Generals Salan, 
Jouhaud and Zeller, with the support of many paratroopers, attempted a putsch in Algiers. 
De Gaulle used the radio to appeal to the rank-and-file of the army to disobey the putschists’ 
orders and the attempted coup failed. Many of those involved deserted to join the OAS, 
including Salan. Favourable historians have concluded that de Gaulle’s policy of gradual 
movement towards independence was part of his plan all along; Irwin Wall, however, has 
concluded that if this had been the case, he was responsible for the ‘worst of all possible 
outcomes’; he blames the resulting situations of the settlers and the harkis on de Gaulle’s 
early ‘untenable promises to the army and the settlers’ which allowed the extremism of the 
OAS to explode.54 
 
On the Algerian side, the Provisional Government of Algeria (GPRA), headed by Ferhat 
Abbas, was declared in September 1958 and refused all offers of peace which did not 
involve full independence. Terrorist attacks by the FLN also reached France for the first 
time, although by the final years of the war these were eclipsed by the metropolitan attacks 
organised by the OAS. In Algeria, the conscript army remained, predominantly attempting 
to halt the FLN through cutting off their supplies. The policing of villages and forced 
removals into containment camps were the norm. In France, the question of torture, 
considered to have calmed following the revelations of Henri Alleg in 1958, was 
resurrected by an article published on 2 June 1960 by Simone de Beauvoir in Le Monde 
concerning the rape and torture of an Algerian woman, Djamila Boupacha, by French 
soldiers. The following month, the Manifesto 121, an anti-war declaration initially signed by 
121 people from across the French cultural sphere, argued for the moral right of French 
soldiers to desert. It was unpublishable but became known during the trial of Francis 
Jeanson and his associates who had been supporting the FLN. The text was finally 
published in October, a month before de Gaulle’s ‘Algerian Algeria’ speech. 
 
By 1961 France was presiding over a three-way war which had reached its metropolitan 
centre. The enemy of the republic, now that the talks between de Gaulle’s government and 
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the FLN in Evian were public, was the OAS. It pursued a policy of bombings and 
assassinations including against conscripts and members of the French government, all of 
whom became symbols of France’s retreat from Algérie française. In counter-terrorism 
measures against the FLN in Paris, a curfew was introduced in 1961 applicable only to 
those of Algerian origin but ostensibly targeted at all those who ‘looked’ Algerian, at the 
discretion of the police, who themselves had been targets of FLN attacks. In an incident 
which was reported in the press at the time but which only yielded significant historical 
research in the 1990s, up to two hundred Algerians were killed by Parisian police on the 
night of 17 October 1961.55 The FLN had organised a strictly peaceful protest march 
through Paris against the discriminatory curfew, involving men, women and children. They 
were met with violence by the police, many were killed and almost 12,000 were herded 
onto buses and held in the Palais des Sports and the Parc d’Expositions.56 The incident 
gained renewed publicity in 1997 when Maurice Papon stood trial for crimes against 
humanity in relation to his actions under the Vichy regime.57 Papon had been prefect of the 
Parisian police in 1961. He refused to admit to any wrongdoing, claiming the violence had 
been a result of sectarianism between the FLN and the MNA, absurd given that the MNA 
had been defunct in France since 1959.58 Papon’s official report from the time admitted 
only three dead, including one American student. 
 
The OAS terrorist campaigns, including attempts on Jean-Paul Sartre’s and Malraux’s lives, 
led, in February 1962, to an anti-OAS demonstration. This was met with brutal police force 
which would turn the Charonne métro station into one of Paris’s symbols of left-wing 
martyrdom; eight demonstrators were crushed to death by the police when they attempted 
to join the demonstration from the station.59 Their funerals drew crowds of half a million.60 
In such a climate, the majority of the French public no longer had time for the cries of 
Algérie française. The pursuit of peace and an independent Algeria was both imminent and 
popular. In April 1962, a referendum on the Evian Accords gained a 91 percent approval 
rating in mainland France. 
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Algeria was granted independence in July 1962 following a 99 percent vote in favour by 
Algerians. The provisions of the Evian Accords allowed a free movement of peoples 
between the two countries and a guarantee that the settlers could remain in Algeria. The 
unrelenting activities of the OAS, however, made a mockery of such agreements and the 
vast majority of settlers, about three quarters of a million, left in a mass exodus to France 
(where most had never lived) over the summer months. At the same time, despite the 
Evian provisions, the majority of harkis (Algerians who had fought on the French side) 
were forced to remain in Algeria, leading to at least 30,000 deaths as they found themselves 
victims of brutal reprisals by the FLN.61 
 
Given the optimistic agreements of the Evian Accords, there were barely any provisions 
made for the settlers entering France and they were met with a good deal of hostility by a 
French population who considered them in league with the OAS. Nevertheless, whilst 
maintaining a well-organised network which campaigned for compensation from the 
government for a loss of livelihood (which gained some success in 1970, and further funds 
in 1987), most assimilated well into French society, even creating economic booms in the 
south where most settled.62 Certainly, they fared a good deal better than their Algerian 
counterparts. Those harkis that did make it across the Mediterranean received no aid from 
the authorities, no pensions for their military service and were not automatically granted 
citizenship like their white counterparts, despite having been French citizens since 1958; 
they were essentially stateless, living in makeshift shanty-towns as outcasts even to Algerian 
communities within France.63 
 
The Fifth Republic completed its constitutional duty in a referendum over the direct 
election of the President in October 1962, of which 13 million voted for and 8 million 
against.64 De Gaulle’s seven-year term ended in 1965 and he won the subsequent election 
against Socialist François Mitterrand, but not without requiring a second round run-off. In 
2005 there were about 1.5 million people of Algerian origin living in France, the majority 
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now French citizens.65 This was the same year in which the infamous law on the positive 
teaching of colonialism was tabled.66 In April 2011, the law banning the covering of the 
face in public places, aimed essentially at those women who wear the hijab was introduced. 
The legacy of the relationship between France and Algeria is by no means over. 
 
 
I.II Methodology: Approaches 
I . IIa Republ ican cu l ture  
This thesis is a cultural history in the sense that its source material is derived primarily from 
novels and films, but its conclusions are socio-political. In this way I owe an obvious debt 
to the work of Roger Chartier and Lynn Hunt.67 In considering the use of culture in its very 
formal form which I utilise here, I am actively suggesting that there is a direct and multi-
directional exchange of meaning between the producer, their cultural product and the 
consumer, none of which operate autonomously from wider society.68 As Jacques Le Goff 
has conceptualised it, ‘[t]he mentality of any one historical individual, however important, is 
precisely what that individual shares with other men [and, no doubt, women] of his time.’69 
This is not to say that I consider culture to be ‘reflective of social reality’ and take heed that 
each reader or watcher is affected ‘in varying and individual ways.’70 But I do consider that 
culture has much to tell us about the society in which it was produced and that cultural 
history has a methodology which can be pursued transparently and effectively. It is here 
that I take guidance from Robert Darnton’s ubiquitous study of the Parisian cat massacre: 
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The anthropological mode of history has a rigor of its own, even if it may 
look suspiciously like literature to a hard-boiled social scientist. It begins from 
the premise that individual expression takes place within a general idiom, that 
we learn to classify sensations and make sense of things by thinking within a 
framework provided by our culture. It therefore should be possible for the 
historian to discover the social dimension of thought and to tease meaning 
from documents by relating them to the surrounding world of significance, 
passing from text to context and back again until he has cleared a way through 
a foreign mental world.71 
 
There are some modifications I make to this prescription, although I do not think it affects 
the methodology itself. Primarily, my study is one which deals with the political more than 
the social. My general idiom is not folk tale-telling peasants or Parisian artisans, but of 
republican culture. That is to say, culture that is part of the dominant republican sphere in 
that it is not anti-republican in political leaning, meaning that, in the period after 1958 it is 
not on the extreme right of French politics.72 However, it is not to say that I will only be 
considering culture that is pro-Gaullist. This idiom corresponds with William H. Sewell’s 
second conception of culture: his first considers culture as an abstract and theoretical 
category, as a section of society akin to economy, politics or biology. It is a singular culture 
in which something is culture or cultural. His second conception is of a culture or cultures, 
which are a set of beliefs or practices often isomorphic with a society. There are multiple 
cultures, distinct within themselves but which are also able to intersect with other cultures. 
He uses the examples of middle-class culture, American culture and ghetto culture, but the 
idiom of republican culture conceptualised here also corresponds to this definition.73 
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The republican culture studied here is self-evidently political, which immediately brings to 
mind the work of Robert Gildea. His The Past in French History is essentially a study of 
political cultures, although he never specifically considers republicanism.74 Gildea is 
interested in how different political communities construct and narrate the past to meet 
their own ends. In this sense, ‘[t]here can be no objective, universally agreed history… 
What matters is myth’, and it is their own particular version of history, their own myth, 
which a political community or ideology, like republicanism, strives to achieve acceptance 
of, which ‘promotes the interest of the community that constructs it.’75 Furthermore, he 
writes, ‘it is not possible to envisage the writing of a universal and objective history. But 
this does not prevent each political community, in order to underpin its cause, from 
campaigning to have its own particular version of events or presentation of a cult figure 
accepted as universal and objective.’76 In this thesis, what I mean by the study of republican 
culture is the study of cultural products (novels, films and paintings but also histories 
themselves) which are part of a promotion of a particular republican version or narrative of 
history.77 The particular republican elements which I trace – citizenship, universalism and 
the guerre franco-française – will be outlined at the beginning of each chapter. 
 
To return to the three-way relationship of producer-product-consumer, the producers are 
also the result of the influence of this particular historical narrative, as are their consumers; 
the political community is wider than the source material on which this study is based. As 
Stephen Bann has articulated, such sources ‘cannot be satisfactorily analysed apart from 
their binding narratives to which they belong’.78 It is precisely this ‘binding narrative’, the 
particular historical myth of the republican community, in which this thesis is interested. 
 
The republican political community, in the period this thesis covers, is tied to the 
government, which is itself republican, but it is also wider than the government and 
dominates the mainstream of political culture. In the republican understanding, France is 
the republic and vice versa. This does not necessarily imply that all republican culture is 
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uncritical of the government. Rather it is the case that, whilst republican culture can be 
critical, even aggressive towards a republican government, it does not promote the 
overthrow of the republican regime itself; it is not calling for a revolution. As The Past in 
French History so deftly illustrates, the French government has consistently been involved in 
the creation of historical myths which justify it in all its guises. Culture plays a fundamental 
part in this myth creation and, as such, the French government has traditionally been very 
much involved in promoting its own particular myths through such means. As Jill Forbes 
and Michael Kelly have noted, ‘cultural politics in France is often considered, by parties of 
the Left and of the Right, as the pursuit of war by other means.’79 This connection has the 
effect of both suppressing and promoting culture, depending on the message required, but 
the government’s involvement illustrates just how much power cultural products are 
considered to have in terms of pursuing a particular historical narrative. One only needs to 
consider the fact that, following the Franco-Prussian war, performances of Wagner’s work 
were banned from the French stage, or the frequency with which politicians quote great 
French writers and pay homage to French literature, the tradition of strong government 
support for the arts, or the investment Marshal Pétain gave to his National Revolution 
despite the period of extraordinary national crisis, to see this connection made tangible.80 
Such political investment in the arts has not faltered under the Fifth Republic and in many 
ways was strengthened under de Gaulle with his creation of the first Ministry of Cultural 
Affairs in 1959. Malraux, who was appointed to head this ministry, was both a ‘very 
prominent intellectual’ and ‘a key political supporter since the Occupation.’81 A year earlier, 
as Minister for Information, Malraux had suggested that three French literary giants, 
including Albert Camus, ‘should go to Algeria to investigate allegations that the French 
army was making regular use of torture against prisoners.’82 Whether such a close 
relationship is exceptional to France is not really a concern here but as John Cruickshank 
quips, it is hard to imagine Hemingway, with the authority of the United States’ 
government, sending Steinbeck and Faulkner to Saigon. 
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Whilst on one level it is patently obvious why the government would want to invest so 
much in culture given its perceived influence, it is worth presenting a firmer basis for this 
relationship. There is evidently an element of power to be considered here in the sense that 
the government (or the wider political community) can utilise culture as a way to promote 
its vision and its particular historical narrative; it is a ‘soft’ power, or to use Jean 
Baudrillard’s conception, ‘soft seduction’.83 Tony Chafer sums this relationship up rather 
succinctly in his study of colonialism in French culture: 
 
[T]o what extent were such uses of images promoting particular views of 
empire and to what extent were they merely reflecting prevailing perceptions? 
It is not always easy to distinguish between the two… Textbooks, newspaper 
articles, films and exhibitions were designed to influence the public and 
ensured the dissemination of particular images of the colonies, even if some 
of those images were themselves already a part of popular culture.84 
 
It is precisely this relationship which led Walter Benjamin to declare that ‘[t]here is no 
document of civilization that is not at the same time a document of barbarism.’85 In 
essence, Benjamin considered dominant cultural productions to be reflective of the 
narrative of ‘History’s’ victors. Given the dominance of both the republican narrative and 
the republican regime in the period which this thesis covers, such a warning is worth 
keeping under consideration. It is a concern also shared by Edward Said and Michel 
Foucault; Said’s primary concern in Orientalism is to insist on the extraction of power 
relationships in order to be able to understand cultural texts, a nod to Foucault’s idea that 
discourse is central to the construction of power.86 My interest is in texts which support the 
republican narrative (or myth, in Gildea’s terminology) of French history, which is also the 
dominant narrative not only within French culture, but also within the Anglo-Saxon 
historiography of twentieth-century France.87 
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I . IIb A note  on memory  
Gildea’s The Past in French History, as well as being a study of political cultures, is also a 
study of collective memory. He takes as his theoretical guide the work of the early 
twentieth-century sociologist Maurice Halbwachs.88 It is through this that he concludes that 
France does not possess ‘a single collective memory’, rather different political communities 
in France have ‘parallel and competing collective memories’.89 Halbwachs considered 
personal memories to be the result not just of individual experiences but also framed by a 
collective construction, dependent on the society we inhabit and the present significance of 
our memories. He suggested that ‘[m]emory needs continuous feeding from collective 
sources and is sustained by social and moral props’ and, furthermore, believed ‘that the 
mind reconstructs its memories under the pressure of society.’90 He concluded with the 
belief that memories were part of the make-up of a unified society and as such ‘society 
tends to erase from its memory all that might separate individuals, or that might distance 
groups from each other.’91 It is on the basis of these ideas that historians have incorporated 
memory studies into their work, inspired by the approaches of Jay Winter and, particularly 
in relation to French history, Pierre Nora and Henry Rousso. Whilst Nora’s collection, Les 
Lieux de mémoire focused on ‘sites’ of memory which were part of French national identity, 
Rousso argued that the collective memory of the Vichy era, particularly in relation to 
collaboration and the complicity in the Holocaust, had been repressed for many decades, 
before becoming an unhealthy obsession from the 1980s.92 
 
Rousso’s work particularly has gone on to inspire many scholars working on the Algerian 
war. Unfortunately, his psychoanalytical metaphor has frequently been transposed 
uncritically into studies of this later period. An ‘Algerian’ or ‘colonial syndrome’ are 
frequently cited in relation to the way in which the French have dealt with the war since its 
end in 1962.93 This raises two concerns. Firstly, this intertextuality between the two periods 
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through Rousso’s work has led to the suggestion that there has been a repression of less 
palatable aspects of the French involvement in the Algerian war, often in regard to its 
practice of torture. Rousso argues, in relation to the Vichy period, that the collaboration of 
the French with their Nazi occupiers was not part of the public discourse for several 
decades after the war, a claim he backs up by, amongst other things, the lack of such 
representations in culture. Scholars such as Anne Donadey, Alison Murray and David 
Prochaska have made similar claims concerning culture after the Algerian war.94 Yet, over 
the course of my research and as will become evident in this thesis, such claims have struck 
me as bizarre and quite without substance. Certainly, the Italian-Algerian film The Battle of 
Algiers was banned in France for a number of years, and indeed was not shown on French 
television until 2004, but there are numerous French films and novels from the art house 
to the mainstream which have covered many of the ‘dirtiest’ aspects of the Algerian war, 
beginning with Henri Alleg’s La Question published in 1958.95 This is by no means a new 
discovery; William B. Cohen has declared that since the war’s end there has been ‘a fairly 
steady diet of books, movies, and television shows’ which have ‘clarified the extent to 
which torture had been ubiquitous in Algeria.’96 A decade earlier, Philip Dine expressed 
that ‘French literature and cinema of the Algerian war are primarily remarkable for their 
frequently alleged non-existence’ when in reality, ‘this body of discursive and performative 
narratives may not reasonably be denied.’97 It is thus quite evident on a quantifiable level 
that this drawing of parallels between the two periods through this syndromic metaphor is 
utterly untenable. 
 
Secondly, I share the reservations which Peter Burke and Wulf Kansteiner have expressed 
in relation to the historians’ application of psychoanalysis, particularly when its use as 
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metaphor creeps over into a more analytical function. For Burke the concern is related to 
the attempts to analyse the work of an artist through such psychoanalytical means, but for 
Kansteiner it is its application to the notion of collective memory and repression which is 
worrying.98 He argues that, unlike in individual cases, repressing traumatic elements of a 
collective memory does not lead to psychological ill health. Indeed, it can be the case that 
‘forgetting’ such episodes is a necessary part of collective memory.99 Such a conclusion is 
damning to Rousso’s thesis of repression of memory followed by an ‘unhealthy’ obsession, 
but he goes further to suggest that the use of such theories avoids considering the political 
element of such a focus: 
 
The concept of trauma, as well as the concept of repression, neither captures 
nor illuminates the forces that contribute to the making and unmaking of 
collective memories… the delayed onset of public debates about the meaning 
of negative pasts has more to do with political interest and opportunities than 
the persistence of trauma or with any “leakage” in the collective 
unconscious.100 
 
It is precisely these ‘forces’ which interest me in this thesis; it is the relationships of power 
highlighted in the previous section which I wish to question. The application of what is 
essentially a theory designed for individuals being applied to a collective seems to me to 
obscure such relationships. Repressing an event from collective memory in a modern and 
democratic state, particularly one in which so many have been directly involved, is a 
ridiculous assertion and really rather improbable.101 More feasibly perhaps, and I think here 
of the massacre which took place in Paris on the night of 17 October 1961 or the fate of 
the harkis, events do not come to prominence in a dominant (in this case, what I have 
identified as a republican) narrative, because they are not important to people with 
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power.102 Such silence is not politically neutral – these events, as Chapter 3 shows, have the 
potential to challenge the republican narrative of the Algerian war – but nor is it one solely 
controlled by the government. 
 
Events do not disappear; they are retrievable, can be brought back into the wider public 
sphere, and can even challenge a particular narrative. Stora has considered the memories of 
the harkis, the conscripts and the pieds noirs as being distinct and absent from the broader 
French collective memory of the war, but maintained within these groups.103 It is here 
where I consider the realm of cultural history rather than memory studies as allowing 
greater insight into these occurrences. To return to the rhetoric of Le Goff and Darnton, 
rather than that of Halbwachs and a bastardised Sigmund Freud, these groups which Stora 
has identified  are often absent from the republican culture idiom which I trace in this 
thesis but they are present in their own idioms and, should they become powerful enough, 
can intersect with the republican idiom. The result of such an intersection can either be one 
of integration (as is the case with the pieds noirs) or challenge (as has been the case with the 
conscripts and the harkis, to differing degrees of success). These intersections with the 
republican narrative, extractable from the cultural sources which I analyse, shed light on its 
purpose and thus its underlying power. 
 
I . IIc Representati on 
I do not consider this thesis, then, to be adding to the corpus of work on memory studies. 
Rather, my approach, as outlined above, owes its influence to the work of cultural 
historians. My particular interest is in representations and what they can tell us about the 
society which produces them. It is thus worthwhile spending some time outlining what is 
meant by ‘representation’ in this thesis, and how it is employed. There are two issues that 
need to be dealt with here. The first is what I consider a representation to be, the second is 
what I consider representations to do; a typical ontological-epistemological divide. 
 
All historians work with representations in the sense that all our source material is some 
kind of representation of the past; however closely one reads a document, it can never be a 
presentation of the past precisely because the past is no longer there to be presented. But 
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there are many, like John Zammito, who would contend that there are differences in value 
in terms of representations of the past. In a reply to the work of F. R. Ankersmit, Zammito 
is keen to draw a distinction between historical and artistic representations of the past.104 
Ankersmit sees representations of reality as being infinite. Zammito has no contention that 
artistic representations of reality have the potential to be infinite but rejects this same 
possibility for a historical representation because it ‘seeks to assert actuality, and the actuality 
exerts constraint’; the historian is not free to invent.105 The key to Zammito’s counter-
argument is cognition. Ankersmit denies any cognitive aspect to representation as a whole, 
seeing it as only part of its aesthetic value; for Ankersmit, theories in the natural sciences 
cannot be called ‘true’ but only ‘plausible’ or ‘better than rival theories’.106 But as Zammito 
points out, in the natural sciences these theories are still tied to ‘essential elements in the 
functioning of the world’, as real as a table or chair, and as such, whilst a scientific theory 
may not be falsified it has a falsifiable quality.107 He applies this same logic to historical 
representation; because historical narratives are ‘not free to invent’ they too are not infinite. 
In Zammito’s words, ‘concepts (in historical representations) can be conceived to refer, in 
this epistemological sense, in roughly the same way that theoretical terms do in natural-
scientific theories’.108 Thus, ‘discrimination is possible among rival versions [of a historical 
representation], and some can be deemed inadequate in light of the contingent, fallible, but 
best current explanations.’109 Ankersmit himself sees such a critique coming and rejects the 
comparison and thus the conclusion Zammito goes on to make but, as Zammito states, 
what ‘separates Ankersmit’s view from mine remains the question of whether there is any 
referential element in a historical representation’.110 Ann Rigney has applied this theorising 
in practical terms in The Rhetoric of Historical Representation and come to a workable 
understanding of the distinction between fiction writing and history writing: the historian is 
not free to invent, rather they are constrained by what we understand as historical facts as 
well as the ‘discursive and narrative strategies’ of the discipline.111 I will return to this in 
Chapter 3 wherein I question the supposed innocence of these ‘discursive and narrative 
strategies’ in relation to the narrative of the guerre franco-française. 
                                                
104 John Zammito, 'Ankersmit and Historical Representation', History and Theory 44 (2005); F. R. Ankersmit, 
Historical Representation (Stanford, CA, 2002). 
105 Zammito, 'Ankersmit and Historical Representation', p. 171. Emphasis in the original. 
106 Ankersmit, Historical Representation, p. 97. 
107 Zammito, 'Ankersmit and Historical Representation', pp. 177-9. 
108 Ibid.  p. 177. 
109 Ibid.  p. 178. 
110 Ibid.  p. 178fn. 
111 Ann Rigney, The Rhetoric of Historical Representation: Three Narrative Histories of the French Revolution 
(Cambridge, 1990) pp. xi-xii. 
Introduction 
 32 
 
What is more pressing for this thesis is understanding what representations do. I am 
studying representations of the Algerian war in republican culture. Specifically, French 
films and novels which refer (whether directly or metaphorically) to the Algerian war and 
which support a republican version of events in the sense that they do not openly challenge 
the existence of a republican regime. For such research to be of any value, I begin with the 
premise that such representations are more than a sum of their parts; that they play an 
interactive role in the society in which they are produced.112 To return to Ankersmit, his 
distinction between description and representation is useful in these terms. Representations 
attribute properties to something as well as referring to it whereas with descriptions the 
two can be separated.113  
 
History writing is a representation of the past rather than a description; it is clear that there 
can be multiple historical accounts of the same event, all tied down by actualities but 
weaving the narrative differently between them. But just as we do not take artistic merit 
from precision, ‘it follows that precision, in the sense of an exact match of words and 
things, will never be attainable in artistic representation [or] historical writing’.114 Ankersmit 
does not see the need to distinguish between artistic and historical writing, as I have already 
noted. Whilst Rigney is in many ways correct to suggest that historians are not free to 
invent as fiction writers are, the authors with which this project is concerned are restricted 
in the sense that the Algerian war (for example) as a point of reference must be ‘true’ 
enough to be recognisable, even in the case of the most fantastical of my sources; Pierre 
Guyotat’s Tombeau pour cinq cent mille soldats as a case in point, never refers to France or 
Algeria by name, or indeed any recognisable historical character, but the novel is evidently 
about the war. I do not contend that this is in any way similar to the ‘truth’ generations of 
historians have based their careers on, but fiction is not as free to invent as Rigney asserts 
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when it wishes to represent an historical event. Thus, as Stephen Bann has asserted, there 
are a plurality of possible ‘forms of representation of the past.’115 
 
Historical representation, and artistic representations of history, do not go unrestrained; 
they are reined in by the requirement of coherence and consistency: whilst one could write 
of the date of Robespierre’s death and then the GNP of Britain in 1867, both these are 
based in reality but they are not a historical representation.116 Representation, then, orders. 
By ordering the past, historically-based representations give it meaning by connecting 
individuals and groups to the particular narrative of the past which they promote. As K. M. 
Baker argued in one of the first issues of Representations, 
 
politics in any society depends upon the existence of cultural representations 
that define the relationships among political actors, thereby allowing 
individuals and groups to press claims upon one another and upon the whole. 
Such claims can be made intelligible and binding only to the extent that 
political actors deploy symbolic resources held in common by members of the 
political society, thereby refining and redefining the implications of these 
resources for the changing purposes of political practice. Political contestation 
therefore takes the form of competing efforts to mobilize and control the 
possibilities of political and social discourse, efforts through which that 
discourse is extended, recast and, – on occasion – even radically 
transformed.117 
 
Whilst Baker is interested in a particular political class, this holds true for wider society and 
hints at why the artistic representations of the past which I am interested in have so much 
to tell us about the understanding and manipulation of that past. The study of this source 
material, which both creates and is part of a republican narrative of the past, provides us 
with an insight into a relationship between culture and politics and a bridge between 
politics and society.118 In essence, a ‘text can act as an arena for engagement with questions 
of identity and its representation.’119 
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I . IId Republ ican his t orians  
The particular idiom I am interested in, republican culture, is not just a political 
community, it is the dominant political community in France.120 The cultural representations 
that carry this idiom are thus both powerful and pervasive and are not limited to the 
fictional sphere. The three main chapters of this thesis each begin with a particular 
historiography, rather than a single historiographical essay being given in the introduction. 
This is because the history writing to which I refer is as much a part of the republican story 
of the past as the films and novels, even those written by non-French scholars.121 Consider 
Nora’s introduction to Les Lieux de mémoire: 
 
History, especially the history of France’s development as a nation, has been 
our most powerful collective tradition, our milieu de mémoire par excellence… 
France’s entire historical tradition has developed as a disciplined exercise of 
mnemonic faculty, an instinctive delving into memory in order to reconstruct 
the past seamlessly and in its entirety.122 
 
The history written in relation to the Algerian war is no exception to this: the Invention of 
Decolonization narrative which Shepard critiques slips seamlessly into such a contention 
wherein history is about drive, about development, moving forward by considering how far 
you have come. Nora goes on to suggest that historiography, 
 
cannot be innocent, because it lays bare the subversion from within of 
memory-history by critical history… Historiography begins when history sets 
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itself the task of uncovering what in itself is not history, of showing itself to 
be the victim of memory and seeking to free itself from the memory’s grip. 123 
 
Thus the writing of history, the history of history, is meant to challenge this developmental 
narrative; ‘historiography sows doubt; it runs the blade of a knife between the heartwood of 
memory and the bark of history.’124 Whilst I do not doubt this to be the case, historians do 
not themselves write free of the influence of France’s ‘powerful collective tradition’. The 
influence of the dominant republican narrative, which this thesis attempts to identify and 
critique, may be driven by other actors – artists, writers, filmmakers, politicians – but 
academic historical writing has been ‘taken up’ by this narrative which is essentially 
concerned with development to the point of being teleological.125 
 
Ceri Crossley has written on a not dissimilar case in relation to the period of Louis-Philippe 
in which contemporary liberal historians were part of the intellectual life which attempted 
‘to establish the legitimacy of the post-revolutionary nation-state’ by considering the July 
Monarchy as the legitimate end to the Revolution.126 As I will argue in Chapter 3, a similar 
trend by current historians to place an end date of the Revolution with the advent of the 
Fifth Republic has added weight to the developmental and teleological republican narrative 
which undermines the place of Algeria in the history of France (and particularly in the 
history of the French republic). 
 
I feel the need to confront this in the thesis because of the weight history writing has in the 
defining of the French self, as Nora, amongst others, has noted. Historical representation is 
a particularly powerful mode in which the republican narrative is transmitted for reasons 
which Paul Ricoeur touches on when considering the different natures of historical and 
artistic representation: 
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125 Bann, The Inventions of History, p. 72; Stefan Berger, 'On Taboos, Traumas and Other Myths: Why the 
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A novel, even a realist novel, is something other than a history book. They are 
distinguished from each other by the nature of the implicit contract between 
the writer and the reader. Even when not clearly stated, this contract sets up 
different expectations on the side of the reader and different promises on that 
of the author. In opening a novel, the reader is prepared to enter an unreal 
universe concerning which the question where and when these things took 
place is incongruous… In opening a history book, the reader expects, under 
the guidance of a mass of archives, to re-enter a world of events that actually 
occurred. What is more, in crossing the threshold of what is written, he stays 
on guard, casts a critical eye, and demands if not a true discourse comparable 
to that of a physics text, at least a plausible one, one that is admissible, 
probably, and in any case honest and truthful. Having been taught to look out 
for falsehoods, he does not want to have to deal with a liar.127 
 
This thesis does not have the scope to consider the reader in any great depth; it is not a 
history of the reception of the source material I consider. But this passage from Ricoeur 
illustrates precisely why historical representations must be considered alongside artistic 
representations in the critique of the republican narrative of the Algerian war: the trust 
residing in such works grants them great influence. 
 
I . II e A contextual is ed and long i tud inal  s tudy 
The origins of this thesis stem from a frustration with a historiography that frequently 
considered the Algerian war and its aftermath solely in relation to the Occupation of 1940-
44. Given the significance placed on the Occupation, it seemed this undermined the 
importance of the Algerian war and rejected its differences and peculiarities. Particularly, it 
avoided both the fact that France was defeated in Algeria and that its moral compass was 
not steady during the war; by placing Algeria in the shadow of Vichy, the myth of a 
victorious Resistance-led victory over Nazism eclipsed any consideration of a failed eight-
year dirty war based essentially on a belief of racial superiority left over from the nineteenth 
century. The Algerian war seemed demoted in significance by historiography which 
considered it only in reference to Vichy. The Algerian war should be considered as an 
event in republican history, rather than the epilogue to a Gaullist biography. The themes, 
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concerns and problems present in the representations of the war have similarities 
throughout republican history which are hidden by a singular comparison with the Vichy 
era. The aim of this thesis, then, is to place the Algerian war into the history of republican 
France; it needs to be considered in relation to the whole of republican history rather than 
just a specific period. 
 
The basis of this study is longitudinal in the sense that it considers themes that have been 
present through republican history. The three grandest themes are covered by the three 
chapters: citizenship, republicanism and the guerre franco-française, but they are all permeated 
by others, such as heroism and rebirth. A historiographical study of French history since 
the Revolution led to the initial highlighting of the themes considered by the chapters. But 
the thesis is concerned with artistic as well as historic representations. As such, republican 
artistic representations of war and defeat in relation to the Franco-Prussian war and the 
Third Republic provide a contextual basis. It would be beyond the scope of a doctoral 
research project to undertake a comprehensive study of artistic representations of war and 
defeat since the Revolution of 1789; as Pierre Goubert has noted, ‘[d]espite some glorious 
episodes, we must admit that wars, especially great wars, did not bring success to the 
French state or nation.’128 The Franco-Prussian war was chosen to provide more in-depth 
contextualisation both because of its basic similarities to the Algerian war and its saliency 
for republicanism. Both the Algerian and Franco-Prussian wars ended in defeat, initiated 
the founding of a new republic, witnessed the massacre of citizens in Paris and resulted in 
the loss of territory and subsequent mass population movements. Whilst the Algerian war 
has largely failed to make an impact in the historiography of French republicanism, except 
as a footnote to the Occupation, the Franco-Prussian war and founding of the Third 
Republic has often been considered republicanism’s pinnacle, with François Furet famously 
declaring that it was the Revolution ‘coming into port.’129 As such, alongside a 
historiographical basis stretching back to 1789, the contextual inclusion of republican 
representations of the Franco-Prussian war enable the grounding of representations of the 
Algerian war in more long-term republican trends and essentially into a republican 
narrative. By pursuing a longitudinal study of French republicanism, I hope to put Algeria 
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129 François Furet, Revolutionary France 1770-1880, trans. Antonia Nevill (Oxford, 1992) [1988] p. 537. See also 
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back into the history of republican France, rather than it being an adjunct to the memory-
history of Vichy. 
 
 
I. III Methodology: Sources 
Novels and films make up the majority of the primary source material analysed in this 
thesis. I have already said much about my approach and my considerations on cultural 
history so I will use this section primarily to set out my choice of source material and how I 
use them as documents. I will look at novels, films and paintings separately here but this 
separation is somewhat artificial and not present in the thesis itself. However, there are a 
couple of points to be emphasised before setting out this final aspect of my methodology. 
The first relates to the part I consider culture playing in political society, the second how it 
fits within the social. 
 
The cultural documents considered in this thesis were individually crafted by a small group 
of people, whether an author and their editor or publisher, or a director, writer, actors and 
production team. They do not work in a socio-political vacuum and their work is not 
received into one; they are a part of the society which they inhabit. Thus, 
 
[c]ulture is a mental construct, built by individuals in shifting experience. 
Moving together in communication, people become alert to problems 
requiring action. Their thought becomes orientated to key paradoxes around 
which interpretations coalesce. Agreeing on the importance of certain issues, 
people come into social association and link their destinies through 
compatible understandings, at once making a culture among themselves and 
cutting a collective track through time.130 
 
Here, Henry Glassie suggests that there is a collectiveness to consciousness insofar as 
producers of culture often become focused on particular issues and share understandings; 
patterns can thus be detected across different productions – different novels, films and 
paintings – which otherwise share no tangible personal links. Furthermore, 
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[c]ultures, like histories, are created by people to serve them during their 
ordeal. People might be equal in brilliance, but they have not been allotted 
resources equally. Societies are lucky or not, and their members in interaction 
build their cultures towards distinct points of value.131 
 
It is precisely these points of value which are of interest to this thesis; identifying them, 
accounting for them and critiquing their wider purpose. I am looking for commonalities in 
the source material – ordered representations – to build a picture, bigger than the sum of 
its parts, which provides a greater understanding of how particular events are dealt with by 
republican society. 
 
This is not to say that one perspective will be identified to the detriment of another in hope 
of building a coherent and flawless picture. One of the strengths of these artistic 
representations is that, unlike modern historical representations, they offer ‘multi-
perspective narratives’ of events; they can often lack a clear linear narrative and can even be 
internally contradictory, elements which are frowned upon in historical representations of 
the past.132 It is how these potentially contradictory representations are largely able to 
support, but on rare occasions challenge, the dominant republican narrative which makes 
them worthy of study in the context of this thesis. 
 
On the second point, how cultural representations relate to the social sphere, I both accept 
that it is predominantly an elite milieu which produces the representations considered here, 
and at the same time reject the notion that there is necessarily a strict divide between 
popular and high culture, even in the nineteenth century. With notable exceptions (Pierre 
Guyotat was living in dire poverty when he wrote Tombeau pour cinq cent mille soldats), the 
authors, painters and filmmakers whose work is of interest here, inhabit an elite strata of 
French society, and not simply a cultural elite. As Nicholas Hewitt has noted, because of 
the ‘unusually high profile accorded to culture in twentieth-century France…there has been 
an easy symbiosis between politics, education and culture’ meaning that ‘cultural figures, 
especially writers, are members of the governing elite’.133 Malraux is an obvious figure here, 
but this both transposes to the nineteenth century (the most obvious figure here is Victor 
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Hugo) and to less official levels: Jean-Paul Sartre did not require a government post to 
influence politics. Given such close ties, it is my contention that cultural representations 
promote a narrative of historical events favourable to the republican regime, although this 
does not mean they are uncritical. 
 
Yet, like both Chartier and Darnton, I wish to ‘abandon the usual distinction between elite 
and popular culture’ precisely because I think ‘intellectuals and common people coped with 
the same sort of problems’ when considering the Algerian war in respect to republican 
French history.134 Particularly in the twentieth century, but also in the nineteenth with the 
explosion of literacy, cheap serialised novels and the mass printing of popular paintings as 
postcards, there is a ‘fluid circulation and shared practices across social boundaries.’135 As 
already noted, cultural representations are not produced in a vacuum, absent from society 
as a whole, but, furthermore, they are able to be pervasive in society not only through their 
consumption but also through shared discourses and social exchanges, from a university 
lecture on a novel to a Télérama review of a film; they are not an end product in themselves. 
Thus, whilst I do not deny that the producers of the cultural representations considered 
here are essentially part of a bourgeois milieu, and that this is reflected in their productions, 
it does not restrict their representations to consumption only by such a milieu. 
 
Before moving on to the consideration of each genre of cultural production, it is worth 
saying a few words on the selection process. In relation to the Algerian war, the material is 
restricted to novels and cinematic films which can be considered French in origin and were 
specifically aimed at a French market.136 The start date is 1958, the year of de Gaulle’s 
takeover of power and the beginning of the Fifth Republic, because it is from this moment 
that the republican narrative goes through shifts and changes to be able to deal with the 
changing situation in Algeria. Some publications may have been conceived prior to this 
date, some will have hit the shelves before May, but their impact is part of this changing 
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scene.137 Evidently they must make some comment on the Algerian war itself but this does 
not need to be their primary focus and there are a variety of ways to go about this: a 
conscripted soldier in a wider story about modernisation in Jacques Démy’s Les Parapluies de 
Cherbourg, the loss of a brother and the making of a pied noir friend in André Téchiné’s Les 
Roseaux sauvages, or a tale of civil war and filth with no mention of Algeria or France but 
evidently about the conflict as with Pierre Guyotat’s Tombeau pour cinq cent mille soldats. As 
Noah McLaughlin has commented in his study of war films, ‘[t]he richest films about the 
French experience of war are not violent anthems of patriotism but complex, literary, and 
introspective efforts’.138 Certain sources in this thesis are set in a war zone, but many are 
not. Some of the productions, Démy’s film being a prime example, are not new to 
historians but, as I hope has been made clear in this introduction, have not previously been 
part of a thesis which considers them within a wider, longitudinal narrative of French 
republicanism. This brings me to the final category in the selection process: the films and 
novels must themselves be republican in nature – not necessarily Gaullist, not necessarily 
uncritical and certainly not necessarily celebratory, but not anti-republican. By the mid-
twentieth century this generally means not on the extreme right: representations of the war 
authored by those sympathetic to the OAS or overtly pro-Algérie française do not feature. 
The focus is on how culture develops and supports a narrative of the war from within the 
republican idiom. 
 
The thesis is not a comprehensive overview of all the films and novels made in France 
which take the Algerian war as their subject matter or even those that do so with a 
republican sympathy. Some sources, whilst fitting the categories discussed above, have not 
made it into the final text largely because they offer only a repetition of the argument; 
conforming to the same tropes as their contemporaries but not really adding anything new 
to the overall thesis. They are absent for want of space. I have not found large 
contradictions to the thesis in the texts I have studied and where I have, as is the case with 
Leïla Sebbar’s La Seine était rouge (2003), I have embraced them.139 
 
The contextual element of the Franco-Prussian war is dealt with in a similar way but the 
visual medium employed is painting rather than cinema. The start date in this instance is 
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1871. The purpose is to contextualise and thus the sources are restricted to a role which 
highlights similar trends throughout republican culture (which I began to identify when 
considering a much wider body of source material), and thus these sources only appear to 
flesh out such an argument, rather than aid the development of their own. 
 
I . IIIa Nove l s  
There is no longer anything particularly controversial about using novels as a source for 
investigating history; the purpose is not to reconsider what occurred, but the way in which 
what occurred has been represented and considered by people after the event.140 However, 
it is worth spending a little time on the specific context of republican France, and France in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in relation to the novel, in order to provide some 
basis for it being regarded here as a useful source material for this thesis. 
 
The historiography of the Third Republic was dominated for many years by Eugen 
Weber’s thesis, Peasants into Frenchmen, in which he placed the republic’s education reforms 
in high regard in relation to the expansion of literacy, the French language and a republican 
nationalism.141 Whilst there are considerable problems with Weber’s thesis, not least its 
republican teleology and its lack of recognition of the reforms brought in under the July 
Monarchy and Second Empire, the expansion of primary schooling alongside the incredible 
reverence given to national literary figures cemented the link between literacy and 
republicanism; reading (and thus writing) was a political activity.142 Gilbert Chaitin sums up 
this mood very well: 
 
The birth of the Republic, with its universal suffrage, universal education, and 
the influential role of public opinion in an era of expanded journalism and 
publishing, provided an advantageous context for the abundance of novels[,] 
of ideas. In a democracy, however imperfect it may be, the writer has a special 
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role to play in the fight to establish the meaning of events in order to sway the 
public toward the policy or candidate she favors.143 
 
The importance of literature for identity is nothing new in France, but with the advent of 
relaxed censorship and a rise in the rates of literacy, the latter end of the nineteenth century 
firmly established the importance of the novel as a socio-political object for the masses, 
and as such, also witnessed the rise in status of the public intellectual.144 This latter element 
is perhaps best evidenced by Émile Zola’s seminal role in the Dreyfus Affair of the 1890s, 
and the dual cultural and political role of Victor Hugo considered to be the ‘poetic high 
priest of the Republic’, in a culture which considered ‘that words were tantamount to 
acts.’145 
 
It does not take much to assert that this importance to the republic of the literary figure 
and their work continues beyond the nineteenth century. The political prominence of 
literary Resistance figures like Vercors and Malraux in the post-Second Word War period, 
Jean-Paul Sartre’s call to arms via the means of a pen in his 1948 Qu’est-ce que la littérature?, 
the frustrated quip of de Gaulle in relation to Sartre’s continued outspoken criticism of 
French policy in Algeria – ‘one does not put Voltaire in the Bastille’, even Stéphane 
Hessel’s best-selling political essay of Christmas 2010, all serve as evidence of the 
continued influence of the literary intellectual on the French republic.146 It is not only that 
French politicians frequently quote great writers; the writers themselves are more than 
aware of the political impact of their work. For the Tel Quel group of the 1960s, of which 
Georges Perec (whose short story Quel petit vélo à guidon chromé au fond de la cour? is studied in 
this thesis) was a member, considered that all writing was political and needed to be 
disseminated beyond universities to the general public. They pursued this belief through 
mediums beyond writing, including radio and television.147 Michael Worton has also 
asserted that novels ‘are reviewed widely on the radio and television as well as in the press, 
and, significantly, writers are asked for their opinions whenever there is an event of 
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national importance.’148 Not only, then, are writers considered to be of great public 
importance, their work is disseminated in ways other than through their original printed 
texts. 
 
Novels are used, in this thesis, as objects in themselves. As such, the same questions are 
asked of them as it is traditional to ask of any written document: who wrote it, in what 
context, who was its intended reader, what was its purpose? But above all, the source itself 
will be considered. I am interested in how ‘history is inscribed in fiction’ and whilst I 
perceive it to have an impact on (and be impacted by) wider society, this thesis is not a 
study of reception.149 The intention is to push the interpretations beyond what Philip Dine 
set out to achieve in his work Images of the Algerian War, for he backs away from considering 
the impact of the works he discusses in any detail for fear of falling foul of the ‘continuous, 
intense, and frequently acrimonious debate’ over whether ‘or not literature can change the 
attitudes of its readers’.150 However, the realms of Wolfgang Iser’s intersubjectivity and the 
admittedly fruitless search for the ideal reader are not delved into; it is the texts themselves 
which are of interest here.151 
 
I . IIIb Cinema 
Much akin to the use of novels as an historical source, the debate over the use and value of 
film has been well rehearsed.152 From Marc Ferro’s and Pierre Sorlin’s works in the 1980s, 
to Robert Rosenstone’s somewhat aggressively prescriptive work of the 1990s, and Hayden 
White’s concept of historiophoty, a visual partner of historiography, even Walter Benjamin 
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theorised about cinema and history in the 1930s.153 Luckily the discipline has come a long 
way since 1977 when Ferro declared that film, ‘[a]lmost a century old but ignored, …does 
not even rank among leftover sources. It does not enter the historian’s mental universe.’154 
Just like the novel, ‘historical film is an interpretation of history’, and it is this interpretation 
which I am interested in here.155 
 
Ferro’s work is notable in that he identifies film as both a product and agent of history, not 
unlike the trilateral relationship I discussed between culture, its author and its consumer 
earlier. As much as I would argue it is true for all the cultural sources I include here, ‘the 
film as art cannot be separated from the cultures that secrete it or the audience at which it 
is aimed.’156 Rosenstone has suggested this can be taken further: rather than simply 
analysing the film ‘as a document (text) that provides a window into the social and cultural 
concerns of the era’, instead consider ‘how a visual medium, subject to the conventions of 
drama and fiction, might be used as a serious vehicle for thinking about our relationship to 
the past.’157 It is this subtle shift in focus which this thesis employs; essentially I am 
considering the films (and novels and paintings) as not simply providing a representation of 
the past, but having their own identifiable historical narrative of that past; they have written 
their own history. Unlike Jay Winter, however, I do not believe that this necessarily 
‘challenges conventional categories of thought’; my thesis illustrates how cultural 
representations often help shape and bolster the dominant republican narrative, rather than 
challenge it.158 
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Ferro mentions in passing a factor that does distinguish cinematic film as a genre when he 
says, ‘films and the world of films stand in a complex relationship with the audiences with 
money and with the state, and this relationship is one of the axes of history.’159 Of the three 
genres I consider in this thesis, film is the most expensive to produce and it also most 
overtly involves the participation of more than one person. The French state has been at 
the forefront of both funding and protecting the national film industry throughout much 
of the twentieth century and as such it has survived ‘in the face of multiple onslaughts of 
Hollywood’.160 Indeed, a percentage of money made on Hollywood films was taken by the 
state and reinvested into domestic production. The protection awarded to the French 
cinema industry has continued following a decision by the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) in 1993 to allow the continuing subsidisation.161 This illustrates the 
importance of film for the French state and French national identity. The original subsidies 
in the 1950s and early 1960s were crucial for many young film makers of the nouvelle vague 
movement and the likes of Alain Resnais, whose film Muriel, ou le temps d’un retour is studied 
here.162 
 
Cinema, more than any other cultural medium considered here, is a bourgeois art; novels 
and paintings may have been more highly regarded on occasion, but they do not require 
the expense of a film. As Sorlin has insisted, one ‘must bear in mind the fact that cinematic 
images are contrived by middle-class adults who, unwittingly, emphasize the reactions of 
their social circle and age groups, and forget or misinterpret the concerns of other 
groups.’163 Given the relationships I have outlined in regards to republican politics and 
culture, and my interest in this dominant narrative, this is not particularly troublesome 
methodologically – indeed in some ways it is quite useful – but it is still worth keeping in 
mind. When considering authorship of films in this thesis, I will look primarily to the 
director; whilst I do not wholeheartedly subscribe to the auteur theory and consider 
filmmaking to be a complex and multi-perspective art, the films as projects studied in this 
thesis do have a clear relationship with the politics of the director, and such an 
understanding makes contextualisation manageable. 
                                                
159 Ferro, 'Film as an Agent, Product and Source of History', p. 358. 
160 Ginette Vincendeau, 'Contemporary French Cinema: Dead or Alive?', Screen 34 (1993) p. 299. On the 
French state’s involvement in cinema see Jean-Pierre Jeancolas, 'The Reconstruction of French Cinema', 
Elizabeth Ezra and Sue Harris (eds), France in Focus: Film and National Identity (Oxford, 2000). 
161 Florianne Wild, 'Film in the 1990s', Contemporary French Civilization XXII (1998) p. 135. 
162 Kelly, Jones and Forbes, 'Modernization and Avant-Gardes', pp. 171-172. 
163 Pierre Sorlin, 'Children as War Victims in Postwar European Cinema', Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan 
(eds), War and Remembrance in the Twenteith Century (Cambridge, 1999) p. 108. 
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Cinematic film is a particularly powerful cultural medium. Whilst it is no longer new, as 
Jean Baudrillard has said, ‘that quality of image, of light, that quality of myth, that hasn’t 
gone.’164 It is this myth-like quality that makes film such an obvious source for this study; 
its power to support or challenge a particular historical narrative is formidable.165 The 
individual stories as microcosms of larger narratives is a common and powerful method 
used to engage with an audience, and its mixture of visual and oral stimulus can make it a 
particularly emotive medium, even to the point at which ‘film saves and stores the past so 
completely that human memory becomes superfluous.’166 Even whilst it may not trump 
individual memories of an event, film certainly has the power to help shape a collective 
understanding of an event, like the Algerian war, too big for a singular memory; it can 
bridge ‘the gap between personal experiences and accepted knowledge.’167 To put it in 
Ferro’s terms, film ‘affects people’s imaginary universe.’168 
 
I . III c Paintings  
Painting is utilised to give the Third Republican period a visual culture element.169 The 
rationale here is not to consider painting as directly comparable to film; the thesis’s 
purpose is to identify particular themes and narratives which these varying artefacts present 
and support. Painting is the obvious artistic genre to engage with given its popularity in the 
latter half of the nineteenth century, and its broad appeal. Whilst attendees of the Salon 
may have been of a particular class, many of the most famous paintings quickly became 
                                                
164 Baudrillard, Baudrillard Live: Selected Interviews, p. 31. 
165 See for example the introduction to Elizabeth Ezra and Sue Harris, eds, France in Focus: Film and National 
Identity (Oxford, 2000). 
166 Robert A. Rosenstone, 'The Historical Film: Looking at the Past in a Postliterate Age', Marcia Landy (ed.) 
The Historical Film: History and Memory in the Media (London, 2001) p. 55; Anton Kaes, From Hitler to Heimat: The 
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168 Ferro, Cinema and History, p. 82. 
169 Ludmilla Jordanova suggests ‘visual culture’ is a ‘more historical category than “Art”.’ I do not consider the 
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well-known through reproductions and satirical versions of them published in daily and 
weekly newspapers, most notably L’Illustration and the Journal Amusant.170 
 
Two broad schools of painting feature in this thesis. The first and perhaps the most 
obvious in a thesis concerning war and defeat is the tradition of military painting which was 
hugely popular during the Third Republic. The paintings of Alphonse de Neuville and his 
run-away-success of an apprentice, Edouard Detaille, were frequently the most popular in 
the Salon, an institution which itself boomed in popularity during the period when these 
two artists were working, attracting an average of over half a million visitors in the 1880s 
compared to just 150,000 in 1840.171 The second school to feature, a little less obviously, is 
that of the impressionists. The rag-tag bunch of Salon-rejected (and thus rejecting) artists 
are central to Arnold Hauser’s claim that in ‘the second half the nineteenth century 
painting becomes the leading art’ in France.172 These feature primarily in Chapter 3.  
 
E. H. Gombrich argues that the impressionists led a revolution in painting which 
‘contributed to the collapse of representation in twentieth-century art.’173 Gombrich’s thesis 
in Art and Illusion is ‘that all representations are based on conventions’, meaning that the 
‘form of representation cannot be divorced from its purpose and the requirements of the 
society in which the given visual language gains currency.’174 That is to say, representations 
are not only products of the society in which they are constructed, they are also restricted 
by the conventions of earlier periods in terms of their method of representation. This 
restriction by convention is also the case for those viewing such representations. Such an 
understanding of art, in terms of painting but also of film and novels, is a vital one in terms 
of the feasibility of this thesis. As such, whilst Gombrich may consider that impressionism 
began a revolution which ended the representation of ‘things’ in art, this is not the same 
thing as the representation of narratives, of which this thesis is concerned; paintings still 
have a story to tell. 
                                                
170 Whilst the caricaturists evidently distort the paintings, much of the time it is in the process of mocking the 
artist or the visitors to the Salon and the paintings’ historical narratives remain obvious, but I will deal with 
this when discussing particular examples. 
171 Detaille’s work is some of the most frequently reprinted and caricatured. The caricatures in Journal Amusant 
either tend to make puns on his name and the detail of his work, or totally obscure his painting with the 
hordes of people desperately trying to see it. On the attendance figures see Gordon Millan, Brian Rigby and 
Jill Forbes, 'Industrialization and its Discontents (1870-1914)', Jill Forbes and Michael Kelly (eds), French 
Cultural Studies: An Introduction (Oxford, 1995) pp. 21-2. 
172 Hauser, The Social History of Art, p. 164. 
173 E. H. Gombrich, Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation (New York, 1956) p. xi. 
174 Ibid. pp. 25 and 90. 
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The principles employed in the analysis of the sources are the same across the three genres; 
I am questioning the historical narrative which they represent, even if their method of 
doing so differs, both across and within genres. There are great differences in the particular 
ways in which these three genres represent war and defeat, thus they require different 
nuances in the questions asked of them. However, they remain comparable and part of the 
same cultural narrative because the fundamental question being asked of them is what they 
represent, rather than how they do so. 
 
 
I.IV Chapter Synopses 
This thesis argues that the Algerian war had a revolutionary effect on French 
republicanism, particularly in relation to citizenship and assimilation. Furthermore, this 
revolution has been concealed, a process which is identifiable through a longitudinal study 
of republican cultural representations of war and defeat. The chapters each build upon this 
argument and highlight the consequences of the concealment for republicanism in the 
twenty-first century. 
 
The first chapter addresses the nature of republican citizenship and the Algerian war’s 
impact on its development. In two parts, the chapter initially argues that the symbol of the 
citizen soldier has been fundamental in the development of republican ideas of citizenship. 
The absence of this figure in representations of the Algerian war signifies not only a 
discursive shift but a revolution in the nature of republican citizenship. The second part of 
the chapter takes these conclusions alongside representations of Algerians to argue that the 
revolution in republican citizenship has been one that is racially defined. With the absence 
of the citizen solider as the quintessential republican citizen alongside the redrawing of 
identity wrought by the Fifth Republic’s policies in the summer of 1962 and their 
subsequent representation, citizenship has become negatively defined in relation to race. 
 
Given that Chapter 1’s conclusions contradict the values of universalism and assimilation, 
historically central to republicanism, Chapter 2 considers how the republican narrative of 
French history conceals the revolutionary impact of the Algerian war. Through a study of 
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historiography and artistic representations from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this 
chapter traces a teleological narrative, inherent in the ideology of universalism, which 
enables this concealment through rhetoric of civilising, decolonisation and modernisation. 
The resulting denial of the role the historic Franco-Algerian relationship has had on the 
French republic has allowed the extreme right to take sole claim to the historical relevance 
of empire and control the agenda in regards to assimilation. 
 
The final chapter takes the discourse of the guerre franco-française as its axis and traces how 
this has been a central element of the republican narrative of French history since the 
Revolution. By drawing a binary distinction between France and anti-France, the guerre 
franco-française aids the teleological nature of the republican narrative by encouraging it 
towards the conclusion marking ‘the end of the Revolution’. This declaration, made first in 
reference to the Third Republic and more recently in relation to the Fifth, has assisted the 
concealment of the revolution in republicanism. The appearance of the guerre franco-française 
discourse in representations of the Algerian war reveals assumptions made about anti-
France (usually the professional army) and those who are un-French and thus not a part of 
the civil war (usually Algerians, in line with Chapter 1’s conclusions on citizenship). 
However, by utilising the discourse of the guerre franco-française in representations of the 
suppression of the FLN protest on 17 October 1961 there is a potential to challenge these 
assumptions within the republican idiom’s own framework. 
 
 
Bertrand Taithe has written that ‘the Algerian past of France is that of its people. As such, 
it is intensely political today, and it is undoubtedly part of the most vibrant 
historiographical development in contemporary France. It is also deeply relevant to current 
world affairs, and it places the historians of this relationship at the heart of a genuine 
intellectual debate.’175 I hope this thesis adds something to that debate. 
 
                                                
175 Bertrand Taithe, 'An Algerian History of France', French History 20 (2006) p. 239. 
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1 
Citizenship and the Republic 
 
This chapter argues that 1958-62 marked a revolution in the nature of French 
republicanism. Specifically, it considers the nature of citizenship and the ways in which it 
was fundamentally altered due to the Algerian war and the founding of the Fifth Republic. 
Todd Shepard and Patrick Weil have already considered the legal and constitutional 
changes of this period; I focus on the tenacity of this impact on culture and how such 
changes have slipped seamlessly into a republican mentalité, escaping debate despite their 
rejection of the key republican values, liberté and egalité. The chapter begins by outlining the 
historiography of the citizen soldier since the Revolution and argues that republican 
citizenship is based upon this revered and heroic figure. A closer look at novels and 
paintings which represent soldiers in the Franco-Prussian war will further support this 
relationship. In the representations of the Algerian war, this figure is strikingly absent; 
soldiers are no longer central figures in an heroic struggle for the republic, but outsiders 
lacking in agency to the point of being framed as victims. Such representations point to 
much larger conclusions: the place of the soldier in society, the meaning of republican 
citizenship and the gendered element that arises from such a relationship. 
 
The second part of this chapter will turn to the republican artistic representations of 
Algerians alongside their changing legal status as subjects and citizens of France since 1848. 
It is apparent that the racial distinctions present in the laws are supported and legitimised in 
artistic representations in such a way as to avoid open debate; the ‘invention of 
decolonisation’ which Shepard identifies in the legal sphere is also present in republican 
culture. Since the revolution in republicanism between 1958 and 1962, which the chapter 
will establish, the French republic defines its citizenship by means of race rather than 
through the now-absent citizen soldier of the past. The ‘invention of decolonisation’ 
narrative denies space to challenge the ‘colour blind’ myth of republican, and thus French, 
citizenship. 
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Part I. Citizenship and the citizen soldier 
1.1 The citizen soldier in republican history, 1789-1954 
In 1789, the status of the French altered from subjects to citizens. Rodney Barker, whilst 
accepting both as legitimate, considers the difference between the two as being based on 
the level of engagement one has with governance: ‘a mere subject…is not a participant in 
the activity of governing, the activity whereby she is subjected. Citizenship contributes 
another dimension. The citizen engages in politics and by so doing authorizes and 
influences the government.’1 Thus, in a state which is populated by citizens rather than 
subjects, the political legitimacy of the ruler is dependent upon a two-way process of 
exchange. Yet citizenship is more than a political status or a trading of legitimacy because it 
is far more emotive than such a construction allows. To be a citizen is to embody an 
identity, to be part of an ‘imagined community’, to employ Benedict Anderson’s ubiquitous 
phrase. For Abbé Sièyes, a contemporary theorist of the Revolution, the nation and the 
people ‘must be synonymous.’2 1789 is not an important date in French history because of 
the paperwork it produced, but because it offered values and ideals which fundamentally 
changed the identity of the French people, and primary amongst these was the notion of 
citizenship. 
 
The army had, along with the church, been a central pillar of the French state prior to the 
Revolution, but it was an exclusive club for the aristocracy to wield power within the state, 
not a mass army which pursued war abroad. The founding of the National Guard in 1789 
fundamentally altered this state of affairs by introducing a democratic element into a 
military organisation with the election of officers.3 The democratic values initiated by the 
Revolution cut across the political sphere and into the military. The new civic model of the 
nation was affecting such changes, indeed it made possible ‘the role of the army in nation-
building’ through a balance of citizenship rights (an ideal of franchise) with duties (military 
service).4 
 
This relationship was cemented under the First Republic. In July 1792, the membership of 
the National Guard was opened up to all male citizens, regardless of income, and the 
                                                
1 Rodney S. Barker, Political Legitimacy and the State (Oxford, 1990) p. 3. 
2 Emmanuel Joseph Sièyes, What is the Third Estate?, trans. M. Blondel (London, 1963) [1789] p. 10. 
3 Jack Hayward, Fragmented France: Two Centuries of Disputed Identity (Oxford, 2007) p. 60. 
4 David M. Hopkin, Soldier and Peasant in French Popular Culture, 1766-1870 (Woodbridge, 2003) p. 6. 
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franchise was broadened in September, although, as Albert Cobban has pointed out, ‘the 
atmosphere…was not the best calculated for the free expression of the will of the people’.5 
Nevertheless, the Republic had voiced the ideal of universal male suffrage and was about to 
put into practice a universal male military service. This was the era of Robespierre’s 
idealised citizen soldier, a solider who 
 
was of the people from whose ranks he had emerged, and it followed that he 
was therefore good and virtuous, the representative and standard-bearer of 
the peuple soverain. He was a citizen first and his citizenship, it was implied, 
informed everything he did, including his motivation as a soldier.6 
 
As such he was a more powerful force, and a greater moral one, than those soldiers of  the 
monarchical armies of Europe. Between 1790 and 1795, the mass naturalisation of 
foreigners with between one and three years residency was enacted in both a move to 
assimilate them into the revolutionary ideals and to make them eligible for conscription.7 
The ideal of a mass citizen army was in development. 
 
The Jacobin decree of 23 August 1793 which gave rise to the first levée en masse, was a 
response to the threat of invasion, but it was also embedded with revolutionary principles 
even if many of those were also bound up with the continuing Terror. Previous call-ups 
had permitted mass evasion, particularly by the richest who were able to pay the poorest to 
take their place. Whilst true conscription without exemption would not appear until five 
years later, the ‘Jacobin demand that all must be equally liable for service’ was not only a 
practical necessity but also a response to the resentment towards the unfairness of the 
previous systems.8 As such it was met with less resistance than previous call-ups, and the 
later ones of Napoleon’s doing.9 In 1789 Sièyes had written, in relation to the balloting for 
military service, 
 
                                                
5 Albert Cobban, A History of Modern France, Volume 1: 1715-1799 (London, 1963) p. 203. 
6 Alan Forrest, Napoleon's Men: The Soldiers of the Revolution and Empire (London, 2002) p. 30. 
7 Patrick Weil, Qu'est-ce qu'un Français ? Histoire de la nationalité française depuis la Révolution (Paris, 2002) pp. 23-25. 
8 Alan Forrest, 'La Patrie en danger: The French Revolution and the First Levée en masse', Daniel Moran and 
Arthur Waldron (eds), The People in Arms: Military Myth and National Mobilization since the French Revolution 
(Cambridge, 2003) pp. 8-12. 
9 Ibid.  
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any public need is the responsibility of everybody and not of a separate class 
of citizens, and that one must be ill-acquainted with reasoning as with fairness 
if one cannot think of a more national means of constituting and maintaining 
whatever kind of army one wants to have.10 
 
The levée en masse saw these ideals come to fruition. It also encapsulated the importance of 
military duties for a citizen as, under the Republic, any soldier who served would have full 
citizenship rights, including the franchise. Whilst the percentage who utilised such a right is 
rather pitiful, it was not an empty gesture; means were provided to allow soldiers to vote 
even when half-way across Europe.11 Furthermore, once such an ideal was implanted, it 
became an expectation not a privilege. 
 
The citizen soldier thus became a fundamental building block of republican citizenship 
with conscription as ‘one of the primary links between the people and the State’.12 It had a 
further purpose in that a citizen army provided a buffer between the republic and the 
professional army, a conflict that is present throughout modern French history and has 
produced numerous affaires and crises.13 In his study of ordinary soldiers’ letters from the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, Alan Forrest has argued that men ‘remained citizens 
as well as soldiers’ and ‘continued to identify with the villages which they had left 
behind[,]… to dream of the day when they, too, would be able once more to bring in the 
cattle or turn the lathe in the local workshop.’14 For the citizen soldier loyalty remained 
with his civilian life, not with the army itself. This should be considered a mark of success 
for the Republic; loyalty to the constitution rather than the army addressed what would be 
a consistent concern of the underlying threat from a frequently anti-republican professional 
army. 
 
The rhetoric of the citizen soldier, as much as the legislation, was fundamental to the 
identity formation it encouraged. The Republic never used the language of conscription, 
always of volunteering, ‘a distinction that, however implausible on its face, would prove 
                                                
10 Sièyes, What is the Third Estate?, p. 64. 
11 Forrest, Napoleon's Men, pp. 61-62. 
12 Timothy Baycroft, France: Inventing the Nation (London, 2008) p. 124. 
13 The Boulanger and Dreyfus affairs of the late nineteenth century being the prime examples. 
14 Forrest, Napoleon's Men, p. 161. 
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surprisingly robust.’15 These were active citizens by choice, showing their support of the 
regime through their willingness to spread its values across Europe, earning their 
citizenship through military service.16 Centred on the language of the Rights of Man, the 
power of this rhetoric should not be underestimated: ‘the image of France’s soldiers 
fighting for a cause in which they believed, serving as citizens of a regime which recognised 
and rewarded their sacrifices, would be an essential part of the mythology of the French 
Revolution.’17 The national and emotive term patrie also originates from this period; there 
was something new and specifically French worth fighting for and defending.18 
 
The Empire retained much of the Revolution’s language in relation to the citizen soldier 
although conscription became more regularised whilst suffrage fell away as the balance 
became weighted entirely towards military duty over civil right. The focus for the Empire 
moved away from citizenship towards grandeur and national unity through military glory.19 
From 1815, the restored Bourbons were interested neither in citizenship nor in war, and 
certainly not the ordinary soldier. Indeed, the White Terror directed against soldiers has led 
Natalie Petiteau to argue that ‘the army, at the beginning of the Restoration, was absolutely 
not perceived as an incarnation of a nation mobilised against a foreign enemy. This army 
was, on the contrary, regarded with suspicion, a force recruited and paid by an internal 
enemy.’20 However, two early laws from the July Monarchy suggest that the Republic’s ideal 
of the citizen soldier survived the counter-revolution. The National Guard was resurrected 
and elected municipal councils were set up, with the tax qualification being dramatically 
lower than that for the Chamber of Deputies and the lowest since 1792.21 Maurice Agulhon 
has referred to these two changes as ‘irreversible’.22 The trend towards citizenship through 
the two prongs of military service and enfranchisement were certainly on the march. Its 
                                                
15 Daniel Moran, 'The Legend of the Levée en masse', Daniel Moran and Arthur Waldron (eds), The People in 
Arms: Military Myth and National Mobilization since the French Revolution (Cambridge, 2003) p. 2. 
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17 Forrest, Napoleon's Men, p. 54. 
18 Pierre Goubert, The Course of French History (London, 1988) p. 202. 
19 Baycroft, France: Inventing the Nation, pp. 19-20. 
20 Natalie Petiteau, 'Survivors of War: French Soldiers and Veterans of the Napoleonic Armies', Alan Forrest, 
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Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1790-1820 (Basingstoke, 2009) p. 49. 
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(Basingstoke, 1995) p. 110. 
22 Maurice Agulhon, The Republican Experiment, 1848-1952 (Cambridge, 1983) p. 13. 
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effects would be evident in the Revolution of February 1848 when the social make-up of 
the National Guard was indistinguishable from that of the Parisian protestors.23 
 
The first act of the Second Republic’s Provisional Government was to declare universal 
male suffrage, increasing the electorate from 250,000 to nine million.24 Sovereignty now lay 
not with a monarch or an emperor but with the people, citizens of the Republic. To 
reiterate its importance, the Second Republic was re-declared after the elections of 4 May in 
order to show that the regime was born from democracy not the barricades; its anniversary 
would be celebrated in May rather than February for the following three years.25 Whilst 
suffrage had been an element of republican thought since the Revolution, it was only in 
1848 that it came to be seen as the only legitimate source of power by a wider selection of 
the political class. When the people used their new-found source of political power to elect 
Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte and subsequently voted in 1851 to make him de-facto Emperor 
of France, thus ending the Second Republic in its infancy, republicans would question the 
people’s education and their political understanding, but universal male suffrage as an ideal 
was not ever seriously brought back into question; it became the norm.26 
 
Placing such power in the hands of a wide electorate ensured the need to question the 
place of education in French society. As Agulhon put it in his study of the Second 
Republic, if ‘the peasant was an elector, the teacher who helped shape his mind inevitably 
found himself promoted to a level of responsibility analogous to that of the priest or the 
doctor.’27 Education would come to dominate the policy of political regimes in the 
nineteenth century as each faction attempted to ensure school children were taught to vote 
in the correct way. The conservative Second Republic’s Falloux law, which essentially put 
                                                
23 Ibid. p. 24; Hayward, Fragmented France, p. 61. 
24 Albert Cobban, A History of Modern France, Volume 2: 1799-1871 (London, 1965) p. 137. Cobban suggests 
that this move was tantamount to the Second Republic committing suicide, although Pilbeam’s quote in the 
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1848. 
25 Agulhon, The Republican Experiment, pp. 47-48. 
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républicains du lendemain) had removed universal male suffrage after gains by the left in the Paris by-elections of 
March 1850, thus allowing Louis-Napoleon to present himself as the defender of democratic freedoms. 
Elections under Napoleon III used universal male suffrage, with a varying residency threshold. 
Censorship of the press and threats of violence meant they were not necessarily ‘free and fair’ elections, but 
such a measurement is perhaps unfair in the nineteenth century; universal male suffrage is not synonymous 
with liberal democracy. On Louis-Napoleon’s democratic credentials and press freedom, see Wilfred Jack 
Rhoden, 'Caricatural Representations of Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte, 1848-1871', PhD thesis (University of 
Sheffield, 2011). 
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universities under the watchful eye of bishops, pushed the republican left into support for 
Louis-Napoleon. The increased interest in education would come to a head under the 
Third Republic, not only to avoid an uneducated peasant mass voting for a Bonaparte but 
also to produce a higher class of soldier following complete defeat at the hands of the 
(considerably more literate) Prussians in 1871.28 Education was seen to create both better 
citizens and better soldiers.29 
 
When Napoleon III surrendered to Bismarck on 2 September 1870, it was a personal 
rather than a national defeat; the Third Republic, declared in Paris on 4 September, vowed 
to continue the war and employed the revolutionary language of the levée en masse to do so. 
‘The Bonapartist edifice collapsed with hardly a whimper’ and with it went the republic’s 
most successful opponent.30 It was replaced in a matter of days by the Government of 
National Defence headed by General Trochu with Jules Favre as vice-president and Léon 
Gambetta as minister of the interior. Gambetta escaped the Prussian siege of Paris, in 
‘perhaps the most celebrated balloon flight in history’, to lead the republican ‘cult of 
revolutionary mass war.’31 He raised an auxiliary army of National Guardsmen and francs-
tireurs, which saw a reawakening of the citizen soldier ideal as those that fought for the 
French became French: ‘Arms could make the citizens. Foreigners serving with the French 
thus became citizens de facto’, Garibaldi being only the most famous example.32 The heroic 
if futile attempts by Gambetta’s army and the National Guard to break through the siege 
cemented the legend of the citizen soldier into the founding of the Third Republic. As Jack 
Hayward has argued,  
 
                                                
28 Napoleon III’s army had used the ballot system rather than universal conscription to raise armies. Gordon 
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31 J. P. T. Bury, Gambetta's Final Years: The Era of Difficulties, 1877-1882 (London, 1982) p. 2; Bertrand Taithe, 
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[i]ronically, it was the disastrous defeat…that made the armed force a 
supreme national symbol and restored their prestige… The defeat of 
Gambetta’s 1870 attempt to revive the Jacobin nation in arms led to reliance 
upon a disciplined conscript army, the male national common denominator, 
to retrieve France’s honour.33 
 
This was only the case in relation to the republican citizen army and contrasted with both 
Napoleon III’s sickly surrender and General Achille Bazaine’s surrender of Metz at the end 
of October.34 Bonaparte and his generals (with the exception of Marshal de MacMahon) 
became objects of ridicule rather than heroes; such a status was held only by those rank-
and-file soldiers that rallied to France’s defence.35 
 
The first elections held by the Third Republic, in January 1871, had voted in a monarchist 
majority but squabbling amongst the Orleanists and Legitimists assured the tenacity of the 
republic long enough for republicans to take power, which they did over a course of 
elections between 1876 and 1879. A variety of legislation towards the end of the century 
ensured the maintenance of the citizen soldier relationship with the republic even in peace 
time. Camille See and Jules Ferry’s series of education laws from 1880-1882, which 
provided free and secular education for both boys and girls nationally, were inspired by two 
concerns. The first, and most emphasised, was ‘a complex effort on a hitherto 
unprecedented scale to alter the identity of the nation’; to turn ‘peasants into Frenchmen’, 
or more accurately, citizens into republicans.36 The hope was that a secular, state-controlled 
education system would produce generations of republican voters. Secondly, the Prussians 
had proven that educated soldiers were better soldiers. In 1870, about 30 percent of eligible 
voters in France were illiterate; even if maps of France had been provided to the troops (an 
oft-cited example of France’s poor preparation for war), many would have not been able to 
                                                
33 Hayward, Fragmented France, pp. 61-62. 
34 In Metz, a large proportion of the regular army had been immobilised under siege since September 1870. 
On the 27 October, having exhausted himself smoking and playing billiards, General Bazaine surrendered 
himself, the city and his entire 180,000-strong army thereby freeing up a large Prussian force and removing 
much of France’s. He would be later tried for treason and sentenced to death, commuted to life in prison. 
Goubert suggests that ‘his case would have been handled better by a psychiatrist’, which is one of the kinder 
assessments of his conduct. The quip concerning Bazaine’s activities comes from Alistair Horne; it is an 
entertaining if somewhat unverifiable statement. Alistair Horne, The Fall of Paris: The Siege and the Commune 
(Revised Edition edn, London, 1989) [1965] p. 106; Goubert, The Course of French History, p. 261. 
35 Dominique Lerch, 'La Répresentation de la guerre par l'imagerie populaire (1854-1945)', Ethnologie française 
xxiv (1994). 
36 Gilbert D. Chaitin, The Enemy Within: Culture Wars and Political Identity in Novels of the French Third Republic 
(Columbus, 2009) p. 7; Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France 1870-1914 
(London, 1977). 
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make sense of them.37 The education laws of the Third Republic were not just about 
creating republican voters, but republican citizen soldiers. The unpopular and expensive 
introduction of conscription during peace time in 1889 illustrates the significance the 
republic gave to the nation-in-arms.38 
 
Having witnessed its two predecessors falling foul of a Bonapartist coup, the Third Republic 
also inherited a deep suspicion of the army elite. The introduction of universal conscription 
was not only a method of educating citizens into republicanism, it also provided a strong 
counterbalance to the power of the generally Catholic and anti-republican professional 
army.39 The experience of the Boulanger and Dreyfus affairs brought the antagonism 
between the republic and the professional army to the fore, dominating public politics for 
much of the last two decades of the nineteenth century. The republic survived both affairs 
intact and indeed strengthened, particularly in light of the Dreyfus affair, but the divide and 
its tension would continue to shape France well into the twentieth century. 
 
As a result of military conscription, by 1914 most of the adult male population had served 
in the army for two or three years.40 Despite the pacifism present in the run up to the First 
World War, particularly on the left, the language of the levée en masse was employed once 
again and the heroic sacrifice of the citizen soldier for the patrie was very much in 
evidence.41 Despite the enormity of the war in terms of its scale and loss, the relationship 
between the republic, the citizen and the soldier did not fundamentally change as a result; 
unlike many other European countries, the nation’s sacrifice did not result in the 
enfranchisement of women.42 The First World War, rather than heralding change, was 
actually the culmination of the citizen soldier’s role as bastion of republicanism. This was 
reflected in the mass state-sponsored memorialisation as war memorials to the fallen 
                                                
37 Hazel C. Benjamin, 'Official Propaganda and the French Press during the Franco-Prussian War', The Journal 
of Modern History 4 (1932) p. 214. 
38 Tombs, France 1814-1914 p. 54; John Horne, 'Defining the enemy: War, law, and the levée en masse from 
1870 to 1945', Daniel Moran and Arthur Waldron (eds), The People in Arms: Military Myth and National 
Mobilization since the French Revolution (Cambridge, 2003) p. 103. 
39 In 1876-8, Gambetta held a secret enquiry into the political preferences of the professional army and found 
that 70 percent of generals were anti-republican with just nine percent overtly republican. Hayward, 
Fragmented France, p. 317. 
40 Tombs, France 1814-1914, p. 309. 
41 Leonard V. Smith, 'Remobilizing the citizen-soldier through the French army mutinies of 1917', John 
Horne (ed.) State, Society and Mobilization in Europe during the First World War (Cambridge, 1997). 
42 See section 1.4. 
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soldiers appeared in ‘virtually every French commune.’43 Furthermore, rather than being 
centres of nationalist sentiment, the monuments were largely republican, secular and 
memorialised individuals, not the army as an institution.44 
 
The celebration of the citizen soldier had a thinner basis during the Second World War due 
to a swift defeat and occupation, but the Resistance was able to utilise the rhetoric for their 
own cause: posters incited a levée with the traditional headline of la patrie en danger and one 
resistance group named themselves after the francs-tireurs, the auxiliary forces much in 
evidence in Gambetta’s army of 1871.45 De Gaulle’s speech upon entering Paris claimed 
that France had liberated herself, which, whilst evidently false given the much larger use of 
Allied over French troops, was necessary to maintain the heroic figure of the citizen soldier 
in the republican consciousness.46 The myth of the resistance in the post-war years helped 
to maintain the centrality of the citizen soldier. The conscripts of France did not face war 
again until 1956 when Guy Mollet, socialist premier of the Fourth Republic, increased the 
length of conscription and sent conscripts outside of Europe for the first time.47 Yet in the 
Algerian war the language of the heroic citizen soldier would prove to be entirely absent. 
 
The heroic citizen soldier had been seen to be a bastion of republicanism and a foundation 
of what republican citizenship incorporated (the duty to serve was inextricably tied to the 
right to enfranchisement). Crucially, this had not been solely the result of government 
policies and favourable commemorations. As Owen Connelly has argued, the 
 
                                                
43 Hayward, Fragmented France, p. 62. The Franco-Prussian war also witnessed mass memorialisation which 
Karine Varley details, but in a significant difference to the First World War, these commemorations were 
largely locally rather than state funded. Antoine Prost, Republican Identities in War and Peace: Representations of 
France in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, trans. Jay Winter and Helen McPhail (London, 2002) p. 12; 
Karine Varley, Under the Shadow of Defeat: The War of 1870-71 in French Memory (Basingstoke, 2008). 
44 Prost, Republican Identities in War and Peace pp. 14-29. 
45 John Horne reprints an example of such a poster. Horne, 'Defining the enemy',  p. 120. The figure of the 
citizen soldier defending the Republic was not restricted to the Gaullists after the Second World War. In a 
survey of Louis Aragon’s writings (a life-long member of the PCF), Angela Kimyongür suggests that 
‘Aragon’s views on war were articulated in the context of the French Republican ideal of the “Nation in 
Arms”, whereby the existence of universal and compulsory male conscription ensures the readiness of the 
nation to defend the Republic.’ Angela Kimyongür, Memory and Politics: Representations of War in the Work of 
Louis Aragon (Cardiff, 2007) p. 2. 
46 Charles de Gaulle, on the steps of the Hôtel de Ville on 25 August 1944 declared, ‘Paris ! Paris outragé ! 
Paris brisé ! Paris martyrisé ! mais Paris libéré ! libéré par lui-même, libéré par son peuple avec le concours des 
armées de la France, avec l'appui et le concours de la France tout entière, de la France qui se bat, de la seule 
France, de la vraie France, de la France éternelle.’ 
47 Baycroft, France: Inventing the Nation, p. 118. 
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heroic soldier of the Year II exemplified republican virtue and French 
national identity, combining valor and spontaneity, generosity of spirit and a 
very Gallic virility. That the myth proved to be so enduring is due in no small 
measure to the efforts of succeeding generations of French historians, most 
of them committed republicans, who lavished their affection as well as their 
analytical skills on the soldiers who had fought to defend the Revolution.48 
 
Connelly surveys the historiography only in relation to the revolutionary period, but the 
trend is evidently apparent in the historiographical narrative presented here, and it will also 
become apparent in the analysis of culture in the Third Republic below. This only serves to 
make the break in such a representation with the Algerian war all the more stark. 
 
 
1.2 The citizen soldier as hero: cultural representations from the Third 
Republic 
The centrality of the citizen soldier to republican meanings of citizenship is evident in both 
the history of republicanism itself and is given further standing by the emphasis placed 
upon it in the historiography considered above. It is also patent in artistic representations 
of war in which the heroic citizen soldier dominates the narrative, regardless of the final 
outcome of the war itself. An examination of the place of the citizen soldier in the artistic 
representations of the Franco-Prussian war will provide a deeper context than a purely 
historiographical one in which to place similar representations of the Algerian war. The 
Franco-Prussian war, like the Algerian war ninety years later, was an intimate and bloody 
war with conscripts making up the rank-and-file of the army and which resulted in the 
defeat of France, the retreat of French troops and the secession of territory. Despite this 
bleak result, the representations of the citizen soldier in the Third Republic were not only 
favourable but heroic. The characters themselves were human and sympathetic, not 
without flaws but frequently placed in favourable contrast to their superiors and men who 
did not meet the ideal of the republican citizen-in-arms. The citizen soldier came in many 
and varied forms, from the mysterious franc-tireur to the exhausted poilu, but all embodied 
                                                
48 Owen Connelly, 'The Historiography of the Levée en masse of 1793', Daniel Moran and Arthur Waldron 
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the same heroic narrative – that of sacrifice, resistance and moral victory – which was the 
foundation of the republican citizen soldier. 
 
The genre of military painting, a consistently popular form in France throughout the 
nineteenth century, is an obvious place to begin when considering artistic representations 
of soldiers.49 As David Hopkin has shown, ‘it would be wrong to give the impression that 
the image of the soldier as national standard-bearer was born, like Minerva, ready-armed on 
the battlefields of 1870-1’; such an image had been around since the Revolution.50 The 
glory of war was frequently celebrated in military paintings, as were the regally dressed 
commanders; Jacques-Louis David’s Bonaparte franchissant le Grand-Saint-Bernard epitomised 
such sentiments.51 Yet when the war was lost, the high command became difficult to depict 
in an heroic manner. Instead, the rank-and-file were represented, doggedly determined in 
the face of insurmountable odds, fighting for a just if futile cause and always, as the genre 
itself insisted, heroic. These are the representations of citizen soldiers in a republican age.52 
 
Chief among the military painters of the 1870s and 1880s was Alphonse de Neuville, a 
student of Eugène Delacroix. De Neuville painted a prolific number of representations of 
the Franco-Prussian war. One of the most famous of his works was the 1873 canvas, La 
Dernière cartouche à Balan (Figure 1), which helped to immortalise the Bavarian attack on 
Bazeilles at the end of August 1870, prior to the surrender of Napoleon III. The painting 
represents an actual event which became an iconic symbol of martyrdom and bravery in 
the French memory of the war.53 It frames a rag-tag bunch of soldiers wearing varying 
degrees and varieties of uniform in a last ditch attempt to fight off the unseen invaders 
from an ordinary home under siege. The domestic setting, rather than the traditional 
battlefield, emphasises the dual role of the painting’s actors, both citizen and soldier. The 
continuation of the battle despite a plethora of injuries, rifles flung down made useless by 
lack of ammunition and the house falling apart around them, all ensure the painting 
                                                
49 Military painting was very popular from 1871-1914 and certainly more so than impressionism, the 
retrospectively great artistic leap of the time. Military paintings were frequently reproduced as cheap prints 
and postcards during this period and were dominant in the Paris Salon. Reviews of the Salon from 
contemporary journals ranging from the conservative L’Illustration to the satirical Le Journal Amusant never 
failed to devote a significant section to the military genre. 
50 Hopkin, Soldier and Peasant, p. 18. 
51 Better known in the English-speaking world as Napoleon Crossing the Alps. 
52 Military painting is a notoriously conservative genre and solidly institutionalised in the Second Empire. I do 
not lay claim to the overt republicanism of the artists’ discussed here, but merely suggest that their paintings 
are consistent with the dominant republican narrative of the war and the defeat. 
53 Varley, Under the Shadow of Defeat, Chapter 6. 
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portrays desperate heroism in the face of certain defeat. As one critic summed up, it was 
‘un tableau qui nous fit révéler la tête.’54 Presented at the Salon, La Dernière cartouche à Balan 
gained much praise and publicity. L’Illustration called de Neuville ‘un des succès et un des 
succès les plus mérités’ and his painting ‘les mieux réussies du Salon.’55 The house itself, an 
ordinary home at the time of the war, became the Maison de la dernière cartouche, a 
museum which celebrated the soldiers’ heroism and where this painting now hangs.56 
 
 
Figure 1. Alphonse de Neuville, La Derniè re  ca rtou che à Balan,  1  Septembre 1870 , 1873. 
 
That this painting represents an event prior to the fall of Napoleon III does not undermine 
its position in the republican narrative of the war. Painted some three years after the event 
it has as much to tell the historian about its time of creation as the time it represents. That 
de Neuville avoided either Napoleon III or any of his generals as his subject and instead 
picked an unregimented group in a very unmilitary setting allowed him to paint essentially 
‘a patriotic counter-image to the humiliation of Sedan.’57 Indeed, John Milner suggests that 
                                                
54 Arsène Alexandre, quoted in John Milner, Art, War and Revolution in France, 1870-1871 (London, 2000) p. 
55. [a painting which makes us raise our heads once more] 
55 Francion, ‘Salon de 1873’, in L’Illustration, (24 May 1873) p. 362. [one of the successes, and one of the most 
deserving successes / the most successful of the Salon] Francion continues to swoon over the painting and 
de Neuville in later weeks and the painting is still referenced in a comparison in 1881. Francion, ‘Les dernière 
cartouches’, (2 August 1873), pp. 78-79; Anonymous, ‘Le Salon’, (7 May 1881), p. 296. 
56 Varley, Under the Shadow of Defeat, pp. 122-123. 
57 Ibid. p. 153. 
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it was intended as a ‘stirring…public propaganda piece for an audience in need of 
reassurance.’58 The Third Republic was still finding its feet in the early years following the 
total defeat by the Prussians and the bloody conclusion of the Paris Commune; this 
painting, so admired that it had prints published for popular consumption in the same year 
that it was shown at the Salon, provided a narrative of bravery, heroism and resilience 
which could not but instil pride and hope in those who saw it.59 The men may have lost the 
battle against the barbarous Bavarians, but they gained a moral victory through these 
qualities. As Claude Digeon has argued in his study of artistic responses to the Franco-
Prussian war, such depictions of glory in battle against such brutal opposition was typical.60 
The republican citizen soldier was victorious in the face of defeat. 
 
The theme of sacrifice, even martyrdom, which penetrates La Dernière cartouche embodies 
‘the idea of the nation as one of ideas not aggressive military might, and of resilience, 
patriotism, and intelligence of the people. In their democratic qualities, the concepts are 
implicitly republican’.61 The narrative of the citizen soldiers’ heroism is the central element 
in the painting. The bravery of ordinary French men in the face of an insurmountable 
obstacle is an emphasis which both celebrates the soon-to-be republican citizens and 
critiques the Empire for the folly of declaring war when under-prepared. 
 
La Dernière cartouche does not provide an image of the enemy other than through the 
damage inflicted upon the house and its defenders, but this is not unusual in de Neuville’s 
paintings of the Franco-Prussian war, or indeed of those of his young protégé Edouard 
Detaille and his contemporaries, Aimé Morot and Henri Dupray. In Detaille’s Charge du 
régiment de cuirassiers dans le village de Morsbronn (Figure 2), a street is packed full of French 
soldiers on horseback under attack, indeed ambushed, but all we see of their attackers is 
white paint depicting shot gun fire from the upper windows of the timber-framed houses 
which enclose the painting. Milner has suggested that in ‘Detaille’s interpretation the charge 
was glorious, romantic and rash as well as fatal. It is clear in Detaille’s view that the brave 
soldiers of France had been tricked,’ but their heroism remained intact.62 Stop’s caricature 
of the painting in Le Journal Amusant mocks the shot gun fire by placing smoking pipes in 
the windows but pays respect to the French soldiers in his caption: ‘Mais, rapprochez-
                                                
58 Milner, Art, War and Revolution, p. 55. 
59 Ibid. p. 55. 
60 Claude Digeon, La Crise allemande de la pensée française (1870-1914) (Paris, 1959) p. 51. 
61 Varley, Under the Shadow of Defeat, p. 153. 
62 Milner, Art, War and Revolution, p. 37. 
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vous ; vous resterez profondément émus devant ce drame terrible et vivant.’63 Cavalry 
charges at Rezonville painted in 1873 by Dupray, now held by the Musée de l’armée in 
Paris, and Reichshoffen by Morot, shown at the 1887 Salon, also follow this narrative of 
futile bravery in which the enemy is absent except for his destructive power.64 The absence 
of the Prussian armies in these representations of war allowed the French soldiers to take 
centre stage with full focus on their heroic sacrifice. 
 
 
Figure 2. Edouard Detaille, Charg e  du ré giment de  cu ira ss ie rs  dans l e  vi l l age  de  Morsb ronn , 
1874. 
 
Detaille, a student of Ernest Meissonier’s, was a dominant figure of the Third Republic 
Paris Salon and the war of 1870-1 his topic of choice.65 The crowds jostled to view his 
paintings, the reviewers of L’Illustration gushed over his compositions, and Stop, Le Journal 
Amusant’s caricaturist, exhausted the puns upon his name.66 In the 1880s Detaille embarked 
                                                
63 Stop, ‘Le Salon pour rire’, Journal Amusant (30 May 1874) p. 5. [But, come closer; you will be profoundly 
moved before this terrible and living drama.] 
64 Aimé Morot, Le Charge Reichshoffen, 6 août 1870, 1887; Henri Dupray, La Charge de la dragoons à Rezonville-
Gravelotte, août 1870, 1873. 
65 Francion, ‘Salon de 1873’, L’Illustration (24 May 1873) p. 264. 
66 Both Stop, and L’Illustration’s rather inferior caricaturist, Bertall, depicted the crowds surrounding Detaille’s 
paintings. Detaille’s détails were a favourite pun of Stop’s. Francion, ‘Salon de 1873’, L’Illustration (3 May 
1873); (24 May 1873); (14 June 1873); (16 May 1874); Bertall, ‘Revue comique du Salon’, L’Illustration (24 May 
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on two grand projects with de Neuville, Le Panorama de Champigny and Le Panorama de 
Rezonville. These two enormous paintings were displayed at purpose-built rotondes in Paris in 
1882 and 1887 respectively (Le Panorama de Rezonville had spent a previous five years on 
display in Vienna).67 ‘Designed to surround, and thereby visually and psychologically to 
involve the viewer,’ the physical enormity of these paintings makes their impact difficult to 
comprehend.68 In one of Stop’s caricatures, as the painting fades away into the distance, a 
buyer asks Detaille whether he would consider selling his painting by the metre.69 
 
The jest would be less amusing to the artist in retrospect; the two paintings no longer exist 
in their original forms.70 From the fragments present in the Musée de l’armée as well as the 
detailed descriptions and black and white photographs of the whole panoramas printed in 
Le Monde Illustré, it is evident that a narrative of futile heroism runs through them both.71 
The panoramas are big enough to encapsulate a variety of episodes across their canvases. 
In the Rezonville fragments held at the Musée de l’armée there are groups of soldiers, their 
packs weighed down, ready for battle; in another, bodies of French soldiers lay strewn 
across a corn field; and a further fragment shows an injured soldier passing his ammunition 
to another, illustrating his bravery and patriotism above concern for his own mortality 
(Figure 3). The view of Metz, noted in Le Monde Illustré, a city which became a symbol of 
defeat following Marshal Bazaine’s surrender, suggests a certain fatalism, or indeed the 
treachery of a Napoleonic commander contrasted against the metres of doggedly-fighting 
soldiers. The myth-like quality of these repetitive representations of the citizen soldier 
bravely fighting on regardless of command, organisation or futility, are precisely the same 
qualities which make up the image of the citizen soldier which is so fundamental to the 
meaning of republicanism.72 
                                                                                                                                          
1873); Stop, ‘Le Salon pour rire’, Journal Amusant (30 May 1874); (20 May 1876); (28 June 1879); (3 May 1884); 
(28 April 1888). 
67 François Robichon, 'Les Panoramas de Champigny et Rezonville par Edouard Detaille et Alphonse 
Deneuville', Bulletin de la Société de l'Histoire de l'Art français (December 1979) p. 260. 
68 Ibid. ; Milner, Art, War and Revolution, p. 49. Their physical scale and visual impact is perhaps comparable to 
Claude Monet’s Les Nymphéas in the Orangerie or Marc Rothko’s Seagram Murals. 
69 Stop, ‘Le Salon de 1884’, Journal Amusant (3 May 1884) p. 4. 
70 They were cut up into 65 and 115 fragments and sold, much to Detaille’s horror: he refused to autograph 
the fragments from Rezonville because he ‘“ne voulant pas sanctionner ce massacre”’. Robichon suggests that 
this is because he considered this second panorama to be his own work as he had conceived of it as a whole 
and edited de Neuville’s work on it. Robichon, 'Les Panoramas de Champigny et Rezonville', p. 261. 
71 Olivier Merson, ‘La Bataille de Champigny’ Le Monde Illustré (4 November 1882); George Bastard, ‘Le 
Panorama de Rezonville’ Le Monde Illustré (23 November 1889). 
72 Some eighteen years after the fall of Napoleon III, Detaille painted one of his most famous works, La Rêve, 
which won the Salon medal in 1888. This canvas, which shows a field of soldiers sleeping whilst the sky is 
filled with their collective dream of the charging and victorious Napoleonic armies of the First Empire, could 
be taken as a slight against the soldiers of the Franco-Prussian war. Indeed, this is the interpretation which 
Algeria in France 
 67 
 
     
 
Figure 3. Edouard Detaille and Alphonse de Neuville, fragments of Le Pano rama de 
Rezonvi l l e , 1883.73 
 
The representations of the Franco-Prussian war considered above were unproblematic for 
a Republican audience; they ‘played down the role of the Emperor, omitted scenes of 
Prussian success and rarely acknowledged the Commune’.74 By avoiding clear articulations 
of the enemy and representing defiance, heroism and sacrifice rather than overwhelming 
defeat, the paintings suited the republican narrative’s place of citizen soldiers in the war. 
                                                                                                                                          
Stop offers in his caricature, drawing sleeping soldiers wearing bonnets which could be taken for Phrygian 
caps, an unmistakeable republican symbol, whilst their ‘comarades montent à l’assaut.’ But the painting itself 
is not critical of the soldiers, if anything it is critical of the Second Empire which failed to live up to the glory 
of the First. Painted at a time when the Third Republic was well established and confident in its success over 
both monarchists and Bonapartists, the painting allows some reminiscence to the glory of war under 
Napoleon I, but does not undermine the heroic narrative of the republican citizen soldier; it is, after all, those 
very men who dream of repeating such glory. Stop, ‘La Salon de rire’, Le Journal Amusant (28 April 1888). 
73 Photographs taken by the author at the Musée de l’armée, L’Invalides, Paris. 
74 Milner, Art, War and Revolution, p. 215. 
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Meissonier captures this mood definitively in his 1884 composition, Le mémorial du Siège de 
Paris (Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4. Ernest Meissonier, Le mémo rial  du Siè ge  de  Paris , 1884. 
 
The dead and dying lie all around but those that can still fight stand alongside Marianne, 
the formidable female allegory of the republic who is defiant in their midst, facing the 
distant enemy, clutching both sword and tricolour flag. Women, children and the elderly are 
present on the battlefield, an unconventional inclusion which reminds the viewer that the 
siege is a collective struggle in which the Prussians are killing innocents as wilfully as 
soldiers; their presence is a moral criticism of the enemy. The figure of Marianne, not yet 
the radical Phrygian-capped figure she would commonly become, is confident enough to 
display the tricolour at the painting’s very centre.75 She, above all else, is what the still-
standing citizen soldiers are fighting for. 
 
                                                
75 For a discussion on Marianne’s controversial headwear, see Maurice Agulhon, Marianne into Battle: Republican 
Imagery and Symbolism in France, 1789-1880 (Cambridge, 1981) especially Chapter 7. 
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Following a visit to the Paris Salon in 1872, Zola remarked that there were few military 
paintings of the Franco-Prussian war, such artists preferring to focus on the glory of the 
Crimea.76 But this reserve was rapidly overcome and representations of the battles of the 
1870-1 war became some of the most popular pieces of art at the Salon in the following 
years. It is not particularly surprising that it took a few years before artists felt comfortable 
enough to depict a very traumatic and overwhelming episode of French history through 
such a stark medium as military painting. One of the earliest well-known artistic comments 
on l’année terrible was Victor Hugo’s novel Quatrevingt-treize, published in 1874.77 Ostensibly 
about the Revolution and Terror of its title, the novel was also an allegorical comment on 
the more recent upheavals. Such an indirect treatment of recent and difficult events is not 
unusual; a novel by Pierre Guyotat considered later in this thesis never mentions Algeria or 
France by name but is evidently a response to the Algerian war.78 In a consideration of 
literature on the Vichy period, S. B. John considers similar “distanced” works as coming 
‘closest to creating the feel of the period and its moral complexities’.79 
 
By 1874 Hugo was a committed republican. A hero of Paris on his return from self-
imposed exile following the surrender of Napoleon III, he secured this reputation by 
resigning as a deputy over the peace terms agreed by Thiers’s government. That he had 
previously been a supporter of the July Monarchy and had spent the period of the 
Commune in Belgium were mere inconveniences.80 His civic state funeral and subsequent 
Pantheonisation in 1885 became ‘the most spectacular attempt to fashion a symbol of the 
secular moderate Republic’.81 The crowds that lined the streets for the event and Hugo’s 
continued reverence in France suggests that this attempt was certainly successful. Such 
fame warranted Quatrevingt-treize an exceptionally long and largely favourable review even in 
                                                
76 Albert Boime, Art and the French Commune: Imagining Paris After War and Revolution (Chichester, 1995) p. 62. 
77 Victor Hugo, 'Quatrevingt-treize' (1874), Project Gutenberg [accessed 27 September 2009] 
http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/9645. 
78 Pierre Guyotat, Tombeau pour cinq cent mille soldats (Paris, 1967). 
79 S. B. John, 'Vichy France, 1940-1944: The Literary Image', John Cruickshank (ed.) French Literature and its 
Background. Volume 6: The Twentieth Century (Oxford, 1970) p. 213. There is a connection here with the 
frequently-noted lack of dialogue between conscripts in the Algerian war and wider French society 
concerning their experiences (see section 1.3c). As will be discussed, conscripts’ stories were not entirely 
‘repressed’ but rather shared only amongst those who had similar experiences, a not unusual method of 
coping with trauma. Distanced works, particularly by ex-conscripts like Guyotat, allow some bridging of this 
divide through more indirect representations. Benjamin Stora, La Gangrène et l'oubli: la mémoire de la guerre 
d'Algérie (Paris, 1991) pp. 265-268; Forrest, Napoleon's Men, p. 133. 
80 Peter Starr, Commemorating Trauma: The Paris Commune and its Cultural Aftermath (New York, 2006) pp. 60-62. 
81 Varley, Under the Shadow of Defeat, p. 67. 
1. Citizenship and the Republic 
 70 
the notoriously conservative L’Illustration.82 The novel itself is set largely in the Vendée 
where civil war is raging between the moderate and moral republican Gauvain and his 
royalist uncle the Marquis de Lantenac. Gauvain is mentored by his childhood teacher and 
ex-priest, Cimourdain, who has ties to the Jacobins in Paris. Whilst largely concerned with 
civil war, and thus, allegorically, the Commune of 1871, the novel is rich in its 
consideration of citizenship and the ideal of the republican citizen soldier embodied in 
Gauvain. 
 
The war itself remains static in the novel; Sandy Petrey has argued that if ‘we look at the 
struggle in the West independently of the personalities who wage it, it becomes apparent 
that nothing happens in Quatrevingt-treize.’83 It is the characters, and the ideal types which 
they represent, which are the crux of the novel’s message. Gauvain is the republican ideal 
type, the balance between the political extremes represented through the morally detestable 
violence of Cimourdain and Lantenac. Conservative, honest and moral, Gauvain is the 
ultimate Third Republican. Commander of the republican armies, he considers a moral 
victory more fundamental than a military one. In the finale of the novel, Lantenac has 
escaped ‘La Tourgue’ which is under siege by Gauvain’s army but in doing so has left a 
peasant woman’s children to burn to death as Gauvain is unaware of their presence in the 
fortress’s library. On hearing the mother’s cry of desperation, Lantenac returns to save the 
children and as a result is captured and sentenced to death. Gauvain, having witnessed 
Lantenac’s progression from a kidnapper and a murderer to a man willing to lay down his 
life for the sake of innocents, cannot allow his enemy’s sentence to be carried out. 
Knowing Cimourdain to be immovable because of the extremes of his politics, Gauvain 
secretly switches places with Lantenac in his prison cell, allowing the marquis to escape and 
condemning himself to death for the treachery. Thus, whilst ensuring a military stalemate 
on which the novel ends, Gauvain has been morally victorious. As he is taken to the 
guillotine, his soldiers cry ‘grâce ! grâce !’ and a grenadier offers his life in Gauvain’s place. 
The citizen’s final words are ‘Vive la République !’84 Such a representation of the 
quintessential citizen soldier shares much with the representations provided by de Neuville, 
Detaille and Meissonier. It supports the republican ideal of a heroic citizen soldier securing 
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a moral victory even in the face of military defeat; a narrative essential for the Third 
Republic born from capitulation. 
 
More than twenty years after the conclusion of l’année terrible, Émile Zola’s La Débâcle 
(1892) dealt with the events in a much more direct manner than Quatrevingt-trieze.85 By 1892 
the conservative republic was entrenched and more confident than in the early 1870s when 
the republicans were not yet in control of government; the shoddy shadow of Bonapartism 
had been vanquished following the Boulanger Affair of the 1880s and the upheavals of the 
Dreyfus Affair were as yet unknown. The penultimate volume in his hugely successful 
Rougon-Macquart series, which used the genre of the novel to trace Zola’s fascination with 
naturalist theories of hereditary degeneration within the context of the Second Empire, has 
the Franco-Prussian war and the Commune at its centre. Whilst Colette Wilson has made a 
strong case for the presence of the Commune in the earlier novels of the series, it is La 
Débâcle which offers a rich representation of the citizen soldier.86 
 
Beginning with the defeat of Napoleon III at Sedan, the novel traces the lives of two 
unlikely friends, Jean Macquart and Maurice Lavasseur, as they attempt to fight the enemy, 
are captured, separated and eventually tragically reunited during the semaine sanglante which 
marked the end of the Paris Commune. The unmistakeable hero of La Débâcle is Jean, an 
honest and hard-working peasant. Like Gauvain, he is the ultimate republican citizen 
soldier, and yet is very different to Hugo’s aristocrat. Whereas Gauvain is directed by his 
superior intelligence and ideology, Jean has not progressed further up the chain of army 
command because of his illiteracy and is driven by a calm rationality and balance.87 He 
fights for his country because he is a patriot, not because of a particular dedication to 
republican ideology. Above all, he is exceptionally ordinary even in his heroism; the citizen 
soldier is a status available to all men, indeed it is almost theirs by default. Such is the 
confidence of republicanism in the 1890s. 
 
Whilst Jean represents the quintessential republican citizen soldier in La Débâcle, the novel 
contains many representations of far less ideal types, beginning with Maurice and 
deteriorating, particularly towards the political extremes. Zola is particularly condemning of 
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Chouteau, a fervent, amoral Parisian revolutionary and Pache, a pious but self-serving 
Breton, both of whom are in Jean’s regiment but who both consider republican patriotism 
as secondary, the former in relation to revolution, the latter to the church. Neither are good 
soldiers and neither are envisaged to be citizens of Jean’s new France which will grow from 
the ashes of the Commune. There is a consistent link between the good soldier and the 
good citizen. 
 
Zola has drawn noticeable distinctions between the rank-and-file soldiers who largely, with 
the few noted exceptions, fight bravely and courageously against an overwhelming enemy, 
and the imperial high command who are weak, incompetent and pursue only selfish glory. 
In short, Zola damned the army elite. This is in evidence from the very beginning of the 
novel where a poorly-planned war has left Jean’s regiment without the necessary supplies 
and in disorder, marching and retreating without ever firing a shot. The Emperor himself is 
portrayed as both physically weak and selfishly frivolous; whilst logistics have failed to 
provide the soldiers with basic supplies, Napoleon III is seen commandeering the house of 
an elderly lady with numerous carts of delicate crockery and fine wines in tow.88 His 
commanders cannot even agree who is in charge on the battlefield.89 Zola was condemning 
the imperial high command, but he was also suggesting a dividing line between the rank-
and-file who became citizen soldiers, and the professional army which, as the Dreyfus 
Affair would bring into stark relief, did not share the sentiments required of republican 
citizenship.  
 
As such, it is unsurprising to find that the most intense and heroic scene of the novel does 
not involve the higher-ranking members of the army at all and its central character is not 
even conscripted; he is a simple citizen. This is the iconic scene of Weiss, Maurice’s 
brother-in-law who had been, to his frustration, exempted from military service because of 
his eyesight.90 He had travelled to Bazeilles to protect his house, bought only recently for 
him and his new wife to raise their family. As the town comes under attack from the 
Bavarian armies, Weiss stays behind with his gardener and a small group of soldiers to 
make a last stand. It is a deliberate homage to the much celebrated battle captured by de 
Neuville’s painting and savoured by the Maison de la dernière cartouche. Unlike the 
painting, Zola’s story is able to continue the narrative beyond the final defence of the 
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house and directly represent Weiss as a true martyr, shot by a firing squad as his wife 
watches, hysterical in her despair.91 The brutality and the sacrifice of these scenes provide 
the ‘patriotic counter-image to the humiliation of Sedan’, the narrative of which surrounds 
Weiss’s battle in Zola’s novel.92 Nowhere is the trope of the heroic republican citizen 
soldier, a true citizen-in-arms, more evident than at this peak in the dramatic narrative. 
 
Weiss is representative of the spontaneous uprising of citizens against the enemy 
reminiscent of the republican levée en masse, the final frontier, psychologically and militarily 
against the nation’s defeat after the surrender at Sedan.93 Zola’s novel does not refer 
directly to Gambetta’s raising of an auxiliary army and the attempted sorties from a besieged 
Paris, but it does include representations of the francs-tireurs, guerrilla fighters who to the 
Prussian army were an illegal force but to the French became symbols ‘of continued 
struggle and defiance [which] was itself a reaffirmation of France as a nation.’94 These 
figures are more shady than the clear-cut heroics of Weiss given that the tactics of the 
francs-tireurs were not always considered honourable, but they play a role both in La Débâcle 
and a semi-autobiographical novel, Robert Helmont by Alphonse Daudet, in representing a 
defiant and wilful patriotism worthy of the citizen soldier and, crucially, one divorced from 
the professional army.95 
 
Daudet’s own politics are not as clear cut as Zola’s but it would be wise not to judge them 
on the basis of his son, Léon, who went on to be an important figure in the extreme-right 
league Action française.96 He was certainly an anti-Dreyfusard, but that was hardly unusual, 
even for a conservative republican. Daudet and Zola do share similarities in their 
representations of francs-tireurs which, in turn, concur with the republican narrative of the 
citizen soldier. Daudet’s novel, first published in serial form in 1873, is written as a diary, 
beginning on 3 September 1870, the day after Napoleon III’s capitulation. Robert 
Helmont, a bourgeois character residing in the rural outskirts of Paris, has a broken leg so 
when, upon hearing the news of the Prussian advance his fellow villagers join the fight or 
flee the village, he remains alone at home, documenting his days in the novel. 
                                                
91 Ibid. pp. 242-252. 
92 Varley, Under the Shadow of Defeat, p. 153. 
93 Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning, and Recovery, trans. Jefferson 
Chase (London, 2001) pp. 8-9. 
94 Badsey, The Franco-Prussian War, p. 61. 
95 Alphonse Daudet, Robert Helmont: Journal d'un solitaire (Paris, 1891) [1874 Robert Helmont: études et paysages]. 
96 Hayward, Fragmented France, p. 234. 
1. Citizenship and the Republic 
 74 
 
The only other inhabitant of the village is the farmer Goudeloup, who refuses to leave and 
arms himself to protect his property. In reference to the advancing armies he tells 
Helmont, ‘“S’ils me laissent tranquille, je ne bougerai pas… Mais s’ils ont le malheur de 
toucher à la ferme…, gare !”’97 It is not long before Helmont discovers Goudeloup has 
been carrying out his threats when he stumbles across a murdered Prussian. Goudeloup’s 
actions are reminiscent of stories in the Parisian press in November 1870 concerning a 
Sergeant Ignatius Hoff who slit the throats of Germans at night.98 Helmont himself cannot 
conceive of ‘tuer pour tuer’ and passes up the opportunity to shoot a lone Prussian when 
he has the option.99 But he harbours a kind of condescending sympathy for the farmer’s 
actions. Protecting his property just as Weiss had planned to do in La Débâcle, Goudeloup’s 
efforts are represented as rather dishonourable but still patriotic. Whilst hardly a member 
of an organised band of francs-tireurs, Goudeloup is representative of the darker side of the 
citizen soldier, a little too radical for the monarchist republic of the early 1870s which had 
been concerned by Gambetta’s call for a nation-in-arms and its homage to the 
revolutionary armies of 1792.100 The same anxiety is represented by the fanatical 
Cimourdain in Quatrevingt-treize. 
 
In La Débâcle, the francs-tireurs are a slightly more ordered group who are targeting Prussian 
soldiers around Remilly during the siege of Paris. In league with Maurice’s Uncle Fouchard, 
they are poisoning the enemy soldiers by selling them rotten meat.101 The group are well-
aware that their interpretation of patriotism leads to harsh reprisals for their fellow villagers 
but Zola paints a more forgiving if still brutal picture of them when they carry out the 
mock trial and murder of Goliath, a Prussian spy who was responsible for several personal 
miseries in the novel.102 Neither Zola nor Daudet represent their franc-tireur characters with 
the same degree of heroism as those of the regular armies; they are more ambiguous, 
certainly dangerous, but not without patriotism. Essentially, whilst citizen soldiers in the 
historical sense of 1792, they were too radical for the conservative republic of the late 
nineteenth century. Education and order were the central tenets of the Third Republican 
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citizen; rash violence, even when pursued in the name of patriotism, was best left to 
history. 
 
These artistic representations of the Franco-Prussian war have served to illustrate the 
centrality of the citizen soldier in forming and cementing the meaning of citizenship during 
the Third Republic, an identity that not only had a legal basis, but a socio-cultural one too. 
The heroism present on the battlefield, however futile, was traded in for enfranchisement, 
education and stability to ensure the success and longevity of the republican regime. As the 
historiography has made clear, this narrative of citizenship is not restricted to the Third 
Republican period but is pervasive and consistent throughout republican history since the 
Revolution. Whilst the artistic representations of the Franco-Prussian war have provided a 
firm contextual basis for a consideration of representations of the Algerian war, the heroic 
commemorations of the soldiers of the First World War and the celebrated place of the 
Resistance from the Second, suggest a continuation of the republican focus on the citizen 
soldier in defining citizenship. The bastion of the republic is the heroic, moral and 
sacrificial citizen soldier. Yet, in artistic representations of the Algerian war, as the 
following section will illustrate, such a figure is entirely absent. Sidelined entirely from the 
narrative of war, the absence of the citizen soldier throws into question the very nature of 
republican citizenship. This absence points to a revolution in republicanism itself. 
 
 
1.3 The absent hero: cultural representations of conscripts in the Algerian 
war 
George Kelly has argued that Algeria was part of the French army’s soul.103 For most of the 
colonial period, the army had a free hand in Algeria and most professional soldiers had 
done a tour of duty there.104 Yet the arrival of French conscripts did not represent a peak in 
this relationship, but the beginning of its end.105 The citizen soldier was not a hero of the 
Algerian war, not even a martyred one in the face of defeat and retreat. This section argues 
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that in the artistic representations of the Algerian war there are no symbolic citizen 
soldiers, only sidelined conscripts lacking in agency. Unlike La Débâcle’s Jean who drives the 
narrative forward, the soldier in Algeria is a pawn to wider forces. Rather than a self-
sacrificing hero, the conscript becomes a victim. 
 
The implications of such a shift in the representation of soldiers in the national context are 
stark given that, as Graham Dawson has argued, 
 
[h]eroic narratives have been given a particular inflection in discourses of the 
nation generated since the emergence of the nation-state in early-modern 
Europe. Intimately bound up with the foundation and preservation of a 
national territory, the deeds of military heroes were invested with the new 
significance of serving the country and glorifying its name. Their stories 
became myths of nationhood itself, providing a cultural focus around which 
the national community could cohere.106 
 
As the first part of this chapter has shown, in France these narratives of heroism are not 
only bound up with a national identity but with a specifically republican identity and one 
which has defined the notion of citizenship since the Revolution. Dawson considers the 
creation of military heroes to be a method of avoiding the complexity of war, but this does 
not mean that the lack of the hero in the representations considered here brings with it a 
reconsideration of these complexities.107 Whereas a heroic war narrative supports a moral 
triumphalism which is self-evidently nationalist, the representation of the soldier as a victim 
is a method of avoiding responsibility for a pursuit of war that, in the subsequent 
republican narrative, was not a moral pursuit. 
 
The teleological narrative of the ‘invention of decolonization’, which Todd Shepard 
identifies, is precisely the culmination of finding the Algerian war morally indefensible and 
retelling it as a story of progress and success of the mission civilisatrice.108 Artistic 
representations of the war within this narrative cannot depict a heroic soldier because he 
would be fighting against the inevitable tide of History. Instead, the conscript is 
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represented as a victim. As such, the agency of the character is removed and the republic’s 
responsibility for war, sometimes even the war itself, can be denied.109 The conscript can be 
visible in republican artistic representations of the war without challenging the discourse of 
decolonisation.110 
 
Antoine Prost, in a discussion of the memory of the Algerian war, sees the notion that ex-
conscripts could ‘claim their rights as victims of war’ as ‘implausible’ because the ‘war itself 
lacked the legitimacy for this claim.’111 Prost unwittingly raises a crucial point in terms of 
victimhood. He is quite right in rejecting the possibility that the conscripts were either able 
to claim to be, or be represented as, victims of the war against Algeria given that the war 
itself challenged the ‘invention of decolonisation’ narrative. However, this does not 
connote a rejection of a victimhood status, only a rethinking of what the conscripts were 
victims of. 
 
The concept of victimhood has been scrutinised by Robert Moeller, amongst others, in the 
context of German artistic representations of the Second World War, particularly in 
literature and cinema.112 The German people, initially in both the DDR and the Federal 
Republic and latterly in a unified German state, were popularly represented as victims of 
the Nazi regime, suffering from the aggressive war machine for which, by extension, they 
were not responsible. As civilians living under the bombing raids in Dresden, Wehrmacht 
soldiers being pushed to their death on the Eastern Front and expellees fleeing the 
Communist advance, the German cultural narratives of the war clearly separated the 
aggressive Nazi state from the victimised German people. This ‘rhetoric of victimisation’ 
served a variety of political and social purposes in both East and West Germany but most 
particularly was a unifying force which could hold together a war-ravaged and politically 
fragmented society; as Aleida Assmann has noted, ‘nothing unites as much as the historical 
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trauma of a collective experience as victims.’113 The basic premise of such a rhetoric comes 
from being able to make ‘a radical distinction between ordinary Germans and fanatical 
Nazis’ which then creates a connected opposition between victim and perpetrator.114 
Furthermore, the ‘rhetoric of victimisation’ concentrates on specific and selective events 
that avoid a discussion of the war’s origins, an acknowledgement of which would implicate 
many as perpetrators.115 
 
In representations of the Algerian war, what the conscripts are represented as victims of 
varies, particularly over time, but it is certainly ‘implausible’ for them to be victims of 
Algerians; to suggest such a thing would be to entirely undermine the republican discourse 
of decolonisation as an inevitable and progressive force. Algerians cannot be represented as 
the enemy in republican culture because this would undermine the progressive element of 
the narrative inherent in the perceived success of the mission civilisatrice.116 Furthermore, the 
occurrence of the ‘rhetoric of victimisation’ in relation to French conscripts, as with the 
German case, avoids the representation of the war’s origins, which again would undermine 
the decolonisation discourse by highlighting that the republic had originally been fighting 
against ‘decolonisation’ in 1954. There is a shift in the status of victimhood over time in the 
representations of conscripts and, as such, these representations will be considered roughly 
chronologically in order to draw out these distinctions and suggest reasons for such 
changes. 
 
1.3a Representati ons in  the  1960s 
Unlike the German literature studied in relation to victimhood in which expellees dominate 
the narrative, representations of conscripts in republican culture in the first decade after the 
end of the Algerian war are largely sidelined.117 They exist almost in the background of a 
more dynamic story which they are not party to and, indeed, often cannot access. This 
difference in prominence comes from the different places the two groups have in their 
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own national narratives; whilst the expellees are representative of the suffering inflicted 
upon the whole German nation as a result of the Nazi war machine and its aftermath, the 
French conscripts do not play a significant role in the decolonisation discourse and, indeed, 
if they were to figure too prominently, would be damaging to such a narrative.118 This will 
become apparent in the analysis of three sources from the 1960s: Alain Resnais’s film 
Muriel, ou le temps d’un retour (1963), Jacques Démy’s film Les Parapluies de Cherbourg (1964) 
and George Perec’s short story, Quel petit vélo à guidon chromé au fond de la cour? (1966). Whilst 
there are many other novels and films from the 1960s which contain representations of the 
Algerian war, there are only three included here as the others do not contain 
representations of conscripts, only the professional army, further evidence that the 
conscript is not a dominant figure in republican representations of the Algerian war.119 In 
contrast to representations of conscripts in the Franco-Prussian war, the would-be citizen 
soldier of the Algerian war does not take centre-stage. 
 
Muriel is Resnais’s second collaboration with the writer Jean Cayrol, who scripted the 1955 
documentary film Nuit et Broulliard on the Nazi concentration camps, and it followed on 
from the critical success of his 1961 film L’Année derrière à Marienbad.120 Set over a fortnight 
in the coastal city of Boulogne, Muriel focuses on four characters, their deceits and their 
relationship with the past. Antiques dealer Hélène has invited her old flame Alphonse to 
stay. He brings with him Françoise who purports to be his niece but is, in actual fact, his 
young lover. Of the same generation as Françoise is Bernard, Hélène’s step-son who has 
recently returned from his tour of duty in Algeria. The film itself is intentionally muddled 
and confusing, fast-cutting between inanimate objects, upsetting chronology by switching 
between day and night and overlaying sound from one scene onto another. It is an uneasy 
film portraying abstruse and disturbed characters. In essence, it is very characteristic of the 
nouvelle vague style through its use of ‘repetition, circularity, return, refusal (or inability) to 
achieve closure, spiralling in on themselves, gaps, holes, blank spaces, aporias of all kinds, 
                                                
118 Annette Seidal Arpaci, 'Lost in Translations? The Discourse of "German Suffering" and W. G. Sebald's 
Luftkreig und Literatur', Helmut Schmitz (ed.) A Nation of Victims? Representations of German Wartime Suffering from 
1945 to the Present (Amsterdam, 2007) p. 161. 
119 Thus among the absent are novels by Claire Etcherelli, Pierre Leulliette, Jean Pélégri, Jules Roy and Pierre-
Henri Simon, and the films, Cléo de 5 à 7, Le Combat dans l’Île and Le Petit Soldat. 
120 Alain Resnais, Muriel, ou le temps d'un retour (France, 1963); Alain Resnais, Nuit et Broulliard (France, 1955); 
Alain Resnais, L'Année derrière à Marieband (France, 1961). The first twenty-five or so pages of the September 
1961 issue of Cahiers du cinéma, the film journal associated with the nouvelle vague movement (of which Resnais 
was on the periphery), were dedicated to L’Année derrière à Marieband. Muriel would garner a fifteen-page 
discussion. Cahiers du cinéma (no. 123, September 1961) and (no. 149, November 1963). 
1. Citizenship and the Republic 
 80 
jumps and cuts.’121 Despite Muriel’s avant-garde quality, it gained much public exposure in 
France, not only in the intellectual Les Temps modernes, but also through long reviews and 
discussions in Le Monde, L’Express and the entertainment magazine, Télérama.122 
 
Jacques Démy’s Les Parapluies de Cherbourg looks and sounds a world apart from Muriel, and 
yet it utilises familiar tropes which support the republican decolonisation discourse: the 
agency-free victimhood of a conscript who is sidelined from the main story, a lack of 
origins of the war and a suggestion that the Vichy era is of far greater relevance to France 
than the troubles of a single soldier.123 Les Parapluies is an extravaganza of music and colour 
in which every sentence is sung and brightly coloured dresses complement equally vibrant 
backdrops. The storyline is simplicity itself in comparison to the muddle of Resnais’s film. 
Geneviève and Guy are in the throes of young love when Guy is called up for military 
service in Algeria. Geneviève discovers after his departure that she is pregnant and, with 
some coordination from her mother, marries the older and considerably wealthier Roland 
Cassard who is willing to bring the child up as his own. Guy returns to Cherbourg, marries 
his aunt’s carer and the film ends some years later with a chance meeting between the two 
former lovers. In both Muriel and Les Parapluies the heroic citizen soldier is absent and in 
his place is a victimised conscript. This is represented in two ways: firstly, through their 
marginalisation from society upon return from war and, secondly, by undermining the 
significance of their experiences through reference to the Occupation period. 
 
Muriel’s Bernard is a marginalised outsider on many levels. He leads an antagonistic 
relationship with his step-mother and is frequently seen leaving the house and being 
bewildered by the constant rotation of possessions and furniture (Hélène deals in antiques 
from the flat). He is out of work, seemingly of his own accord and has thus separated 
himself from society at a civil level since his return from military service. He rarely engages 
in conversation unless pushed and frequently seems detached from what he is saying. He 
lies to the other characters, telling Hélène that his non-existent fiancée Muriel is ill, only to 
immediately backtrack and say that she is not. He leaves Françoise one evening explaining 
                                                
121 Lynn A. Higgins, New Novel, New Wave, New Politics: Fiction and the Representation of History in Postwar France 
(London, 1996) p. 15. 
122 Bernard Pingaud, ‘Clefs pour Muriel’, Les Temps modernes (no. 210, November 1963); Jean de Baroncelli, 
‘Au Festival de Venise : Accueil favorable pour “Muriel” d’Alain Resnais’, Le Monde (3 September 1963); Jean-
Luc Godard, Pierre Kast, André-S. Labarthe, Henri Langois et Jacques Rivette, ‘Faut-il comprend Resnais ?’, 
L’Express (3 October 1963); Claude-Jean Philippe, ‘Faut-il une clé pour comprendre Muriel ? Le nouveau film 
d’Alain Resnais’, Télérama (13 October 1963). 
123 Jacques Démy, Les Parapluies de Cherbourg (France, 1964). 
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that he is going to see a girl who he insinuates is his financée, only to be found by Hélène 
alone in a bar. Bernard films the world through his hand-held camera, recording scenes 
through windows in cafes and even in his own home when an argument breaks out; there 
is a pane of glass between him and the world.124 And yet, being on the outside and looking 
in, Bernard is also the most perceptive character, seeing Alphonse for the fraud he is in 
terms of his tales of his life in Algeria (which is entirely fabricated) and his relationship with 
Françoise. 
 
The only character in the film Bernard appears close to is his lover Marie-Do, who is not 
known to any of the other characters and also seems to know nothing of the mysterious 
Muriel. In one scene, he encourages Marie-Do to look at him through a kaleidoscope, the 
fragmentation of him through the lens serves to represent the fragmented nature of his 
character in relation to the rest of society. It is not until the scene following Marie-Do’s 
announcement that she is leaving Boulogne that we discover the true identity of Muriel. 
Over footage he shot on his hand-held camera when deployed in Algeria, Bernard narrates 
his participation in the torture of an Algerian prisoner, Muriel. The scene is reminiscent of 
a flashback, giving the viewer both ‘images of memory, the personal archive of the past…, 
[but also] images of history, the shared and recorded past.’125 Bernard is both an individual 
and at the same time representative of ex-conscripts. The incident with Muriel is at once 
his own private experience yet also signifies the common experience of those involved in 
torture during the war. As the shot pans out to take in Bernard’s studio we see that he is 
actually talking to an older man, of Hélène’s generation. The shots of this conversation 
focus on each of the participants’ faces individually, exacerbating the divide between them; 
between France and the returning soldiers. Whilst the complicated back-story which 
involves Alphonse and Hélène, whose hearts, minds and memories are still in the Second 
World War, is in the process of being resolved by the end of the film, Bernard remains as 
he began: a traumatised victim on the edge of society. 
 
Guy is only present at the beginning and end of Les Parapluies; as the plot moves on apace 
in Cherbourg, he is serving as a conscript in Algeria. His departure is a starkly bleak scene 
compared to the bright and jazzy mise-en-scène of the rest of the film, and his equally austere 
                                                
124 I am indebted to Nicholas Shaw for this turn of phrase. Nicholas Shaw, The Pane of Glass Between Me and the 
World (Britain, 2009) http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xcg3gx_the-pane-of-glass-between-me-and-
th_shortfilms (accessed 23 June 2010). 
125 Maureen Cheryn Turim, Flashbacks in Film: Memory and History (London, 1989) p. 2. 
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return is compounded by the fact that it occurs immediately following Geneviève and 
Cassard’s vivid and joyful wedding scene. Guy is a victim of change. The only time he 
appears in the central part of the film during his military service is in a static black and 
white photograph, standing alone with a background that provides him no context. Upon 
his return he is alienated by the changing landscape of Cherbourg, which culminates in the 
replacement of Geneviève’s old umbrella shop with a store selling washing machines. The 
road name has changed from ‘la rue de notre amour’ to ‘la rue des regrets’. He is discarded 
by his true love and separated from his child. One reviewer described him as ‘plutôt passif’, 
in direct contrast to the bright and dynamic residents of Cherbourg of which he used to be 
a part.126 But he is more than passive; he is helpless, agency-less and a victim. 
 
Kirsten Ross has argued that French culture has drawn a relationship between 
decolonisation and modernisation which, in its dying days, ‘bolstered’ the claims of 
colonialism being a civilising mission and thus maintaining, ‘at the peak of the empire’s 
most barbarous behaviour’, its republican credentials.127 Geneviève’s pregnancy and the 
transformation of the shop into one selling washing machines, a clear symbol of modernity 
and the consumerism of les trente glorieuses, are reflective of such a narrative. This notion of 
modernisation, of an inevitable progress, is evident in the decolonisation discourse.128 In 
this environment, Guy has spent most of the film fighting for a cause that disappears 
before his very eyes whilst at the same time, being entirely removed from the 
modernisation engulfing his home town, making it unrecognisable upon his return. The 
social effect of his military service has been to move Guy away from the centre to the 
periphery of society. Furthermore, despite bearing witness to this change in his absence, 
Guy is totally incapable of comprehending the world around him and claims that nothing 
has changed; he is portrayed as psychologically traumatised by his unseen experiences in 
Algeria. When the film ends with Guy alongside his wife and child, his trauma is concealed 
by the apparent success of his civil duty as a father and provider, but it is not the happy 
ending of a true love story. Whilst Bernard is marginalised from civil society, without a job 
or a fiancée, Guy’s apparent integration is actually a front for his lost life.  
 
Bernard is certainly not an heroic citizen soldier character; he is not the future of France 
and for the most part his existence is inconsequential to the other characters and their 
                                                
126 Madeleine Chapsal, ‘Fanny à Cherbourg’, in L’Express (20 February 1964) p. 24. 
127 Kristin Ross, Fast Cars, Clean Bodies: Decolonization and the Reordering of French Culture (London, 1995) p. 114. 
128 This theme of inevitability and modernisation will be developed further in Chapter 2, section 2.3b. 
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storylines in the film. He is a victim of his traumatic experiences of war, as well as French 
society’s unsympathetic reaction to him upon his return. As such, Resnais’s film suggests a 
potential to present a radical challenge to the republican decolonisation discourse and the 
lack of a connection between Algeria and France. However, two aspects of the film 
prevent this being the case. Firstly, the Algerian war is represented as a timeless entity; it 
has neither origins nor conclusions, but exists only as a static memory of Bernard’s which 
has no wider context. As with the victimhood narrative attributed to post-war Germany, 
the failure to acknowledge the war’s origins avoids attributing any cause, and thus 
responsibility, for the war itself. Bernard’s memories do not interrupt the flow of the 
decolonisation discourse. His marginal place in society, in which he lacks agency, 
emphasises that he could not possibly interrupt such a course of history. 
 
Secondly, Bernard’s victimhood is usurped by that of his step-mother. Hélène has suffered 
because of the collective trauma of the Vichy era, which is omnipresent in Muriel. The film 
is laced with Hélène and Alphonse’s memories of their wartime love affair; the mystery of 
the film centres on their conflicting recollections of the past.129 The Second World War is 
present in the very fabric of the film, with the setting of Boulogne. The viewer is constantly 
reminded of the past conflict by the newly-built apartments upon the rubble of the 
destroyed port. Despite the name in the title being part of Bernard’s story, it is Hélène and 
Alphonse’s troubled affair of the past which bookends and dominates the film. In Muriel, 
all begins and ends with Vichy; there is no start or end to the Algerian war, no leaving and 
returning by Bernard and no wider consequence of his whole experience in terms of the 
films’ narrative. Vichy dominates. Resnais, rather than presenting a challenge to the 
republican narrative of the Algerian war, is party to the same trope as the historians noted 
in the introduction to this thesis; the Vichy era takes precedence over the Algerian war thus 
undermining, indeed denying in Muriel’s case, the latter’s importance and impact on the 
French Republic.130 
 
Guy, like Muriel’s Bernard, is a victim alienated from the society in which he lives. Like 
Bernard, too, he is marginalised both by the film and in the film to avoid the Algerian war 
becoming too prominent a feature. The war itself is never seen, is never discussed and has 
no beginning or end beyond Guy’s involvement in it. A fundamental character of the story, 
                                                
129 Naomi Greene, Landscapes of Loss: The National Past in Postwar French Cinema (Princeton, 1999) pp. 46-47. 
130 See Introduction, section I.IIb. 
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Guy’s existence is barely commented upon in the central part of the film and his absence 
does not prevent the film’s narrative driving forwards. His loss of Geneviève and his child 
is the most evident example of his marginalisation but there is a further element which 
emphasises this and denies the significance of the Algerian war to France. Given that his 
absence in the film, the loss of both his way of life and his first child are all singularly due 
to his conscription into the French army, his aunt’s flippant contention that ‘“le régiment 
n’est pas la guerre”’ is indicative of the status young conscripts shipped off to Algeria had 
to the generation that lived through the Occupation.131 His part in the war, and the war 
itself, is entirely undermined by the attitude of his aunt’s generation. The implication is 
clear: the post-Vichy era of modernisation and affluence is not to be interrupted by the 
unnecessary and unspoken troubles of those who had experienced ‘le régiment’ in Algeria.  
 
Two years after Démy’s hugely popular musical production, Georges Perec penned a ludic 
short story, Quel petit vélo à guidon chromé au fond de la cour?, as much a challenge to literary 
conventions as it was an amusing tale.132 Perec had just published his first novel, Les Choses, 
which Max-Pol Fouchet, writing in Le Nouvel Observateur, picked for one of his top three 
books of 1965.133 He would go on to become a member of OuLiPo, a collective of writers 
and mathematicians who were fascinated by the potential of language and wished to push 
the boundaries of literature, as their full title suggests: Ouvroir de littérature potentielle.134 Under 
the influence of this group, Perec constructed what is probably the longest palindrome ever 
written, at over 5000 characters in length, but his penchant for inventiveness with language 
was already apparent in Quel petit vélo.135 It also effectively illustrates the rhetoric of 
victimisation in the Algerian war context. The story follows the attempts by a group of 
Parisian intellectual chums to help a young conscript avoid being sent to Algeria in the 
closing months of the war. It is narrated by Perec whose friend, Henri Pollak, is a sergeant 
in the same regiment, as well as an intellectual; he leads ‘une double vie’.136 
 
                                                
131 [“Military service isn’t war.”] 
132 Georges Perec, Quel petit vélo à guidon chromé au fond de la cour? (Paris, 1966). Perec even cites Démy’s film in 
his story. p. 52. 
133 Max-Pol Fouchet, ‘Les Trois livres qu’ils ont prefers en 1965’, Le Nouvel Observateur (29 December 1965). 
134 For an overview on Perec’s background and his works see Leonard R. Koos, 'Georges Perec: P or the 
Puzzle of Fiction', Yale French Studies 75 (1988). 
135 Georges Perec, 'Le Grand Palindrome', 1967 [accessed 18 June 2009] 
http://home.urbanet.ch/urba7038/motscroises/lexique/palindrome.htm. 
Perec is perhaps most famous for his lipogrammatic 1969 novel, La Disparition in which the letter ‘e’ is 
never used. He also won the Prix Médici in 1978 for his huge tome, La Vie Mode d’Employ: Romans. 
136 Perec, Quel petit vélo, p. 12. 
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The conscript they are attempting to save from deployment is a rather simple character. 
Karamanlis is a feckless private whose first action in the tale is to sob ‘comme un petit 
enfant’ and plead with Pollak to injure him sufficiently so that he is prevented from being 
sent to Algeria.137 Karamanlis is then left to the whim of the narrator and his friends. He is 
given no further agency in the tale, indeed his ‘immédiat avenir’ is decided by a round of 
voting when he is not even present.138 When he does arrive into the narrator’s house, where 
his future has been plotted and prepared, he is intimidated and sits with 
 
la morve au nez, mais n’osant se moucher, recroquevillé dans un coin, ne 
soufflait mot, ou bien parfois, sous la bienveillant insistance de nos regards 
convergents, il esquissait un faible sourire et disait d’un ton neutre : ‘C’est 
bien chez vous quand même, c’est petit, mais c’est bien.’ Ce qui était on ne 
peut plus juste.139 
 
His fate decided in his absence, Karamanlis is led to it by Pollak and another (‘dont le nom 
ne vous dirait rien’), the plan being that it should be made to look as though Karamanlis 
was mentally unstable and had attempted to take his own life.140 The plot plays out in a 
farcical manner and entirely fails, blamed, by the narrator at least, on Karamanlis’s own 
drunken foolishness. 
 
Karamanlis’s victimhood is developed in various ways: his evident weakness and 
malleability as a character, his sick and defeated state at the end of the novella as he is made 
to board the train, but also in the nature of his representation from the very beginning of 
the tale. Quel petit vélo begins by introducing him, 
 
C’était un mec, il s’appelait Karamanlis, ou quelque chose comme ça : 
Karawo ? Karawasch ? Karacouvé ? Enfin bref, Karatruc. En tout cas, un 
                                                
137 Ibid. p. 18. [like a baby. Georges Perec, 'Which Moped with Chrome-Plated Handlebars at the Back of the 
Yard?', Georges Perec (ed.) Three (London, 1996)] 
138 Perec, Quel petit vélo, p. 55 [immediate future]. 
139 Ibid. pp. 62-3. [his snot-filled nostrils, not daring to blow his nose, curled up in the corner, not breathing a 
word, unless, egged on by the convergence of our friendly gazes, he would sketch a feeble smile and say, 
deadpan: ‘Nice place you’ve got here, anyway, small, but nice.’ Which as dead on goes, was dead on.] 
140 Ibid. p. 88. [whose name would mean nothing to you] 
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nom peu banal, un nom qui vous disait quelque chose, qu’on n’oubliait pas 
facilement.141 
 
This initial paragraph not only sets out the ludic tone of the story, it also introduces the 
first of many literary conventions which are broken in the novella by consistently changing 
the name of a central character.142 Karamanlis is only called Karamanlis in this first 
sentence; whenever he is referred to subsequently the suffix of his name changes. This 
linguistic game serves to weaken Kara-’s character all the more, not even being sturdy 
enough to hold on to a consistent proper noun. As Sylive Rosienski-Pellerin has argued, ‘le 
héros porte un nom afin qu’on puisse y associer tous ses succès’.143 Without a name, Kara- 
cannot be the hero required of a citizen soldier. 
 
It has another and perhaps more pertinent effect too. Whilst many of the various different 
suffixes seem chosen purely for amusement’s sake (‘Karamel’), some are recognisable as 
common ends to surnames, such as ‘stein’, ‘schoff’, ‘berg’ and so forth.144 A character’s 
name ‘doit nous dire quelque chose, ce n’est certainement pas sur l’origine ethnique ou le 
statut du personnage.’145 By not defining him thus, Kara- is able to be more than one 
conscript: he is the representation of many in the same position. Unlike Bernard and Guy 
in Muriel and Les Parapluies who are distinctly alienated individuals, the multiply-named 
Karamanlis collectivises the conscript experience, suggesting that it is not just Karamanlis 
who is the victim of being forced into war, but all the Kara-s. As such the novel considers 
all conscripts in the Algerian war to be victims, victims of an army high command (who are 
present at the end of the story, loading the conscripts onto their trains) continuing a 
fruitless war. 
 
                                                
141 Ibid. p. 11. [There was once this character called Karamanlis. Or something like that: Karawak? Karawash? 
Karapet? Well, anyway, Karathingy. It was a weird enough name, whatever it was, a name that rang bells, that 
stuck in your mind.] 
142 This ludic tone is present throughout the novel and culminates in the bizarre inclusion of an index which 
bares precious little relation to the rest of the text and trails off after ‘Psittacisme, certes’ with ‘etc., etc., etc.’ 
Ibid. p. 119. For more on Perec’s use of the index, see Bernard Magné and Peter Consenestein, 'Georges 
Perec on the Index', Yale French Studies (2004). 
143 Sylvie Rosienski-Pellerin, 'Jeux Péritextuels: Quel petit vélo à guidon chromé au fond de la cour? de Georges 
Perec', Etudes Litteraires 23 (1990) p. 37. [the hero has a name so that we can associate all of his successes with 
it] 
144 Perec, Quel petit vélo, pp. 34, 60, 14 and 41. 
145 Rosienski-Pellerin, 'Jeux Péritextuels', p. 37. [must tell us something, but it certainly not the ethnic origin 
or status of the character.] 
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The notion that the war is fruitless is central to both Karamanlis’s victimhood and the 
nature by which Quel petit vélo presents a story complementary to the republican narrative of 
the Algerian war. Much like Muriel and Les Parapluies, Perec’s short story does not include 
the beginning or the end of the Algerian war and the site of conflict is never represented in 
the narrative. As such, there is no discussion of the origins of the war and thus no 
responsibility is attributed. But unlike the two earlier films, the end of the war is alluded to, 
indeed repeatedly and flippantly so. The affirmation throughout the story that ‘l’armistice 
c’est dans la poche et la paix est signée’ follows the post-war teleological decolonisation 
discourse.146 This extenuates Karamanlis’s victimhood (particularly at the end of the story 
as he is packed off to a war in which he will serve no purpose) and collectivises it, as all 
those who had been conscripted had served in a futile conflict. Yet, once again, the conflict 
and the conscript are sidelined by the narrative; for the narrator and his intellectual chums, 
their part in Karamanlis’s fate was evidently just an amusing episode in their day and would 
have no lasting impact on their lives. The Algerian war was simply an inevitable process of 
decolonisation and of little concern for the future of the French republic. 
 
The rhetoric of victimisation dominates these republican artistic representations of French 
conscripts in the Algerian war. The conscripts are not the heroic and self-sacrificing citizen 
soldiers of earlier wars, but marginalised figures with little impact on French society. Unlike 
the victimhood narratives in Germany where the Nazi state is the collective counter-image, 
that is to say representations of ordinary Germans always portray them as victims of the 
Nazis, there is no collective consensus for the conscripts in the Algerian war. As Helmut 
Schmitz has argued, collective suffering is necessary to ‘serve collective purposes and 
underwrite a collective narrative.’147 This lack of a collective in relation to representations 
of conscripts in the Algerian war reiterates their marginality from society, a society which 
remains unaffected by their existence, able to pursue their past obsessions, modernisation 
or intellectual japes with no interruption. 
 
This lack of unity and collective consensus in the victimhood narrative, is caused by the 
lack of unity in what the conscripts are victims of; there is no suitable alternative to the 
collective enemy of the Nazis. Indeed, there are no representations of an enemy and no 
                                                
146 Perec, Quel petit vélo, p. 30. [the armistice is in the bag and peace is signed] Also ‘ils nous la flanqueront la 
dégelée et que la paix elle est signée’, ‘le négoce il s’enclenche et que la paix elle est signée’, ‘le cessez-le-feu il 
sera conclu et que la paix elle est signée’, and ‘la trêve c’est pour tantôt et que la paix est signée.’ pp. 29, 33, 
78, 84. These phrases always come at the end of a paragraph, giving them additional finality. 
147 Schmitz, 'The Birth of the Collective', p. 94. 
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representation of the war itself, not even the French-dominated battlefields akin to those in 
the paintings of de Neuville and Detaille. Because they are now the success stories of 
France’s mission civilisatrice, the Algerians, even just the FLN, cannot be represented in the 
same way as the Bavarians who destroyed Weiss’s house in La Débâcle. In the Franco-
Prussian war, Bertrand Taithe has argued, ‘national identity had been strengthened against 
the Germans, and Germany then became the counter-image of France’.148 In 
representations of the Algerian war there is no such counter-image. As such, even their 
victimhood is confused and intangible: they are victims of France’s obsession with the 
Vichy past to the detriment of its present in Muriel, to modernisation in Les Parapluies and 
to the ambiguous professional army who bundle the sick Karamanlis onto a train in Quel 
petit vélo.149 
 
The rhetoric of victimisation in relation to representations of conscripts in the Algerian war 
does two things. The first, in a similar way to the rhetoric of victimisation in post-Second 
World War Germany, is to avoid a consideration of the origins of the war, the reasoning 
behind the existence of the conscripts’ (or the expellees in the German case) and thus the 
responsibility for and purpose of the war itself.150 Secondly, the lack of unity in the 
conscripts’ victimisation marginalises them, thereby denying the importance of their 
experiences. There are no heroes in these representations of the Algerian war, and certainly 
no heroic citizen soldiers. As the beginning of this chapter asserted, the citizen soldier was 
the basis of republicanism’s understanding of citizenship. The absence of this heroic figure, 
and his replacement with a marginalised victim in artistic representations of the Algerian 
war suggests a fundamental shift in this understanding. The denial of the conscripts’ 
relevance alongside the teleological decolonisation discourse which permeates these texts, 
avoids a consideration of this alteration in republican citizenship and of questioning how 
such definitions have changed. 
 
 
                                                
148 Taithe, Citzitenship and Wars, p. 158. 
149 Both Guy Austin and Timothy Baycroft have asserted that ‘in the range of French films with the Algerian 
War as either the background or the main subject, in almost none does “the Algerian”, much less “the 
enemy” appear at all.’ They are correct in terms of the films in the first decade after the war but, as the 
following section will show, this changes somewhat in the 1970s. Baycroft, France: Inventing the Nation  p. 119; 
Guy Austin, 'Representing the Algerian War in Algerian cinema: Le Vent des Aurès', French Studies 61 (2007) p. 
183. 
150 Robert G. Moeller, 'Victims in Uniform: West German Combat Movies from the 1950s', Bill Niven (ed.) 
Germans as Victims: Remembering the Past in Contemporary Germany (Basingstoke, 2006) p. 57. 
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1.3b Representati ons s inc e  the  1970s 
The avoidance of the conflict zone in artistic representations of the Algerian war did not 
last and the war became a central theme of many films and novels once the first decade 
after the war had elapsed. The conscripts became more prominent actors in these 
representations and, subsequently, the enemy also became more tangible, akin perhaps to 
the much greater visibility of the Prussian armies in La Débâcle of 1892 in comparison to 
earlier works. Yet the enemy remained ambiguous and whilst fire is aimed at the FLN in 
battle, the continued lack of representation of the origins or endings of the war as well as 
the often complex relationships which make up the stories, suggest that the true enemy is 
not necessarily the one faced on the battlefield. 
 
Two films from the early 1970s took audiences directly into the arid landscape of the 
Algerian theatre of war. René Vautier’s Avoir 20 ans dans les Aurès (1972) and Yves Boisset’s 
R.A.S.(1973) both placed the conscript as a central figure in Algeria.151 Avoir 20 ans follows 
a group of green conscripts on their tour of duty in the Aurès mountains accompanied by 
Lieutenant Perrin and a young parachutist, Noël.152 Two events stand out in the film: the 
first is the conscripts’ reaction to de Gaulle’s plea for loyalty to France during the Generals’ 
putsch in Algiers in April 1961. After hearing him on the radio the conscripts arrest Perrin 
until a further broadcast from de Gaulle has confirmed the threat’s end. The second is the 
desertion of Noël in reaction to the treatment of a prisoner. This adventure ends in tragedy 
with the death of himself, the prisoner and an Algerian family who had helped them. 
R.A.S., an abbreviation of rien à signaller, or nothing to report, begins in 1956 and follows 
three conscripts, Charpentier, March and Dax, from their departure held up by protests at 
the train station, to their posting with the formidable Commandant Lecoq. The film 
presents a very similar environment to Vautier’s film and depicts the break-up of the three 
friends with the tragic death of Charpentier and the desertion of March. 
 
Both Vautier’s and Boisset’s films include scenes of conflict between the conscripts and the 
FLN, torture, killing and Avoir 20 ans also graphically depicts the multiple rape of an 
Algerian woman. Yet the narrative of victimhood permeates both films and their empathy 
lies clearly with the conscripts. This is achieved in three interconnected ways. Firstly, the 
                                                
151 René Vautier, Avoir 20 Ans dans les Aurès (France, 1972); Yves Boisset, R.A.S. (France and Italy, 1973). 
152 Noël is played by Alexandre Arcady, director of Le Coup de sirocco discussed in Chapter 2. His ambiguity as 
a sympathetically-depicted paratrooper is discussed alongside Pierre Leulliette’s semi-autobiographical novel 
Saint Michel et la dragon in Chapter 3. 
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Algerians themselves lack any real characterisation; they rarely have names, motives or 
desires and are usually simply a collective mass.153 Even the prisoner who Noël rescues in 
Avoir 20 ans, whilst honoured with a name, Youssef, is unable to speak French. As such 
there remains a very palpable divide between Noël and Youssef which is also a divide 
between the audience and Youssef as his words are not subtitled and thus would make little 
sense to most of the French audience. Whilst it would be an exaggeration to suggest that 
the Algerian characters were dehumanised in either of these films, they are certainly not a 
particular concern and indeed often feel incidental to both narratives. The fate of the 
conscripts is given far more importance than the fate of a few background figures. 
 
Secondly, related to this is the strong characterisation of the professional army, embodied 
in the two films by Lieutenant Perrin and Commandant Lecoq. The conscripts’ victimhood 
is in relation to this army elite. Both narratives imply that the fault of the conscripts’ 
postings to Algeria lies with their commanders and by implication, their actions are a result 
of their unwanted duties. This is the third strand of victimhood: the lack of agency. When 
Dax kills a sous-officier and subsequently commits suicide in R.A.S., it is Dax’s death which is 
a tragedy, pushed beyond his limits and driven to extremes by a situation outside of his 
control. Both March’s and Noël’s desertions are futile gestures, the latter resulting in the 
death of innocent civilians and thus excusing those who stayed in their posts. Furthermore, 
Avoir 20 ans ends in a similar manner to its beginning, with Lieutenant Perrin addressing a 
fresh batch of novice conscripts. The message is clear: regardless of their actions and their 
protests, the pursuit of war is out of the conscripts’ control. It is a circular process which 
they have no ability to end. 
 
Vautier and Boisset were both militant left-wing filmmakers, but these films continue to 
perpetuate the same teleological decolonisation discourse of their earlier counterparts.154 
                                                
153 Jean-Charles Jauffret has argued that the lack of ‘distinctive, declared enemy’ in the Algerian war altered 
the culture of war for the French combatants and caused a division between the professional paratroop 
regiments and the conscripted soldiers. Jean-Charles Jauffret, 'The War Culture of French Combatants in the 
Algerian Conflict', Martin S. Alexander, Martin Evans, and John F. V. Keiger (eds), The Algerian War and the 
French Army, 1954-62: Experiences, Images, Testimonies (Basingstoke, 2002) p. 101. 
154 Télérama’s review of the Avoir 20 ans dans les Aurès includes a whole paragraph on Vautier’s political 
activities including acts of resistance under the Vichy regime as a teenager, a prison spell in Tunisia and 
support for the decolonisation of black Africa in the 1950s. The centre-right journal, Le Figaro’s tirade against 
Boisset’s film leaves one in no doubt of the director’s left-wing credentials. The left-wing Nouvel Observateur is 
not impressed by the film either despite, as the reviewer writes: ‘Ce devrait être tout simple: Yves Boisset a 
fait un film de gauche, “Le Nouvel Observateur” va donc dire du bien du film d’Yves Boisset. Normal et 
confortable. Les ennemis de nos amis sont nos ennemis.’ The issue in this review is less a political complaint 
and more a problem with a poorly made film. Jean-Louis Tallenay, ‘Avoir 20 ans dans les Aurès’, Télérama (21 
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This is particularly clear in the inclusion in both films of the events surrounding the 
Generals’ putsch of April 1961. The scenes in the films relating to this event deliberately and 
effectively draw a very distinct dividing line between the conscripts and their military 
superiors, a separation already clear through previous incidents. The filmmakers are not 
anti-republican, rather they are opposed to the army elite who are represented as ‘brutal 
and fascistic’.155 As such, the conscripts’ status as victims is affirmed and the republican 
narrative of an inevitable decolonisation prevents a deeper questioning of the role and 
actions of the soldiers themselves. William Cohen makes a very astute point when he 
suggests that many ‘of the films on the war are projections of what France today wishes its 
soldiers had done.’156 The futile acts of desertion in Avoir 20 ans and R.A.S. are very clear 
instances of such a projection and it is such a desire that drives even politically radical 
filmmakers to reiterate the decolonisation discourse: ordinary French people did not 
support the war, did not fight the war willingly and consistently foresaw an independent 
Algeria as an automatic outcome. As such, there remains an avoidance of questioning the 
war’s origins or its effect on the nature of republicanism itself, particularly in relation to 
citizenship. The responsibility for war is at most placed in the hands of the professional 
army (and later, the OAS), or simply denied altogether. 
 
The distinction between the conscript and the professional army is also a regular trope in 
literature and repeated in many different forms in order to separate the conscript from the 
brutality of the Algerian war. Philip Dine has identified this separation in his overview of 
novels which represent the war through into the 1990s. In Philippe Labro’s Des feux mal 
éteints (1967) the professional army is associated with the terrorist group, the OAS, and the 
conscript, Seb, shoots himself; in Guy Croussy’s Ne pleure pas, la guerre est bonne (1975) the 
main character, again a conscript, is against the war being waged by his superiors; in both 
Robert Pépin’s Pavillon 144 (1981) and Pierre Bourgade’s Les Serpents (1983) the conscript 
                                                                                                                                          
May 1972); Jean Pouget, ‘A Propos de “R.A.S.” : Réflexions luminaires sur le film d’Yves Boisset’, Le Figaro 
(10 August 1973); Pierre Ajame, ‘A la française !: Du cœur et du courage mais une lourdeur qui rend anodin 
ce qui se coulait explosif’, Le Nouvel Observateur (20 August 1973). 
Jill Forbes notes a shift to much more overt political cinema from the 1970s. I reject the implication that 
the cinema of the 1960s is thus not political, but certainly in term of cinematic representations of the Algerian 
war, those of the 1970s are more clearly politically aligned. The same is true for right-wing filmmakers, such 
as Pierre Schoendoerffer and his 1977 film Le Crabe-tambour. Jill Forbes and Sue Harris, 'Cinema', Nicholas 
Hewitt (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Modern French Culture (Cambridge, 2003) p. 332. See also Guy Austin, 
Contemporary French Cinema: An Introduction (Manchester, 1996) pp. 40-42.  
155 Philip Dine, Images of the Algerian War: French Fiction and Film, 1954-1992 (Oxford, 1994) p. 229. Stora notes 
that both these films were made in a post-1968 atmosphere in which comparing figures of authority with the 
Nazi SS had become part of the generation’s discourse. Stora, La Gangrène et l'oubli, p. 251. 
156 William B. Cohen, 'The Algerian War and French Memory', Contemporary European History 9 (2000) p. 490. 
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central to the narrative commits suicide after being forced to participate in torture, an end 
also met by six of the eight conscripts in the short story collection, Trente ans après: nouvelles 
de la guerre d’Algérie (1992).157 
 
The division between conscript and career soldier is also present in Virginie Buisson’s 
autobiographical novel, L’Algérie ou la mort des autres, in which the narrator, who begins the 
story as an eleven-year-old girl, moves to Algeria in 1954 with her family as her father, a 
high ranking military official, is stationed there.158 Her father, as one would expect in a 
novel narrated by the young daughter, is seen mainly in a domestic setting, protecting his 
family and showing no desire to be in Algeria. The division between conscript and 
professional army occurs outside the home. She shares friendships, and later sexual 
relationships, with individual conscripts she meets. Their commanders and, later, members 
of the OAS remain impersonal and distant figures. Her relationship with Jacques 
dominates the final third of the novel and who, as a pied noir, is represented as both a 
civilian and a conscript: 
 
J’avais une robe rose de collégienne en vacances, tu étais encore en civil. Tu 
m’as dit qu’il te restait huit mois d’armée et qu’après tu retournerais dans la 
ferme de tes parents à Sédrata. J’ai aimé que tu ne dises pas la guerre.159 
 
Their summer romance is cut off by Jacques’s return to the war (‘La guerre nous a repris’). 
The responsibility for their separation is represented as the Generals’ putsch of April 1961 
and the rise of the OAS. The narrator’s description of these events is sandwiched in 
between two references to Jacques’s absence: 
 
Je n’ai plus vu Jacques et j’ai retrouvé l’isolement dans une école qui se 
barricade. 
… 
 Je ne vois plus Jacques.160 
                                                
157 Dine, Images of the Algerian War, pp. 116-145; Daniel Zimmerman, ed., Trente ans après: Nouvelles de la guerre 
d'Algérie (Paris, 1992). There are sixteen short stories in this collection, eight by French authors, which are the 
stories I am referring to here, and eight by Algerian authors. 
158 Virginie Buisson, L'Algérie ou la mort des autres (Paris, 1981) [1978]. 
159 Ibid. p. 81. [I had the pink dress of a middle school student on vacation, you were still in civilian clothes. 
You told me that you only had eight months left in the army and that afterwards you would return to your 
parents' farm in Sédatra. I was pleased that you did not say the war.] 
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He returns in the finale of the book as the OAS-led violence and fear is at its peak and of 
which he too is a victim: ‘J’ai peur de la mort des autres. J’ai peur pour Jacques, pour mon 
père qui ne parle pas, pour mes frères qui ne jouent pas.’161 Jacques’s death, at the hands of 
the OAS immediately after she witnesses them killing a ten-year-old boy, ends the novel. 
His body is removed by a faceless patrol and ‘ils m’ont forcée à t’abandonner.’162 
 
That the narrator is never in a position to see Jacques in combat evidently makes it easier 
to portray him as a victim, but the clear division drawn between his superiors alongside the 
OAS, and the conscripts and civilians in Algeria, ensures that he is as much a victim as 
those not so actively involved in the war. Akin to the novels Dine reviews, the conscript 
becomes a victim of the anti-republican professional army and the OAS. As such they 
maintain a lack of agency and thus responsibility for the pursuit of war itself. 
 
Whilst the artistic representations of conscripts in the 1970s are more willing to place them 
in the conflict zone, they confirm the narrative already present in the representations from 
the 1960s. These men are not the heroic citizen soldiers common in republican 
representations of earlier wars, but marginalised victims lacking in agency. This lack of 
agency enables Vautier’s and Boisset’s films to overcome the problem of portraying a 
torturer as a victim, but the more complex and direct representations of the conscripts is 
most notably balanced by a clear drawing of who they are victims of: not the FLN, not the 
republic, but the professional army.163 
 
This division between conscript and professional continues into the twenty-first century 
and is present in Philippe Fauçon’s La Trahison, Laurent Herbiet’s Mon Colonel and even 
Jean-François Richet’s 2008 blockbuster Mesrine: l’instinct de mort.164 Mesrine caricatures the 
trend by suggesting at the beginning of the film that the notorious gangster, Jacques 
Mesrine’s brutality was a result of the brutality he witnessed and was forced to take part in 
                                                                                                                                          
160 Ibid. p. 83 and 85. [I never saw Jacques again and I found isolation in a school that was barricading 
itself… I do not see Jacques anymore.] 
161 Ibid. p. 86. [I am afraid of the death of others. I am afraid for Jacques, for my father who no longer 
speaks, for my brothers who no longer play.] 
162 Ibid. p. 93. [they forced me to abandon you.] 
163 This division between the republic and the army is discussed further in Chapter 3, section 3.2a. 
164 Philippe Fauçon, La Trahison (2005); Laurent Herbiet, Mon Colonel (France, 2006); Jean-François Richet, 
Mesrine: L'Instinct de mort (France, 2008). I will consider these films in more detail, including the relationship 
between conscript and professional soldier, in Chapter 3. 
1. Citizenship and the Republic 
 94 
as a conscript in Algeria. Whilst this relationship will be considered further in Chapter 3, it 
is worth noting that it is not itself new or unique in representations of the Algerian war and 
is in evidence with the division between the incompetent generals and the heroic Jean and 
Maurice in La Débâcle. It is the absence of heroism and, instead, the presence of the 
rhetoric of victimisation, which makes this relationship distinctive in the case of the 
Algerian war. 
 
 
1.3c  An Algerian s yndrome? 
Antoine Prost has raised concerns in relation to the conscripts’ memory of the Algerian 
war. He argues that because of the nature of the war’s end, when it became an illegitimate 
cause to fight, conscripts were unable to form collective memories which should have 
impacted on the national memories of the period.165 Instead, according to Prost, their 
memories remained cloistered amongst fellow veterans, shared through veteran 
associations. Yet, as Alan Forrest has argued, the sharing of memories only amongst other 
soldiers rather than with amongst civilians, is not unusual. In relation to the Napoleonic 
wars of the early nineteenth century, he considers the popularity of veterans’ associations: 
 
[Joining these associations], just like the veterans of other wars in modern 
times, suggests that their military experience was not one which they entirely 
wished to forget, even if many chose to brush out from their memory 
moments of particular brutality or overarching fear. The fact that they found 
it so difficult to communicate with civilians, with those who had not shared 
the same arcane rituals and absurdities, helping in the process of healing in 
which they were all involved, of searching for a meaningful narrative of their 
lost years.166 
 
In a documentary film of 1992, Bertrand Tavernier and Patrick Rotman interviewed many 
veterans of the Algerian war who were all members of the same veterans’ association in 
                                                
165 Prost, Republican Identities in War and Peace, pp. 169-171. 
166 Forrest, Napoleon's Men, p. 133. The idea that having different ‘collective memories’ of an event is 
somehow damaging or detrimental is one that continues to be rolled out in relation to the Algerian war. This 
concern is very much tied to the universalist aspect of the republican narrative of French history and the 
Algerian war, discussed further in Chapter 2. See, for example Pascal Blanchard and Isabelle Veyrat-Masson, 
eds, Les Guerre des mémoires: La France et son histoire, enjeux politiques, cntroverses historiques, stratégies médiatiques 
(Paris, 2008); Eric Savarèse, Algérie, la guerre des mémoires (Paris, 2007). 
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Grenoble.167 La Guerre sans nom actively promotes the argument that these men are 
traumatised because they have been unable to share their memories and that those 
memories have been repressed. Tavernier declared he wanted ‘to bring back to life a 
forgotten memory’.168 Certainly, they find it difficult to communicate such experiences to 
those who are unable to comprehend the horrors of war, but many of the interviewees 
state that they share such memories with their fellow veterans. This it not to say that the 
men in the documentary are not traumatised; many clearly are and show signs of post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) on film, particularly in the conclusion when the camera 
pans a hall full of veterans, many with obvious tremors. But it is extremely manipulative to 
suggest that such trauma is because they have been unable to communicate their 
experiences effectively to the broader public who have little to offer in the way of empathy. 
PTSD was first identified in American soldiers who had fought in the Vietnam war in 1980 
and has only slowly gained acceptance as a legitimate condition. Tavernier’s film 
unwittingly hinders such an understanding of the veterans’ mental trauma by suggesting it 
is a result not of the war itself, but of the inability to communicate their memories of war 
to a wider audience. 
 
In the interviews Rotman conducts, whilst recalling particularly traumatic events is 
unsurprisingly a struggle for some, the veterans are clearly happy to talk about their 
experiences, to have them filmed and to be presented to a public audience. It is simply that 
it is the first time for most that they have been asked. This is the crux of the matter: not 
that there is a repression of conscripts’ memories in relation to the Algerian war but that 
there was no interest in them. The invention of decolonisation narrative essentially paints 
the conscripts’ role in the war as, at best, peace-keepers during the period of the OAS, and 
at worst, entirely illegitimate. 
 
The figure of the conscript is present in many artistic representations of the Algerian war, 
from the years immediately following the war’s end to the present day. Initially he is a 
marginal character, either in his importance to the story of which he is part, or is 
represented as marginal within the society he inhabits. But within a decade the conscript 
came to be at the forefront of both cinematic and literary representations. This is not an 
                                                
167 Bertrand Tavernier, La Guerre sans Nom (France, 1992). 
168 Bertrand Tavernier, 'I Wake Up, Dreaming', Projections 2 (1993) p. 267. See also Greene, Landscapes of Loss, 
pp. 125-127. For a more critical consideration of Tavernier’s intentions, see Maryse Bray and Agnès 
Calatayud, 'Remembrance of Things Past: New Perspectives on Films and French Domination in Algeria: 
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unusual state of affairs; Hugo’s 1874 novel Quatrevingt-treize avoids direct representation of 
l’année terrible whereas Zola’s La Débâcle (1892) represents the soldiers in the Franco-
Prussian war in great detail; a short passage of time before representations of defeated 
soldiers become prominent does not seem to be particularly surprising. Hollywood was no 
more quick off the mark with films about Vietnam as, with the exception of the gung-ho 
The Green Berets (1968), the war was not represented in film until well into the 1970s.169 
What is clear is that there is no lack of representations of the conscript in the Algerian war, 
and certainly no ‘repression’ as those who have claimed the existence of an Algerian 
syndrome would have it. Moeller, in his consideration of the victimhood narrative in post-
Second World War Germany is critical of a similar phenomenon, arguing that historians 
and commentators are ‘constantly claiming to break the silence that…has never really 
existed.’170 
 
This claim of repression of the conscript memory is deliberately reminiscent of Rousso’s 
thesis on the Vichy syndrome, but it is also part of his ‘syndrome’: the obsession of 
repeated controversies and already-known ‘revelations’ about the Vichy era.171 This is 
perhaps best considered in relation to the film Muriel. Philip Dine considers it a radical film 
in relation to Algeria, breaking the ‘cinematic taboo on the French military’s use of torture’ 
and exposing the repressed memory of the war.172 His opinions are echoes of ones made by 
the reviewers in Cahiers du Cinéma upon its release.173 Yet, whilst it was the first film to be 
released which referred to the use of torture in the war (Jean-Luc Godard’s Le Petit Soldat 
was made in 1960 but censored until 1964, a year after Muriel’s release), it was in no way 
breaking a taboo in relation to the use of torture which had been extensively covered in the 
French press during the war and particularly during flashpoints like the release of Henri 
Alleg’s La Question (1958) and Gisèle Halimi and Simone de Beauvoir’s Djamila Boupacha 
(1962).174 That the film represents the returned conscript Bernard as an outsider to the 
                                                
169 Gilbert Adair, Hollywood's Vietnam: From 'The Green Berets' to 'Apocalpse Now' (London, 1981). 
170 Moeller, 'Victims in Uniform', p. 28. 
171 Henry Rousso, The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944, trans. Arthur Goldhammer 
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172 Dine, Images of the Algerian War, p. 223. 
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society he inhabits is not, as has been shown in this chapter, a radical challenge to the 
decolonisation discourse which delegitimates his actions in the war, indeed it compounds 
such a discourse. Resnais’s film is certainly radical in terms of its representation of the 
Vichy period and its aftermath, but it strikingly conventional in the representation of the 
conscript in the Algerian war. Resnais transfers the trope of repression from his older 
characters to Bernard, suggesting that he suffers from the same trauma. Not only does this 
undermine the very different nature of Bernard’s experience (and thus his experience, 
which we barely witness at all), it avoids the Algerian war’s origins and conclusions by 
fixing his experience within the narrative of the Vichy era; the film itself begins with the 
reuniting of Hélène and Alphonse, separated by the Occupation, and ends with the mystery 
of their relationship solved. Bernard’s story is simply pulled along in its wake. 
 
There has been no silence in regard to the conscript in the Algerian war, but that is not to 
say the representations have been a balanced and truly critical affair.175 The dominance of 
the Vichy comparison in terms of the claim to ‘repressed’ memory in historiography, film 
and literature, is a further method of downplaying the importance of the conscript in the 
Algerian war by placing their experiences, or the interpretation of their experiences, in the 
shadow of the earlier period. As such, the representations continue to bolster, or certainly 
leave unchallenged, the teleological republican decolonisation discourse. The trope of 
Vichy is used to conceal or undermine the role of the conscript in Algeria and, as such, to 
conceal the revolution in citizenship which this absence of the citizen soldier signals. What 
this revolution entailed is the subject of the second part of this chapter. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
Picasso. Hommage des peintres Lapoujade et Matta. (Paris, 1962). The discussion of torture in representations of the 
Algerian war is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
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1.3d Conc lus ions  
The victimhood narrative which runs through the representations of conscripts in the 
Algerian war is both a method of denying responsibility for the war and denying its 
existence as a brutal conflict between the French Republic and the Algerian FLN. Initially 
this victimhood is ambiguous: conscripts are marginalised victims of a society in which 
they no longer fit because of their war experiences, usurped by the march of modernity or 
sidelined by the importance of an earlier conflict. In later representations, they become 
victims of the professional army and particularly the OAS. This allows the conscripts to be 
represented as fighting in Algeria but their role is futile and they are fighting an unwinnable 
war, forced into fighting against the very march of progress.176 This rhetoric of victimhood 
complements, even allows for the fact that, by 1962, there was ‘an absence of a generally 
accepted sense of the legitimacy of the Algerian war’.177 
 
There is no doubt that conscripts did suffer during the Algerian war and many lost their 
lives. Yet suffering is morally neutral whilst victimhood is ‘ethically coded’; one can both 
suffer violence and perpetrate it, but a rhetoric of victimhood is a claim to a sole right to be 
considered a victim.178 In the republican narrative of the war, the conscript can be nothing 
other than a victim, and no other group can lay claim to the same status in relation to the 
Algerian conflict.179 As such, the consideration of the effects the war had on Algerian 
society is entirely absent.180 The power of this rhetoric enables the framing of a victim even 
when such a character has perpetrated the most violent of acts. Despite his involvement in 
Muriel’s torture and death, it is Bernard who is the victim in Resnais’s film. As James Orr 
has noted in relation to a similar rhetoric he considers in Japanese culture after the Second 
World War, this tendency towards a singular victimhood is ‘self-serving and ultimately 
apologist.’181 It is this aspect of the rhetoric of victimhood which allows the responsibility 
for the Algerian war to be dismissed and avoids a consideration of the war’s impact, 
particularly, as this thesis is concerned, on the republican conception of citizenship. 
                                                
176 Raphaëlle Branche and Jim House, 'Silences on State Violence During the Algerian War of Independence: 
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The conscript is not absent in artistic representations of the Algerian war, but the same 
cannot be said for the citizen soldier. The image of the heroic citizen soldier has been 
present in the republican narrative of France since the Revolution; the mythical power of 
the levée en masse permeated artistic and historic culture right into the twentieth century.182 
War, for the republican soldier, was not simply a defence of the patrie but a fight ‘for a new 
way of life, a set of institutions, a part of their national heritage that dated back to the 
Revolution.’183 The citizen soldier is a moral force, who fights with courage and 
enthusiasm.184 The decolonisation discourse which permeates republican cultural 
representations of the Algerian war erases the possibility that the conscripts stationed in 
Algeria are a moral force fighting for the republican cause, heirs to the levée en masse. As was 
argued at the beginning of this chapter, throughout republican history, the citizen soldier 
has been synonymous with the republican citizen. The soldier was central to defining a 
republican citizen. Yet, as is evident from the artistic representations studied here, in the 
mid-twentieth century the conscript went from national symbol to a marginal and futile 
figure. The Algerian war of 1954-62 fundamentally altered the historical relationship 
between the soldier and republican citizenship. 
 
The second part of this chapter will consider how this change in representation is evidence 
of a revolution in the understanding of republican citizenship; how, in both legal and 
cultural terms, the Algerian war marked a fundamental shift in defining what it meant to be 
a French citizen. Additionally, identification of this change also suggests a fresh perspective 
into an old debate concerning France’s slow pace of reform in the sphere of gender 
equality, particularly in comparison to Britain and Germany. It is to this issue that this 
chapter will briefly turn. 
 
 
1.4 Citizenship and Gender 
There has been much debate in French historiography concerning the role of women in 
society and particularly in relation to the slow and often regressive policy changes in 
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relation to women being part of the active citizenry. These debates often centre around the 
restrictive Napoleonic Civil Code and the late enfranchisement of women, some thirty-six 
years after their peers in Britain or Germany.185 Despite the frequency with which suffrage 
in France is referred to as ‘universal’ from 1848, only half the adult population were able to 
vote until roughly a century later. The most frequently cited and ‘republican-friendly’ 
reason for this delay is that granting women the vote would simply boost the power of the 
anti-republican Catholic right, given that women were generally assumed to be far more 
pious than men (and, indeed, attended church with greater frequency). This is the main 
explanation Sîan Reynolds offers in terms of the regular blocking by the Senate during the 
interwar period of bills attempting to widen the franchise to include women.186 Sudir 
Hazareesingh provides a broader range of reasons, beyond the immediate political 
implications, for such a slow realisation of electoral equality in the Third Republic: 
 
[S]ince the Revolutionary era, moderate republicans had always taken a 
restrictive view of equality, always defined in civil as opposed to social or 
physiological terms… 
[There were] elite republican concerns – probably well-founded – that 
enfranchising women would give an enormous boost to the Catholic Church 
and its political allies… 
[A] socio-cultural argument could be offered, drawing out the “bourgeois” 
nature of republicanism and identifying the normative constraints on the 
equalization of gender roles… 
Republican anti-feminism thus arose through a combination of these factors 
together with the fact that many powerful women in nineteenth-century 
France deliberately eschewed a robust form of feminism…[advocating] 
feminine difference rather than feminine equality.187 
 
No doubt all of these explanations had some influence in society but they are all based on 
negative reasoning, on anti-feminism or restrictive equality or, as the clerical argument 
would suggest, even an anti-democracy. None of these ring true with the largely positive 
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rhetoric of republican ideology which stems from the Revolution. Robert Tombs has noted 
that the ‘lack of a vote for the female half of humanity should perhaps have posed an 
important philosophical problem, but it did not’, yet he fails to consider why this was the 
case.188 
 
As this chapter has argued, both in historiography and in artistic representations, 
republican citizenship is represented as a positive trait and intrinsically related to the heroic 
and dynamic figure of the citizen soldier. The relationships between citizenship and 
enfranchisement, and citizenship and the citizen soldier are intrinsic, and it is here that the 
reasons behind women’s political inequality lie. ‘National imageries’, as T. G. Ashplant has 
noted, are ‘centred around the idealized figure of the masculine soldier’ and nowhere is this 
more true than in republican France.189 Unlike the largely professional traditions of Britain 
and Germany, the French army is centred around the figure of the citizen soldier and has 
been since the first levée en masse. Thus, to be a republican citizen was synonymous with 
being a citizen soldier, a pathway not open to women. As such, the calls for votes for 
women remained stunted, less because they were women than because they could not be 
citizen soldiers. 
 
The gendered nature of republican citizenship was not an inevitable ideological outcome of 
the Revolution. Abbé Sièyes considered the Revolution’s purpose to be one of overcoming 
such divisions, or at least eradicating their impact on citizenship: 
 
Advantages which differentiate citizens from one another lie outside their 
capacity as citizens. Inequalities of wealth or ability are like inequalities of age, 
sex, size, colour, etc. In no way do they alter the nature of the equality of 
citizenship; the rights inherent in citizenship cannot attach to differences.190 
 
It was the militarisation of society from the Revolutionary wars that tied gender so 
intrinsically to citizenship through the imagery of the levée en masse. Alan Forrest considered 
this imagery to be ‘highly gendered’ as women ‘occupied the wings or played a secondary 
role in the action… there to encourage their sons and brothers, husbands and lovers, to 
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urge them to put their love for the Republic above such feelings as they had for the women 
in their lives.’191 Women could thus be sacrificial, but not heroic in the manner of men.192 
 
In contrast to the heroics of masculine citizen soldiers, women who take a more active role 
during periods of conflict become threatening and even savage, visions which are 
particularly in evidence around the myths of the tricoteuses of the Terror and the pétroleuses of 
the Commune, as well as the jibes against the ‘idea of battalions of “Amazons”’ during the 
Second Republic.193 Karine Varley utilises this trend to explain why, in French artistic 
representations of the iconic defence of Bazeilles during the Franco-Prussian war, women 
are absent from accounts; there was a fear of associating the savage image of pétroleuses with 
an episode of heroic resistance.194 Charles Berheimer, in a study of cultural representations 
of prostitutes in the nineteenth-century, has argued that their prominence in art was a 
method ‘to control and dispel her fantasmatic threat to male mastery.’195 The prominence of 
the prostitute as a figure in cultural representations, particularly after the defeat of 1871 (in 
the paintings of Degas, Toulouse-Lautrec and Manet for example, but especially in the short 
stories of Guy de Maupassant which feature the figure of the prostitute in direct relation to 
representations of the war) are potentially a reaction to the threat to masculinity after 
military defeat; a way of re-emphasising the control and power of the citizen soldier in 
relation to a debased view of women.196 
 
On the other hand, positive depictions of women in art after the 1871 defeat place them in 
very controlled bourgeois environments. Albert Boime contrasts Gustave Caillebotte’s Jeune 
homme à sa fenêtre (1876) with his Intérieur, Femme à la fenêtre (1876) in which the former is 
‘unabashedly authoritarian’, in a masculine stance surveying his territory, whereas in the 
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latter the equally bourgeois woman ‘is denied the same degree of hierarchical control’, her 
stance more tentative and her space infiltrated by a man seated in the foreground of the 
picture.197 The contrast between the sexes is even more evident in Hugo’s Quatrevingt-treize. 
Near the beginning of the novel, Michelle Fléchard, peasant mother of the children who 
the Marquis de Lantenac would later kidnap, is happened upon by a group of revolutionary 
soldiers from Paris. They question her allegiances in ways which are entirely alien to her: 
 
‘Quelle est ta patrie?’ 
‘Je ne sais pas, dit-elle.’ 
‘Comment! tu ne sais pas quel est ton pays?’ 
‘Ah! mon pays. Si fait.’ 
‘Eh bien, quel est ton pays?’ 
La femme répondit: ‘C'est la métairie de Siscoignard, dans la paroisse d'Azé.’ 
Ce fut le tour du sergent d'être stupéfait. Il demeura un moment pensif. Puis il 
reprit: ‘Tu dis?’ 
‘Siscoignard.’ 
‘Ce n'est pas une patrie, ça.’ 
‘C'est mon pays.’ Et la femme, après un instant de réflexion, ajouta: ‘Je 
comprends, monsieur. Vous êtes de France, moi je suis de Bretagne.’ 
‘Eh bien?’ 
‘Ce n'est pas le même pays.’ 
‘Mais c'est la même patrie!’ cria le sergent. 
La femme se borna à répondre: ‘Je suis de Siscoignard!’198 
 
The confusion is evidently one of etymology and the inability to distinguish between pays 
and patrie, the latter of which is more than an indicator of geographical location but 
‘expresses in addition the concept of a parent-child relationship between an area and its 
inhabitants, a filial bond to a political entity which Michelle Fléchard, the natural mother, 
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cannot understand.’199 The soldiers, on the other hand, have a clear sense of the usurping 
importance of the patrie and represent the republic, something of which Fléchard cannot 
conceive; there is a degree of security in ‘belonging to a gendered national collectivity’.200 
The artistic representations of the early Third Republic are a reassertion of masculinity 
taking place after the defeat of the heroic citizen soldier. The formation of citizenship into 
an essentially masculine entity has become ubiquitous in republican culture. In essence, 
even when defeated, war acts as a boost to the gendered nature of citizenship precisely 
because it is evidence of the active nature of republican citizenship through the citizen 
soldier. 
 
The combination of gendered citizenship and war would effect the status of women 
throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In the highly militaristic society of the 
First Empire, the introduction of the 1804 Civil Code drastically demoted the legal status 
of women, even losing their French nationality altogether if they married a foreigner.201 
This particular clause was only removed in 1924 when natalist concerns brought on by fear 
of the rise of Germany took precedent; women’s nationality became important again once 
their purpose as mothers to citizen soldiers became paramount.202 It is possible even to 
suggest that the enfranchisement of women in the aftermath of the Second World War was 
in recognition of their role as citizen soldiers in the Resistance, although it may be 
stretching the point somewhat. It is certainly not a coincidence that the legal recognition of 
women as citizens is so temporally close to the breakdown of the citizen soldier narrative 
which this chapter has documented. 
 
Robert Aldrich touches upon but does not explore a key element to gendered citizenship 
when he writes, the ‘very acts of colonisation – exploration, conquest, development of 
natural resources, pacification of indigenes, the governance of new domains – were 
associated in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century thought with the male gender.’203 
Essentially, for the most part, such acts were pursued by the army. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that with the retreat from the colonial territories which had been at the very 
heart of the French army, most particularly Algeria, that these inherent links of gender, 
soldiery and citizenship begin to be redesigned. Whilst the gendered element of citizenship 
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loses its prominence just at the same moment the image of the citizen soldier does, an 
opposite – an ‘other’ – surfaces to stand as the contrast to, and thus help freshly define, the 
French republican citizen. This is the revolution in republicanism which occurred during 
the Algerian war. The second part of this chapter will argue that the Algerian war led to a 
redefining of republican citizenship in relation to race. 
 
 
Part II. Citizenship, origin and race 
 
The first part of this chapter has argued that republican citizenship had always been 
inherently connected to the figure of the citizen soldier. The absence of this figure in 
relation to the Algerian war suggests a fundamental change in republican ideas of 
citizenship. The revolution which occurred during the Algerian war oversaw the end to the 
citizen soldier tradition and essentially reconfigured what it meant to be a republican 
citizen. This second part considers what has defined citizenship since the Algerian war and 
how the war, particularly alongside the decolonisation discourse, has altered French 
national identity. Essentially, I will argue that citizenship is no longer defined by a positive 
trait (the citizen soldier) but in a negative manner.204 The Algerian war oversaw a revolution 
in republican citizenship in which origin and race became pronounced indicators of who 
was and, most critically, who was not a citizen. Whilst I in no way imply that race is a novel 
concept in French citizenship, the Algerian war and its aftermath gave it a new 
prominence.205 This section begins with a legal discussion of citizenship in relation to 
Algerians based on the historiography, largely on Todd Shepard’s and Patrick Weil’s 
research, and will then move on to consider how artistic representations have 
reconstructed citizenship along racial lines. 
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1.5 Algeria and the legal basis of citizenship 
From 1848, Algeria was France but this did not equate with Algerians being French. 
Algerians remained subjects rather than citizens, a distinction which had not applied to 
anyone on French soil under a republican regime.206 Only with the founding of the Fifth 
Republic did all Algerians become full French citizens, an identity which was collectively 
removed five years later in direct violation of the Evian Accords which brought the 
Algerian war to an end.207 Between 1848 and 1958 ‘Muslim’ a was legal distinction in 
relation to the population of the three Algerian départements, rather than a religious 
identification.208 Racial categorisation, language relating to ethnicity or origins, was 
specifically avoided and never codified in legal texts as to do so would be to reject the goals 
of the Revolution.209 The view was taken that Algerians would become full citizens through 
assimilation although it was Napoleon III, not the republic, that actually embraced such a 
possibility with the Senatus-Consulte of 1865. To become citizens, Algerians had to 
renounce Islam and their Koranic local civil status. The latter was extremely restrictive in 
terms of civic freedoms in relation to the French state (qualifying freedom of movement, 
rights to employment and representation before the law) but allowed a use of Islamic law 
in non-state matters. 
 
The Third Republic saw the collective granting of citizenship to all Jewish inhabitants of 
Algeria with the 1870 Crémieux decree which, along with the distinctions that the French 
attempted to draw between Berbers and Arabs despite the centuries of integration, 
‘indicates the extent to which Islam was held up as a object of contempt.’210 The necessity 
to renounce Islam in order to gain full citizenship remained until 1947. Further legislation 
in 1884 ‘automatically naturalized all children of European origin born in Algeria, thus 
creating the so-called “French-Algerian community”.’211 Azzedine Haddour is right to 
suggest this was in part due to the fact that the non-French European population of 
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Algeria had begun to outnumber the French, which was both embarrassing and, most 
fundamentally, a security issue. Yet it also reiterated that Islam, as defined by the republican 
state rather than by Algerians, was the barrier to assimilation. A more cynical view would 
suggest that this religious distinction, made clear by the collective legal assimilations of 
1870 and 1884, was a useful cover for a discrimination based upon origins, which of course 
would be a rejection of the Revolutionary and republican belief in universalism. 
 
Patrick Weil rejects the argument that French citizenship was based on race at any time 
during the period when Algeria was considered to be a part of France, with the exception 
of the Vichy period.212 In the run up to the Algerian war and in response to the Cold War, 
Weil argues, questions of origin and citizenship did arise but were thoroughly rejected in 
1953 and from then on, for a further twenty years, ‘le critère de l’origine disparaît des 
débats sur la nationalité et des pratiques de naturalisation en particulier, et de la nationalité 
en général.’213 His argument is reminiscent of the Vichy exceptionalism which the 
introduction to this thesis takes issue with. It is also utterly indefensible in light of the legal 
evidence Shepard provides in relation to the changing nature of citizenship over the course 
of the Algerian war and its end. 
 
As has already been noted, the Fifth Republic finally granted full adult universal suffrage to 
all citizens of the French republic, specifically extending it to include all Algerian men and 
women who had maintained their local civil status – the vast majority. ‘The French 
Revolution’s promise of universal adult suffrage was fulfilled’ not in 1944 but in 1958.214 
De Gaulle’s intention with this move was evidently to appease the rebels by offering a real 
chance of equality and recognition within a French state. As such, the Algerian local civil 
status was maintained by de Gaulle, although only as a temporary step on the path to 
assimilation. But the demands from the FLN had always been based on independence and 
such late-in-the-day gestures had little effect on their support and certainly none on their 
aims. Three years later, when de Gaulle’s government had accepted the steadfastness of 
such demands and entered into peace negotiations, discussions on nationality maintained 
this new egalitarian quality. The policy of a dual nationality was championed by the French 
delegation at Evian. The settlers would have dual nationality for three years and must then 
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choose between two options, ‘devenir Algérien ou adapter un statut de résident étranger 
privilégié.’215 A similar arrangement for Algerians was suggested in which they would be 
free to move to mainland France, although this was in direct contrast to the GPRA’s united 
Algeria ideal.216 According to French law, in 1962 all ‘people from Algeria remained French 
citizens unless they officially renounced it’.217 Equally, according to the Evian Accords, all 
those wishing to remain in Algeria had the right to do so. 
 
Yet during the exodus over the summer of 1962 in which the European population of 
Algeria, almost in its entirety, left for mainland France and were ‘repatriated’, measures 
were put in place to prevent a similar trip being made by citoyens français musulmans d’Algérie 
(to use their official title). Over the course of several months, the language of French 
citizenship became overtly based upon race. Aimed particularly, although not exclusively, at 
the tens of thousands of harkis (Algerians who had fought for the French during the war) 
fleeing Algeria, the government moved to prevent their arrival on French soil. Whilst the 
leaked Joxe telegram of 12 May 1962 which exposed this policy caused some initial outrage, 
in an Ordinance of 21 June the French government ‘unilaterally altered one of the primary 
elements of the Evian Accords: the right of all people from Algeria to keep French 
citizenship’, a right central to the government’s successful referendum campaign in April.218 
By July de Gaulle openly announced that ‘the term repatriates obviously does not apply to 
the Muslims. In their case we are dealing only with refugees.’219 This not only breached the 
Evian Accords, it also drew a very distinct dividing line between who qualified to be 
French, on a basis entirely dependent on race. Those who were considered ‘repatriates’ 
were eligible to specific state benefits, those who were ‘refugees’ were not.220 Shepard 
identifies documents from May 1962 which distinguished between European and Muslim 
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origine.221 By 1963, nine million people had had their French citizenship removed on the 
basis that they were Algerian of Muslim origin rather than Algerian of European origin. 
The majority of the latter continued to be French.222 
 
Republicans had, for over a hundred years, insisted that Algeria was an integral part of 
France and Algerians were either French citizens or in the process of becoming French 
citizens through assimilation. The revolution in republicanism caused by the Algerian war 
witnessed this rhetoric of the assimilability of Algerians being fundamentally rejected based 
purely on their origin. For Shepard, that this became an acceptable norm in republican 
France, a regime based on the ideology of the Revolution with its belief in universalism, 
assimilation and effectively colour-blindness, was due to the invention of the 
decolonisation narrative. The purported belief that France had played her part in the 
civilisation of Algeria which had thus earned its right to independence was a complete 
rejection of all earlier justifications for French military involvement in the country. It also 
allowed a compete rejection of any responsibility for the safety and well-being of former 
French citizens, particularly the harkis, of which hundreds of thousands were brutally killed 
by the FLN. For de Gaulle, they were simply ‘the victims of that unavoidable and planetary 
evolution that has been called decolonization.’223 
 
 
1.6 Representations of Algerians and the reconstruction of citizenship 
Part of the contention of this thesis is that the legal changes which Shepard documents in 
his invention of decolonisation thesis, are supported by cultural representations which 
sympathise with republican ideology. The final section of this chapter will return to these 
representations of the Algerian war, and specifically consider the representation of 
Algerians. The racial distinctions in French citizenship drawn by de Gaulle are in evidence 
and continue to support the decolonisation discourse. The representation of the harkis and 
their relationship with the citizen soldier symbol will make up the first half of this section, 
followed by a broader consideration of the representation of the Algerian, first in Algeria 
and then in France, which will argue that the Algerian is now the focus of the ‘other’ in 
                                                
221 Shepard, 'Excluding the Harkis', p. 97. 
222 Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization, pp. 2-3. 
223 Charles de Gaulle quoted in ibid. p. 7. 
1. Citizenship and the Republic 
 110 
France, the opposite of a French citizen and thus an aid to a negative and thus exclusive 
and racist understanding of citizenship. 
 
1.6a The harkis and the  re j e c t ion of  the  c i t izen soldier  
The Evian Accords stipulated that, 
 
Nul ne peut être inquiété, recherché, poursuivi, condamné, ni faire l’objet de 
décision pénale, de sanction disciplinaire ou de discrimination quelconque en 
raison d’actes commis en relation avec les événements politiques survenus en 
Algérie avant le jour de la proclamation du cessez-le-feu.224 
 
There can be little doubt that the fate of the harkis was at the forefront of the minds of the 
men that drafted this paragraph. The likelihood of the harkis’ fate was predictable at the 
beginning of 1962 but just as the French government ignored the agreement on dual 
nationality, so the new Algerian government had little interest in honouring such 
proclamations of protection, particularly for a group considered to be abhorrent traitors. In 
November 1962, Le Monde estimated that more than ten thousand harkis had been killed in 
Algeria since the cease-fire; Shepard and Alexander conceive of a final estimate being 
closer to 100,000.225 Given that there were roughly 200,000 harkis serving in the French 
army during the war and 52,000 managed to cross into France in the summer of 1962, 
Shepard’s figure may be considered feasible although a gross underestimation if one also 
includes the collective reprisals against harkis’ families.226 The ferocity of these murders was 
not muted by their occurrence after the ceasefire. 
 
In the novels and films studied in this thesis, the harki is rarely a dominant character and is 
frequently absent in representations of the war. But this absence is not total and nor can it 
                                                
224 Quoted in Lacouture, Algérie, la guerre est finie, p. 177. [No one can be investigated, searched for, charged, 
condemned nor receive any penal decision, disciplinary sanction or any manner of discrimination as a result 
of acts committed in relation to the political events in Algeria before the date of the proclamation of the 
cease-fire.] 
225 Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization, pp. 232-233; Martin S. Alexander, Martin Evans and John F. V. 
Keiger, 'The "War without a Name", the French Army and the Algerians: Recovering Experiences, Images 
and Testimonies', Martin S. Alexander, Martin Evans, and John F. V. Keiger (eds), The Algerian War and the 
French Army, 1954-62: Experiences, Images, Testimonies (Basingstoke, 2002) p. 25. 
226 These figures come from William B. Cohen, 'Legacy of Empire: The Algerian Connection', Journal of 
Contemporary History 15 (1980) p. 107. Cohen estimates that around 130,000 Algerians, harkis and their 
dependents, arrived in France in the summer of 1962. 
Algeria in France 
 111 
be explained away by some kind of collective amnesia. An analysis of four sources, Pierre-
Henri Simon’s 1958 semi-autobiographical novel, Portrait d’un officier, and the films, Cher 
Frangin (1989), La Trahison (2005) and Cartouches Gauloises (2008), will give a clearer 
understanding of why they do not feature prominently as characters in republican culture, 
and what insights this provides into the altered nature of republican citizenship caused by 
the Algerian war.227 
 
Simon was a Catholic republican intellectual who came to prominence in the beginning of 
1957 with his pamphlet, Contre la torture which spoke out against the use of torture 
specifically influenced by the Battle of Algiers being waged by General Jacques Massu and 
his paratroopers.228 A frequent contributor to Le Monde’s literature reviews in the early 
1960s, Simon was appointed to the Académie française in November 1967. He was 
consistently critical of France’s use of torture by the military, considering it to be sullying 
the honour of the nation, but neither Contre la torture nor Portrait d’un officier engage with the 
possibility of Algerian independence. Essentially Simon, in 1958, continued to believe in 
the mission civilisatrice but was not willing to accept the methods used to maintain it.229 
Portrait d’un officier tells the story of Jean de Larsen who meets the narrator of the book on a 
train as he travels back from Algeria. They knew each other as prisoners of war in the 
1940s but unlike the narrator, Larsen continued to pursue his military career, first in 
Indochina and then in Algeria. His experiences with an Algerian family, a father in his 
battalion in Indochina and then his son in Algeria, led Larsen to prematurely end his army 
career. The son, a harki (although the word itself is not used in the novel), particularly 
represents an altering perception of the citizen soldier (of which the sources previously 
discussed are a culmination) and, when compared to later cultural representations, show 
the development of the decolonisation discourse in the cultural sphere which Shepard has 
identified through legal history. 
 
The father, Brahim Sadoun, had served with Larsen as a conscript in the liberation of 
France: 
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Frères d’armes, nous l’avion été magnifiquement pendant vingt-six mois, du 
Sud algérien au Rhin et au Danube, et cela dit tout : une confiance absolue, un 
certitude de connaître l’autre.230 
 
The relationship of loyalty and bravery between Larsen and Sadoun is both reminiscent of 
the relationship between Jean and Maurice in La Débâcle (brothers, although not equal 
brothers, in arms) and also a clear representation of the republican tradition of the citizen 
soldier which is notably absent in representations of the Algerian war.231 Sadoun was loyal 
to France, believed in educating his children and had aspired to one day be a French officer, 
but the death of his own father had meant he had been forced to leave school to provide 
for his family.232 A situation not dissimilar to Jean’s, the quintessential citizen soldier of the 
Third Republic who, despite his expertise as a soldier and loyalty to France, is unable to 
progress further up the ranks of the army because of his lack of education.233 Sadoun 
remains in the army after the Second World War to continue to fight by Larsen’s side and as 
such finds himself fighting against the independence movement in Indochina. 
 
Larsen then tells of an exchange between himself and Sadoun in Indochina in which 
Sadoun is intending to leave the army. Feeling that not only is the war in Indochina not his 
to fight, Sadoun’s loyalty to France, given the lack of progress in Algeria, is faltering, indeed 
has failed: ‘que les Français s’arrangent avec les Viets, ça les regarde ; mais ce n’est pas mon 
affaire d’empêcher des Jaunes de reprendre leur liberté, quand nous n’avons pas encore la 
nôtre.’234 Larsen entirely rejects Sadoun’s reasoning (as, one is left to suppose does Simon 
who, as the narrator, never seeks to defend it) and emotionally blackmails Sadoun to stay, 
appealing to his personal trust and loyalty to himself rather than to France. Four days later, 
Sadoun is killed in combat.235 
 
                                                
230 Simon, Portrait d'un Officier, p. 97. [We had been the most perfect brothers in arms for twenty-six months, 
from southern Algeria to the Rhine and the Danube, and that says everything: complete confidence, the 
certainty of knowing each other. Pierre-Henri Simon, Portrait of an Officer, trans. Humphrey Hare (London, 
1961) [1958]] 
231 Simon, Portrait d'un Officier, pp. 97-99. In La Débâcle, Jean is Maurice’s superior in the army as well as his 
main bastion of support and advice. 
232 Ibid. p. 99. 
233 Zola, La Débâcle, p. 3. Indeed, Jean is not even able to reach the rank of sergeant which, under Larsen’s 
guidance, is the rank Sadoun eventually achieves. 
234 Simon, Portrait d'un Officier, p. 106. [let the French fight it out with the Viets, that’s their affair, but it’s no 
business of mine to prevent these yellow men recovering their liberty, while we still haven’t got ours.] 
235 Ibid. p. 108. 
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Larsen’s service then takes him to Algeria where he pays a visit to Sadoun’s family and 
finds he has become a family hero, a ‘personnage mythique’.236 As such, Sadoun’s son 
Kadour, whose life Larsen had saved as a child by loaning the family money for medical 
treatment, signs up to serve under Larsen in the fight against the FLN. Kadour becomes a 
harki of his own volition based on the same loyalty to Larsen that killed his father. What is 
notable is that Kadour is never represented as having the loyalty to France which his father 
had when fighting in the Second World War. Instead, Kadour is representative of a 
conspicuously different generational mindset to his father. Larsen’s description of him to 
the narrator is worth quoting at length. Kadour was 
 
un soldat consciencieux, discipliné, et sur ce point je retrouvais bien le fils de 
Brahim ; cependant, plus évolué que son père, il était l’homme d’une 
génération à la fois plus imprégnée d’influences françaises et plus susceptible 
dans son amour-propre national. Le premier Brahim que j’avais connu n’était 
pas déchiré, sa fierté de se battre pour la France éclatait dans un cœur où 
demeuraient pourtant intactes ses croyances et ses traditions d’Algérien 
musulman. Il avait fallu les froissements infligés par les maladresses et 
l’absurde orgueil de beaucoup des nôtres pour l’éveiller progressivement à une 
douleur que la guerre l’Indochine avait fait éclater. Chez son fils, je sentais que 
le drame existait virtuellement, congénital, antérieur à l’expérience, mais avec 
un autre accent, plus trouble : l’esprit, les mœurs de notre civilisation, et pas 
toujours dans ce qu’elle avait de meilleur, l’avaient marqué ; il avait vécu dans 
sa petite ville de province africaine à peu près comme un garçon de chez 
nous, aimant le sport, la rue, le café, le cinéma, les pin-ups ; de sa religion, il 
ne gardait guère que des coutumes extérieures, quelques gestes consacrés, le 
respect du nom Allah ; mais, plus détaché de la spiritualité de son peuple, il 
tenait davantage à sa personnalité d’Arabe, plus fier et plus crispé dans sa 
différence, dans sa déférence même.237 
                                                
236 Ibid. p. 110. 
237 Ibid. pp. 122-123. [a conscientious, disciplined solder, and as far as that went I could see in him the son of 
Brahim; however, he was better educated than his father and belonged to a generation that was at once more 
imbued with French influences and more conscious of its national pride. Brahim, when I had first known 
him, had not been torn two ways, his heartfelt pride in fighting for France had been apparent though he had 
preserved intact his Algerian Muslim’s beliefs and traditions. It had been only the slights inflicted on him by 
many of our fellow-countrymen…that had gradually brought him to the state of mind that had come to a 
crisis in the war in Indo-China. In the son’s case, I felt that this emotional drama was innate and congenital, 
that it preceded experience but had another, and more disquieting, accent: the mentality and habits of our 
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Kadour would eventually desert to the Algerian side and be killed as a result; Larsen’s part 
in this is his reason for leaving the army. Importantly, it is a personal relationship rather 
than a disillusionment with the army’s cause that leads to Larsen’s resignation. The above 
quotation is, in essence, an abbreviation of the success of the civilising mission which 
Simon continues to hold dear in 1958. Kadour is both more educated and, crucially, more 
secular than his father, both values which have dominated republicanism particularly since 
the Third Republic. Kadour has become so like a Frenchman that he can no longer be a 
Frenchman. There is a distinct whiff of the decolonisation discourse which permeates later 
representations of the Algerian war, although given the early nature of Simon’s book, and 
his rather moderate political leanings, it is not yet fully formed. 
 
Simon’s book supports the civilising mission, hints at its success, touches upon the 
inevitability of decolonisation and expertly avoids dealing with any of the complexities of 
the Algerian war which is raging as he writes. With the death of Sadoun in Indochina, the 
novel stops the possibility of the heroic republican figure of the citizen soldier becoming 
affiliated with the FLN, which would throw up a crisis of legitimacy in Simon’s essentially 
colonialist story. If Sadoun had straddled both these identities he would have affiliated the 
Algerian independence movement with the liberation of France thus undermining France’s 
entire history in Algeria, turning it into one of occupation, indeed Occupation, rather than 
one of Algérie française and the mission civilisatrice. Kadour is distinctly not the citizen soldier 
his father was; his loyalty is surely a personal one to Larsen not a patriotic one to France. 
As such, his defection to the FLN does not lead to a crisis for Simon’s understanding of 
the war. Most importantly, in terms of the representation of the harki, Kadour’s death 
rejects any need to consider what his final fate would be at the war’s end, an event not 
given any consideration by the novel thanks to Larsen’s timely return to civilian life. 
 
Portrait d’un officier avoids almost all the complexities of the Algerian war and the harkis 
simply by killing off the characters before they are in a position to highlight them. The 
ultimate fate and thus the responsibility for the harkis is of no concern to Larsen. 
Nevertheless, Simon’s Portrait in many ways is a very balanced consideration of the harki: it 
                                                                                                                                          
civilisation, and not always what was best in them, had marked him; he had lived in his little provincial 
African town very much as would a boy in France, liking games, the streets, the café, the cinema and pin-ups; 
of his religion, he had preserved merely the outward semblance, a few sacred gestures and a respect for the 
name of Allah; but, though more detached from the spiritual side of his people, he was more tenacious of the 
fact that he was an Arab, prouder and more set in his difference, and even in the deference of his manner.] 
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represents reasons for the choices harkis take to both side with the French army and to 
turn against it. It is also not a negative portrayal of the harki; Larsen is seen to be genuinely 
saddened by Kadour’s betrayal, but he understands his reasons and is not embittered. 
Portrait d’un officier was written at a cross-roads; after the takeover of power by de Gaulle but 
a year before the public declaration of self-determination as a solution to the war.238 A 
positive depiction of the harki is still possible within a republican discourse because the 
cause for which they are fighting is still a legitimate one. After this date, representations of 
harkis essentially disappear from the cultural imagination for several decades. 
 
The absence of such representation is not surprising given the extreme marginality of harkis 
in France after the war. Those that had reached the metropole were housed largely in 
makeshift accommodation, isolated from the wider community and where many lived for 
decades.239 Having been French citizens since at least 1958, this status was stripped from 
them in direct disregard of the legally-binding Evian Accords in 1962 and done so purely 
on the basis of their race (a similar fate did not befall the ‘repatriated’ settlers). 
Government grants for the harkis were less than half of the amount given to their 
‘European’ counterparts.240 Whilst such treatment was resented, research by Benjamin 
Stora and Claire Eldridge has indicated that the harkis did not speak out as a collective 
group; it was not until their children’s generation that a collective movement which 
highlighted their marginality and demanded recognition came to the fore.241 As a journalist 
in Le Monde wrote, ‘[t]heir cause goes against the grain, few are those who will defend men 
who are Arabs but French nationalists, poor but suspect of being right-wing, victims of 
racism, but heartily despised by its other victims.’242 For the French republic they were an 
embarrassing reminder that their decolonisation discourse did not allow an accurate 
understanding of the pursuit of war and the loyalty to France of some Algerians. 
 
The children of harkis began to protest in the 1970s and 1980s, occupying government 
buildings and going on hunger strike, in an attempt to gain official recognition for their 
                                                
238 Portrait d’un officier was published at the end of 1958, reviewed in December in Le Monde and in January 
1959 in the liberal Catholic journal Esprit. Jean Planchais, ‘Portrait d’un Officier: Une Étude de Pierre-Henri 
Simon’, Le Monde (28-29 December 1958); Jean-Marie Domenach, ‘Librairie du mois: Essais: Pierre-Henri 
Simon, Portrait d’un officier’, Esprit (no. 269, January 1959). 
239 Cohen, 'The Algerian War and French Memory', pp. 497-498. 
240 Cohen, 'Legacy of Empire', p. 108. 
241 Stora, La Gangrène et l'oubli; Claire Eldridge, '"We've Never Had a Voice": Memory Construction and the 
Children of the Harkis (1962-1991)', French History 23 (2009). See also Evans, 'The Harkis', p. 129. 
242 Bernard Brigoulieux, ‘Être arabes, pauvres, et nationalistes français’, Le Monde (24 December 1976) quoted 
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parents and tackle their own marginality. In 1991 a widespread protest was launched which 
culminated in riots in the south of France, where most of the half a million harkis and their 
descendents still lived.243 In 1994, ‘a law was passed to affirm the French Republic’s 
gratitude towards the Harkis’ and in 2001, President Jacques Chirac unveiled a plaque to 
commemorating those harkis who were abandoned by France in 1962.244 Géraldine 
Enjelvin has argued that this, along with the Algerian war memorial of 2002 ‘elevated the 
Harkis to the status of national heroes’ but such a status is neither present in the artistic 
representations of the harkis nor felt by those who continue to protest for recognition and 
compensation (see Figure 5).245 
 
Republican artistic representations of the harkis began to re-emerge around the same time 
as their children were making public their plight. A harki makes a brief appearance in 
Gerard Mordillat’s 1989 film, Cher Frangin as a rather simple and obedient fellow but it is 
not until the twenty-first century that they become discernible characters of their own.246 
Philippe Fauçon’s La Trahison is in many ways exemplary in its portrayal of the 
complexities of the relationship between the French army and the harkis.247 Set in southern 
Algeria in 1960, Lieutenant Roque is attempting, with little success from what the film 
shows, to track down FLN members by controlling the movements of the local villages. 
Amongst his men are four harkis including Taïeb who has been with Roque for fourteen 
months, acts as his translator and with whom he appears to have a strong bond and a 
relationship of mutual respect. Yet at the beginning of the film Roque is warned that Taïeb 
is heading up a plan to attack the base. Whether this information is correct is left 
ambiguous in the film with the exchanges of words, the discovery of FLN propaganda and 
                                                
243 Ibid.; Martin Evans, 'From Colonialism to Post-Colonialism: The French Empire since Napoleon', Martin 
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247 Fauçon, La Trahison.  
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the assassination of an anonymous witness supporting the possibility of treachery but 
offering no conclusive evidence. More concrete are the changing attitudes of Taïeb and his 
fellow harkis as they witness the abuse of Algerians and are the subject of abuse both from 
the villagers and their fellow soldiers. The film ends with all four harkis being arrested. The 
parting shots are of Taïeb shouting to Roque, ‘Vive l’independence, mon lieutenant! Vive 
Algérie!’ 
 
 
Figure 5. Harki  protest banners (including t r i co lo urs ) on the Place du Président Édouard 
Herriot outside the Assemblée Nationale, January 2010.248 
 
Medhi Charef’s 2008 Cartouches Gauloises is set in Algeria in the summer of 1962.249 
Everything in the film is shown through the viewpoint of its main character, eleven-year 
old Ali who knows the whole town through his paper round. Gradually his French friends 
and their families leave for France and the film ends with independence and the possible 
return of Ali’s FLN father. The harki in the film is Djelloul, a corporal whose brutality Ali 
witnesses on several occasions and whose family consider him to be a traitor. Djelloul 
expresses to his French lieutenant that he knows that for him, the options are only ‘victoire 
or exile’, to which the lieutenant has no reply. At the film’s close, as the French are leaving, 
Djelloul begs his superiors to let his fellow harkis and their families come with them. The 
lieutenant only offers passage for Djelloul alone; Djelloul shoots him in the back. Ali 
                                                
248 Taken by the author. 
249 Charef, Cartouches Gauloises. 
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discovers Djelloul hiding in his den which he and his settler friend, Nico, have been 
building. Ali gives no response to Djelloul’s pleas to use the den as a safe-house and tells 
local farmers of his whereabouts. There is no doubt that he is killed. Ali is not without 
compassion, but he has born witness to the brutalities of the French army (including the 
torture of his father) of which Djelloul has been an active part. Instead, Ali saves Zina, a 
traitor of a different kind. She is a prostitute working in a brothel frequented by French 
soldiers whom Ali knows through his paper round and her fate is certain to be the same as 
Djelloul’s without Ali’s help. 
 
In both La Trahison and Cartouches Gauloises the harkis are well developed, multi-dimensional 
characters, rather than the flippant background character present in Cher Frangin. Certainly 
in La Trahison and even to some extent in Cartouches Gauloises, they are sympathetic 
characters, their dilemmas clearly portrayed. Unlike in Simon’s early novel, their fate is also 
clear; neither side will accept them, their brutal death is assured.250 Yet Simon’s book is far 
more radical in terms of threatening the boundaries of the republican decolonisation 
discourse (although, given the time of his writing, without such intention). Fauçon’s and 
Charef’s films clearly show that harkis have no place in a decolonised Algeria. Charef is 
perhaps condemning the French army for not helping the harkis escape, but makes no 
allusion to government policy. Neither, however, consider representing the reasons the 
harkis are fighting on the French side. There are no personal histories, no justifications, no 
origins of this misplaced loyalty. As such, only part of the harki story is told. Much akin to 
the refusal of the decolonisation discourse to consider the origin of colonialism and the 
belief in Algérie française, the absence of reasoning behind the harkis’ involvement (whether 
through loyalty, like Kadour, or for survival, for protection or for numerous other diverse 
reasons) is a rejection of the legitimacy of the harkis’ loyalty. As such, these films leave the 
decolonisation discourse unchallenged and indeed support it. Furthermore, with no 
representation of the possibility that the harkis were fighting for France in a cause they 
considered legitimate, they cannot symbolise the citizen soldier. Theirs cannot be a heroic 
sacrifice for the French nation, even less so than the conscripts, because to be seen as such 
would not only undermine the republican narrative of the war, it would give them claim to 
be French citizens. A claim that the republic continues to deny. 
 
                                                
250 Fauçon’s film is set almost two years later than the book from which La Trahison was adapted from in 
order to threaten this fate more clearly. Steven Ungar, 'Two Films and Two Wars in the Public Sphere', 
Patricia M. E. Lorcin and Daniel Brewer (eds), France and its Spaces of War (Basingstoke, 2009) p. 282. 
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1.6b Algerians as  the  Other 
Thus far I have argued that citizen soldiers have underpinned the definition of republican 
citizenship in France, that the Algerian war altered this basis and produced a revolution in 
citizenship, that this revolution has remained undiscussed by means of a discourse of 
decolonisation, and that citizenship is now defined negatively, as the harkis have 
experienced to their detriment. The final section of this chapter will pursue this latter point 
further by considering the representations of Algerians, rather than just the harkis, in 
republican cultural representations of the war. The representations of Algerians share 
strikingly similar tropes to Third Republican artistic representations of the peasant. The 
peasant, in the initial years of the Third Republic, was frequently represented as the 
ultimate anti-republican. The same characteristics – ignorance, backwardness, religious 
faith and a connection to the natural world – are present in the artistic culture of the Fifth 
Republic in relation to Algerians. But the resulting implication is strengthened: Algerians 
are not simply anti-republican but un-French.251 Peasants were anti-republican but 
reformable; the doctrine of assimilation was overtly pursued particularly through education 
policy, to create a republican, and thus a truly French, peasantry. This process was denied 
to Algerians. Whilst the sharing of tropes with Third Republican culture suggested a 
precedent, the Frenchness of Algerians was flatly denied, their potential to assimilate 
rejected. This final section will argue that the revolution in republican citizenship caused by 
the Algerian war led to a racial understanding of citizenship, a radical change tempered by 
the use of old tropes found in Third Republican representations of the peasantry. 
 
Many of the French artistic representations of Algerians in Algeria are unsurprisingly 
written by ex-settlers, those Frenchmen most familiar with them. There is a post-war 
tendency, no doubt aided by the involvement of many settlers in the OAS, to assume that 
settlers were overtly racist, right-wing and militaristic. The settlers were not such a 
monocultural group and there are many examples of literature written by republican 
settlers, a few of whom even supported the independence movement (although generally in 
the expectation that the settlers would remain in Algeria). Whilst there are other novels and 
films many of which contain representations of Algerians in Algeria, many which feature 
elsewhere in this thesis, the novels of Jean Pélégri and Jules Roy are considered here 
                                                
251 Chapter 3 considers in greater detail the distinction between being ‘anti-’ and ‘un-’. See section 3.2. Using 
the logic of Jacques Derrida’s theory of opposites, to be ‘anti-France’ is to imply an opposition and thus an 
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because they were both published between 1958 and 1962 when, in legal terms, all 
Algerians were full French citizens.252 The racially-defined parameters of French 
citizenship, which became a legal reality in the summer of 1962, are already present in these 
two novels. This suggests that the racial definition of Frenchness was a part of the 
republican mentalité and not simply a practical piece of legislation designed to prevent an 
influx of refugees. A discussion of the transference of the trope of peasant will be included 
alongside Hugo’s Quatrevingt-treize and David Hopkin’s work on the figures of the soldier 
and peasant in popular culture. To conclude, it will be argued that this method of 
representation has not remained attached solely to Algerians in Algeria but has reached the 
metropole. The uncivilised peasant trope remains and is present in Michel Haneke’s film 
Caché, where it is used to deny the legitimacy of claims to French citizenship by those of 
Algerian origin in the twenty-first century.253 
 
In his study of soldiers and peasants in popular imagery and oral folktales in France in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Hopkin identifies ‘distinctions between peasants and 
soldiers’ which continue into the end of his period.254 This division is supported by both 
sides, being evident both in the urban literary culture of Zola and Balzac which scorned the 
peasantry, and rural culture which resented the imposition of conscription.255 As this 
chapter has noted, Hopkin also recognises the powerful symbolic presence the soldier has 
upon the understanding of a citizen, and this relationship’s longevity as ‘the soldier as 
national standard-bearer…had been appearing in folk art for at least a hundred years 
before the Franco-Prussian War.’256 Nevertheless, he does argue that the strength of the 
identity between the conscript and the nation comes to the fore as the republic finally finds 
its own longevity after 1870.257 
 
Hugo was certainly part of the urban culture Hopkin identifies as throwing scorn upon the 
peasantry. His distaste for the rural masses was particularly acute because of the (not 
particularly accurate) association he and many other republicans had made between the 
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rural vote and the success of Louis-Napoleon between 1848 and 1851.258 In essence, he 
held the peasantry responsible for the destruction of the Second Republic and the 
formation of the Second Empire, his hatred of which led him to spend its duration in self-
imposed exile. The figure of Tellmarch in Quatrevingt-treize becomes the vessel into which 
Hugo pours his contempt for the peasantry. Tellmarch is a solitary Breton beggar, utterly 
ignorant of the politics around him and his ignorance is the cause of all the bloodshed in 
the novel as well as the failure of a peaceful republican conclusion.259 Unaware of the 
Marquis de Lantenac’s identity at the beginning of the novel, Tellmarch feeds and shelters 
the outlaw, unwittingly saving the life of a bloodthirsty warrior. He learns of the marquis’s 
identity upon discovering Lantenac’s slaughter of a village, leaving Tellmarch to cry 
uselessly, ‘“Si j’avais su !”’260 His direction of the kidnapped children’s mother also leads to 
the series of events around Lantenac’s capture, escape and Gauvain’s death. Tellmarch 
cannot be a republican citizen because he has no understanding of what such a thing 
entailed. As Hopkin has argued, ‘this distinction between “peasant” and “French” rests on 
a...fundamental division whose origins lie much further back in the history of the 
formation of the nation-state – the division between peasant and soldier.’261 
 
The tenacity of this disassociation is important because it gives a foundation and thus a 
historical legitimacy to the refusal to consider those of Algerian origin to be French 
citizens. In an unforgivably nostalgic, la vie en rose-infected article, Richard Kuisel attempts 
to pinpoint what he considers to be the decline of a certain idea of France. His first 
‘discontinuity’ is the decline of the peasantry, his second the loss of French society’s 
‘capacity to assimilate outsiders.’262 What he fails to consider, is that these two trends 
(whilst not marking a ‘decline’), are intrinsically linked. 
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Jean Pélégri’s Les Oliviers de la Justice is a novel which combines the life and death of 
Pélégri’s father and of Algérie française.263 Much of the narrative focuses on his father’s life 
and the characters of Pélégri’s own childhood, among them an old Algerian, Embarek. 
There are  striking similarities between Tellmarch in Quatrevingt-trieze and Embarek. Both 
inhabit cave-like dwellings, primitive in their living conditions. Both have mystical 
characteristics: ‘Tellmarch était un “philosophe”, mot de paysans qui signifie un peu 
médecin, un peu chirurgien et un peu sorcier.’264 Embarek sits surrounded by candles, 
quietly whispering Arabic prayers which ‘descendre en’ and ‘consumait’ a young Pélégri.265 
Embarek is also given a deep connection to the land, part of its soul, a familiar trope to the 
nineteenth-century peasant.266 He talks to the land and dies kissing it. Although seen to be 
critical of the unjust nature of colonialism in Algeria and his wish to break the intellectual 
silence of settlers on the war fashioned by Albert Camus, Pélégri cannot escape his own 
banal racism which justifies his position in the society within which he lives.267 Whilst the 
narrator’s recollections of the Algerian individuals he has known in his life is always 
positive, it is also, ‘dans un flot des clichés’ primitive.268 Thus the primitive, mystical 
peasant of the nineteenth century who, as an opposite to the soldier, was considered to be 
an untrustworthy republican citizen, is a trope passed down to the Algerian of the 
twentieth century, and with it the incompatibility with French republican citizenship.269 The 
absence of the citizen soldier in the latter case negates a traditional route to assimilation for 
Algerians; without the citizen soldier-peasant binary, Algerians are not anti-French but 
simply un-French. 
 
Jules Roy’s reminiscences of his own childhood in Algeria which permeate La Guerre 
d’Algérie, a part-autobiography, part-political tract, are very similar to Pélégri’s. His 
immediate recollections of Algerians are that the settlers referred to them as figuiers, fig-
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264 Hugo, 'Quatrevingt-treize'. [Tellmarch was a “philosopher”, a peasant phrase which means a little of a 
doctor, a little of a surgeon, and a little of a sorcerer.] 
265 Pélégri, Les Oliviers de la justice, p. 23. [descend into / consume] 
266 Ibid. pp. 21-23. 
267 Dine, Images of the Algerian War, p. 76. 
268 Alain-Gérard Slama, 'La Guerre d'Algérie en littérature ou la comédie des masques', Jean-Pierre Rioux (ed.) 
La Guerre d'Algérie et les français (Paris, 1990) p. 585. [in a wave of primitive clichés] 
269 It is worth briefly considering the peasant Jean in Zola’s La Débâcle who is the epitome of the citizen 
soldier, rather than its reverse. The difference is certainly one of timing. Jean encapsulates the mood of a 
more self-assured republic in the final decade of the nineteenth century; he has not benefited personally from 
the education laws of the 1880s but as a peasant he no longer represents a perceived threat to the stability of 
the republic through his ignorance; he is no Tellmarch. 
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trees, before they became ratons and bicots.270 The Algerians’ connection to the land, their 
primitiveness and the closeness he felt to them as a child are all akin to Pélégri’s 
representations: 
 
Le plus vieil ouvrier de la ferme s’appelait Meftah. Il habitait avec sa famille 
une hutte de paille et de torchis près du bassin et du partager. Il n’a jamais eu 
d’âge. Un jour, j’ai appris qu’il était mort après avoir, pendant trente ou 
quarante ans, fait la litière du bétail que nous avions, conduit les voitures et les 
attelages, porté plusieurs arrosoirs d’eau par jour du puits à la maison. A cette 
nouvelle, j’ai pleuré parce que je l’aimais bien. Je l’accompagnais souvent à son 
travail. Au retour, il me hissait sur les chevaux et quelquefois me prenait sur 
son dos.271 
 
Like Pélégri, too, Roy offers no similarly close relationships with Algerians as an adult, 
indeed there is a distinct distance in their relationships even with those who used to work 
on their family farms. Essentially, the Algerians are represented as childlike in both novels. 
This is not to suggest there is overt racism in either of these two books; both offer 
extremely sympathetic portrayals of the Algerians they know and have known. In La Guerre 
d’Algérie, this is in marked contrast to the crass and abhorrent racism Roy attributes to 
many settlers, often his own family (although whilst he rejects their ideas, he suggests they 
are not responsible for them: ‘Elle n’est pas responsable. Il y a cinquante ans, nous 
pensions tous de même’.)272 Nonetheless, there is an implicit understanding of difference 
between themselves as Frenchmen and the Algerians as other, even though both Pélégri 
and Roy were writing during that small window of time when all were equally French under 
the constitution. 
 
This is perhaps a more complex distinction in La Guerre d’Algérie. Roy is certainly an 
advocate of Algerian independence, suggesting a political reasoning behind his separation 
                                                
270 Roy, La Guerre d'Algérie, p. 18. 
271 Ibid. p. 18. [The oldest worker on the farm was named Meftah. He and his family lived in a mud hut near 
the pond and the kitchen garden. He was ageless. One day I learned he had died after thirty or forty years of 
pitching hay for the cattle, driving the carriages and teams, and carrying several water jars a day from the well 
to the house. I cried when I heard the news, for I was fond of Meftah. Often I would follow him around as 
he did his work. On the way home he let me ride the horses and sometimes carried me on his back. Jules 
Roy, The War in Algeria, trans. Richard Howard (Westport, Connecticut, 1961) [1960]] 
272 Roy, La Guerre d'Algérie, p. 47. [She isn’t responsible. Fifty years ago we all felt the same way] Roy’s 
prejudice towards the harkis is much more overt: he refuses to talk to them as ‘qu’auraient-ils pu me dire ? Je 
n’aime pas qu’on essaie de me mentir.’ p. 85. 
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of Europeans and Algerians, but he also identifies himself as able to fight on the side 
opposing his own race: 
 
Il n’y a plus rien de commun entre vous et moi, capitaine. Je ne serai jamais de 
votre côté en Algérie et si un jour, dans le collimateur de vos chars ou de vos 
avions, vous distinguez parmi les ratons en guenilles un grand bâtard de votre 
race aux cheveux blancs, ce sera moi.273 
 
Roy has set himself up as an exception to the racial divide he represents throughout his 
book, finding more common cause with the Algerians than with the Europeans, whether 
settlers, the army or the citizens of the metropole. Yet the fact remains that the division is 
clearly one he defines by race and despite his common cause, his representation of 
Algerians through the trope of the peasant prevents any possibility of such a divide being 
bridgeable. 
 
In his sources which range over a century of French history, Hopkin finds many different 
representations of the soldier, both attractive and repulsive, violent and orderly but, 
‘whatever he was, the soldier was definitely not a peasant.’274 By extension, given the 
republican connection between soldier and citizen, the peasant was often the antithesis of 
the ideal of the citizen soldier, particularly in the Second and Third Republics. The tropes 
familiar to republican cultural representations of the peasant in the nineteenth century are 
transferred to the Algerian in the twentieth. Whilst both peasant and Algerian may have 
legally been republican citizens, they were clearly not considered as such by the republican 
mentalité which supported the government. Whilst the divide was considered, rhetorically at 
least, bridgeable through assimilation in the nineteenth century, such a prejudice actually 
enabled the barely-noted backtracking over the citizenship guarantees made in the Evian 
Accords in 1962. Race was already an accepted distinction in regard to citizenship prior to 
the Joxe Telegram, which instructed the army to prevent the harkis crossing over to the 
metropole and prior to de Gaulle’s overtly racial distinctions between settler ‘repatriates’ 
and Algerian ‘refugees’. As Shepard has noted,  
 
                                                
273 Ibid. pp. 169-170. [You and I have nothing left in common, Captain. I shall never be on your side in 
Algeria. And if some day, in the gun sights of your tank or your plane, you make out beside the tattered ratons 
a tall white-haired bastard of your own race, it will be me.] 
274 Hopkin, Soldier and Peasant, p. 13. 
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the government embraced a simple division between ‘Algerians’ and ‘French’. 
The former were ‘Muslims’…while the latter were not. These categories did 
not accurately capture some obvious realities, nor did they respect republican 
principles and French law. They were, however, easier to understand and 
easier to explain to a metropolitan population that had tired of trying to figure 
out what was happening in Algeria.275 
 
Core republican principles of universalism and assimilation were rejected with ease and 
without discussion, replaced with a racially-defined right to French citizenship. This was 
possible through the employment of the decolonisation discourse which, as this chapter 
has shown, was not confined to the political sphere but integrated into republican culture 
and supported by reference to recognisable republican traditions and prejudices. 
 
Both Shepard and Weil detail the continuing impact of the racial turn on republican 
citizenship after 1962. Between 1927 and 1983, newly naturalised citizens in France ‘sont 
exclus de l’exercice des droits politiques et de l’accès à certaines professions pour une 
période de 5 à 10 ans’.276 For Algerians who arrived on the same boats as the settlers in 
1962, this meant that not only did they have to apply for citizenship so recently revoked, 
even if they succeeded in being granted it, their continued civil and social discrimination 
had a legal foundation. In the late 1970s, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing attempted to forcibly 
‘repatriate’ French Algerians to their country of origin, despite that country having been 
French at the time of their birth.277 Furthermore, Weil identifies the general principle of 
French nationality law since 1889 as being based on double jus soli which meant that 
someone would be automatically French if they were born on French soil to a parent who 
was also born in France. In line with the invention of decolonisation narrative Shepard 
identifies and this chapter supports, Algerians born in Algeria before 1962 were not 
considered to have been born in France. This was only addressed in 1993 but with two 
added provisions: that the parent prove residence in (metropolitan) France for a minimum 
of five years and the child officially declare a wish to be French between the ages of 16 and 
21, rather than being granted citizenship automatically at the age of majority.278 The settler 
                                                
275 Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization, p. 220. 
276 Weil, Qu'est-ce qu'un Français ?, p. 14. [were prevented from exercising their political rights and excluded 
from access to certain professions for a period of five to ten years] 
277 David R. Howarth and Georgios Varouxakis, Contemporary France: An Introduction to French Politics and Society 
(London, 2003) p. 120. 
278 Weil, Qu'est-ce qu'un Français ?, pp. 176-177. 
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‘repatriates’ faced none of these problems, regardless of which side of the Mediterranean 
they or their parents had been born. 
 
The racism which defines who is legitimately a French citizen is not restricted to the legal 
sphere but permeates the republican mentalité through artistic culture. Nor is this racial 
distinction only present in the works of ex-settlers at the twilight of the Algerian war. In 
representations of French Algerians in France (thus officially French citizens) and in the 
context of the Algerian war, a divide is drawn based on race which delegitimates the 
Algerian as French citizen. Claire Etcherelli’s novel Élise, ou la vraie vie (1967), Didier 
Daeninckx’s novel Meurtres pour mémoire (1984), Alain Tasma’s film Nuit noire, 17 octobre 1961 
(2005) and most recently, Rachid Bouchareb’s Hors la loi (2010), all draw a clear divide 
between French and Algerian which, whilst not necessarily representing a racist narrative, is 
a distinction made on the basis of race which has become inescapable in French republican 
culture.279 Daeninckx, Tasma and Bouchareb are all openly political in their writing and 
film-making, attempting to bring issues, particularly of past French crimes against 
Algerians, to the fore. Michel Haneke, director of Caché (2005) made the same claim about 
wanting to ‘expose’ the massacre of Algerian demonstrators in Paris in October 1961.280 
Yet all are unable to overcome the republican decolonisation discourse which effectively 
rejects the possibility of people of Algerian origin being French citizens. 
 
Caché is particularly interesting because rather than being a representation of the Algerian 
war, it is a representation of the war’s aftermath forty years on, with specific reference to 
the repression of Algerians during the 17 October 1961 demonstration.281 It is a very self-
                                                
279 For example, as Etcherelli’s novel ends, Élise’s attempts to reject the racial divide between her and her 
lover Arezki, are revealed to be futile and the narrative itself suggests a tragic but recognisable young 
woman’s rebellious dalliance against society’s norms, a society which she is slipping seamlessly back into. The 
division between French and Algerian is nowhere more stark than the awkward relationship between the stoic 
Abdelkader and sexualised young blond porteuse in Hors la loi. Claire Etcherelli, Elise, ou la vraie vie (London, 
1985) [1967]; Didier Daeninckx, Meurtres pour mémoire (Paris, 1984); Alain Tasma, Nuit Noire, 17 octobre 1961 
(France, 2005); Rachid Bouchareb, Hors la loi (France, 2010). 
280 Haneke, Caché. Such claims are made by both Tasma and Haneke in interviews with them included on the 
DVD extras. On Daeninckx see, Dine, Images of the Algerian War, p. 143. The representation of 17 October 
1961 will considered fully in Chapter 3. 
281 Haneke is Austrian, not French but the film Caché can certainly be considered a French film and indeed 
part of the French republican cultural sphere this thesis is concerned with. T. Jefferson Kline wastes a great 
deal of space attempting to justify his discussion of Caché as French in such absurd ways as suggesting 
Haneke’s appreciation for the Polish filmmaker Krystof Kieslowski makes him French and that, through 
Caché, ‘this Austrian director has become authentically “French,” so able is he to present us with such an 
insoluble paradox’, as though such things could only be possible from French filmmakers. In a final bid to 
insist on the Frenchness of the film he draws a baffling comparison with Albert Camus’ L’Etranger. Haneke is 
not French, nor does he make any claim to be. But Caché is a film concerned with a particularly French 
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aware film, commenting on bourgeois Parisian life, French culture and the current war in 
Iraq. Caché is essentially a psychological thriller or mystery by genre. Literature show 
television host, Georges and his wife Anne are being sent video tapes containing hours of 
footage of the outside of their house from an opposite street, Rue des Iris. There is no 
obvious motive but when they start arriving wrapped in childlike sketches Georges begins 
to have flashbacks to an experience from his childhood. Georges’ parents adopted a young 
Algerian boy, Majid, after his own parents failed to return from the 17 October 
demonstration. Jealous of his presence, Georges told lies about Majid and his parents gave 
up their adoption, essentially depriving Majid of the privileged social sphere of which 
Georges is clearly a part. 
 
The representation of the Algerian characters in Caché is markedly different from the 
French characters. Georges flashbacks to his childhood give the first representation of 
Majid, a silent, scrawny, half-naked boy, blood on his face, wielding an axe and beheading a 
chicken. A young cleanly-coiffed Georges in a shirt watches, afraid. As adults, the divide is 
the same: in the first adult appearance of Majid he is wiping his hands on a tea-towel and 
wearing a scruffy open-necked jumper, whereas Georges is in a suit jacket. The adult Majid 
is only ever seen in the back of a police van and in his poky flat, decorated with patterned 
wall paper, piled high with washing, boxes and possessions quite apart from Georges and 
Anne’s pristine clean-lined house. Georges and his family, by contrast, are given freedom 
of movement, frequently seen entering and leaving their house and mobile across other 
places in the city. Both Georges and his mother admit to having forgotten all about Majid 
and in their first conversation, Majid suggests that he is invisible to Georges, he would walk 
straight past him on the street. Majid’s son becomes starkly visible when he turns up at 
Georges white bourgeois office, although he is first seen in a setting more familiar to a 
French audience: pushed out of shot by policemen and then exposed to a long shot in the 
back of a police van with his father. He is never deemed worthy of a name. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
subject, filmed in French, in France with a French cast and a largely French crew. Most fundamentally, for 
this thesis’s purpose, it exhibits many of the features of the French decolonisation discourse in relation to 
Algeria. Mark Cousins frames this point effectively when he says, ‘if, when we leave the auditorium, we are 
asking who did it, we are asking the wrong question, and that we should, instead, be asking about the nature of 
colonial guilt.’ In such a context, the film is self-identifyingly French. Films are projects involving a multitude 
of people and companies and can rarely be considered solely the produce of a single country but most are 
usually grounded in one and for Caché, that country is, without contention, France. T. Jefferson Kline, 
Unraveling French Cinema: From L'Atlante to Caché (Chichester, 2010), pp. 166, 170 and 172; Mark Cousins, 
'After the End: Word of Mouth and Caché', Screen 48 (2007) p. 225. 
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Haneke may have had the intention to uncover and question ‘colonial guilt’, but Caché 
treats its one-dimensional Algerian characters as no more than stereotypes and plot devices 
for providing exotic intrigue; they are not characters but malleable symbols.282 Majid is 
scruffy and marginal, his bloody suicide by slitting his throat is directly reminiscent of 
Georges’ flashback to the killing of the chicken and pushes him into the borders of 
animalistic. Paul Gilroy takes this criticism further, arguing that Majid’s suicide is 
representative of a long-term ‘comforting idea that the colonial native can be made to 
disappear in an instant through the auto-combustive agency of their own violence’ which in 
its modern context leads towards ‘the idea that Europe’s immigrants should be induced to 
disappear by any means possible.’283 Such an interpretation would be more convincing if 
Majid’s graphic and sudden death was a comment on him or on colonialism, but it is the 
reaction of Georges with which the film is concerned; Majid is essentially seen to slit is 
throat for the benefit of representing a troubled bourgeois Frenchman. 
 
Majid’s confinement and his nameless son’s exposure illustrate all too clearly that they do 
not have a place in French society. They are evidently not the active citizens which George 
and Anne’s productive lives represent through their creative jobs and their son’s 
involvement in that bulwark of republican citizenship, the school. Majid and his son’s 
marginality from this society is represented as entirely a product of their race. So 
successfully did the republic of 1962 embrace the settler ideas of who was legitimately 
French, that its ramifications are long-term and striking even in culture forty years 
afterwards. So strong is the decolonisation discourse that the revolution in republican 
ideals of citizenship goes unchallenged even by films which purport to be subversive. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Patrick Weil begins his book on the history of French citizenship with an overview of the 
various disagreements over its definition which had taken place in the 1990s: 
 
                                                
282 As Richard Derderian and Eric Saverèse have both observed, Algerian characters remain background 
characters, marginalised even in films seemingly about them. Richard L. Derderian, 'Algeria as a lieu de mémoire: 
Ethnic Minority Memory and National Identity in Contemporary France', Radical History Review 83 (2002) p. 
34; Eric Savarèse, Histoire coloniale et immigration: Une invention de l'étranger (Biarritz, 2000) p. 44. 
283 Paul Gilroy, 'Shooting Crabs in a Barrel', Screen 48 (2007) p. 234. 
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‘On est français par le sang’, a avancé Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, renvoyant au 
Code civil de 1804. Non, ‘le sang c’est Vichy’, lui a répondu la gauche ; ‘on est 
français par le sol, c’est un principe républicain’. Faux, a jugé le Conseil 
constitutionnel en 1993 : le droit du sol n’est pas un principe fondamental de 
la République, il n’a été introduit dans le droit français qu’en 1889 ‘pour 
répondre notamment aux exigences de la conscription’. ‘On n’a plus besoin 
d’être français pour avoir des droits, pour voter par exemple’, ont alors 
revendiqué certaines associations, en se référant à la Constitution 
montagnarde de 1793.284 
 
The laws of 1804 and 1889 matter little to French Algerians. It is the conventions 
developed between 1958 and 1962 that produced a revolution in republican citizenship and 
redefined how Frenchness would be conceived which now affect their relationship with the 
French state, and wider French society. 
 
This chapter has argued that until the Algerian war, the defining figure of the citizen for the 
French republic was the citizen soldier, a moral and heroic symbol intrinsic to the 
republican mentalité since the raising of the first levée en masse in 1792. The absence of such a 
figure, and replacement by a marginalised conscript developed around a rhetoric of 
victimisation, suited the republican decolonisation discourse which framed the war as part 
of the onward march of History, an inevitable process of civilising modernity, and denied 
responsibility for the conflict or its aftermath. Most importantly, this transition represented 
a revolution in the meaning of republicanism through citizenship. 
 
The Fifth Republic oversaw major legal changes in the area of citizenship, as Shepard and 
Weil have shown, but these changes were not, and could not be, restricted to the legal 
sphere. They required a socio-cultural basis, one that followed the same ‘invention of 
decolonisation’ narrative through a decolonisation discourse; a dominant and self-
congratulatory method of representing such changes as inevitable and progressive in order 
to avoid considering the challenges and contradictions they meant for the very nature of 
                                                
284 Weil, Qu'est-ce qu'un Français ?, p. 9. [‘One is French by blood’, advanced Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, 
throwing out the Civil Code of 1804. No, ‘blood is Vichy’, answered the Left; ‘one is French by land [by 
birth], it is a republican principle.’ False, judged the Conseil Constitutionnel in 1993: rights of birth is not a 
fundamental principle of the Republic, it was only introduced into French law in 1889 ‘in order to answer the 
demands of conscription.’ ‘One no longer needs to be French to have rights, to vote for example’, claimed 
certain associations, referring to the Montagnard constitution of 1793.] 
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republicanism. As Shepard has argued in relation to the politico-legal sphere, the ‘reliance 
on the tide of History…allowed most French people to ignore the radical implications for 
republican citizenship’.285 This narrative was supported in the cultural sphere by the 
replacement of the positive, if highly gendered, representation of the citizen through the 
citizen soldier with a negative conception of citizenship based on race and legitimated 
through republican language of the ‘other’, recognisable in nineteenth-century conceptions 
of the peasant. The changing nature of representations of the citizen soldier in republican 
culture suggests a shift in the understanding of what made a republican citizen. This shift, a 
revolutionary change, became clear as the racial distinction of citizenship in representations 
of Algerians, even during periods when they were considered to be full French citizens. 
These representations are evidence that this revolutionary change was not just a legal 
alteration but was bolstered by a wider republican mentalité. As such, the Revolutionary 
ideals of universalism, assimilation, of liberté and egalité, the foundations to which the Fifth 
Republic still lays claim, were entirely flouted. The following chapter will consider the 
nature of republicanism and the changes wrought on it by the Algerian war in greater 
depth, and will begin to suggest how this revolutionary change has gone largely 
uncommented upon. 
 
                                                
285 Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization, pp. 98-99. 
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2 
Universalism, Assimilation and the Teleological Republic 
 
This chapter builds upon the idea of the decolonisation discourse explored in Chapter 1 
and argues that it is part of a broader narrative of universalism inherent within 
republicanism. This universalist narrative is a teleological one and has been used to 
effectively conceal a revolution in the application of republican ideals which occurred 
between 1959 and 1962. As this chapter will show, the teleological universalist narrative is 
emploted in both historical and artistic representations of the Algerian war. Furthermore, 
this teleological emplotment has led to the rejection of assimilation, a core element of 
republican ideology since the French Revolution, in relation to those defined by the Fifth 
Republic as Muslim, Algerian or more broadly North African. As a result, religion and 
origin have become negatively defining features of French identity and have become so 
without any public reconsideration of the values of republicanism.1 
 
A history of French republicanism and a critical consideration of the republican histories of 
France are necessary to ground this argument. This dual endeavour will not only consider 
the development of universalism and assimilation, but also how historians have helped to 
shape and promote the ideological narrative of republicanism itself. Just as Ceri Crossley 
and Anne Rigney have critically examined the historical writings of constitutional 
monarchists and republicans in earlier periods, so I will consider the narratives of François 
Furet, Eugen Weber, Maurice Agulhon, Robert Tombs and Pamela Pilbeam who have 
helped shape the understanding of republicanism both in and outside France during the 
Fifth Republic.2 I will then consider more specifically the historiography of French 
colonialism, particularly in relation to Algeria, how it has incorporated the decolonisation 
discourse identified in the previous chapter, and how the longitudinal cultural history 
pursued by this thesis is able to offer a challenge to this dominant teleological narrative. 
                                                
1 Negatively in the sense that to be French is to not be ‘Muslim’ or ‘Algerian’ (as defined by the republic rather 
than self-identified) rather than previously the positive identification of the citizen soldier. 
2 Ceri Crossley, 'History as a Principle of Legitimation in France (1820-1848)', Stefan Berger, Mark Donovan, 
and Kevin Passmore (eds), Writing National Histories (London, 1999); Ann Rigney, The Rhetoric of Historical 
Representation: Three Narrative Histories of the French Revolution (Cambridge, 1990). The origin of this idea that 
history writing is a part of the construction of a particular narrative, as well as my use of the term 
‘emplotment’, stem from the work of Hayden White. White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-
Century Europe (London, 1973). 
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In the third part of the chapter, I will return to an analysis of artistic representations of 
both the Franco-Prussian and Algerian wars and argue that the themes of rebirth and, 
latterly, modernisation are tropes used to further the teleological narrative which underpins 
the republican ideal of universalism, helping to conceal the ruptures and crises that would 
otherwise come to dominate the representations of such events. Finally, the chapter will 
turn to consider assimilation in the specific context of representations of the Algerian war. 
Building on the initial arguments made in the previous chapter in relation to citizenship, I 
show how, using the teleological narrative inherent in universalism, the value of 
assimilation is able to be promoted in relation to representations of settlers whilst 
concurrently ignored, or even rejected outright, in relation to Algerians, without causing a 
questioning of republicanism itself. As a result, the history of empire has become a history 
to which the extreme right alone has laid claim, allowing it to be used unchallenged in the 
promotion of their racist immigration agenda. 
 
 
2.1 The history of French republicanism; the republican history of France 
2.1a From the  Firs t  t o the  Four th Republ ic  
French republicanism has its roots in the ideas and events which occurred across the 
Atlantic more than a decade before its own Revolution. The texts of the Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789 and the 1791 French Constitution are striking in their 
similarities to the likes of the Virginia Bill of Rights from June 1776 and the following 
month’s Declaration of Independence of the United States.3 Whilst the ideas these 
documents incorporated were indebted to French and English philosophical thought, the 
tangible political reality given to them by the American Revolution and brought over to 
France by the likes of Tom Paine and Lafayette, had a direct influence on the timing and 
nature of the French Revolution. Ideals of equality (particularly before the law; the 
question of social justice would come later and be far less tenacious), of liberty and of 
sovereignty being held not by a monarch but by the people, are all stated in the Virginia Bill 
                                                
3 Pierre Goubert, The Course of French History (London, 1988) p. 178. 
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of Rights and are now considered to be central to the French ‘values of 1789’, to which 
republicanism lays claim.4  
 
The Revolution did not bring with it a republic; to say that it was in gestation from 1789 to 
1792 would be to overestimate the desirability of such a regime to those steering the 
Revolution in its early years. Nor were Robert Tombs’ ill-defined ‘values of 1789’ claimed 
only by republicans. The regimes of constitutional monarchy, empire and republic all cited 
their origins in the Revolution. The fundamentals which they shared – in the shift from 
subject to citizen, rights as well as duties and equality before the law, all being based on 
sovereignty lying with the people rather than in divine right – whilst not always evident in 
practice, instilled each regime with the legitimacy of being a successor to the Revolution. 
Only the Bourbon monarchy refused such ideals and never returned to power through the 
actions of the French people. 
 
Both Bonapartists and republicans went to war legitimated by the idea of spreading 
Revolutionary ideals beyond France’s borders; the belief that the ‘values of 1789’ were 
universal was a foundation stone of both empire and republic. This universalism of the 
Rights of Man, cannot be separated from the early experience of war which brought with it 
a suspicion of foreigners. This experience, as Jack Hayward has succinctly described, 
married the ideologies of universalism and assimilation for republicanism: 
 
The ideological contradiction between universal human rights and exclusion 
of foreigners was in practice resolved against inclusiveness if only because 
otherwise the French nation would have been geographically boundless. 
However, the rejection of ethnicity or religion as a criteria of nationality 
(Protestants and the Jews were accepted as citizens) and the rapid 
abandonment of the 1794 attempt to impose linguistic unity as unworkable 
because it would in particular have excluded Alsace and Brittany from the 
French nation, meant that the proclaimed legal quality of citizens and the 
universalist symbolism of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the 
Citizen preserved a more assimilationist conception of nationality.5 
 
                                                
4 Ibid. p. 178; Robert Tombs, France 1814-1914 (London, 1996) p. 208. The understanding of who legally 
constituted ‘the people’ would not be resolved until the 1960s in either country. 
5 Jack Hayward, Fragmented France: Two Centuries of Disputed Identity (Oxford, 2007) pp. 113-114. 
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Universalism, then, was an ideal stemming from the Revolution: distinctly visible in the 
thought of Abbé Sièyes and the actions of the government, not least with the abolition of 
slavery which Napoleon would later reverse.6 Assimilation, the idea that anyone could be 
French if they were to cast off any other identity, hold in respect the values of liberté, égalité 
and fraternité and, most fundamentally, be French above all else, was a product of the 
Revolutionary wars under the First Republic. 
 
The French Revolution was an event, or series of events, ‘so dramatic, so abrupt, and so 
influential that it imposed its shadow on French society for at least the following two 
centuries.’7 Universalism has been perhaps the most tenacious of ideals, a belief in which 
has been easier to maintain than the practical application of the famous triptych. Tombs, in 
reference to the nineteenth-century historian Jules Michelet, sums up the conception of 
this belief in the nature of French civilisation: 
 
The starting point was the conviction that French civilization was in 
important ways universal. The French were not merely a nation; in a sense 
they were the nation, la grande nation. Michelet expressed this plainly: a nation 
was not merely a biological race, and not merely a geographically defined 
population, but a personality that created itself through its history; and French 
history has been the greatest such act… The idea of universality originated 
from French cultural and political hegemony during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries.8 
 
As Tombs goes on to declare, such a belief was not confined to ‘nationalist extremists’ but 
was commonplace. Universalism clearly requires a belief in the superiority of one’s ideals 
and in this sense is not novel to French nationalism. The addition of assimilation is what 
has set French republicanism apart from the nationalism of its neighbours; because 
everyone could be French there is an underlying element which suggests that everyone should 
be French. In the 1790s such an ideology justified the Revolutionary wars; in the following 
                                                
6 Emmanuel Joseph Sièyes, What is the Third Estate?, trans. M. Blondel (London, 1963) [1789]. As Peter 
Campbell has noted in the introduction to this addition, Sièyes’s commitment to the universalism of the 
political rights he outlines in his work was all encompassing, ‘even where their adoption might weaken the 
power of France herself.’ p. 31. Put like this, it is self-evident as to why the notion of assimilation, as a 
suitable balance to such a idea, became of paramount importance with the onset of war. 
7 David R. Howarth and Georgios Varouxakis, Contemporary France: An Introduction to French Politics and Society 
(London, 2003) p. 2. 
8 Tombs, France 1814-1914, p. 312. 
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two centuries, under the banner of the mission civilisatrice it would legitimise colonialism over 
and above the liberté, égalité, fraternité triptych. 
 
The First Republic, which Agulhon confines to 10 August 1792 to October 1795 (that is 
until the Directory) could both be seen as a logical outcome of the Revolution (particularly 
given the American influence wherein the constitutional monarch was discarded along with 
the British) or, as Pamela Pilbeam has argued, the Revolution’s failure, given that the 
revolutionaries had not begun 1789 with republican intentions.9 Neither interpretation aids 
an understanding of the development of republicanism itself, but both suggest that there 
were political rather than purely ideological reasons for moving from a monarchy to a 
republic. The new republic began by declaring, if not putting into practice, some of the 
elements which would become fundamental to later republican ideology, particularly in 
relation to suffrage. Yet many of these apparently republican foundation stones, like anti-
clericalism which would truly come to the fore during the Third Republic, began prior to 
the deposition of the king with the sale of church lands and the removal of privileges from 
the Catholic Church. The Committee of Public Safety, which dominated the scene during 
these three years, seemingly rejects the Revolutionary, and later fundamentally republican 
principle, that sovereignty lay in the hands of the people. Whilst the Revolution imposed its 
‘shadow’ on France, ‘the oft-quoted ideals of the eighteenth-century enlightened writers 
offered no simple template.’10 As such, the interpretation and application of these ideals 
depended very much on the subsequent regimes and their circumstances. 
 
Whilst Agulhon restricts his understanding of republicanism into three short years prior to 
his own passion of 1848, Pilbeam appeals to the classical heritage of the republic to see its 
continuities not only under the Empire but also the July Monarchy and even the Bourbon 
Restoration.11 The importance of such a classical heritage should not be underestimated; 
certainly many of the symbols of the First Republic took their inspiration from Greece and 
Rome. Pilbeam argues that ‘to the Anglo-Saxon mind there is always a certain 
inconsistency in calling a military dictatorship a republic. For those imbued with the 
classical tradition there was no inherent contradiction between the two… In this respect it 
                                                
9 Maurice Agulhon, The Republican Experiment, 1848-1952 (Cambridge, 1983) p. 2; Pamela Pilbeam, 
Republicanism in Nineteenth-Century France, 1814-1871 (Basingstoke, 1995) p. 40. 
10 Pamela Pilbeam, 'Revolution, Restoration(s) and Beyond: Changes, Continuities and the Enduring Legacies 
of 1789', Martin S. Alexander (ed.) French History Since Napoleon (London, 1999) p. 32. 
11 Pilbeam, Republianism in Nineteenth-Century France, pp. 56, 58-59. 
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was entirely logical to call the constitution of December 1799 republican.’12 Fundamentally, 
however, the Napoleonic era would come to be seen as a rejection of republican ideals 
which were formulated under Louis-Philippe and made themselves heard, for a very short 
time, in 1848; to a great extent republicanism in terms of its specific aims and ideals shifted 
from the translucency of the eighteenth century to the more solid ideology of the 
nineteenth in opposition to Bonapartism. That Bonapartism would become the regime 
which usurped fledgling republics on two occasions would only strengthen the ideological 
opposition of the Third and Fourth Republics to the more dictatorial and militaristic 
regime. 
 
There did not exist any self-defined republican parties under the Restoration, but they 
began to form in the more liberal environment of the July Monarchy. Republicanism’s 
resounding rallying cry became, during this period, one of democracy and liberty. It also 
began to take on a social element, no doubt inspired in part by the economic recession 
which would exacerbate the troubles of Louis-Philippe culminating in the revolutionaries 
of February 1848 seizing power. Pilbeam sees ‘universal suffrage and the “right to work”’ 
as two central tenets of the Second Republic, although the former would not exist for over 
a century and the latter was rejected with the repression of the June Days.13 Nevertheless, 
to reiterate the importance of suffrage, the Republic was declared again, after the initial 
elections on 4 May 1848, in order to show that the Second Republic was a regime born out 
of democracy rather than the barricades.14 The reclamation of liberty by the Second 
Republic was a more tenacious ideal than the right to work, both in terms of freedom of 
the press and association, the abolition of the death penalty for political crimes and in the 
abolition of slavery.15 Elements of both democracy and liberty existed in the Second 
Empire to a greater extent than the First, but never to the extent that republicans 
demanded in opposition.16 
 
                                                
12 Ibid. pp. 48-49. 
13 Ibid. p. 185. Universal suffrage did not exist until the inclusion of Algerians in 1958; it certainly did not 
exist in 1848 when women, Algerians and the Jewish population of Algeria were all excluded. 
14 Agulhon, The Republican Experiment,  pp. 47-48. 
15 Ibid. pp. 27-28; Albert Cobban, A History of Modern France, Volume 2: 1799-1871 (London, 1965) p. 137. 
16 Elections involving the vast majority of the adult male population continued throughout the Second 
Empire and slavery was not reintroduced. Freedom of the press did not survive Louis-Napoleon’s coup d’état 
though. Fernand Terrou, 'Le Cadre Juridique', Claude Bellanger, et al. (eds), Histoire Générale de la Presse 
Française. Volume II: De 1815 à 1871 (Paris, 1969); Wilfred Jack Rhoden, 'Caricatural Representations of Louis-
Napoleon Bonaparte, 1848-1871', PhD thesis (University of Sheffield, 2011). 
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The workshops of February 1848 which represented the right to work proved too costly 
for the more conservative government of May. They were shut down and replaced by 
conscription and forced labour. A bitter civil war, fought briefly in Paris, was won by the 
newly-elected government, with the support of the National Guard. For those lacking in 
sympathy for republicanism, the June Days served as a reminder of the violence and 
bloodshed witnessed under the First Republic. The Second Republic, then, ushered in what 
the Third Republic has so often taken credit for: a conservative republicanism. Social 
programmes on the scale of those enacted in the spring of 1848 were not seen again until 
the Popular Front of 1936.17 The anti-clericalism which would become a strong tenet of 
republicanism towards the end of the nineteenth-century was absent in the constitution of 
the Second Republic.18 The final nail in the its founding principles also stemmed from the 
chamber elected in 1848. An attack on suffrage came from the monarchist-turned-
opportunist-republican Adolphe Thiers and was ironically, if somewhat cynically, defended 
by the Bonaparte he failed to outwit. The change in voting qualifications was accompanied 
by a sharp increase in stamp tax and repressive measures against the press.19 Louis-
Napoleon’s coup d’état was hot on its heels. 
 
Napoleon III’s final plebiscite in 1870 indicated that he was as popular towards the end of 
his reign as he had been in the beginning.20 There was no mass republican movement trying 
to overthrow him, no brewing revolution. The surrender of Napoleon III on 4 September 
1870 was predicated wholly by external military defeat; the Republic declared on the steps 
of the Hôtel de Ville was an opportunistic one. Fresh elections in 1871 provided it with 
legitimacy which allowed Thiers, the most popular deputy (he had been elected in twenty-
six départements) and head of the new government, to obliterate the Paris Commune with a 
degree of force and violence not witnessed in France on such a compact scale. The Third 
Republic was not ruled by republicans until 1879 and owned its continued existence not to 
the republicanism of the enfranchised citizens who had filled its seats with deputies, but to 
the lack of unity amongst the majority of those who considered themselves to be, in one 
form or another, monarchist. 
 
                                                
17 That government lasted little longer, although their programmes were not so hastily reversed. 
18 Indeed, the Falloux law of 1850 which institutionalised the Church in university education, was introduced 
by a republican government, albeit one with a Bonaparte as president. Agulhon, The Republican Experiment, p. 
122. 
19 Ibid. p. 126; Pilbeam, Republianism in Nineteenth-Century France, pp. 235-236. 
20 Cobban, A History of Modern France, vol. 2, p. 199. 
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Republicanism lost its revolutionary edge with the suppression of the June Days in 1848 
and particularly the brutal slaughter which ended the Paris Commune of 1871. To this 
extent, near-universal manhood suffrage can be seen to have tamed the left wing of the 
republican political class wherein the violence or threat of violence by the mob became 
distasteful even to socialists. To be a republican citizen meant to have the right to vote, but 
also the responsibility not to attempt revolution. This made republicanism a much less 
threatening regime to those who had previously seen it only through the lens of the Terror. 
The fear of Jacobinism goes some way to explain the brutality of the repressions, but the 
desire to redefine republicanism as a stable, orderly and conservative regime was 
paramount. Nevertheless, the governments which enacted the repressions against Paris in 
1848 and 1871 were not those which would define republicanism itself; indeed many, like 
Thiers and General Louis Eugène Cavaignac, were republican only by convenience.21 The 
new republicans, the likes of Léon Gambetta and Jules Ferry who would shape 
republicanism in the latter years of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, were able 
to select aspects of republicanism which traversed both sides of the civil war, particularly in 
terms of suffrage, anti-clericalism and free, compulsory education.22 This triptych of ideals 
would remain central to republicanism for the following century.23 
 
Antoine Prost considers the First World War to be a particularly important moment in the 
development of French republicanism as it was at this moment that it became synonymous 
with the nation.24 Such a synthesis was no doubt aided by the reintegration of Alsace and 
Lorraine into France and the popularity of republican regimes across Europe, as well as the 
eventual victory in the war itself. The First World War gave the Third Republic ‘the 
unbelievably presumptuous idea that their country was the beacon of the whole of 
humanity’, thus without doubt strengthening the conviction of universalism.25 Even as the 
European republics fell with increasing rapidity in the 1930s,  eventually including France’s 
in 1940, such a belief in the intrinsic relationship between the nation and the republic 
allowed for Charles de Gaulle to reinstate the republic in 1944. He refused even to declare 
                                                
21 Cavaignac had led the suppression of the June Days and was Louis-Napoleon’s main challenger for the 
presidency of the Second Republic at the end of 1848. 
22 The notion of civil war, la guerre franco-française, will be considered in Chapter 3. 
23 The first two had origins in the Revolution of 1789 and the latter was certainly not unique to 
republicanism; both the July Monarchy and the Second Empire had made enthusiastic inroads into educating 
the French population. 
24 Antoine Prost, Republican Identities in War and Peace: Representations of France in the Nineteenth and Twentieth 
Centuries, trans. Jay Winter and Helen McPhail (London, 2002) pp. 79-87. 
25 Ibid. p. 87. 
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it anew on the steps of the Hôtel de Ville, as was the tradition, given that, according to de 
Gaulle (in an idea embraced by his supporters) it had never actually ended.26 Nevertheless, 
as with the founding of previous republics, a period of civil violence occurred before being 
brought to an end by the republic in a show of strength and unity.27 The belief in 
universalism as intrinsic to republicanism could only bolster such confidence in the 
longevity, even invincibility, of the republic, at least in retrospect.  
 
Charles Sowerwine, like Prost, considers the Third Republic to mark a pinnacle of success 
for republicanism. He has argued that the Revolution of 1789 was politico-cultural and 
began a process which, through a belief in ‘reason’, altered the nature of the French state: 
 
The triumph of the Third Republic ended a struggle begun in the French 
Revolution of 1789. That struggle can be called the republican project. It 
depended on the assumption that human beings could use Reason to change 
their world. Otherwise they would have had no right to change the monarchy, 
which was ordained by God. To use Reason to change the world, the universe 
had to be knowable and knowable by human beings. God could no longer be 
the source of knowledge.28 
 
In such an argument, it is evident how the Third Republic’s reforms in terms of ‘universal’ 
manhood suffrage, anti-clericalism and free, ‘universal’ education stem from 1789 and its 
Enlightenment heritage. The Catholic Church was considered an enemy of Reason and also 
a stalwart of absolute monarchy, but in addition to this, it had also traditionally played a 
formative role in education. Fervent anti-clericalism of the Third Republic thus led to a 
separation of Church and State in 1905. Suffrage was a way to legitimate regimes where 
divine right no longer had any place. A secularly-educated enfranchised citizenry was thus 
required to pursue a regime based on ‘Reason’; a true inheritor of the Revolution. These 
values can be considered the basis of republicanism and from this narrative it is clear how 
                                                
26 This steam-rollering of the Vichy era and the consideration of it as an anomaly in republican history is dealt 
with in more detail in Chapter 3. 
27 As the June Days of 1848 and the semaine sanglante of 1871 ushered in conservative republics, so the 
épuration of 1944 provided an opportunity for revenge against (and scapegoating of) collaborators whilst at the 
same time allowing de Gaulle and his allies to sideline the Communists and represent themselves as the party 
of order. See, for example Julian Jackson, France: The Dark Years, 1940-1944 (Oxford, 2001) pp. 571-576.  
28 Charles Sowerwine, France Since 1870: Culture, Politics and Society (Basingstoke, 2001) p. 40. 
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François Furet was able to claim that, with the Third Republic the Revolution was ‘coming 
into port.’29 
 
2.1b Universal ism,  ass imilat ion and te l eology 
The Revolution of 1789 did not just bestow the value of ‘Reason’ upon republicanism. It 
began a narrative which would remain a central theme in French republican thought, 
practice and history writing. The Revolution instilled upon France, and upon French 
republicanism in particular, a linear narrative, a path of history along which the Revolution 
would be fulfilled. As Pilbeam declares at the very beginning of her book on republican 
France, ‘for republicans a republic came to epitomize the final spiritual and institutional 
triumph of man in society.’30 Thus, for republicans, everyone should be striving for this end 
and everyone, if they incorporated the ‘values of 1789’ to employ Tombs’ stock phrase, 
could reach it. This narrative then, linear, universalist and teleological, also incorporated 
assimilation; all people were free and equal and thus all could reach the ‘final triumph’ if 
they assimilated into the values of the French republic.  
 
Historians, as Tombs has suggested in reference to Michelet above, are part of the creation 
of this narrative of universalism. However, their role did not end in the nineteenth century. 
Furet’s idea of the Revolution ‘coming into port’ serves to re-emphasise the teleological 
nature of the republican narrative, as does Tombs’ own obsession with identifying when 
the Revolution ended (with both Empires and the Fifth Republic in his analysis).31 Indeed 
most republican historians feel the need to identify when the Revolution ended, and it is 
not surprising to find that it is frequently with the regime in which they themselves are 
present.32  
 
The notion of progress is central to this narrative. Prost has argued this point as well as 
supporting it in his own historical narrative: 
                                                
29 François Furet, Revolutionary France 1770-1880, trans. Antonia Nevill (Oxford, 1992) [1988] p. 537. Furet 
enjoyed a neat ending to a book as much as a neat ending to the Revolution; he also claimed that with 
Napoleon’s coup d’état on the 18 Brumaire, ‘the Revolution was over at last.’ François Furet and Denis Richet, 
The French Revolution, trans. Stephen Hardman (London, 1970) [1965] p. 398. 
30 Pilbeam, Republianism in Nineteenth-Century France, p. 1. 
31 Tombs, France 1814-1914, p. 488. 
32 This is the case in the work of Cobban, Hayward, Pilbeam and Tombs. Prost seems to favour the more 
traditional reverence for the Third Republic akin to Furet, a trend which will be considered in Chapter 3. Ceri 
Crossley has noted the same phenomenon in historians writing during the Restoration. Crossley, 'History as a 
Principle of Legitimation', pp. 49-56. 
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‘Progress’ is a key word in the republican vocabulary. The expression is 
electorally powerful because it is more than propaganda; it refers to a concrete 
reality, based above all on economic evolution but visible to all, a factor of 
which the republican school takes pains to create an awareness in order to use 
it for the credit of the regime.33 
 
The need for such a deterministic narrative stems both from the Revolution and from the 
many subsequent political crises France, and particularly the republics, have encountered. 
As Nick Hewlett has suggested, ‘France’s revolutionary, and therefore violent, past has 
become an enduring subject of national political pride and a symbol of progress, an integral 
and fundamental part of France’s political identity.’34 There is nothing more interesting for 
historians than a crisis, and a revolution or civil war suit such interests given that they are 
also easily dealt with on a national level. A narrative of progress allows certain crises to be 
positive; each crisis is overcome and the republic moves forward along a linear path 
towards an end, in the French case so frequently the end of the Revolution. Yet, as Henry 
Glassie has warned, if ‘history reduces to a linear, segmented tale of change, it falls into 
alliance with the forces of oppression.’35 Thus, to consider the republican historical 
narrative another way, a narrative of progress overcomes crises and provides ultimate 
legitimacy to the regime which overcomes them; such a narrative cannot be politically 
banal. Given the power that such a narrative has, it is hardly surprising that Gilbert Chaitin 
has considered French republicanism to be akin to religion.36 
 
The Third Republic is a particular focus of this narrative for several reasons: the enormity 
of the crises which it ‘overcomes’ (complete defeat by only one power, civil war in Paris, an 
anti-republican dominance in political circles for several years), the tenacity of the regime in 
comparison to all those which preceded it since 1789 and the ‘progressive’ successes it 
achieves (democracy, education, secularisation) which are considered to be (by republicans, 
                                                
33 Prost, Republican Identities in War and Peace, p. 78. This reference to economic progress is very reminiscent of 
the changes Guy encounters on his return to France in Les Parapluies du Cherbourg (see Chapter 1). 
34 Nick Hewlett, 'Explaining Conflict and Violence in France's Modern Political History, 1789-1945', Jan 
Windebank and Renate Günther (eds), Violence and Conflict in the Politics and Society of Modern France (Lampeter, 
1995) p. 10. 
35 Henry H. Glassie, Material Culture (Bloomington, 1999) p. 39. 
36 Gilbert D. Chaitin, The Enemy Within: Culture Wars and Political Identity in Novels of the French Third Republic 
(Columbus, 2009) pp. 41 and 225. He writes that the ‘keystone of the republican ideological edifice was…the 
claim that there exists a universal secular morality capable of taking the place of the Christian moral system’. 
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including republican historians) the almost natural outcomes of the Revolution. Sudhir 
Hazareesingh, in a study of Third Republican intellectuals in which he is specifically 
attempting to address this teleological narrative of progress, identifies it clearly in the 
thought of republican politicians and writers in the nineteenth century.37 Whilst he credits 
the likes of Émile Littré as having a slightly more complex understanding of the 
Revolution’s heritage and influence (particularly in its embrace of a conservative rather 
than Jacobin-style regime), teleological ‘progress was a “natural” phenomenon’ and 
‘republicans offered a conception of state and society which best corresponded [in Littré’s 
words] with “the general rules of the development of humanity”’.38 Fundamentally, 
Hazareesingh identifies the merging of two intellectual giants of the nineteenth century, 
positivism and republicanism, which together ‘harked back to the Enlightenment’s project 
of establishing a social and political order based on progress’, of which reason (key to 
Sowerwine’s understanding of republicanism) was a central legitimating factor.39 
 
The focus on the Third Republic for the likes of Furet, Prost and Eugen Weber thus not 
only allows a declaration of the success of republicanism as the progressive force of French 
history, but also promotes a narrative which from 1870 (or perhaps 1879 when the regime 
was fully ‘republicanised’) suggests that the French are from this point natural republicans, 
republicans by default.40 This republican belief in its ‘natural right’ is not a trend novel to 
France as Stefan Berger demonstrates with great clarity: 
 
all national histories showed a remarkable zeal in demonstrating the 
uniqueness of their particular nation-state, leading to a historiography of 
special paths which often obscured the common characteristics of the 
European heritage. Thus, Whig historians in Britain put in a claim for the 
unique tradition of liberal parliamentarianism, whereas French historians 
                                                
37 Sudhir Hazareesingh, Intellectual Founders of the Third Republic: Five Studies in Nineteenth-Century French Republican 
Thought (Oxford, 2001). 
38 Ibid. pp. 39-40 and 49. 
39 Ibid. p. 79. 
40 Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France 1870-1914 (London, 1977). It is 
precisely this linear narrative which has led to an obsessive questioning of the Vichy era, considered to be an 
anomaly in the otherwise unbroken republican line since 1870. This will be considered in more depth in 
Chapter 3. That this is reminiscent of the decolonisation discourse identified in Chapter 1 is not coincidental. 
As Chapter 3 will argue, it is precisely this transference of discourse between the two periods which allows 
the ‘decolonisation’ of Algeria to be brushed over and the constitutional changes of the Fifth Republic to be 
left unquestioned or debated. Hugo Frey is particularly astute in his analysis of the historiography in relation 
to the Vichy era. See Hugo Frey, 'Rebuilding France: Gaullist Historiography, the Rise-Fall Myth and French 
Identity (1945-58)', Stefan Berger, Mark Donovan, and Kevin Passmore (eds), Writing National Histories: 
Western Europe since 1800 (London, 1999). 
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tended to stress the singular significance of the ‘Great Revolution’… All of 
these claims to uniqueness were connected to the notion that one’s own 
nation was superior to other nations.41 
 
In French history this uniqueness and superiority is promoted in ‘a universal mission…[of] 
spreading revolutionary values’, as well as a belief in assimilation.42 For historians of the 
Fifth Republic it is precisely this narrative that requires the decolonisation discourse 
considered in the previous chapter and enables what Shepard has identified as the 
‘invention of decolonisation’.43 This teleological narrative of universalism, present in the 
republican histories of France, is imperative in the concealment of the crisis which the 
Algerian war caused in republicanism itself. 
 
The defeat of the French in Algeria was a twofold defeat for republicanism. Firstly it was a 
direct rejection of the assimilationist project and as such undermined the universalism of 
the Revolution and its values. Secondly, it was indicative of the fact that assimilation was 
never actually pursued as a policy in Algeria as it was within France (Weber’s ubiquitous 
‘peasants into Frenchmen’). The complete denial of this second point, which is what Todd 
Shepard’s thesis is concerned with, was concealed by rhetoric of a newly independent 
Algeria, brought up under French guidance and having matured into a secular republic; the 
culmination of the mission civilisatrice.44 Thus, by denying that assimilation was never 
meaningfully pursued, the independence of Algeria could be represented as an example of 
the universalism inherent to the ideals of the French Revolution. In reality, 1962 marked 
not only a rejection of French universalism, but also its intrinsic failure, undermining the 
very essence of the French republic and the Revolutionary ideas of 1789. 
 
 
                                                
41 Stefan Berger, Mark Donovan and Kevin Passmore, 'Apologias for the Nation-State in Western Europe 
since 1800', Stefan Berger, Mark Donovan, and Kevin Passmore (eds), Writing National Histories: Western 
Europe since 1800 (London, 1999) p. 10. 
42 Ibid.  
43 Todd Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France (London, 2006). 
44 Ibid.  
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2.2 The historiography of colonialism and decolonisation 
2.2a Algeria as  ‘an in tegral  par t of  France ’  
In line with Hazareesingh’s tracing of the relationship between positivism and 
republicanism in the intellectual thought of the later nineteenth century, Martin Evans 
argues that ‘colonialism, along with a belief in the values of positivism, science and primary 
education, became an integral part of the Third Republic’s unitary political culture.’45 In 
essence, colonialism was a political rather than an economic companion of republicanism.46 
Robert Aldrich has argued that the colonies were intended to be profitable in a rationale 
much more familiar to British colonies, but in reality, they operated at a financial loss for 
France at least prior to the First World War.47 The French empire of the nineteenth 
century, whatever its strategic value, was largely one of prestige. 
 
This is particularly true of the empire during the Third Republic. Founded on a crushing 
defeat and a loss of territory, a refocusing towards colonial possessions to regain 
international standing was a natural progression for the regime. Evans considers the ‘1870-
1 catastrophe’ as being ‘intimately connected to the evolution of a full-bodied colonial 
doctrine’ which would ‘signal an end to political and social decadence, proving beyond 
doubt that France was still a great power.’48 It caused some criticism, particularly from 
those on the right who considered this focus on the colonies as cowardice when focus 
should have been placed on revanche against Germany.49 Nevertheless, the colonies, and 
Algeria especially, became an important symbol of French greatness, and a more popular 
one than is often given credit.50 Algeria’s importance was enhanced after 1871 as many 
Alsatians, wishing to remain French, moved there, often to land ‘confiscated’ on their 
behalf by the new republic.51 
                                                
45 Martin Evans, 'Culture and Empire, 1830-1962', Martin Evans (ed.) Empire and Culture: The French Experience 
(Baskingstoke, 2004) p. 10. 
46 This section deals only with the second wave of French colonialism mainly involving Africa and Indochina, 
rather than that across the Atlantic, which was largely lost by the time of the Third Republic. 
47 Robert Aldrich, A History of French Overseas Expansion (Basingstoke, 1996) p. 91; Martin S. Alexander and 
John F. V. Keiger, 'Defending France: Foreign Policy and the Quest for Security, 1850s-1990s', Martin S. 
Alexander (ed.) French History Since Napoleon (London, 1999) p. 284. 
48 Martin Evans, 'From Colonialism to Post-Colonialism: The French Empire since Napoleon', Martin S. 
Alexander (ed.) French History Since Napoleon (London, 1999) p. 396. 
49 Paul Déroulède, founder of the Ligue des Patriotes declared in response to Jules Ferry’s colonial policy, ‘J’ai 
perdu deux sœurs, et vous m’offrez vingt domestiques.’ 
50 Tony Chafer and Amanda Sackur, eds, Promoting the Colonial Idea: Propaganda and Vision of Empire in France 
(Baskingstoke, 2002) pp. 3-5. 
51 Albert Cobban, A History of Modern France, Volume 3: 1871-1962 (London, 1965) p. 92; Karine Varley, Under 
the Shadow of Defeat: The War of 1870-71 in French Memory (Basingstoke, 2008) pp. 102-103. 
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For a regime laying claim to a Revolutionary heritage, however, a focus on colony policy as 
pursued by key republican figures like Ferry and Gambetta, did not sit easily with the ideal 
of égalité. Abbé Sièyes’s critique of the nobility’s privileged position as a barrier to an equal 
society, is striking in its similarity to the issues which colonialism raises for republicanism: 
 
The nobility, however, is also a foreigner in our midst because of its civil and 
political prerogatives. 
What is a nation? A body of associates living under common laws and 
[re]presented by the same legislative assembly, etc. 
Is it not obvious that the nobility possesses privileges and exemptions which 
it brazenly calls its rights and which stand distinct from the rights of the great 
body of citizens? Because of these special rights, the nobility does not belong 
to the common order, nor is it subjected to the common laws. Thus its 
private rights make it a people apart in the great nation. It is truly imperium in 
imperio.52 
 
The suggestion is that the nobility are the colons of a colonised France and given Sièyes’ 
belief in equality regardless of race, it would not stretch his ideas to suggest that 
colonialism itself was not befitting of revolutionary ideals. 
 
In lieu of one revolutionary ideal, the Third Republic looked to another to justify its 
colonial policy: universalism and the belief that the mission civilisatrice ‘provided the moral 
underpinning which…distinguished French conquests from the selfish aggression of other 
colonial powers, especially Britain’.53 A belief in universalism and a responsibility to it was 
foundational for Ferry and one that fitted well with his pursuit of state-led education; 
civilising the colonies shared the same strand of his ideology as educating the peasants.54 
Paul Sorum has identified such a belief in the civilising mission persisting and continuing to 
justify French colonialism well into the twentieth century.55 Colonialism was promoted in 
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this way by the republic, not least through the expositions universelles of 1878, 1889 and 1900 
and the exposition coloniale of 1931, so much so that Elizabeth Ezra has suggested that 
colonial culture became ‘inescapable’, that France had made it ‘an integral part of itself.’56 
 
If France was pursuing a mission civilisatrice in its colonies, spurred on by the ideal of 
universalism, the aim must be one of assimilation in order to maintain ideological 
coherence. This may have been less true for more traditional colonies but was certainly the 
case for Algeria; the Second Republic’s incorporation of the three Algerian départements into 
the French state suggests a pro-active move in support of such an intention. The colony as 
an integral part of France was an idea which stemmed from the Revolution, when decrees 
of March 1790 and August 1792 declared (but not did not act upon the declaration) that all 
colonial subjects were now citizens of France.57 The republican project in Algeria could 
thus be seen as a culmination of these Revolutionary ideals. 
 
However, assimilation, other than for a brief and panicked period between 1954 and 1959, 
was never pursued in Algeria. The belief in universalism was an excellent mode of 
justification but it was not a reality. The savagery and racism which the Algerians 
encountered from their ‘civilisers’ throughout the Third Republic is not simply explainable 
through personal gripes or manhandling by the army, it was systemic: 
 
The fact that for Muslims wine cultivation [a key settler crop] was deeply 
offensive – a permanent affront to their religious sensibilities and savagely 
sapping of food resources for the local population – did not enter into the 
equation… By 1930 only 1 per cent of Algerians had a farm of more than 100 
hectares as hunger became part of everyday life for the native population… 
[During the Great Depression] the French ruthlessly protected settlers’ 
interests, thereby provoking a pauperization process which produced a huge 
rural exodus on the part of the native population to the major coastal cities. 
This flight from the countryside climaxed tragically with the 1937 famine, 
widely remembered amongst North Africans as the terrible year of hunger, 
when people literally dropped dead of starvation on the roadside… [L]ocal 
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authorities took fright, …most tried to send victims back in lorry-loads to 
their place of origin, and what underpinned such a reaction was the belief that 
Muslim Algerians did not constitute a modern nation. Theirs was a primitive 
culture based upon tribes and religion which, because it could not compete, 
was predestined for extinction.58 
 
Ferry’s rhetoric had suggested that the republic considered Algerians to be in need of the 
same treatment as Breton or Corsican peasants: education, industrialisation, 
republicanisation. Yet this was evidently not what was pursued.59 Timothy Baycroft has 
considered the comparison of regional and colonial assimilation in relation to Algeria and 
concluded that whilst ‘the Republican rhetoric of empire was similar to that of the nation’, 
the implementation of the policy was ‘not completely parallel, and numerous differences 
can be seen.’60 He implies that this was partly to do with the ‘interpretation by subsequent 
generations’, but Ferry himself openly considered the Algerians to be racially distinct from 
the French in a way that was certainly not the case for French regions.61 There may have 
been parallel rhetoric, but there was no parallel policy. 
 
The claim to the pursuit of assimilation is made more absurd when considering how 
Algeria was run, even when referred to as ‘an integral part of France’ from 1848.62 Putting 
aside the apparent ridiculousness of ‘deporting’ June Days insurgents to what was 
ostensibly a region of France, Algeria possessed a civilian administration but was effectively 
controlled by the army; General Cavaignac was Governor-General of Algeria during the 
Second Republic.63 That Algeria had a governor-general throughout its period as ‘an 
integral part of France’ further illustrates the absurdity of such a claim. Napoleon III was 
perhaps a little more honest about the relationship between France and Algeria; he 
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considered Algeria to be an Arabic kingdom of which he was protector.64 This change in 
rhetoric meant little to most Algerians. The dominance of the army and existence of a 
governor-general remained consistent features of French rule until independence. 
 
Yet, despite Algeria being a home-from-home for the army, even they did not consider it 
to be France. With the invasion and occupation of France by Nazi Germany in 1940, 
General Maxime Weygand was ‘determined that the government should not leave the soil 
of France’.65 Certainly this conclusion had much to do with preserving the army itself, but 
coupled with Marshal Pétain’s pursuit of those deputies who did attempt to reach Algeria 
to continue governing, it clearly suggests that Algeria to both the army and the French 
populace generally, was not a true part of France.66 During the war itself, the United States 
were the first to land in Algeria, during November 1942; de Gaulle did not arrive until May 
the following year.67 Gathering troops for the liberation of France, much of the Free 
French armies were made up of colonial and Algerian soldiers but, under specific 
instructions from de Gaulle, they were removed from the armies which liberated Paris.68 
For both the army and the populous, Algeria was not considered to be French and nor 
were Algerians. 
 
The reasoning behind the rhetoric and the civil administration, the need for Algeria’s 
special status, stemmed from the dominance and political visibility of the settlers. They 
were bastions of the Third Republic which offered them both practical support and 
extended citizenship (in 1870 for the Jews, in 1886 for newly emigrated ‘Europeans’). 
Settlers were republicans by virtue of not being Bonapartists (given Napoleon III’s more 
favourable rhetoric directed at the Algerians). As such, their existence and the governance 
of Algeria needed to be justified in republican terms: through the language of universalism 
and assimilation. The settlers were taking civilisation to Algeria, creating farms from desert, 
setting up schools and building roads. That the farms were frequently vineyards offensive 
to Muslim sentiment, the schools were largely for the settlers’ children and cars were a 
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luxury few Algerians could even hope to afford, was of secondary concern.69 Evans has 
argued that ‘the only interest that counted were those of the settlers, which in turn explains 
why the Third Republic became so closely associated with the attempt to make Algeria 
French.’70 Algeria was French not because of assimilationist ideals but because of settler 
interests. The rhetoric was evidently powerful and successful enough so that by the time of 
the Fourth Republic, public opinion ensured that ‘it was impossible not to help the Pieds 
noirs, these not-so-distant cousins, against the threat of the Algerian “rebels”’.71 In reality, 
assimilation applied only to the settlers, never to the Algerians themselves. 
 
The assimilation of Algerians into the French republic was not pursued with any degree of 
conviction between 1848 and the start of the Algerian war. This does not in any way 
undermine Todd Shepard’s ‘invention of decolonisation’ thesis by suggesting that Algeria 
never really was ‘an integral part of France’; the settlers, their farms and the cheap labour 
the Algerians provided were certainly considered and treated as such but the Algerians 
themselves largely remained a foreign entity. It was only when the republic’s authority came 
under threat that the rhetorical justifications for the status of Algeria produced practical 
policies.72 As Stephen Tyre has found, the outbreak of the war prompted much more 
assertive policies of integration.73 Jacques Soustelle, governor-general between 1955 and 
1956, planned a remarkably radical pursuit of assimilation which broke from the mould by 
suggesting it would be possible to maintain a Muslim identity whilst additionally gaining a 
French one.74 His idea of integration was to make French and Algerians equal in terms of 
civil rights (including in the realm of female suffrage), remove the dominance of the secular 
model over an Islamist one and make Arabic compulsory in all schools.75 
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Soustelle was removed from his position with the transfer of the head of government to 
Guy Mollet, but the pursuit of assimilation as a method of ending the war remained for a 
few more strained years. François Mitterrand, Minister of the Interior under Mollet, was 
heard regularly reiterating the principle that Algeria was France.76 The subsequent 
governor-general (after General Georges Catroux’s brief stint), Robert Lacoste, pursued 
similar policies to Soustelle, pouring money into attempts to raise Algerian living 
standards.77 De Gaulle’s enfranchisement of the whole adult population in 1958 and his 
five-year Constantine plan, a programme of social and economic development including 
land redistribution, was very much in the same vein.78 In his speech in Constantine on 3 
October 1958, de Gaulle ‘referred to the notion that the people of Algeria were full-fledged 
Frenchmen.”’79 The FLN’s reaction was to set up a provisional government. With the shift 
in policy towards self-determination in 1959, the desperate clambering for the republican 
ideal of assimilation ended, and was then denied. The pursuit of assimilation in the initial 
years of the war allowed the republic to engage in a very bitter conflict whilst maintaining a 
claim to republican values; in order to extract themselves from Algeria, such policies which 
laid claim to the idea that Algeria was ‘an integral part of France’ were replaced with a 
decolonisation discourse atoning to the successful civilisation of Algeria under French 
protection and the blossoming of a new independent republic. 
 
2.2b France  v is - à-v is  Algeria 
There was evidently a direct shift in the rhetoric used firstly to justify Algeria’s place in 
relation to the French republic (1848-1954 and the assimilation of the settlers), secondly to 
justify the initial attempts to maintain it as such (1954-9 and the assimilation of Algerians) 
and finally to disengage from the war and draw a solid distinction between who was French 
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and who was Algerian (the success of the mission civilisatrice). As Matthew Connelly has 
asserted, ‘the Algerian War was, in part, ideological combat, [thus] peacemaking required 
ideological disarmament.’80 In many ways it was as much about an ideological conflict 
between changing interpretations of republican ideals to fit French interests as it was 
between the French and the FLN. 
 
The teleological narrative of universalism and the decolonisation discourse, allowed a 
writing of history which suggested a loyalty to republican ideals in both the colonial and 
post-colonial eras; in essence, a writing over of history. There are similarities here with 
Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi’s thesis on forgetting: 
 
at certain junctures, peoples are also capable of anamnesis, though it is not the 
group as such that initiates the process, but outstanding individuals or 
elites…Every ‘renaissance,’ every ‘reformation,’ reaches back into an often 
distant past to recover forgotten or neglected elements with which there is a 
sudden sympathetic vibration, a sense of empathy, or recognition. Inevitably, 
every such anamnesis also transforms the recovered past into something new; 
inexorably, it denigrates the intermediate past as something that deserves to 
be forgotten.81 
 
Whilst, as the introduction has made clear, this thesis does not subscribe to the notion of a 
collective forgetting, the idea of recovering a ‘forgotten’ past (whether it is a real past or 
not is without consequence) – in this situation the recall from 1959 that France is engaged 
in a civilising mission which is reaching its inevitable end – is recognisable in the change in 
rhetoric in relation to Algeria over these three periods. 
 
There are many historians who have accepted (and thus promoted) the decolonisation 
discourse in their works and, frequently, the ‘outstanding individual’ in this instance is 
often identified as de Gaulle. The General takes centre-stage for historians who view his 
leadership as creating a path for the inevitable decolonisation. Even writing before the end 
of the war Tanya Matthews suggests that de Gaulle ‘gradually unveiled what in all 
probability was his original purpose in Algeria, culminating in the offers of self-
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determination and of independence’, while for Pierre Goubert, the General’s gradual 
introduction of the possibility of independence, initially through ‘autodetermination… 
‘inevitably gathered strength’.82 To avoid undermining the decolonisation discourse through 
a recognition that de Gaulle came to power on the back of the belief that he would 
maintain Algérie française, it is suggested that his intentions were never to pursue such a 
policy. Michael Kelly credits his creation of the Fifth Republic as giving de Gaulle ‘the 
scope to settle the Algerian war, at the expense of disappointing his erstwhile supporters’.83 
Anthony Clayton argues that, in ‘a major speech in September 1959, de Gaulle disclosed 
his project of the previous year by openly offering Algeria “self-determination”’.84 John 
Talbott has argued that de Gaulle’s ‘admirers insist that no one else could have extricated 
France from Algeria without provoking a civil war.’85 As Talbott implies, such a narrative 
of the war denies its hugely destructive and very bloody character. Jean Lacouture suggests 
it led to further bloodshed because the false narrative made space for the OAS who were 
able to re-appropriate the notion of Algérie française, a concept denied by the republic after 
1959.86 
 
This pursuit of a decolonisation discourse within historiography thus ‘transforms the 
recovered past into something new’ and by doing so ‘denigrates the intermediate past as 
something that deserves to be forgotten.’ In this instance, de Gaulle’s return to power 
becomes the beginning of Algerian decolonisation and the period of the war beforehand is 
given scant importance. This allows Tony Chafer to suggest that assimilation of the 
Algerian population was always ‘unrealistic’ precisely because it was not in line with 
Algerian independence, rather than because the assimilation doctrine itself was flawed.87 
Beyond the historiography, Jean-Robert Henry has accused French political scientists of 
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having ‘passively accepted the apparently “given” fact of Algerian independence, pushing 
to the extreme the notion of…separate identities and completely overlooking the very real 
cross-currents which link together the identities of France and Algeria.’88 Serge Berstein 
does not share the celebratory sentiments for de Gaulle evident in these works, criticising 
the false history present in de Gaulle’s Mémoirs d’espoir in which he claims to have always 
considered independence to be the only solution to the Algerian war. Yet even Berstein is 
not able to extract his history from the dominant republican decolonisation discourse 
because, whilst critical of de Gaulle’s role, he is critical because he is suggesting that 
decolonisation was an inevitability and de Gaulle simply failed to see it as such and thus 
continued to pursue a bloody war.89 
 
This almost complete rejection of the history of the war prior to the shift in government 
policy to towards peace through Algerian independence has led to an overlooking, even a 
denial, of the very violent policies pursed by the French in the name of the republic. Alain-
Gérard Slama absolves the republic of responsibility by suggesting that ‘la colonisation 
française fut l’œuvre d’aventuriers – soldats, entrepreneurs, administrateurs, condamnés et 
exclus – elle ne fut pas un projet collectif.’90 Aldrich simply concludes that it is 
‘remarkable…how few long-lasting effects in France the giving up of empire entailed.’91 
This is also the conclusion that the education law of February 2005 (which demanded that 
the school syllabus ‘recognize in particular the positive role of the French presence 
overseas, notably in North Africa’) was attempting to support.92 These narratives not only 
reject the pre-history of decolonisation – covering Algeria’s time as part of France and the 
war itself – but also denies any possibility of a post-colonial history in which subsequent 
generations are still affected by the legacy of the colonial past. 
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The decolonisation discourse has been fostered in its apparent veracity by the teleological 
nature of the narrative of universalism in which it resides. The myth created by this 
discourse, that of the success of the mission civilisatrice, the denial of any attempts at 
assimilation and, most fundamentally for those of Algerian origin in France, the 
impermeable division of Algerians from French, has led to a concealment of the revolution 
in republicanism which occurred between 1959 and 1962 and which this thesis is 
attempting to reassert.93 In reference to the 2005 law, Peter Dunwoodie argues that the 
legislators were motivated by the ‘belief that they had the right to (re)interpret the past in 
the name of a homogenized history’.94 This thus denies a space for a more critical 
understanding of the relationship between France and Algeria and the impact such a 
relationship has had, not only on the relations between France and those of Algerian origin 
who live within the ‘hexagon’, but also on the nature of republicanism itself, particularly in 
regards to the dishonoured claim to universalism and assimilation. 
 
Republican historiography has thus become as ‘decolonised’ as republicanism itself; as 
Baycroft has argued, 
 
[the] absence of the colonies in such works as Robert Gildea’s The Past in 
French History or…Pierre Nora’s Les Lieux de Mémoire…show just how little the 
colonial past is considered a part of France by historians. For the 
representatives of official Republican France, as well as for the majority of 
France’s ‘national’ historians, colonialism is something which France did, not 
a part of what France was.95 
 
As such, these histories reject the possibility that the Algerian war could have affected the 
nature of republicanism itself. Unsurprisingly, therefore, it has been historians who have 
studied those outside this decolonisation discourse (such as the harkis) who have critiqued 
both its dominance and its interpretation of the past. Todd Shepard has noted that it was 
not until 1959 that public discussion in France ‘presumed the need for Algerian 
independence’, that is to say it had not always been considered the inevitable progression 
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others had described.96 H. B. Sutton considers the amnesties for OAS members following 
the war to be a method of avoiding asking difficult questions about the cause for which 
they were fighting that would have ‘blemished the image of de Gaulle as having 
successfully carried out decolonisation.’97 
 
In their critical histories of de Gaulle (rather than this dominant republican interpretation 
of history), Lacouture and Irwin Wall have raised another concern with this teleological 
discourse. Both identify de Gaulle’s post-war insistence that he had always worked towards 
Algerian decolonisation and both reject such a claim, considering his policy to be much less 
consistent and, as such, the war was ‘plus longtemps encore sinueuse et chaotique’.98 Wall 
is most damning, arguing that de Gaulle’s policy led to the ‘worst of all possible of 
outcomes’, particularly in relation to the harkis.99 The decolonisation discourse, supported 
by the teleological narrative of universalism, effectively conceals these more troubling 
ruptures in French history and leaves no space for the deviating histories of the harkis or 
those that continued to fight for Algérie française with the OAS.100 
 
The dominant republican historiography is intimately tied to the narrative of universalism. 
The mission civilisatrice aspect of this narrative insists upon the importance of France in 
aiding Algeria to become a modern independent republic, implying that it was an image of 
France and thus proof of republican universalism. This narrative is necessitated by ‘the 
inability of French…intellectuals to accept the idea that French culture and civilization 
could no longer be considered universal.’101 Such a narrative of history is dependent upon 
its own dominance, a rejection of the possibility of plural history, and thus unable to be 
inclusive to those which the republican history excludes, like the harkis studied by Shepard 
and Sutton. Julian Jackson has argued that in de Gaulle’s Fifth Republic this ‘republican 
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merely hateful and, since they bucked the tide of History, irrational.’ Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization, p. 
88. 
101 James D. Le Sueur, Uncivil War: Intellectuals and Identity Politics During the Decolonization of Algeria 
(Philadelphia, 2001) p. 257. 
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consensus has never been more total’.102 As a result it has excluded those marginal to this 
narrative, those who do not comply with the decolonisation discourse. Unable to find an 
identity in the republican narrative, the stories of those who continued to fight for Algérie 
française after 1959 find space only on the extreme right. As such the extreme right in 
French politics is able to lay sole claim to broad swathes of the history of empire from 
which it is able to set the agenda as regards identity and immigration. The republican 
history of empire is framed through an impermeable distinction to the metropole, making 
Frenchness exclusive. 
 
The teleological basis of the decolonisation discourse is reflective of the nature of French 
republican ideology in which universalism demands an equally progressive, almost 
deterministic, understanding of French history. This teleological narrative which is evident 
in republican historiography effectively avoids the consideration that the Algerian war 
actually had a revolutionary effect on republicanism, particularly in relation to assimilation. 
By denying that Algeria had ever been considered part of the French republic between 
1848 and 1954 during which time Algerians were deprived of égalité because of their race, 
and then denying that assimilation had been actively pursued in an attempt to maintain 
Algérie française (1954-1959), republican histories have concealed the challenge the Algerian 
war made to the belief in the universalism of French republicanism and, intrinsically related 
to that, the foundational Revolutionary belief that origin bore no relation to the possibility 
of becoming French. 
 
As the following section will lay out, this teleological narrative was not restricted to 
republican historiography, but is identifiable in other cultural mediums.  Nor, I will argue, 
is such a teleological narrative novel to the Algerian war but equally identifiable in the 
narratives of other periods of crisis for the republic, notably the Franco-Prussian war and 
Commune of 1870-1. This is consistent with the understanding that there is an inherent 
element of teleology in republican universalism itself; a universalist notion must intrinsically 
be one which proclaims to be superior and is thus destined to eventually dominate. The 
tradition of such a narrative in republican culture has lent additional power to the 
decolonisation discourse of the Algerian war which has itself concealed the revolutionary 
impact the war had on the application of assimilation.  
                                                
102 Julian Jackson, 'Historians and the Nation in Contemporary France', Stefan Berger, Mark Donovan, and 
Kevin Passmore (eds), Writing National Histories: Western Europe Since 1800 (London, 1999) pp. 245-246. 
Algeria in France 
 157 
2.3 From rebirth to modernisation: The teleological trope of republican 
culture 
Chapter 1 has already touched upon the tropes of inevitability in the republican narrative 
by means of a decolonisation discourse in artistic representations of the Algerian war. This 
discourse is present in Pierre-Henri Simon’s pre-independence novel, Portrait d’un officier, in 
which Jean de Larsen is resigned to the end of his military career which has been so 
intimately tied to Algérie française.103 Georges Perec’s Quel petit vélo à guidon chromé au found de la 
cour?, set before the war has ended but written afterwards, is quite convinced of the war’s 
ultimate end and the subsequent independence of Algeria within its narrative.104 This 
section adds to these initial observations by considering additional source material and 
suggesting that, along with the historiographical overview above, a teleological narrative is 
endemic in republicanism due to its connection to the doctrine of universalism. It is 
through this narrative that the republic is able to distance itself from less palatable elements 
of its own history. Thus, this section begins with a brief consideration of artistic 
representations of the Franco-Prussian war and the Commune in which the theme of 
rebirth is utilised to overcome the traumatic experience of l’année terrible and leave the 
republic untarnished. Whilst rebirth is transposed to representations of the Algerian war by 
some authors and filmmakers, modernisation provides a more popular and insistently 
forward-looking theme for this later period. Both provide a structure for the teleological 
narrative of republican universalism which denies the importance of unpalatable aspects of 
the past for the republican grand narrative of History. 
 
2.3a The Third Republ ic ’ s  c yc l i cal  re bir th 
Representations of war and defeat in republican culture of the late nineteenth century are 
thick with images of nature, the countryside and rebirth. The defeat becomes the birth of 
the republic; a tenacious image which effectively distances the new regime from the defeat 
inflicted by the Prussians and the slaughter of the Paris Commune (from the ashes of 
which the republic is so frequently depicted as being born, despite having been in power 
for the previous eight months). The symbol of rebirth after defeat is hardly unique to art in 
nineteenth-century France: Wolfgang Schivelbusch has noted, the ‘myth of Troy as both an 
end and a beginning is one of the many expressions of the ancient idea, common to all the 
                                                
103 Pierre Henri Simon, Portrait d'un Officier (Paris, 1958). 
104 Georges Perec, Quel petit vélo à guidon chromé au fond de la cour? (Paris, 1966). 
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world’s great cultures, that war, death and rebirth are cyclically linked.’105 Its presence in 
French culture also suggests a Catholic influence, regardless of the secular doctrine of the 
Third Republic, giving added moral strength to the idea of death and resurrection. The 
purging of the old to create anew also owes some heritage to the Enlightenment and the 
Revolution; Alan Forrest has noted the ‘importance of images of regeneration and 
renewal…in revolutionary discourse and symbolism.’106 Thus, rather than a defeat, 
republican culture represents the Franco-Prussian war ‘as a purifying and renewing 
force’.107 The focus on nature enhances this symbolism, particularly its cyclical aspect 
(defeat marks the return of the republic, its rebirth), and is common in both painting and 
literature at this time, influenced by the naturalist and impressionist movements. 
 
One of the most literal artistic translations of the theme of rebirth in the aftermath of the 
defeat is Pierre Puvis de Chavannes’s 1872 painting, L’Espérance (Figure 1).108 The 
allegorical nude sits amongst ruins as the sun rises. Flowers are growing from the rubble 
around her as she sits on a white sheet clutching a tree branch. Her purity is evident and 
suggestive of the purity of the new republic which, even after the violent destruction of the 
Paris Commune, is able to grow anew from the ruins. The branch is symbolic of peace and 
unity. Puvis de Chavannes was a supporter of the Versailles government and the use of the 
female form (a frequent focus of his paintings) reclaimed the image from the aggressive 
depictions of Communard women as pétroleuses.109 Espérance is passive, calm and revered; 
there is a gesture of reconciliation in the painting.110 The nature element suggests a cyclical 
                                                
105 Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning, and Recovery, trans. Jefferson 
Chase (London, 2001) p. 2. 
106 Alan Forrest, 'La Patrie en danger: The French Revolution and the First Levée en masse', Daniel Moran and 
Arthur Waldron (eds), The People in Arms: Military Myth and National Mobilization since the French Revolution 
(Cambridge, 2003) p. 21. 
107 Schivelbusch, The Culture of Defeat, p. 29. 
108 Puvis de Chavannes also painted a clothed version of this painting which Stop caricatured in Journal 
Amusant as a rather emaciated figure perched on a set of dominoes to which his caption prescribed a diet ‘du 
fer et du vin de quinquina.’ Stop perhaps did not share Puvis de Chavannes faith in the government of 
Adolphe Thiers. Stop, ‘Le Salon de 1872’, Journal Amusant (18 May 1872). 
109 On Puvis de Chavanne’s politics see John Milner, Art, War and Revolution in France, 1870-1871 (London, 
2000) pp. 195-196. On the contrast to images of Communard women see Albert Boime, Art and the French 
Commune: Imagining Paris After War and Revolution (Chichester, 1995) p. 62. 
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p. 75. 
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narrative which has returned France to its rightful, even its natural state as a republic; its re-
emergence was as inevitable as the coming of spring.111 
 
 
Figure 1. Pierre Puvis de Chavannes, L’Espé rance , 1872. 
 
The theme of rebirth is also very clear at the end of Zola’s La Débâcle as Jean Macquart, 
peasant citizen soldier of France, emerges from the destruction of the war and Commune: 
 
Le champ ravagé était en friche, la mission brûlée était par terre ; et Jean, le 
plus humble et le plus douloureux, s’en alla, marchant à l’avenir, à la grande et 
rude besogne de toute une France à refaire.112 
 
                                                
111 Indeed, as inevitable as the rising of the sun seen in the top left of this painting. Albert Boime also notes 
this element in Claude Monet’s Impression, soleil levant (1874) seeing it as representing a new day dawning for 
France. Boime, Art and the French Commune p. 36. Impressionism is returned to later in this section. 
112 Émile Zola, La Débâcle (Paris, 1892) p. 636. [The ravaged field was lying fallow, the burnt house was down 
to the ground, and Jean, the most humble and grief-stricken of men, went away, walking into the future to set 
about the great, hard job of building a new France. Émile Zola, The Debacle, trans. L. W. Hancock (London, 
1972) [1892]] 
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Zola’s naturalism and his pseudo-scientific interpretations of the effects which 
environmental and hereditary factors played upon personal and societal health led him to 
pen the twenty-novel series, Les Rougon-Macquart: histoire naturelle et sociale d’une famille sous le 
Second Empire between 1867 and 1893, of which La Débâcle is the penultimate offering. His 
novels concluded that hard work and the countryside produced the fittest body and mind 
and Jean represented the epitome of such a character. In the final novel, Le Docteur Pascal, 
notable for its insularity in comparison to the very distinct historical and societal context of 
the rest of the series, Jean remains the celebrated character of the family.113 It is reported 
(much of the book summarises the lives of the series’ earlier characters) that he has 
returned to peasant life and begun to rebuild France alongside his wife and healthy, 
hardworking children. Zola’s naturalism bordered on determinism, largely removing the 
free-will of his characters in terms of their eventual fate which was often ordained by their 
hereditary and social environments.114 This had the benefit of excusing the social ills which 
the Third Republic had inherited from its predecessor (the series is consistently disparaging 
of the Second Empire), whilst also emphasising the means by which the republic could be 
built or, more in line with Zola’s symbolism, grown anew. 
 
This imagery of the natural environment as healthier and superior to the urban industrial 
background is repeated in other novels and paintings of the period, certainly evidencing a 
contemporary concern with urbanisation and industrialisation. Additionally, and most 
poignantly, it suggested that the Republic was a natural and thus inherently good entity in 
contrast with its enemy, whether that was the decadent Second Empire or the Prussian 
army machine. In La Débâcle as well as Alphonse Daudet’s Robert Helmont: Journal d’un 
solitaire and the science-fiction writer Jules Verne’s 1879 novel Les Cinq Cent Millions de la 
Bégum, the Prussian foe is depicted as an industrialised mass, the antithesis of the clean and 
healthy natural environment occupied by the French.115 
 
Verne’s novel, whilst never likely to be described as his masterpiece, ensured the author’s 
popularity through its crass stereotyping of Germans whilst the mood of revanche was still 
palpable, if unpractical, in France.116 It tells the story of two men who inherit a vast 
                                                
113 Émile Zola, Le Docteur Pascal (Paris, 1893). 
114 Robert Gildea, Barricades and Borders: Europe 1800-1914 (Oxford, 1996) pp. 263-164. 
115 Alphonse Daudet, Robert Helmont: Journal d'un solitaire (Paris, 1891); Jules Verne, 'Les Cinq Cent Millions de 
la Bégum', Project Gutenberg, 1879 [accessed 24 September 2009] http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/4968. 
116 Karine Varley notes that ‘while revenge may have been a popular fantasy, it was never really a realistic 
foreign policy objective, being virtually forgotten even among nationalists by the late 1880s and scarcely 
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fortune. The first, a French doctor, uses it to build a utopian town dedicated to public 
health. The second, a German scientist, positivistic, mechanistic and a hearty consumer of 
sausages and sauerkraut, hears of Dr Sarrasin’s plan and builds his own town. An urban 
and industrial dystopia, Schultze’s town is built with the intention of destroying Sarrasin’s 
France-Ville whilst also making a hearty profit as the world’s greatest producer of arms. 
Schultze is finally hoisted by his own petard when his invention of a bomb containing 
frozen carbon dioxide accidentally explodes in his office. 
 
As with La Débâcle, both Robert Helmont and Les Cinq Cent Millions end on the theme of 
rebirth through nature. Helmont ends his diary entries which make up the novel with the 
melting of snow and the possibility of spring budding forth wherein, 
 
si quelque chose peut consoler de la guerre, c’est ce repos de la nature et des 
hommes, ce calme universel d’un pays meurtri qui répare ses forces dans le 
sommeil, oubliant la récolte perdue, pour préparer les moissons à venir !...117 
 
In Les Cinq Cents Millions, with the assured success of the idyllic France-Ville, Sarrasin’s 
young protégé, Marcel Bruckmann, becomes engaged to his daughter, a union which will 
no doubt bring about new life. 
 
The novels of Zola, Daudet and Verne all present an antithesis to the natural rebirth of the 
republic. In Les Cinq Cent Millions, Schultz has built an industrial powerhouse full of dirty, 
deadly mines and huge factories to which his rough German workers crowd.118 Bertrand 
Taithe has identified a trend in the use of body metaphors in the French literature of this 
period, particularly in regards to the amputation of Alsace and Lorraine but also a more 
general ‘medicalisation of French political representations.’119 As such, the figure of Doctor 
                                                                                                                                          
mentioned in the press.’ Varley, Under the Shadow of Defeat, p. 12. Verne himself was a well known writer in 
France by this time. The journal L’Illustration had noted his success and ‘la popularité de son nom’ some 
seven years previously. Jules Claretie, ‘Revue Littéraire’, L’Illustration (28 December 1872). To aid the revanchist 
plot, Sarrasin’s patriotic genius of a protégé is the Alsatian Marcel Bruckmann. Verne, 'Les Cinq Cent 
Millions de la Bégum', Chapter II. 
117 Daudet, Robert Helmont pp. 205-205. [If anything can impart consolation after a cruel war, it is this repose 
of all nature and mankind, this universal calm which rests upon a shattered country – a country recruiting its 
strength by sleep, forgetful of the lost harvest in preparing for that of the future!] 
118 Verne, 'Les Cinq Cent Millions de la Bégum', Chapters III and IV. In Chapter IV of the novel, Bruckmann 
is undercover in Schultz’s city. His landlady, a widow due to an industrial accident, also loses her fifteen year-
old son when he asphyxiates in a mine. 
119 Bertrand Taithe, Defeated Flesh: Welfare, Warfare and the Making of Modern France (Manchester, 1999) pp. 180-
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Sarassin and his health-focused town is particularly poignant. The industrial city of 
Schultz’s was an even more powerful antithesis to France-Ville in such a literary 
environment. 
 
In Zola’s novel the balance of natural France is tipped more towards agriculture than 
health. As such, its antithesis has a slightly different focus. When the Bavarians attack, a 
character describes how she saw, 
 
des milliers et des milliers, qui arrivaient par les routes, par les champs, par les 
bois, en colonnes serrées, sans fin. Tout de suite, le pays en a été noir. Une 
invasion noire, des sauterelles noires, encore et encore, si bien qu’en un rien 
de temps, on n’a plus vu la terre.120 
 
From Bazeilles, Weiss sees ‘un si noir fourmillement de troupes allemandes’.121 The 
metaphorical connection between the German armies and the vision of the ordered 
destruction by a mass of ants or locusts is the direct opposite of the healthy rebirth of 
France through agriculture and hard work. Nature has sustained the stranded Helmont as 
he has taken comfort in ‘la tiédeur d’un œuf sous la paille’, the forest has been his larder 
and he had kept track of the seasons by ‘grandes troupes d’oies sauvages, le vol battant, le 
cou tendu’ migrating.122 The occupying Germans are set against this natural beauty as 
mechanical brutes with no respect for the countryside around them. Just as Helmont is 
enjoying a ‘claire journée d’automne, sous un ciel d’un bleu profond et pur’ it is shattered 
by ‘une détonation formidable, très voisine, a ébranlé la maison, secoué les vitres, le 
feuillage, et fait sortir de partout des vols éperdus, des cris, des effarements, une 
galopade !’123 The arrival of the Prussians upsets the peace and balance of nature. They lack 
the respect Helmont has for the forest and they are wasteful of the resources which he 
                                                
120 Zola, La Débâcle, pp. 166-167. [‘thousands and thousands of them coming along all the roads, over the 
fields, through the woods, in close-packed ranks, endlessly. A black invasion, like black grasshoppers, on and 
on, so that in no time you couldn’t see the ground for them.] 
121 Ibid. p. 210. [a black swarm of German troops] 
122 Daudet, Robert Helmont, pp. 44, 90-91 and 94. [the warmth of an egg in the straw / large flocks of geese, 
with outstretched necks and beating against the wind] 
123 Ibid. p. 50. [clear autumn day, under a deep and pure blue sky’; ‘a formidable explosion in my immediate 
vicinity shook the house, rattled the windows, and stirred the leaves, sending forth on all sides the sound of 
wild flutterings, screams, alarms, and galloping!] 
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relies upon. Helmont is even forced to kill his cockerel to prevent its cry alerting the 
occupiers to his presence, a scene which suggests an ancient sacrifice to nature.124 
 
These scenes of the beauty of nature and its vicious pillage by the invading army are 
illustrated in the paintings by Picard and Montégut that accompanied the novel in its 
second printing of 1891. There are many depictions signed by Picard of snippets of the 
countryside, a riverbank, the garden and the forest in which the brush strokes and blurred 
edges have clearly been influenced by the impressionist movement. As the novel 
progresses, pictures signed by Montégut appear, darker in shade and clearer in form, 
ominous in their depictions of German soldiers and the casting of Helmont’s shadow when 
in hiding.125 A painting of the French farmer, Goudeloup, hiding in the forest plays on 
these methods: buried up to his waste in foliage with his upper body blending into a tree 
trunk, Goudeloup is watching a German soldier whose straight lines of uniform cause him 
to stand out in this natural landscape.126 
 
The theme of nature is heavily present in many impressionist works after the Franco-
Prussian war, a period during which ‘the importance of landscape painting’ grew in the 
French art world.127 Agricultural scenes, such as his famous haystacks and bourgeois 
gardens, make up a significant section of work by Claude Monet (Figure 2). Scenes of 
leisure in the countryside were frequently represented by Edgar Degas and, later, Georges 
Seurat (Figures 3 and 4). Gordon Millan has argued that the impressionist interest in train 
stations, painted by Monet, Gustave Caillebotte and Edouard Manet, was actually a 
reference to the countryside, newly open to city-dwellers with the development of the 
public transport network.128 Whilst this may be stretching the link a little too far, there was 
certainly a tendency to paint new life through nature rather than the destructiveness of 
war.129 This helped to sideline the significance of the war as well as the destructive and 
divisive Commune, enabling the focus instead to be on the creation of the natural republic. 
 
                                                
124 Ibid. p. 74. 
125 Ibid. pp. 71 and p. 97. 
126 Ibid. p. 139. 
127 Richard Thomson, ed., Framing France: Essays on the Representation of Landscape in France, 1870-1914 
(Manchester, 1998) p. 2. 
128 Millan, Rigby and Forbes, 'Industrialization and its Discontents (1870-1914)', p. 31. See Edouard Manet, 
Gare Saint-Lazare, 1873; Gustave Caillebotte, Le Pont de l’Europe, 1876; Claude Monet, Le Pont de l’Europe and 
Gare Saint-Lazare, 1877 as well as various others from the same series. 
129 The works of Manet were an exception to this trend and will be considered in the next chapter. 
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Figure 2. Claude Monet, Jardin  à Argent eui l , 1873. 
 
 
Figure 3. Edgar Degas, At the Races  in  t he  Count ry , 1872. 
 
 
Figure 4. Georges Seurat, Une Ba ignade à  Asni ère s , 1884. 
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Much of the republican culture after l’année terrible incorporated the themes of nature and 
rebirth, sometimes emphasised by the counter-image of the industrial German. Barbara 
Kelly has noted similar tendencies in music, particularly in her study of Claude Debussy’s 
Pelléas which was both explicitly anti-German (particularly, anti-Wagner) and had a close 
relationship with nature.130 Schivelbusch has noted that at ‘the heart of both defeat and war 
lies the threat of extinction that resonates long past the cessation of hostilities.’131 The 
theme of rebirth through nature was certainly a method of overcoming what could 
otherwise become a paranoia, but it did more besides. This pervasive trend in Third 
Republican culture expressed a belief in the legitimacy of the republic; the connection to 
the natural world suggested that the republic was France’s natural state and that its rebirth 
from defeat was part of a cyclical process of natural time. As with Zola’s characters whose 
lives were determined by the environments, this went some way to remove the agency of 
those involved in the defeat and the Commune. As such it promoted an environment of 
reconciliation and avoided laying a wide net of blame for either of the two intertwining 
crises which shook France; the soldiers and the Communards, unless identified as leaders, 
were to become reconciled with the Republic at this new dawn.132 The Republic was thus 
universal. Given the cyclical and natural character of the allegories used in these 
representations (of spring, of dawn) there was also an inevitability tied to them; the return 
of the Republic was as natural as the rising of the sun and thus the preceding destruction of 
little consequence. The teleology of these various representations is intrinsic to their 
republican universalism. 
 
2.3b The Fif th  Republ ic ’ s  l inear modernisa ti on  
In the 1870s and 1880s the Third Republic could be represented as having been reborn 
because it came about following the defeat of the most tenacious of nineteenth-century 
republican enemies, Bonapartism. The Fifth Republic could not claim such a triumphal 
flouting of a political nemesis. Rebirth suggests an inevitable blossoming from the ruins; 
representing the Fourth Republic as ruins would be problematic given that it laid claim to 
the same republican doctrine as its successor. The teleological aspect of universalism 
                                                
130 Barbara L. Kelly, 'Debussy and the Making of a musicien français: Pelléas, the Press, and World War I', 
Barbara L. Kelly (ed.) French Music, Culture and National Identity, 1870-1939 (Woodbridge, 2008) pp. 58-76. 
131 Schivelbusch, The Culture of Defeat, p. 5. 
132 Bertrand Taithe similarly sees a ‘transcendent’ imagery in the history and literature about the Franco-
Prussian war in the Third Republic. Bertrand Taithe, 'Rhetoric, Propaganda and Memory: Framing the 
Franco-Prussian War', Bertrand Taithe and Tim Thornton (eds), Propaganda: Political Rhetoric and Identity 1300-
2000 (Stroud, Gloucestershire, 1999). 
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remains, however, but rather than reaching the final destination of republicanism through a 
cyclical rebirth, the representations of the war and defeat in the Fifth Republic are 
frequently more linear. This is a particularly Gaullist republican trend which began with de 
Gaulle’s interpretation of the Second World War. In not announcing the new Fourth 
Republic at the Hôtel de Ville, de Gaulle claimed the republic had never ended. In the 
Gaullist narrative of the Second World War, the republic lived on in exile; Vichy was un-
French and thus not suitable for a cyclical narrative of rebirth.133 Instead, a linear narrative 
of progress, and particularly of modernisation, informs the Gaullist republican 
interpretation of history. Identifiable in the phrase ‘trente glorieuses’, referring to the three 
decades of economic growth following the Second World War, the progressive narrative is 
also present in many of the artistic representations of the Algerian war and defeat. Much 
akin to de Gaulle’s claim to continuity with the founding of the Fourth Republic, this linear 
narrative, whilst maintaining the teleological element of the Third Republic, avoids 
considering the change of regime in 1958 as a revolution. 
 
Four works from the Fifth Republic clearly illustrate this linear political narrative. Two are 
already familiar: Jean Pélégri’s Les Oliviers de la justice and the 1964 film Les Parapluies de 
Cherbourg. The other pair are coming-of-age stories, a narrative style which serves to 
enhance their linearity: Claire Etcherelli’s 1967 novel, Elise, ou la vraie vie and, to illustrate 
the enduring nature of the trend, André Téchiné’s 1994 film, Les Roseaux Sauvages. These 
four artistic representations of the Algerian war all pursue a linear narrative that effectively 
dismisses the importance of the very war which provides them with context. By doing so, 
the consequences of the war on the French republic are given no consideration; the 
narrative is teleological thus the end of the war can present nothing new. By way of 
contrast, there are examples of republican artistic representations of the war which do not 
follow the linear Gaullist trend but share the trope of rebirth with Third Republican 
culture.134 Pierre Guyotat’s Tombeau pour cinq cent mille soldats (1967) and two recent films, 
                                                
133 Such an interpretation is part of the trend which I call Vichy exceptionalism, essentially a denial of the 
Frenchness of the regime. I consider this in detail, and highlight why it has had a detrimental impact on the 
history of the Algerian war, in Chapter 3. 
134 This thesis’s focus is on republican culture, as defined in the Introduction. Two films which I judged not 
to correspond with this were Pierre Schoendoerffer’s Le Crabe-Tambour (1977) and Brigitte Roüan’s Outremer 
(1990). This was partly on the basis of their authors (Schoendoerffer is a right-wing filmmaker with a 
personal history attached to the professional army, Roüan is an ex-settler), but primarily on the films 
themselves. Neither film presents a linear narrative of progress or a cyclical narrative of rebirth. 
Schoendoerffer’s film is bleak except for the flashback scenes which represent a golden era of the French 
army and colonialism. It ends with the acceptance that such an era will never return and the future stretches 
into an unending bleakness. Roüan’s film is heavily nostalgic of settler life as Le Crabe-Tambour is of the 
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Cartouches Gauloises (2007) and Hors la loi (2010) all directly represent defeat and subsequent 
rebirth. However, as the analysis here will show, these three cultural productions still 
conform to the teleological narrative of universalism which denies a revolution in French 
republicanism caused by the Algerian war because the rebirth they represent is not that of 
the French Republic. 
 
Divided into three parts, Pélégri’s Les Oliviers de la justice is a novel of tragic resignation.135 It 
recounts the story of the death of an old settler as told by his son, Michel. Part one 
documents the evening before his father’s death and the day of the Muslim festival of 
Ashura. This latter event raises the anticipation of terror attacks in Algiers where the family 
now live, having moved from the vineyard Michel’s father had set up. The second third of 
the novel narrates the day of his father’s death and focuses on Michel’s reminiscence of his 
idyllic childhood. In the final part his father’s body is returned to their old farm. Here 
Michel speaks frankly of the misdeeds of colonialism yet voices the concern that the 
settlers’ work is as yet unfinished. The life and death of Michel’s father  is reflective of the 
life and death of Algérie française. His father is dying as terrorism is taking over Algiers; both 
narrator and author are resigned to the French colonisation of Algeria being near its end. 
The notion that the settlers’ work is unfinished suggests a linear and inevitable narrative of 
progress as Michel’s sadness intertwines with the death of his elderly father and the end to 
the settlers’ way of life.  
 
Much like the representations of war in the Third Republic, nature is a strong element in 
the novel. Michel’s father embodies Algeria physically in his connection with the land. 
Persistent references to cultivation build throughout the novel. Judas and orange trees, of 
which his father had planted ‘dans le paysage desséché ils semblent flotter, comme un 
chapelet d’îles’, the plain had become his kingdom ‘parce qu’il avait défriché, labouré, 
planté – sans violences.’136 There is a gradual escalation of this cultivating narrative until, in 
part three when his dead father is being returned to the old farm to be buried, it unfolds 
                                                                                                                                          
professional army’s, and follows three sisters from their lives in Algeria to their move to France. In the final 
scene, the youngest sister cannot take her wedding vows, ‘she is obviously unable to begin life anew… She 
remains mute, paralyzed.’ Neither of these films accept the independence of Algeria, seeing in it only an 
ending of a golden age without the possibility for anything new or progressive. As such, they are critical of 
the republican policy of decolonisation rather than supportive of it. Pierre Schoendoerffer, Le Crabe-Tambour 
(France, 1977); Brigitte Roüan, Outremer (France, 1990); Naomi Greene, Landscapes of Loss: The National Past in 
Postwar French Cinema (Princeton, 1999) p. 144. 
135 Jean Pélégri, Les Oliviers de la justice (Paris, 1959). 
136 Ibid. pp. 34 and 122. [float in the dried up countryside like a rosary of green islands / because he had 
cultivated, laboured, and sown the land – without harshness] 
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into a narrative of creation: ‘Ils avaient défriché et planté ces terres difficiles, et ils en 
avaient fait un paysage neuf et fertile.’137 These heartfelt visions of bringing oases to the 
sirocco-blasted land are consistent with the mission civilisatrice which suits a liberal settler like 
Pélégri in 1959 because it provides a justification for his existence, but it does not 
contradict the decolonisation discourse. Whilst Michel may express that the settlers have 
more work to do in terms of modernising Algeria, such an idea in itself also suggests that at 
some point in the future their work cultivating the land will be finished and Algeria will be 
‘civilised’. 
 
Algeria in Les Oliviers de la justice is personified in a settler and as such was born only out of 
their hard work.138 There is a feeling of regret in Michel’s narrative not only because of the 
loss of his ancestral land but also the feeling that the work of building the country is 
incomplete. He fears his own generation has lacked the courage and the work ethic of their 
forefathers and may now never get the chance to attain their destiny. He blames his 
contemporaries for becoming distanced from the land, handing it over to rich 
businessmen, and in this perceives the seeds of the current war.139 Whilst his father was 
able to create a country through his work on the land, Michel’s own generation will lose the 
country lacking as they do the same intimate connection with creation and nature. There is 
a sense of inevitability in this narrative; the settlers have been the engines of progress but 
now independence lies upon the horizon. Whilst this is not a positive outcome for Michel, 
he considers it too late to change course, the future is already determined. 
 
The same sense of an inevitable and linear progress pervades Jacques Démy’s Les Parapluies 
du Cherbourg, but the focus here is France rather than Algeria and on modernity rather than 
independence.140 Algeria is largely absent in Les Parapluies, just as France is in Les Oliviers. 
Whilst Pélégri’s novel charts the death of Michel’s father and Algérie française, Démy’s film 
witnesses a period of gestation, through both Geneviève’s pregnancy and of the changing 
town of Cherbourg. Nonetheless these two artistic representations are underpinned by the 
same republican, universalist narrative of the war. As Jean-Robert Henry as argued, ‘Algeria 
helped sustain in the French imagination the distinctions between modernity and tradition, 
                                                
137 Ibid. p. 211. [They cleared and planted this unresponsive ground and they created a new and fertile 
landscape.] 
138 Azzedine Haddour has made a similar connection between the agricultural labour of the settlers and their 
identification with creating a country. Haddour, Colonial Myths: History and Narrative (Manchester, 2000). 
139 Pélégri, Les Oliviers de la justice, pp. 124-125 and 210-213. 
140 Jacques Démy, Les Parapluies de Cherbourg (France, 1964). 
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between civilization and the desert… Algeria was constructed against modern France and 
yet at the same time in its image.’141 In this instance, as Algérie française is on its deathbed, no 
longer France’s convenient antithesis, the ‘hexagon’ looks towards the future and 
modernity. Michèle Cone, in her study of twentieth-century French art has noted a similar 
concern with modernisation, particularly in the work of Marcel Duchamp and Yves Klein, 
suggesting that this trope is pervasive in culture.142 
 
Kristin Ross has identified a relationship between the discourses of decolonisation and 
modernisation in French culture, both of which share an element of teleology. The former 
as identified in the decolonisation discourse of Chapter 1, the latter as Ross explains: 
 
Modernization is even because it holds within itself a theory of spatial and 
temporal convergence: all societies will come to look like us, all will arrive 
eventually at the same stage or level, all the possibilities of the future are being 
lived now, at least for the West: there are, arrayed before us, a changeless 
world functioning smoothly under the sign of technique.143 
 
This modernisation discourse, which runs through Démy’s film, clearly also suits the 
republican claim to the Revolutionary heritage of universalism in the sense that it assumes 
to be on the path to the pinnacle of what society can, should and will achieve. 
Modernisation in the twentieth-century takes on the power which Sowerwine attributes to 
Reason in the nineteenth.144 Both modernisation and decolonisation are linear rather than 
cyclical paths; the Republic, with no qualifying number (neither Third nor Fourth nor 
Fifth), is unending and infallible. The cyclical narrative present in republican culture after 
the Franco-Prussian war was dependent upon a representation of defeat, a rubble out of 
which the republic could grow. To maintain the linear narrative of the unending republic, 
defeat must be absent; the war may end but its outcome is insignificant. 
 
This is true for Les Parapluies as Guy returns from his service prior to the war’s end and its 
final outcome is never mentioned. For all except Guy the war has been invisible because 
modernisation within the metropole has been all consuming, as the loss of the umbrella 
                                                
141 Henry, 'Introduction', pp. 3-4. 
142 Michèle Cone, French Modernisms: Perspectives on Art Before, During, and After Vichy (Cambridge, 2001) pp. 
162-167. 
143 Ross, Fast Cars, Clean Bodies, p. 10. 
144 Sowerwine, France since 1870, p. 40. See section 2.1a. 
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shop to be replaced by a washing machine store signifies. Such invisibility, an active 
concealment, brings to mind Guy Debord’s criticism of modernity’s spectacle: 
 
The spectacle corresponds to the historical moment at which the commodity 
completes its colonization of social life. It is not just the threat the 
relationship to commodities is now plain to see – commodities are now all 
that there is to see; the world we see is the world of commodity.145 
 
The commodity, the ultimate symbol of modernisation in the 1960s, effectively conceals 
the political world, and in relation to the Algerian war, the revolution in republicanism 
which it promoted. Modernisation as a focus thus aided the post-1962 rejection of the idea 
that Algeria had ever been anything more significant than a colony; it ‘slammed shut the 
Algerian chapter and relegated it to another temporality, made it and all of colonialism into 
an instant archaism’.146 
 
The outcome of the war is also concealed in Etcherelli’s novel, Elise, ou la vraie vie which 
concludes prior to peace, and Téchiné’s later film, Les Roseaux Sauvages, in which the war’s 
end is hidden in the background and of scant interest to the characters.147 Despite being a 
significant part of each novel or film’s context, the actual event of the Algerian war – its 
story, its beginning and end – is able to be reduced to insignificance through the more 
dominant discourse of modernisation and, for Etcherelli and Téchiné, a coming-of-age 
narrative. Such a sidelining of what could be an over-powering context is relatively 
straightforward given that, as Robert Rosenstone has argued, they ‘put individuals in the 
forefront of the historical process. Which means that the solution of their personal 
problems tends to substitute itself for the solution of historical problems.’148 The death of 
Michel’s father, the final scene of Guy’s family life and the endings of both Elise and Les 
Roseaux Sauvages all conform to this tendency. 
 
Elise, ou la vraie vie was Etcherelli’s first novel and won her the Prix Fémina in 1967. It is set 
between 1957 and 1958, firstly in Elise’s non-specified home town in northern France and 
                                                
145 Guy Debord, Society of the Spectacle, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (New York, 1994) [1967] p. 29. 
146 Ross, Fast Cars, Clean Bodies, p. 196. 
147 Claire Etcherelli, Elise, ou la vraie vie (London, 1985) [1967]; Andre Téchiné, Les Roseaux Sauvages (France, 
1994). 
148 Robert A. Rosenstone, Visions of the Past: The Challenge of Film to Our Idea of History (London, 1995) p. 57. 
Rosenstone is writing here in relation to film but I find it is just as applicable to novels in this instance. 
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then in Paris. Despite being twenty-eight, the novel documents Elise’s coming-of-age, 
firstly out of the shadow of her attention-seeking political activist brother, Lucien, and then 
through her relationship with an Algerian worker, Arezki, who she meets whilst working in 
a Billancourt car factory. Like Pélégri’s novel there is an element of autobiography in 
Etcherelli’s work as she too worked in a car factory in Paris during this period and wrote 
the novel in the early 1960s, completing it after the end of the war.149 
 
Elise finds her independence amongst the anti-Gaullist protestors of May 1958. Having 
followed Lucien to Paris in hope of finding la vraie vie (‘La vraie vie ne pouvait manquer de 
commencer’), it is not until Lucien’s death and her lover Arezki’s disappearance that she 
comes into her own.150 Her participation in the protests alongside her fellow workers 
towards the novel’s close truly invigorates her, indeed intoxicates her:  ‘je me levai dans un 
état voisin de l’ivresse.’151 The following morning: 
 
Je ressentais un bonheur physique intense. Il me semblait qu’une ère nouvelle 
s’ouvrait et que nous avions fait la veille une manière de révolution… Le pain 
frais s’émiettait en craquant, et cette minute de flânerie prolongeait la 
jouissance de la veille qui m’imprégnait encore.152 
 
Of course, there was no revolution of the kind Elise imagines; her revolution is a workers’ 
revolution against de Gaulle and thus it fails.153 Crucially, it is only after this coming-of-age 
transformation that Elise, and the reader, become aware that the two characters who have 
dominated her life are now permanently removed. 
 
Following the loss of Lucien, Arezki and her hoped-for revolution, Elise returns home to 
her grandmother’s house. Whilst her future does not look bright – the unpleasant 
characters of Paris are replaced by those back home, a dead-end job replaces the 
                                                
149 John Roach, 'Introduction', John Roach (ed.) Elise ou la vraie vie (London, 1985) p. 2. 
150 Etcherelli, Elise, ou la vraie vie, p. 98. [The real life could not fail to begin. Claire Etcherelli, Elise or the Real 
Life, trans. June P. Wilson and Walter Benn Michaels (1970) [1967]] 
151 Etcherelli, Elise, ou la vraie vie, p. 267. [I woke up in a state of close to drunkenness.] 
152 Ibid. pp. 268-269. [I felt an intense sense of physical well-being. It seemed as if a new era was opening up 
and that the night before we had staged [affected] a kind of revolution… The fresh bread made crumbs as I 
broke it, and this minute of idleness prolonged the thrill of yesterday.] 
153 Elise’s experience of the protest was a working-class one: ‘Certains, les plus ages, arboraient des cravates 
rouges’; ‘“C’est 36, dit Daubat derrière moi.”’ ; ‘“Et voilà Renault!” Le fer de lance de la classe ouvrière 
avançait sous les applaudissements.’ Ibid. pp. 267-268. The reference to ‘36’ is to the Popular Front 
movement of 1936 which also saw mass street protests by the working classes in Paris. 
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mechanised boredom of Billancourt – she is no longer the girl who has bobbed through 
much of the novel with seemingly little control of her own existence: 
 
La douleur me guette, tapie dans mon futur, camouflée dans les souvenirs ; 
elle m’attend pour me frapper, mais je la contournerai et me défendrai 
hardiment. Je chasserai de moi jusqu’à la moindre image. Mais sous les 
cendres, l’inévitable espérance tiendra bon.154 
 
Elise has grown up, she has learnt her own mind and has the confidence to defend herself, 
out of the shadow of Lucien and Arezki. Philip Dine considers this to be Elise ‘achieving 
enlightenment.’155 This coming-of-age is aided by the theme of birth (but not rebirth), 
notable in the use of ‘imprégnait’ above but also in that ‘La vraie vie aura duré neuf 
mois.’156 Elise is, however, wrong in this assertion; her time in Paris was her own gestation 
period from which she would emerge as an independent and experienced woman rather 
than the naïve and passive girl who had been present in the beginning of the novel. 
 
Her coming-of-age narrative is a necessarily linear one, a growth from childhood into 
adulthood, rather than cyclical narrative of death and rebirth. With no representation of 
defeat in the novel, ending as it does in 1958, there is no call for a cyclical element to the 
narrative. Instead there is a steady insistence of progress. Rosenstone has argued that, ‘no 
matter what the historical film…the message delivered on the screen is almost always that 
things are getting better or have gotten better or both.’157 Whilst one’s film experience 
would have to be restrictively optimistic to find this consistently to be the case, for those 
films which trace a decolonisation and a modernisation discourse, it certainly rings true. 
Elise has experienced modernity through her connection with an urban metropolis and 
particularly the thoroughly modern image of the car production line. She has been driven 
forward by it in a linear progression which is tied to her move into adulthood. The coming-
of-age narrative is intrinsically a teleological one and, when placed alongside that of 
modernisation, drives forward a linear narrative which rides roughshod over any possible 
obstacles raised by the Algerian war. 
                                                
154 Ibid. p. 281. [Sorrow shadows me, hovers over my future, lurks in my memories. It waits to attack me but 
I’ll divert it and I’ll defend myself. I’ll drive it down from me down to the last image. And under the ashes, 
hope will hold on.] 
155 Philip Dine, Images of the Algerian War: French Fiction and Film, 1954-1992 (Oxford, 1994) p. 203. 
156 Etcherelli, Elise, ou la vraie vie, p. 279. [The real life will have lasted nine months.] 
157 Rosenstone, Visions of the Past, p. 56. 
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The theme of modernisation is less powerful in Les Roseaux Sauvages not least because it was 
made in the 1990s, well after the end of the trente glorieuses, when the obsession had been 
somewhat tempered by the economic slowdown of the following twenty years.158 
Furthermore, unlike Elise, ou la vraie vie, it does cover the period of the Algerian war’s end. 
It is essentially a coming-of-age film. Set in Villeneuve sur Lot near Toulouse, the film 
follows a group of teenagers through their final school year of 1961 to 1962, ending on the 
day of their baccalauréat results, that ultimate symbol of successful republican schooling. 
 
François Forestier is very much the intellectual and struggles throughout the film to come 
to terms with his sexuality.159 His best friend and daughter of his teacher, Maïté Alvarez has 
strong political convictions passed down to her from her mother who heads the local 
section of the Communist party. François’s school friend and brief sexual partner, Serge 
Bartolo, comes from a poor farming family. Serge’s brother is conscripted to fight in 
Algeria and loses his life in an OAS attack. Henri Mariani is a settler, new to the boarding 
school and considerably older than his classmates at twenty-one, having yet to pass his 
baccalauréat. These characters are microcosms of particular groups in the war: the unaffected 
civilian, the Communist activist, the family of the soldat perdu and the French settler. As 
such there is a particular antagonism at several points between Henri and alternatively 
Serge and Maïté, but the friendship of François brings them altogether by the end of the 
film. It ends, as coming-of-age films generally do, very positively; quintessentially it is a 
narrative where ‘things are getting better or have gotten better’.160 
 
                                                
158 Téchiné’s film was extremely successful upon release and received four Césars including Best Film and 
Best Director. 
159 François never mentions the war, being too involved with his own battles concerning his sexuality and his 
place in the world. Brigitte Rollet suggests that there is a metaphor here ‘between the “war with no name” 
and the “love with no name”…In a sense, his painful experience in fighting the hypocrisy surrounding his 
sexual orientation could be associated with the general hypocrisy of the time regarding the conflict and the 
failure to call it what is was, i.e. a war.’ This interpretation, whilst interesting, does not stand up to scrutiny as 
François discusses his sexuality with his friends and openly declares his status to himself in front of the 
mirror, repeating ‘Je suis un pédé’. This is not to suggest that coming to terms with his homosexuality is an 
easy step for François, indeed it troubles and occupies him throughout the film, but he is not silent about it, 
he speaks its name. This contrasts with the Algerian War, which does not appear to affect him at all, an 
apparent imperviousness to the war that is reminiscent of the civilian characters of Hélène in Muriel and 
Madame Emery (Geneviève’s mother) in Les Parapluies de Cherbourg. Brigitte Rollet, 'Remembering the 
Algerian War: Memory/ies and Identity/ies in Téchiné’s Les Roseaux Sauvages', Martin S. Alexander, Martin 
Evans, and John F. V. Keiger (eds), The Algerian War and the French Army, 1954-62: Experiences, Images, 
Testimonies (Basingstoke, 2002) p. 205. 
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Once again, the narrative of the film is politically linear with no representations of defeat 
and no suggestion of a cyclical narrative through the metaphor of rebirth. The characters 
are seen to go through their own trials and tribulations, some affected by the war but many 
not, and they reach the film’s conclusion as adults ready to find their own way in the world. 
From the very beginning the war’s end is suggested as inevitable when Mme. Alvarez says 
‘Algérie va être indépendante’ to Serge’s brother who is attempting to desert from the 
army.161 Thus when the war does end during the film, it is of no consequence to the young 
band of friends and changes nothing for them. Even Henri once having met Maïté, is no 
longer seen to be concerned about the fate of Algeria or the activities of the OAS; he no 
longer listens to his radio which had been his one connection with his old life. The linear 
narrative of progress which Les Roseaux Sauvages portrays conforms to the teleological 
narrative of universalism and rejects the possibility that Algerian war could seriously impact 
France; the republic had come-of-age rather than being reborn through revolution. 
 
The linear narrative of modernisation and coming-of-age are used in these texts to support 
a republican interpretation of the Algerian war which is also specifically Gaullist.162 There is 
no defeat, no significant change for French society or politics other than the inevitable 
progress of republicanism which for de Gaulle meant, amongst other things, a shift 
towards a strong executive he had considered to be lacking in the Third and Fourth 
Republics. This absence of defeat is an absence of revolution; there were no ashes out of 
which a new republic could or needed to grow. But there are examples of republican 
culture which seem to take a more critical stance and actually follow a cyclical narrative 
similar to that seen in Third Republican culture, wherein a new republic is founded 
amongst the ruins of war. Two of these are very recent films, Cartouches Gauloises (2007) and 
Hors la loi (2010) but the first is Pierre Guyotat’s 1967 novel Tombeau pour cinq cent mille 
soldats, which also shares similarities with the nineteenth-century culture already discussed 
in its use of nature as symbol of rebirth. 
 
                                                
161 Téchiné, Les Roseaux Sauvages. 
162 Hugo Frey has argued that Gaullist historiography tends to see the Vichy period as one of national decline 
and thus the subsequent era one of national revival, a ‘rise and fall myth’. This concurs with the argument 
here as it views the trente glorieuses and the discourse of modernisation as part of this rise, amid which the 
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Algeria in France 
 175 
Guyotat joined the French army of his own accord, rather than being conscripted but 
deserted and was then jailed for encouraging others to do the same.163 His writing is overtly 
challenging and political, his depiction of war incomprehensibly gruesome, nasty and vile. 
Set out in seven ‘chants’, the narrative is not always evident but does persevere in the sense 
that the book does not simply stop, it has a noticeable end. Algeria is never mentioned in 
the text, nor is France or any of the names and places we associate with the war. It is a 
figurative depiction, or perhaps more accurately, a hallucinatory one.164 Inamenas, an island 
colony of Ecbatane for a hundred years, is the field of war and it is evident from the start 
that it is a war of decolonisation. 
 
The ending could not be described as happy: the sixth chant ends with looting and rats 
taking over the city. But the short seventh chant, which reads like an epilogue, is one of 
love even if it is of a sordid, animalistic, indeed bestial kind, between Kment, a rebel leader, 
and Giauhare, carrying inside her the ‘le dernier-né du monde’, isolated from the vileness 
of the city and seemingly at one with nature.165 
 
Les arbres ployés contre le sol par le poids de boue, se détendent, jaillissent 
dans l’air délivré ; les sources, étouffées par les cadavres d’hommes et 
d’enfants assoiffés par le feu, giclent dans l’obscurité, cherchent leur ancien lit 
sous les herbes recourbées ; puis, l’ayant trouvé, s’élancent, se brisent avec 
des cris de joie, aux cascades, se mélangent, se perdent, se fuient, avec des 
rires. 
 Aux premières lueurs, des essaims d’abeilles, des vols criards 
d’oiseaux, s’abattent sur l’île, secouent les fleurs alourdies, les feuillages, les 
crimes froissées, se jettent dans la poussière, survolent les vals encore 
obscurcis ; le ciel éclaboussé d’oiseaux déchaînés, d’abeilles enflammées, se 
dévoile, tourne vers le soleil dont la plaie sèche et se rétrécit.166 
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Middle East 28 (2008) p. 14. 
164 Stephen Barber, 'Introduction', Stephen Barber (ed.) Tomb for 500,000 Soliders (London, 2002) p. 5. 
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This passage is notable in its very striking antidote to so much of what the book has seen 
before. Gone are the scavenging violent rats, replaced by pollinating bees; the cesspit 
stench of the city is burnt away by the sun, washed clean by the springs. The place of water 
as a cleanser is particularly powerful given that, until now, the rivers and seas have been 
open sewers carrying bloated bodies, excrement, semen and blood, a veritable rat 
highway.167 It is also an antidote to the fires that seemingly burn everywhere, metaphors for 
stifling heat of Algeria, anger, war and brutal sexual acts. Water has a calming and cooling 
presence that has not existed before. Guyotat claimed to set his writing against nature but 
the world he has created in Tombeau pour cinq cent mille soldats is one that is eventually 
redeemed by it; nature’s power is able to eradicate the dystopia that has inhabited its 
earth.168 
 
Guyotat’s novel also uses the theme of rebirth familiar to Puvis de Chavannes, Daudet and 
Zola, but it is not so straight-forwardly the rebirth of a republic. In Tombeau pour cinq cent 
mille soldats, Kment and Giauhare are liberated from a muddy grave: 
 
s’accroupissant, il fouille la boue avec les mains, libère, relève le corps de 
Giauhare qu’il serre contre lui et baise sur les lèvres, aux épaules et aux seins. 
Giauhare s’éveille, le limon coule hors de ses paupières closes, dans les replis 
de ses oreilles ; ses joues gonflées de vase, Kment les baise et prenant les 
lèvres de Giauhare entre les siennes, il aspire ce limon ; ainsi mêlent-ils la vase 
de leurs bouches, leur semence originelle ; ainsi, nus glacés, se donnent-ils 
l’un à l’autre la vie et le soleil les enflamme et les place dans son orbite, 
comme deux planètes nouvelles. Ils s’élancent, ils plongent dans le fouillis de 
fleurs, de feuillages, d’oiseaux et de sources. La main de Kment sur le ventre 
                                                                                                                                          
the sky splashed with wild birds, blazing bees, unveils, turns towards the sun whose wound is drying and 
shrinking.] 
167 For example: ‘Dans le haut de la plage, la mer a poussé des galets, des cailloux ronds, des os de seiches, 
des écorces, des lièges que les hommes ont recouverts de leurs excréments : des rats s’y enfoncent, leurs crocs 
crèvent les vessies des goémons. Plus haut, dans les rochers plats, des petits poissons tremblent dans les 
flaques au fond rose. Plus haut encore, au pied de la falaise, les lézards courent entre les falques où l’urine des 
ânes et des homme fume.’ Ibid. p. 313. 
168 John Taylor, 'The Inhuman Work of Pierre Guyotat', The Times Literary Supplement (15 March 2006). 
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de Giauhare, et la main de celle-ci sur la poitrine du garçon ; le soleil mousse 
dans leurs chevelures.169 
 
This passage is littered with metaphors of rebirth, from the bizarre vampire-like awakening 
from the soil, the reference to semen, the spring life which they throw themselves into and 
Kment’s hand resting on the pregnant Giauhare’s stomach. There is also a mutual 
affection, even love, in this passage which has been built upon throughout the novel; in a 
text so littered with sex in so many forms, very little of it consensual or caring, Kment and 
Giauhare’s relationship stands out as the deviant form, even revolutionary. This is a bizarre 
utopia, but after the grotesque and gruesome dystopia of the war it is a happy ending of 
sorts. 
 
Mehdi Charef’s Cartouches Gauloises also represents the end of the war, through the eyes of 
eleven-year-old Ali.170 Over the course of the film set during the summer of 1962, his 
settler friends are taken away by their parents, one by one, as the exodus gathers pace. 
Whilst he is sad to see them go, he has also witnessed the horrors of war including the 
shooting of his uncle and the terrible state of his FLN father in a French army prison. The 
cyclical element of the narrative in Charef’s film is return rather than rebirth, as, at the end 
of the film when the town is awash with Algerian flags and the sound of singing, Ali’s 
father appears on the horizon. Rachid Bouchareb’s Hors la loi is similarly cyclical in its 
representation of the end of the war.171 Set in Algeria and Paris between 1925 and 1962, it 
follows the lives of three Algerian brothers. The eldest, Messaoud, has been a French 
soldier in both the Second World War and Indochina and works with his brother in the 
FLN in Paris upon his return. Abdelkader is an intellectual and becomes a key member of 
the FLN.172 The youngest, Saïd, is the joker who lacks the moral codes of either of his 
brothers, providing for his mother in their absence by setting up a strip club in Clichy. The 
film is book-ended with two scenes of the end of war, both shown through archive footage 
                                                
169 Guyotat, Tombeau pour cinq cent mille soldats, p. 486. [squatting down, he searches in the mud with his hands, 
releases, lifts up Giauhare’s body, which he hugs against him and kisses on the lips, on the shoulders and on 
the breasts. Giauhare wakes up, the silt runs out of her shut eyelids, in the folds of her ears ; her cheeks 
swollen with sludge, Kment kisses them and taking Giauhare’s lips between his, he sucks up that silt ; thus 
they mix the sludge of their mouths, their original semen ; thus, naked, frozen, they give each other life and 
sun inflames them in its orbit, like two new planets. They rush forward, they dive in the jumble of flowers, 
foliage, birds and springs. Kment’s hand on Giauhare’s belly, and hers on the boy’s chest ; the sun sparkles in 
their hair.] 
170 Mehdi Charef, Cartouches Gauloises (France, 2007). 
171 Rachid Bouchareb, Hors la loi (France, 2010). 
172 Abdelkader is certainly named after the Algerian nationalist hero, Abd el-Kader, who fought against 
French colonial forces in the nineteenth century. 
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which is not otherwise present in the film. The first, following a brief opening scene of the 
family in 1925, is 8 May 1945 in France, VE Day, with street celebrations in black and 
white but with the colours of the tricolour visible. The final scene is very similar but in 
Algiers on 7 July 1962 and the flag coloured green and red rather than red and blue. 
 
Tombeau pour cinq cent mille soldats, Cartouches Gauloises and Hors la loi all represent the end of 
the war and employ a cyclical element in their stories. However, unlike the cyclical 
narratives present in republican culture following the Franco-Prussian war, this does not 
represent a new dawn for French republicanism, indeed there is no suggestion that French 
republicanism is in any way affected by the war or its end. Guyotat’s story does not return 
to Ecbatane after the first chant but remains in the colony of Inamenas which is where 
Giauhare is reborn. There is a new dawn represented in these stories, but it is that of 
Algeria, not of France.173 The difference from the linear narratives is perhaps attributable to 
the authors’ own convictions: Guyotat was a French soldier who deserted to join the FLN 
and both Charef and Bouchareb are French of Algerian origin who have previously made 
films about the position of French Algerians within France itself.174 The cyclical narratives 
give legitimacy to Algeria’s independence, suggesting the outcome is natural or with 
historical precedent, thus following the decolonisation discourse. All three also conform to 
the republican teleological narrative; the French republic is unaffected by the revolution in 
Algeria because it was an inevitable, and thus foreseeable, outcome. 
 
The teleological narrative present in the artistic representations of the Algerian war, 
whether linear or cyclical, suggest an inevitability, a tide of History, in the outcome of the 
war. This inevitability, a rejection of the notion that Algeria was ever an ‘integral part of 
                                                
173 By all ending at this juncture, the novel and films avoid asking difficult questions about what followed the 
liberation celebrations. 
174 Mehdi Charef, Le Thé au harem d'Archimède (France, 1985); Mehdi Charef, La Fille de Keltoum (France, 
Belgium and Tunisia, 2001); Rachid Bouchareb, Indigènes (France, 2006). Charef was born in Algeria in 1952 
and moved to Paris when he was eleven where his father was a labourer. Bouchareb was born in France in 
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tend to avoid it. These two films, can also be considered part of mainstream culture in France given their 
popularity, rather than tied exclusively to a subculture. Rodney Ball et al., 'French in the World: From 
Imperialism to Diversity', Jill Forbes and Michael Kelly (eds), French Cultural Studies: An Introduction (Oxford, 
1995) p. 271; Nicola Cooper, 'Days of Glory? Veterans, Reparation and National Memory', Journal of War and 
Culture Studies 1 (2008). On beur culture see: Carrie Tarr, 'Questions of Identity in Beur Cinema: From Tea in 
the Harem to Cheb', Screen 34 (1993); Mark McKinney, 'Métissage in Post-Colonial Comics', Alec G. Hargreaves 
and Mark McKinney (eds), Post-Colonial Cultures in France (London, 1997); Alec G. Hargreaves, 'The Beurgeoisie: 
Mediation or Mirage?', Journal of European Studies 28 (1998); Dina Sherzer, 'French Colonial and Post-Colonial 
Hybridity: Condition Métisse', Journal of European Studies 28 (1998). 
Algeria in France 
 179 
France’, is pursued in favour of the more deterministic notion of the mission civilisatrice for 
which the outcome was always to be independence. This has altered the nature of French 
republicanism by changing the meaning of universalism: rather than the assimilationist ideal 
of the Revolution in which it was possible for anyone to become French, universalism is 
now claimed to mean that anyone can become like France. According to this model Algeria 
reached this stage, was decolonised and became independent with no further impact on 
France or French identity. This is not simply an overwriting of history – the denial that 
Algeria had been considered to be an integral part of France between 1848 and 1959 whilst 
a very specific and racial distinction between who was French and who was Algerian was in 
place – but additionally a fundamental alteration to the ideals of French republicanism. 
Algeria can be like France but Algerians cannot be French. The doctrine of assimilation has 
become fundamentally altered by the war but this has been concealed through the use of a 
teleological narrative, inherent in universalism and present in both historical and artistic 
representations of the war. The next section will consider the representations of Algerians 
and settlers in republican culture to better understand and critique how this distinction was 
drawn and the impact it has had on the republican practice of assimilation. 
 
 
2.4 Black, Blanc, Beur: Assimilation and the Fifth Republic 
The image of Zinedine Zidane’s face projected onto the Arc de Triomphe following the 
French victory at the 1998 football World Cup has become a ubiquitous feature in 
discussions about assimilation as the republic reaches into the twenty-first century. As 
Elizabeth Ezra has observed, the ‘team’s success was immediately transfigured into a 
metaphor for national unity, with implications what extended far beyond the soccer 
field.’175 The racial diversity of the national team, it was suggested, was evidence of the 
success of the Revolutionary doctrine of assimilation. Thirteen years later, the French 
Football Federation was hit by scandal when Mediapart, a French news journal, revealed 
secret plans to restrict the number of foreign players in French football by means of a 
racial quota system for entrants to the prestigious national training academies.176 
Assimilation, it seemed, was only open to a select few, and certainly not to those of North 
                                                
175 Ezra, The Colonial Unconscious, p. 146. 
176 Fabrice Arfi, Michaël Hajdenberg and Mathilde Mathieu, 'Exclusive: French football chiefs' secret plan to 
whiten les Bleus', Mediapart (28 April 2011). 
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African origin who were Muslim.177 The FFF apparently took the same view as Napoleon 
III’s Senatus Consulate of 1865 wherein a select few Algerians could become French 
citizens but it was not considered a pathway open to the vast majority. This section looks 
specifically at the differences in the representations of Algerians and settlers in republican 
culture and argues that the Algerian war led to a fundamental altering of the Revolutionary 
doctrine of assimilation to one which has become particularly exclusionary towards those 
of North African origin. 
 
It is worth reaffirming the three stages which Algerians went through in terms of 
assimilation and their relationship to the republican state. From the 1848 declaration that 
made Algeria a part of France, until the beginning of the war in 1954, the republican 
rhetoric insisted upon the integral nature of the three départements on the other side of the 
Mediterranean to France, but a strong distinction between Algerians and ‘Europeans’ 
(including Jews after 1870) remained, legally as well as socio-culturally. Whilst colonisation 
was justified along the same lines as ‘the process of cultural assimilation and 
republicanization that was turning peasants into French men inside France’, few assertive 
attempts were made to make this a reality; in 1944 when de Gaulle enfranchised women, he 
failed to extend this right to most Algerians.178 In many ways the Third Republic moved 
against the assimilation of Algerians. The Crémiuex decree of 1870, which collectively gave 
all Algerian Jews French citizenship, was a distinction based as much on origin as religious 
practice, as was the legal codification of the ‘native code’ in 1881 that contained twenty-
seven infractions applicable only to Algerians, including travelling from a commune 
without a permit.179 
 
The term ‘Muslim’ was the preferred collective noun for Algerians but, as the court of 
appeals in Algiers stated in 1903, the term applied regardless of religious practice or belief; 
it was in essence a racial distinction.180 In 1944, de Gaulle’s Provisional Government coined 
the term français musulmans d’Algérie (FMA) as a new legal category which, like ‘Muslim’ 
                                                
177 The policy was clearly aimed at those of North African origin given the anti-Islamic policies pursued by 
the FFF, including the banning of halal meat from players’ meals in 2010. Ibid. 
178 Tombs, France 1814-1914, p. 203. 
179 Patrick Weil, Qu'est-ce qu'un Français ? Histoire de la nationalité française depuis la Révolution (Paris, 2002) p. 233. 
Shepard calls the Crémieux Decree ‘the high point of assimilationist practice’ in Algeria but its targeting of 
groups rather than individuals, and particularly its targeting of race under the auspices of religion, was 
essentially a gross bastardisation of the Revolutionary doctrine of assimilation. As he notes later, local civil 
status, which had drawn the distinctions between Jews and Muslims, ‘was assigned on the basis of descent’; it 
was not a self-defining religious category. Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization, pp. 28 and 34. 
180 Weil, Qu'est-ce qu'un Français ?, p. 235. 
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before is was considered a civil status but was in essence a category based upon perceived 
ethnicity, and became officially based on ‘origin’.181 Those labelled as FMAs did not need to 
self-identify as Muslims or practice any particular religion. They were identified as such by 
the republic and the identification was racially based. This legal distinction would become 
fundamental to the future of Algerians in 1962. 
 
With the outbreak of war in 1954, particularly under Soustelle’s governorship and in first 
year of de Gaulle’s rule, assertive policies focusing on development and assimilation were 
pursued and the rhetoric of Algérie française was, in part, finally reproduced in social, 
economic and political policy.182 Shepard sees this period of economic assistance as 
‘unparalleled in the history of Western overseas imperialism.’183 He also argues that, with 
the legal category of the FMA based upon origin, the French republic was able to target its 
integration programme in a similar way to the USA’s later ‘affirmative action’ approach; a 
legal recognition of race had the potential to produce a positive outcome in terms of 
assimilation.184 
 
With the shift towards favouring self-determination and then independence from 1959, 
assimilation was once again rejected and instead the mission civilisatrice became one based on 
independence, a nation coming-of-age, rather than integration.185 This period is identified 
by Shepard as the beginnings of the ‘invention of decolonisation’ and is when this thesis 
has attributed the origins of the decolonisation discourse which is pervasive in republican 
culture. In 1962 millions of Algerians were stripped of French citizenship based on their 
legal status as FMAs in direct violation of the Evian Accords. As both René Galissot and 
Max Silverman have asserted, assimilation was never really intended for Algerians anyway, 
but was a doctrine only ever meant for ignorant French peasants.186 These changes in the 
rhetoric and policy of the republic have been concealed, in both historical and artistic 
representations, through a teleological narrative of modernisation and progress which 
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184 Ibid. p. 50. 
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promoted the idea of the mission civilisatrice as one that had always intended to lead to 
independence and thus deny the historical place of Algeria as ‘an integral part of France’. 
The celebration of the success of this mission civilisatrice has remained important for France, 
gushed over by Jacques Chirac and codified in the education law of 2005.187 This self-
congratulatory decolonisation discourse necessitates a sharp distinction between French 
and Algerian. 
 
This division is patently evident in the republican culture, from Pélégri’s Les Oliviers de la 
justice to cinematic films from the twenty-first century. The previous chapter considered the 
representation of Algerians in the conflict zone, both in terms of FLN fighters and harkis. 
In this chapter, it is the comparative contrast between Algerian civilians and their French 
and settler counterparts that is of concern. The representations of these groups combine 
the republican teleological narrative and its inherent mission civilisatrice quality with the denial 
of the assimilability of the Algerian population in cultural representations. In Les Oliviers, 
the mission civilisatrice is the backbone of the novel, leading to Algeria’s coming-of-age under 
the guidance of the settlers, but there is never a possibility that the Algerians will become 
French; instead they will become independent.188 The teleological narrative of universalism 
demands a false consistency on the road to Algerian independence, a denial that Algeria 
was ever France and thus that Algerians were ever, or could ever be, French. 
 
To return to the two coming-of-age stories, Etcherelli’s 1967 novel Elise, ou la vraie vie and 
Téchiné’s 1994 film Les Roseaux Sauvages, the position of the Algerian character, and in 
Téchiné’s case also the settler, follows the republican assumption that only the latter is truly 
able to be French. Arezki, and the other Algerian and North African workers at the 
Billancourt factory, do not mix with the French workers, are not included in the unions for 
which Elise’s brother, Lucien, agitates and are considered and consider themselves to be 
separate from the French workers: they live in different areas, go to different cafés, wear 
different clothes. Whilst Lucien considers himself to be fighting ‘“pour paix en Algérie”’, 
                                                
187 Both as Prime Minister in 1988 and as President in the mid 1990s, Chirac declared the success of France’s 
million civilisatrice and the pride France should take in it. William B. Cohen, 'The Algerian War and the 
Revision of France's Overseas Mission', French Colonial History 4 (2003) p. 234. 
188 Pélégri, Les Oliviers de la justice. Haddour has argued that Pélégri’s novel grasps ‘the failure of the 
assimilationist project, and as a consequence the political suicide of the pieds noirs’ but actually the novel never 
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he does not attempt to include Algerians in his campaign.189 Even supporting the same 
cause and working in the same factory, the French and Algerians cannot present a united 
front. At the beginning of the war, as Maurice Thorez himself admitted, the working class 
did not identify with the FLN’s aims.190 Martin Evans has suggested that this was because 
‘a colonialist mentality had successfully saturated the popular imagination, producing a 
network of prejudices about Algeria and Algerians.’191 Even when the Communist Party, of 
which Lucien is a part, did begin to support the cause, the perceived differences between 
the French and Algerians did not subside, as Lucien’s attitude makes clear.192 
 
The relationship between Arezki and Elise is doomed from its very beginning as Arezki 
warns his friend after asking Elise out, ‘“Laisse tomber… Les Françaises n’aiment pas les 
bicots.’”193 Their date is secretive as they leave the factory separately and travel to an area 
unfamiliar to Elise. In the café, ‘[n]os voisins nous regardèrent sans discrétion…je pris 
conscience de ma singularité. J’étais avec un Algérien.’194 Their courtship continues to make 
both themselves and the people around them awkward and uncertain. Elise’s character is 
likeably naïve and whilst the novel appears to disapprove of the reaction their relationship 
receives it does not offer a challenge to it; it is clear their courtship can have no future. 
Arezki’s disappearance at the end of the novel allows Elise to move on with her life, the 
adventure of la vraie vie complete. The two influences that have dominated her throughout 
the novel, first Lucien and then Arezki, are cleanly removed through death and 
disappearance.195 Elise describes Arezki’s disappearance as ‘naturelle, elle s’inscrivait dans 
une fatale logique dont j’étais la seule à m’émouvoir.’196 By conforming to this teleological 
narrative, Elise, and the novel, avoid facing the difficult questions that the relationship 
                                                
189 Etcherelli, Elise, ou la vraie vie, p. 138. 
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191 Ibid. p. 391. 
192 On the PCF and the Algerian war see Irwin M. Wall, 'French Communists and Algerian War', Journal of 
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would have faced beyond the very short term.197 Elise desired a true partnership but knew 
that fate would not allow it because Arezki was Algerian and she was French. Thoroughly 
incompatible, assimilation would be impossible. 
 
In contrast to Etcherelli’s varied cast, Les Roseaux Sauvages offers only one Algerian 
character and not until near the film’s close. Following a breakdown caused by the death of 
her ex-pupil, Serge’s brother, at the hands of the OAS, Mme. Alvarez, Maïté’s mother, is 
replaced by M. Morelli as the school’s French teacher. Morelli used to teach in Algeria, 
although specifically avoids Henri’s question about whether he comes from there, and 
seems to offer a balanced view of the war.198 Towards the end of the film Morelli meets 
Mme. Alvarez for lunch in a local café. As they leave he invites her to meet his wife who, it 
transpires, has been waiting in his car for the duration of their meal. Mme. Alvarez is 
notably if politely surprised to be introduced to an Algerian woman who merely says 
‘bonjour’ when prompted, then turns to Morelli, says simply ‘j’ai un peu froid’ and Morelli 
directs her back into the car.199 It is a brief and strange scene in comparison to the mood of 
the rest of the film, particularly the excitement of the following scenes as the students await 
their baccalauréat results and then go to the river to swim in the sunshine. Aïcha Morelli is 
evidently represented as being an alien in an foreign environment, rather strangely being 
left in the car outside the restaurant and with no further characterisation, or indeed 
recognition, given to her other than this fleeting introduction. She is certainly not 
represented as having assimilated despite Morelli’s own belief in the possibility, given that 
she is unwilling or unable to join her husband for lunch, and does not engage in 
conversation with Mme. Alvarez. As the main characters of the film come-of-age, Aïcha 
Morelli seems static. This is particularly at odds with the changes Henri, the settler, has 
gone through during the film. 
 
In Morelli’s first class, he asks the students to analyse La Fontaine’s fable, ‘Le Chêne et le 
Roseau’ in which the sturdy but rigid oak is blown over in a storm whilst the flexible reed 
survives. Morelli, whilst tutoring him privately, tells Henri that with his support of the OAS 
                                                
197 Ross also notes this need in a ‘dominant contemporary French perspective’, which I identify as republican, 
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199 Téchiné, Les Roseaux Sauvages. [I am a little cold] 
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and Algérie française he is the oak from the story. By the end of the film, this is far from the 
case and it is Aïcha Morelli who seems to fit such a comparison more accurately. Henri, 
like his companions, has battled his demons throughout the film, as would be expected 
from the coming-of-age theme. Just as Maïté has tamed some of her Communist dogma 
through reading one of Henri’s letters from his parents, so Henri has become more 
accepting of the ‘inevitable’: the independence of Algeria.200 Their two apparent opposite 
points of view meet literally in the middle when they have sex at the end of the film. Henri 
has become the reed in the fable, assimilating into French life. Morelli’s Algerian wife 
cannot do the same. 
 
Both Elise, ou la vraie vie and Les Roseaux Sauvages represent French and Algerians in 
contrast, the latter not being assimilable with the former. In two further films, Alexander 
Arcady’s Le Coup de Sirocco (1979) and Laurent Herbiet’s Mon Colonel (2006), the Algerians 
are seen within Algeria and in contrast to the settlers. The first follows the fortunes of the 
Narboni family from the birth of their child Paulo in 1945, through the war, the exodus 
and finally to a successful and integrated life in Paris.201 In this light-hearted film based on 
Daniel Saint-Hamont’s 1978 novel, the Narbonis overcome personal tragedies, including 
the emotional loss of their home and livelihood, to reach a happy ending with Albert 
Narboni, the father, setting up an épicerie in Montmartre and Paulo’s only complaint being 
in regard to French girls. The Narbonis are clearly Italian rather than French in origin and 
lived in Algeria their whole lives until the exodus, yet they are a success story of 
assimilation. The film reiterates what Shepard identifies as the French government’s ‘ardent 
reaffirmation of the theory of assimilation’ which focused on economic assimilation most 
particularly.202 Much of the film follows Narboni attempting to claim the compensation 
that he is owed by the French state (there has been a mix up over names) and his success in 
this pursuit leads to his success in business. The Narbonis’ transition is not smooth or easy, 
and proves emotionally traumatic especially for Paulo’s mother, Marguerite, whose 
hyperbolic Mediterranean temperament provides much of the film’s humour. Yet it is 
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never considered an impossible or even an unlikely integration, simply one that took effort 
from both sides.203 As such, the conservative journal Le Figaro spoke very warmly of the 
film on its release and commissioned Jules Roy, ex-settler and writer of the once 
scandalous La Guerre d’Algérie, to write an emotive and praising review.204 
 
Despite its initial Algerian setting, however, few Algerians feature in the film other than to 
fill space in public places. None of the Narbonis’ friends are Algerian and the few they 
know, like their housekeeper, are not even deemed worthy of names. The only Algerian 
character who speaks is the man who comes to buy Narboni’s épicerie as the exodus mounts 
and he is represented as aggressive and unfair, paying much less than the shop is worth 
because he is able to exploit the family’s precarious position. This lends power to the film’s 
narrative that not only are the settlers able to integrate into French life, it is natural for 
them to do so because they are not Algerian. Indeed, France takes on the character of 
home for the dispossessed as the Narbonis are no longer either Italian or Algerian, instead 
France will offer them a home and they will work hard to earn their position there. The 
film uses the Revolutionary ideal of assimilation whilst denying the same possibility to 
Algerians who are far too distinct to qualify. The vastly different characterisations (or lack 
of them) from the very beginning of the film make such a conclusion inevitable.205 
 
Ross’s observations on the parallels of modernity and decolonisation are again apparent in 
the strong distinctions between the Narbonis and the Algerians. Ross notes how 
representations of modernity and domesticity are interconnected; the washing machine 
store in Les Parapluies du Cherbourg is her example but Marguerite Narboni’s obsessive 
house-keeping furthers this connection: 
 
If the woman is clean, the family is clean, the nation is clean. If the French 
woman is dirty, then France is dirty and backward. But France can’t be dirty 
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and backward, because that role is played by the colonies. But there are no 
more colonies. If Algeria is becoming an independent nation, then France 
must become a modern nation: some distinction between the two must prevail. 
France must, so to speak, clean house: reinventing the home is reinventing 
the nation.206 
 
This link between dirt and backwardness, cleanliness and modernity, is nothing new to the 
French cultural imagination, as Zola’s naturalist novels evidence. The drawing of such a 
distinction between France and Algeria, though, emphasises their differences and thus, in 
the post-1959 decolonisation discourse, enables the denial that Algeria was ever France. 
This represents a revolutionary change in the nature of French republicanism because it 
asserted that Algerians could never be French; the universalist doctrine of assimilation is 
rejected. 
 
Like Le Coup de Sirocco, Mon Colonel also travels between France and Algeria but does so less 
chronologically. France is represented in the multicoloured present wherein an attractive 
young army lieutenant is investigating the murder of a retired colonel, aided by the letters 
sent anonymously to her which detail the experiences of a newly-recruited lieutenant, Guy 
Rossi.207 As she reads, his story in Algeria unfolds in black and white whilst the present – 
that is to say, France – remains in colour, a striking expression of the claim to 
modernisation. It transpires that Rossi, part of Colonel Duplan’s team in directing the 
‘pacification’ of the ‘ville française’, Saint-Arnaud near Constantine, begins to question 
both the Colonel’s methods and the war itself, aided in his change of heart by 
conversations with the communist teacher René Ascencio.208 His letters end as he goes to 
tell Duplan that he cannot double-cross Ascencio in order to kill members of the FLN. 
Officially, he is listed as missing in action but the film is clear that Duplan had Rossi killed. 
                                                
206 Ross, Fast Cars, Clean Bodies, p. 78. Italics in the original. 
207 Laurent Herbiet, Mon Colonel (France, 2006). 
208 Much like the place of Mme. Alvarez in Les Roseaux Sauvages, the trope of the communist teacher appears 
to be an uncomplicated way of ensuring a character has resolute anti-war views without having to question 
the reasoning behind such convictions beyond the doctrine of communism. Generally civilians are 
represented as having little interest in the war itself because, as the republican narrative goes, it was of little 
importance to wider French society. The use of communist ideals also avoids the notion that people’s views 
on the war shifted over time (as John Talbott’s figures have shown was the case) which would undermine the 
teleological nature of the republican narrative. It is actually somewhat inaccurate to portray the communist 
line as consistent throughout the war, as Irwin Wall has shown, but the use of an indoctrinated communist 
allows the portrayal of an anti-war stance without requiring much consideration as to the reasons why, when 
few others appear to be sharing such staunch views. Talbott, 'French Public-Opinion and Algerian War', pp, 
357-358; Wall, 'French Communists and Algerian War', pp. 521-543.  
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It transpires that Rossi’s letters were written to his father who admits at the end of the film 
to having killed the Colonel. 
 
Algerians feature rather more heavily in Mon Colonel than Le Coup de Sirocco but they are still 
given little characterisation, particularly compared to the settlers who Rossi meets, from 
Ascencio and his Pétainist school principle to the swooning girls at a picnic. Few Algerians 
are seen as individuals; Rossi interacts with them as a collective, whether organising the 
photographing of women for identification cards or appointing a classroom full of men to 
take responsibility for their areas. The settlers and the Algerians are very distinct in the 
film, inhabiting different public spaces and eating in different cafés. This contrast is 
particularly stark between the upmarket French restaurant which makes space for Rossi 
and Ascencio based upon the former’s uniform and the latter’s missing arm (wrongly 
presuming him to be a war veteran), and the couscous café run by a double-dealing 
Algerian. The women, particularly, form a contrast: those being photographed are swathed 
in the hijab, their faces covered and when the camera shows them close up they are elderly. 
The women who swoon over Rossi, however, are young, made up and decked in light 
summer dresses. They are, essentially, civilisations apart.  
 
The only occasion in which a settler and an Algerian are seen to mix is when Rossi goes for 
lunch with Ascencio and his friends, Françoise and Ali. At first they struggle to know 
where to eat; they cannot go to a French restaurant because Ali would not be welcome and 
they cannot go to an Algerian restaurant because they would be unable to drink wine. 
Eventually they decide on a Jewish café which appears dark and tucked away, as though a 
secretive hideout for their deviant social behaviour. As Françoise explains, to her family 
he’s a ‘bicot’, to his family she’s a ‘pute’.209 Even amongst friends, however, Ali barely says 
a word other than to point them in the direction of the café. This couple never reappear in 
the film. In the present, both Ascencio and Duplan exist but Françoise and Ali inhabit only 
this brief moment in black and white colonial Algeria; to represent their future, whether in 
Algeria or France, would upset the new meaning of republican universalism after the war in 
which Algeria had civilised and become like France but Algerians were not French.210 
                                                
209 Short for putain: whore. 
210 John Talbott asserts that such relationships were extremely rare, with intermarriages occurring at fewer 
than 100 per year. He continues, in ‘colonial Algeria, linguistic, religious, and racial differences ran parallel 
along either side of one vast cultural vault’ between Europeans and Algerians. Fundamentally, ‘no institution 
served, at any point in society, to join the two sides of the fault together.’ Such images truly make a mockery 
of the ideal of assimilation. Talbott, The War Without a Name, p. 14. 
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Ascencio, who as an activist with the FLN could have stayed in Algeria after the peace, is 
in France having served a prison sentence for his treason and subsequently amnestied. The 
implication is that, as an ex-settler, France is where he belongs; for de Gaulle he was a 
repatriate whilst Algerians like Ali would only be refugees.211 
 
These four artistic representations conform to the post-1959 republican narrative of 
Algeria’s inevitable independence and share its teleological trend which sees the mission 
civilisatrice as complete and France’s connection to Algeria as neatly severed. The 
inevitability of decolonisation, as Shepard has argued, ‘now appeared as wholly consistent 
with a narrative of progress’ and this is aided in Etcherelli’s and Téchiné’s works through a 
coming-of-age narrative.212 Yet it is the very deep distinctions that all four books and films 
make between who is French and who is Algerian, and the impossibility of the successful 
combining of the two (Morelli’s socially-absent wife, Françoise and Ali’s lack of future), 
which fulfil the republican narrative’s core assumptions. The racial element of national 
identity, already present in the legal sphere through the defining of origin in the 1944 and 
the active use of such a definition in 1962 to prevent an exodus of Algerians alongside the 
exodus of settlers, is reasserted and supported in these representations. The ex-settlers, 
from the hard-line Henri to the Italian-originating Narbonis and the communist Ascencio, 
with hard work and a little enlightenment are able to be fully assimilated into French 
society. Algerians are not.213 All four assume the rightful place of Algerians is an 
independent Algeria but as such deny the possibility of Algerians being French. 
 
The doctrine of universalism, and with it the practical application of assimilation, was 
altered by the Algerian war. Universalism requires a belief in the superiority of ideals but 
whilst prior to the Algerian war this meant everyone should attempt to be French, after the 
war it altered to mean that everyone should attempt to be like the French. The 
ramifications within France were such that the racial identifiers of the colonial period were 
transposed in the republican ‘hexagon’. The additional elements of modernisation and 
                                                
211 De Gaulle stated in July 1962, in relation to the harkis, ‘“the term repatriates obviously does not apply to 
the Muslims. In their case, we are dealing only with refugees.”’ Quoted in Shepard, 'Excluding the Harkis', p. 
97. See Chapter 1, section 1.5. 
212 Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization, p. 6. 
213 Notably, military service is not a method by which they become assimilated into French society, in keeping 
with the demise of the citizen soldier figure as detailed in Chapter 1. Antoine Prost has questioned why the 
settlers have not ‘found ways to commemorate collectively their experience and their losses.’ In terms of 
government-sponsored commemoration, it would be counter to the republican narrative which considers the 
settlers repatriates and emphasises their assimilation into French society, particularly evident in Arcady’s film. 
Prost, 'The Algerian War in French Collective Memory', p. 16. 
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progress allowed the republic to maintain its superior identity, intrinsic to any nationalism, 
vis-à-vis Algeria. 
 
 
Conclusions: a revolution concealed 
There is nothing new in asserting that the French are fixated with their own history, and 
particularly the history relating to the Revolution and its intellectual influence, from 
nineteenth-century historians’ obsession with the ‘principles of 1789’ to what David 
Howarth has described as ‘a profoundly historicist political culture’ in the twenty-first.214 It 
is this preoccupation which has continued to lend support to the ideology of French 
universalism which is identified within the longitudinal analysis pursued here. Through this 
context of historiography and Third Republican culture, a fixation with the discourses of 
the Revolution is clearly in evidence in both historical and artistic representations of the 
Algerian war. Whilst it is plausible that such values offer the French republic a favourable 
ideological baseline (liberté, égalité, fraternité still seem to be agreeable concepts two centuries 
later), such a focus has led to the concealment of practices which run counter to them. 
Universalism, the belief that French Revolutionary values are relevant to all peoples, is both 
paternalistic and necessarily teleological; tied to concepts like modernisation and progress, 
it lends itself to a linear and deterministic narrative. The paternalistic element justified the 
mission civilisatrice that was apparently pursued during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
in Algeria, whilst the teleological strand concealed both the lack of pursuit of such a model 
(particularly in regards to its core practice of assimilation) and latterly the failure of the 
doctrine of universalism itself. As Bertrand Taithe has more succinctly put it, ‘much of 
French universalism was tested to destruction in the empire’.215 
 
The problem with this dominant narrative is the concealment of those elements which do 
not find space in its linearity, particularly those who fought for and believed in Algérie 
française, but also Algerians living in France, with often devastating results.216 Prior to 1954, 
most Algerians were practically considered to be unassimilable to France, post-1959 they 
                                                
214 Hazareesingh, Intellectual Founders of the Third Republic, p. 294; Howarth and Varouxakis, Contemporary France, 
p. 2. Historians continue to assess and reassess the influence of the Revolution and the ‘values of 1789’ (to 
use Tombs’ phrase) in the present. In particular, many like to assert when the Revolution came to an end, a 
phenomena which the next chapter will consider. 
215 Bertrand Taithe, 'An Algerian History of France', French History 20 (2006) p. 236. 
216 See the discussion of Lacouture in section 2.2b and Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization, p. 88. 
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were ideologically considered as such. This has altered the integrity of universalism in a way 
which has been concealed through a celebration of colonialism, particularly through the 
mission civilisatrice as well as through the discourse of decolonisation, both of which directly 
connect with the teleological nature of universalism to suggest a progressive, modernising 
and inevitable force. In practical terms this has impacted on how national identity has been 
defined in the republic because the post-1959 narrative insists that Algerians cannot be 
French; they are too distinct to be assimilated.217 The teleological element also removes the 
responsibility of the republic for those affected by the war and its aftermath: ‘History’ was 
beyond their control.218 
 
The mission civilisatrice was the one consistent element of French republican rhetoric in 
relation to Algeria from 1848 through to the Fifth Republic. The doctrine of assimilation 
may have waxed and waned but the mission civilisatrice, a convenient tie-in with the 
paternalistic aspect of universalism, fitted the narrative regardless of whether Algeria was 
being colonised, was ‘an integral part of France’ or whether it was being prepared for 
decolonisation. As Alice Conklin has explained, the ‘notion of the civilising mission rested 
upon certain fundamental assumptions about the superiority of French culture and the 
perfectibility of humankind’.219 Such a conviction of superiority inevitably produced the 
cultural prejudice necessary to justify colonialism.220 
 
                                                
217 Such discrimination, particularly during the exodus of 1962, is unchallenged by Algeria because it suits the 
doctrine of the FLN – an Algeria for Algerians (if the mission civilisatrice had taught them anything over 
generations, it was racial discrimination). Franz Fanon, writing in 1959 did not subscribe to the idea that the 
settlers would stay in Algeria in the way the French (as evidenced by the Evian Accords) assumed they would, 
but for him the distinction was not one of race but of politics: any European fighting for the FLN would be 
as welcome in an independent Algeria as an Algerian fighting for the FLN. Yet even this was perhaps naïve 
given Andre Nouschi’s assessment of post-war Algerian identity: ‘Arab culture and Islam became the twin 
foundations of a new Algerian identity after 1962. This policy consciously rejected the cultural legacy which 
the country inherited from the previous century of French colonialism… Modern Algeria has sought to reject 
all aspects of its colonial history and has struggled to re-establish a cultural connection with a more distant 
Arabo-Islamic heritage.’ It is difficult to see where a significant group of Europeans would fit in such an 
identity. Frantz Fanon, Studies in a Dying Colonialism (London, 1989) particularly Chapter 5; Andre Nouschi, 
'The FLN, Islam and Arab Identity', Alec G. Hargreaves and Michael J. Heffernan (eds), French and Algerian 
Identities from Colonial Times to the Present: A Century of Interaction (New York, 1993) p. 128. 
218 Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization, p. 98. Such a denial of responsibility goes some way to explaining 
how those who were conscripted to serve in Algeria were not granted ex-serviceman status, and the pensions 
and allowances attached to such a status, until 1974. Martin Evans, 'Rehabilitating the Traumatized War 
Veteran: The Case of French Conscripts from the Algerian War, 1954-1962', Martin Evans and Kenneth 
Lunn (eds), War and Memory in the Twentieth Century (Oxford, 1997) p. 77. 
219 Alice L. Conklin, A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930 
(Stanford, 1997) p. 1. 
220 This is evidently not novel to France but part of the Enlightenment’s inheritance present in all modern 
European colonialism. 
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Max Silverman has proposed that in a post-colonial France (or a post-modern France as he 
sees it) there is a new racism whose ‘defining feature…is its abandonment of the old 
discourse of racial purity and racial hierarchy in favour of one based on cultural difference 
and cultural essentialism.’221 This ‘new racism’, better understood as cultural prejudice, is 
nothing new to post-Revolutionary France. Indeed, cultural superiority and prejudice were 
inherent features of the republican doctrine of universalism. The revolutionary shift 
between 1959-62 was not one from racial to cultural prejudice, but in fact the reverse. The 
teleological and linear narrative of universalism concealed the revolution by implying a 
cultural rather than a racial distinction. However, the legal category of FMA, despite its use 
of ‘musulman’, was always a racial not a religious distinction; it was not applied after a 
survey of religious practice nor was it chosen by those who self-identified as Muslim. It was 
a legal category applied by the republic to those people it considered to be Algerian rather 
than European in origin. Its use during the early stages of the Algerian war, as a method of 
positive discrimination, was novel for French republicanism but conformed to the doctrine 
of assimilation. It marked a revolution in republicanism when it became a tool of exclusion 
from 1959 and particularly from the summer of 1962. FMA became a racial identification 
of who could be French. 
 
The cultural representations of the Algerian war considered here have followed this logic, 
representing Algerians as too culturally distinct to be assimilated into France. Most 
radically, in the post-1959 republican narrative, this did not necessarily imply they were 
culturally backward, rather the Algerians had been successfully civilised and were thus able 
to create a state in France’s image, distinct from but equal to France. The Algerian republic 
was born from the ashes of war just as the Third Republic had been. Whilst in one sense 
this could be considered as a positive alternative to classic French universalism – an 
acceptance that it was not the only standard-bearer of ‘civilisation’ – it draws a racial and 
thus impermeable distinction between the French and the Algerian.222 As such, in artistic 
representations of the Algerian in France, from Elise, ou la vraie vie’s Arezki to Caché’s Majid, 
they are always alien. The rejection of the assimilationist role played by the citizen soldier, 
which Chapter 1 has asserted, is fundamental to this shift from a cultural to a racial 
                                                
221 Maxim Silverman, Facing Postmodernity: Contemporary French Thought on Culture and Society (London, 1999) p. 
44. 
222 Conklin identifies the term ‘civilisation’ as ‘a particularly French concept; the French invented the term in 
the eighteenth century and have celebrated the achievements of their own ever since.’ Conklin, A Mission to 
Civilize, p. 1. 
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understanding of national identity and allows the exclusion of the identifiable collective of 
the harkis from the French republic. 
 
To lend strength to the decolonisation discourse which sees Algeria as coming-of-age 
under the guidance of the French republic, France too is seen to progress, moving forward 
along its own linear path. As Martin Evans has argued, specifically in relation to the 
exclusion of the harkis, for ‘de Gaulle post-1962 the phenomenon of decolonization was 
reconfigured as a victory for modernization.’223 This theme of modernisation, as noted 
both by Kirsten Ross and in the artistic representations analysed in this chapter, is 
pervasive in post-war France, an added bulwark against the successfully decolonised 
Algerian republic.224 The rhetoric of modernisation, decolonisation and the progressive 
nature of universalism worked in a synchronicity of inevitability to conceal the revolution 
in French republicanism which occurred during the Algerian war. 
 
                                                
223 Martin Evans, 'The Harkis: The Experience and Memory of France's Muslim Auxiliaries', Martin S. 
Alexander, Martin Evans, and John F. V. Keiger (eds), The Algerian War and the French Army, 1954-62: 
Experiences, Images, Testimonies (Basingstoke, 2002) p. 128. 
224 Even in Charef’s Cartouches Gauloises which ends with the success of the FLN, the train station manager 
expresses his concern to Ali that without French expertise, they may not know how to work the signals. 
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3 
The One and Indivisible Republic 
 
The previous two chapters have argued that there exists within French republican ideology 
a teleological narrative of history, supported by the belief in universalism and identifiable in 
republican historic and artistic culture. This narrative has framed the relationship between 
France and Algeria as one of paternalistic progress leading to Algerian independence 
through decolonisation, denying the impact of the relationship on France after 1962. In 
order to challenge this rejection of the Franco-Algerian relationship’s saliency for modern 
France, this final chapter identifies another element of the republican narrative of French 
history: the discourse of the guerre franco-française. Here I consider how this discourse has 
been used by the dominant republican narrative of French history to conceal the revolution 
in republicanism of 1959-62, and how it can be utilised to challenge that narrative and put 
Algeria back into the history of France. 
 
The chapter begins with a consideration of some of the historiography of modern France 
and republican artistic representations of the Paris Commune, which employ the guerre-
franco-française discourse. I argue that it is a specifically republican discourse, tied to the 
Revolution and the progressive, teleological struggle of republicanism. The guerre franco-
française discourse is a central element to the romantic emplotment of the republican 
understanding of French history, an ongoing ‘drama of the triumph of good over evil, of 
virtue over vice, of light over darkness’.1 This binary distinction, with its overtly moral 
claim, encourages the republican narrative towards a conclusion, to reach the ‘end of the 
revolution’. The idea of romantic emplotment, identified originally by Northrop Frye in his 
analysis of literary texts and subsequently transferred to the historical sphere by Hayden 
White’s study of nineteenth-century historiography, is used in this chapter to help identify 
the structure and meaning of the republican narrative of French history.2 The romantic 
mode suggests a simple good versus evil mode of story-telling which most often concludes 
with a comedic or tragic mode, the former being one of reconciliation. This will be 
discussed in more depth over the course of the chapter. 
                                                
1 Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (London, 1973) p. 9. 
2 Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays (Princeton, 1957); White, Metahistory. 
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In republican historiography, the identification of the end of the Revolution has shifted 
from the Third to the Fifth Republic. This concern has had an impact on the 
understandings of both the Occupation period and the Algerian war in relation to their 
place in French history. The initial ‘ending’ of the Revolution with the dawn of the Third 
Republic denied the implicitly French nature of the Vichy regime by inferring that the 
republic was France’s ‘natural’ state after 1870. The revised ‘ending’, through the shift to a 
comedic mode of emplotment emphasising reconciliation between Bonapartism and 
republicanism, places the Algerian war in the shadow of Vichy and denies the revolutionary 
impact of the later event on the French Republic. The representation of the Third Republic 
as a key moment in the development of republican France has survived this shift by being 
considered to be the last revolutionary moment in the development of republicanism; as 
the last chapter showed, the rhetoric of revolution and rebirth ends with the Third 
Republic and the progression of republicanism then takes on a more evolutionary guise. 
 
The second part of the chapter will, through an analysis of artistic representations of the 
Algerian war, illustrate how the guerre franco-française discourse structures narratives of the 
war. The republic is distanced from responsibility for both the use of torture and the 
terrorism of the OAS by the drawing of the professional army as the republic’s opposite, 
anti-France, using the rhetoric of fascism transferred from the Vichy era. This transference 
has the added effect of undermining the place of the Algerian war in French republican 
history in two ways. Firstly it places the violence of the war in comparison to the mass 
slaughter of the Second World War and the Holocaust, thus diminishing its apparent 
significance. Secondly, in line with the teleological narrative of republican history and 
specifically with the shift from a revolutionary to an evolutionary stage of republican 
progress concluding with the founding of the Fifth Republic, the conflicts of the Algerian 
war are represented as a continuation of those of the Second World War. The romantic 
(good versus evil) mode is drawn as the same conflict through both periods. This prevents 
both a questioning of the origins of the Algerian conflict, which would act as a reminder of 
the ‘Frenchness’ of Algeria in republican discourse before 1959, and a consideration of its 
impact on the French Republic. 
 
What is notably absent in these cultural representations of the guerre franco-française is the 
depiction of Paris, usually the centre of the civil war, and, less surprisingly, the drawing of 
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Algerians as the anti-France. The final part of this chapter thus turns to the events of 17 
October 1961 in which up to 200 peacefully-protesting Algerians were killed by the 
Parisian police. Through an analysis of both the historiography and artistic representations 
of the event, I argue that the pervasive dominance of the Vichy era in the republican 
narrative of the Algerian war has had a detrimental effect on a more nuanced 
understanding of the conflict. However, the guerre franco-française discourse and the use of a 
longitudinal context also has the potential to offer a deeper and more complex 
understanding of the war and its place in the history of republican France. 
 
 
3.1 The guerre franco-française and the ending of the Revolution 
3.1a Revolution ,  c iv i l  war  and reg ime change  
The discourse of the guerre franco-française is a consistent feature in the histories of modern 
France. From the Terror of 1792-3 to the June Days of 1848, the Paris Commune of 1871 
and the Dreyfus Affair at the end of the nineteenth-century, all have been identified by 
historians as flare-ups in the same civil war story.3 As Ann Rigney has asserted, ‘historical 
works are not only documentary sources of information about the past but also “verbal 
artefacts” which may be legitimately studied as such.’4 Whilst this thesis takes the same 
view as both Rigney and F. R. Ankersmit, noting that historical representations are subject 
to stricter constraints than those of a purely artistic bent, historical representations are 
powerful transmitters of certain narratives because of the authority this constraint endows.5 
                                                
3 The clearest example of such a narrative can be found in Robert Tombs, France 1814-1914 (London, 1996), 
but it is not exceptional. See also Albert Cobban, A History of Modern France, Volume 2: 1799-1871 (London, 
1965); Maurice Agulhon, The French Republic, 1879-1992, trans. Antonia Nevill (Oxford, 1993); Nick Hewlett, 
'Explaining Conflict and Violence in France's Modern Political History, 1789-1945', Jan Windebank and 
Renate Günther (eds), Violence and Conflict in the Politics and Society of Modern France (Lampeter, 1995); Pamela 
Pilbeam, Republicanism in Nineteenth-Century France, 1814-1871 (Basingstoke, 1995); Sharif Gemie, French 
Revolutions, 1815-1914: An Introduction (Edinburgh, 1999); David R. Howarth and Georgios Varouxakis, 
Contemporary France: An Introduction to French Politics and Society (London, 2003); Jack Hayward, Fragmented France: 
Two Centuries of Disputed Identity (Oxford, 2007); Timothy Baycroft, France: Inventing the Nation (London, 2008). 
On the left wing of republicanism are those who consider the guerre franco-française to be an ongoing class 
struggle much akin to Karl Marx’s analysis of the Paris Commune. See Karl Marx, 'The Civil War in France', 
V. Adoratsky (ed.) Karl Marx Selected Works in Two Volumes. Vol. II (Moscow, 1933); Roger Magraw, France 
1815-1914 (London, 1983); Susan Milner, 'What About the Workers? The Trade Unions' "Short Century"', 
Martin S. Alexander (ed.) French History Since Napoleon (London, 1999). 
4 Ann Rigney, The Rhetoric of Historical Representation: Three Narrative Histories of the French Revolution (Cambridge, 
1990) p. xi. 
5 Ibid. p. xii; F. R. Ankersmit, Historical Representation (Stanford, CA, 2002) p. 284. 
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As such, the historiography of republican France is a fundamental element in the drawing 
of the guerre franco-française narrative. 
 
Modern France possesses an impressive array of constitutions, fifteen by Robert Tombs’ 
count, from Bourbon absolutism to liberal Empire and conservative Republic.6 All but the 
Bourbons would derive legitimacy from the Revolution of 1789, yet, without the provision 
of a long-term stable model, what such a heritage meant would remain a contentious issue.7 
For Robespierre, the Republic of 1792 marked the end of the Revolution, for Pamela 
Pilbeam, it represented the Revolution’s failure.8 Regardless, it began a long French 
tradition of regime change marked by political violence, by civil war. The massacres and 
repressions of the Terror would ensure a long-term association of republicanism with mass 
violence and yet the historical narrative of the guerre franco-française is a republican one. The 
Bonapartist narrative is one of unity, of uniting the revolutionaries and counter-
revolutionaries, whilst legitimists ‘pretend that the First Republic never existed’.9 The 
heritage of civil conflict is claimed by republicans alone. 
 
This identification with civil violence by republicanism is at one level contradictory to 
successive republics’ claim to be ‘one and indivisible’; the phrase’s inclusion on the coins of 
the embittered and short-lived Second Republic seems rather ironic. Yet it is part of the 
same teleological narrative discussed in Chapter 2 and is also inclusive of the guerre franco-
française. The steady increase in civil violence in the early 1790s, aided by external wars, 
amplified the paranoia of a counter-revolution. The internal uprisings in Brittany and the 
Ardèche were couched in the language of treachery, not only anti-Revolution but anti-
French. It is through the adoption of this language and its mergence – that to be anti-
Revolution and thus anti-republican was synonymous with being anti-French – that the 
discourse of the guerre franco-française becomes evidently republican. The teleological element 
                                                
6 Tombs, France 1814-1914, p. 3. 
7 Pamela Pilbeam, 'Revolution, Restoration(s) and Beyond: Changes, Continuities and the Enduring Legacies 
of 1789', Martin S. Alexander (ed.) French History Since Napoleon (London, 1999) p. 32. Abbé Sieyès did not 
consider a consistent model to be a desirable outcome of the Revolution writing, ‘[n]ot only is the nation not 
subject to a constitution, but it cannot be and it must not be; which is tantamount to saying that it is not.’ He 
asserted instead that a constitution should be flexible and answerable to representative democracy. 
Emmanuel Joseph Sièyes, What is the Third Estate?, trans. M. Blondel (London, 1963) [1789] pp. 126 and 134-
137. 
8 Albert Cobban, A History of Modern France, Volume 1: 1715-1799 (London, 1963) p. 241; Pilbeam, 
Republianism in Nineteenth-Century France, p. 40. 
9 Baycroft, France: Inventing the Nation, p. 20; Pilbeam, Republianism in Nineteenth-Century France, p. 61. Louis 
Napoleon’s supporters were quite insistent that ‘Bonapartism was neither right nor left’ in an attempt to 
present him as a candidate of unity. Rene Rémond, The Right Wing in France: From 1815 to de Gaulle, trans. 
James M. Laux (Philadelphia, 1969) p. 138. 
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of the ‘one and indivisible’ claim insists upon the continued success of France (the 
Republic) over anti-France; anti-France can never be France in this logic. 
 
The discourse of the guerre franco-française particularly highlights the romantic structure to 
which the republican narrative of French history adheres. Frye first described four modes 
which fictional narratives tend to follow, the romantic, comic, tragic and satiric, but these 
modes have since been used to analyse history writing and broader cultural narratives, 
notably by White and Lynn Hunt.10 The romantic mode of emplotment narrates ‘the story 
of a quest, a heroic struggle between good and evil, where either protagonist or antagonist 
stands to achieve decisive victory.’11 Given that, in this narrative the Republic is France, 
only the Republic can be victorious. It is the mode which White has identified in the 
republican historian Jules Michelet’s writing of the Revolution, the ‘“Romance” of the 
French people’s struggle against tyranny and division’.12 The guerre franco-française discourse 
suits this emplotment well, taking on a binary distinction between France (the Republic, 
good) and anti-France (evil) which carries with it not only a moral claim but also a 
teleological one: an eventual victory of republicanism is the only future for France. 
 
In republican histories of France, the moments identified as part of the guerre franco-française 
are those which follow the declaration of a republic or mark a turning point in 
republicanism. Under the Second Republic, the June Days of 1848 witnessed a repression 
of workers in Paris who, disappointed by the conservative results of the elections in May, 
found themselves jobless and forcibly conscripted with the closing down of workshops 
that had been set up following the relatively bloodless revolution in February. Five 
thousand were ‘deported’ to Algeria and many hundreds killed for their part in the 
uprisings against the new government’s retraction of the right to work.13 The scale of the 
repression of 1871 would dwarf the June days. Over 10,000 communards were killed in the 
semaine sanglante in which the Versaillais army, under the orders of the conservative republic 
sitting in Versailles, took Paris and destroyed the Paris Commune. These two most striking 
                                                
10 Frye, Anatomy of Criticism, pp. 33-67, 158-239; White, Metahistory pp. 1-31; Lynn Hunt, Politics, Culture, and 
Class in the French Revolution (London, 1984) pp. 34-39. 
11 James Krapfl, 'Revolution and Revolt Against Revolution: Czechoslovakia, 1989', Kevin McDermott and 
Matthew Stibbe (eds), Revolution and Resistance in Eastern Europe: Challenges to Communist Rule (Oxford, 2006) p. 
176. 
12 White, Metahistory, p. 161. Hunt also views the romantic mode as dominating the understanding of the 
Revolution from 1792, the first flare-up of the guerre franco-française, calling it a ‘series of life-and-death 
struggles with the demonic forces of counterrevolution.’ Hunt, Politics, Culture, and Class, p. 35. 
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examples of civil war in nineteenth-century France were not just a guerre franco-française but 
also a guerre republicaine; a fight for the very meaning of republicanism. It is thus 
unsurprising that they feature so prominently in republican histories of France. 
 
In contrast, the White Terror of 1814-5 barely makes a footnote in republican histories as, 
for the most part, it was a war between monarchists and Bonapartists and thus of little 
interest to the republican struggle.14 In their histories of nineteenth-century France, neither 
Pilbeam nor Tombs consider it worthy of more than a few paragraphs, Tombs simply 
suggesting it was ‘much exaggerated’, and Pierre Goubert fails to mention it at all.15 Ceri 
Crossley’s work on the historiography of the July monarchy suggests by implication why 
the White Terror (and the Algerian war) do not feature prominently in the current 
historiography of republican France. Historians of France in the 1830s and 1840s, who 
Crossley studies, consider the regime they are living under to have ended the Revolution, 
their ‘desired reconciliation between freedom and order had been achieved’ and their 
versions of history dominated.16 Yet, the ‘fall of the July Monarchy gravely undermined the 
liberal history’s ability to function as a discourse of truth’.17 Once their political dominance 
was challenged with the revolution of 1848, the historical representation of the July 
Monarchy altered and was no longer considered to mark the end of the Revolution. In a 
similar manner the republican narrative, with which this thesis is concerned, remains 
dominant because it suits the current political regime in France, the Fifth Republic. As 
such, the guerre franco-française discourse is applied to those events which suit the republican 
narrative of revolutionary moments of progress in French republicanism. 
 
Timothy Baycroft, in a study of the public commemoration of the Second Republic, has 
argued that whilst the regime is well studied by historians and has a prominent place in 
republican histories of France, it has not held the same significance for the French state 
and its public.18 It is certainly not commemorated like the Revolution or treated with the 
reverence of the Third Republic. The application of the discourse of the guerre franco-française 
is also more diverse in relation to the Second Republic: for Agulhon such a discourse 
                                                
14 Pilbeam, Republianism in Nineteenth-Century France, p. 69. 
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16 Ceri Crossley, 'History as a Principle of Legitimation in France (1820-1848)', Stefan Berger, Mark Donovan, 
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17 Ibid. pp. 55-56. 
18 Timothy Baycroft, 'Commemorations of the Revolution of 1848 and the Second Republic', Modern and 
Contemporary France 6 (1998). 
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appears more prominently in his discussion of Louis Napoleon’s coup than the June Days, 
for Sharif Gemie it is a battle between utopian and (for want of a better word) practical 
republicanism, whilst for those of a more left-wing bent, the discourse is employed to give 
prominence to the June Days as an outbreak of class war.19 Thus, to give a longitudinal 
cultural context to the discussion of the guerre franco-française discourse in the representations 
of the Algerian war, it is worth turning once again to the artistic representations of the 
Franco-Prussian war and specifically to the Paris Commune, which encapsulates such a 
discourse in both historic and artistic representations. 
 
3.1b A f inal  f lare?  The guerre franco-française and the  Paris  
Commune 
The end of the Paris Commune has reached the status of a founding myth of 
republicanism, in which the conservative and reconciliatory elements won through and the 
violence of earlier republicanism was laid to rest. Revolution was tamed and republicanism 
became the choice of the majority (at least within a decade for those who were 
enfranchised). This is François Furet’s docking station for the Revolution in which the 
fundamental conflicts within republicanism were resolved.20 In modal terms, the romantic 
emplotment is replaced by the comedic, as the guerre franco-française is concluded with 
reconciliation.21 The comedic mode, frequently romance’s partner in the conclusion of a 
narrative, is a particularly suitable solution to the guerre franco-française of republican history 
because of its tendency to implicate a conservative solution to conflict, precisely what Furet 
considered the Third Republic to be.22 As the previous chapter has shown, the artistic 
                                                
19 Agulhon, The Republican Experiment, pp. 144-149; Gemie, French Revolutions, especially Chapters 5 and 6; 
Milner, 'What About the Workers?', p. 316; Magraw, France 1815-1914, especially Chapter 4, section II. Zola 
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Fortune des Rougons (Paris, 1886). 
20 François Furet, Revolutionary France 1770-1880, trans. Antonia Nevill (Oxford, 1992) [1988]. 
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reconciled or converted than simply repudiated.’ White’s understanding of the comedic emplotment is very 
reminiscent of the end of Zola’s La Débâcle (see below): ‘the reconciliations which occur at the end of 
Comedy are reconciliations of men with men, of men with their world and their society; the condition of 
society is represented as being purer, saner, and healthier as a result of the conflict among seemingly 
inalterably opposed elements in the world; these elements are revealed to be, in the long run, harmonizable 
with one another, unified, at one with themselves and the others.’ It is easy to see how such a mode of 
conclusion suits a doctrine of assimilation. Frye, Anatomy of Criticism, p. 165, see also pp. 44 and 54; White, 
Metahistory, p. 9. 
22 White, Metahistory, p. 29. 
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representations of the Third Republic mimic Furet’s conclusion (or rather Furet mimics 
theirs), implying that the Third Republic is France’s final rebirth after a century of civil war. 
 
The Commune embodies all the elements of the narrative of republican rebirth embedded 
within the guerre franco-française discourse: the founding massacre of a republic, the triumph 
of conservative republicanism over both Bonapartism and radicalism, the symbolic 
significance of Paris and the culmination of the Revolution.23 With the representations of 
pétroleuses, it even harked back to the equally fictional tricoteuses of the Terror.24 Under the 
German siege which lasted the whole bitter winter of 1870-1, 40,000 people died through 
bombardment, starvation, cold and disease.25 Whilst most people were reduced to eating 
rats and queuing for hours for bread made from sawdust, the rich held exotic feasts 
supplied by the ménagerie in the Jardin des Plantes to keep their spirits up. Given such a 
background, it is unsurprising that Susan Milner considers the subsequent violence of the 
Paris Commune to be class-based.26 On the 27 January 1871, terms for an armistice were 
agreed and a general election called. The results were conservative; it was an election for 
peace or war and the former won, except in Paris. Adolphe Thiers headed the new 
government and signed a peace agreement in Versailles: Alsace and much of Lorraine 
would be surrendered to the new united Germany, an occupying force would remain until 
reparations were paid, and the German army were given leave to parade through Paris.27 
The deputies of Paris, Alsace and Lorraine, including Léon Gambetta and Victor Hugo, 
resigned in protest. The defeat was total. It is understandable how such an event is 
considered by so many historians to have had such a profound influence on the 
development of French, and particularly republican, identity; Gildea considers it ‘second 
only to the French Revolution’ in terms of an event which redefined the political nation.28 
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Already angered by the election results and the peace terms, slighted by the government’s 
continued residence in Versailles rather than returning to Paris, and becoming increasingly 
radicalised as many of the bourgeoisie, previously trapped by the siege, had left the capital, 
the Parisian National Guard organised itself into a central committee based in Montmartre 
where it took its 200 cannon.29 When, on the 18 March, the French army went to 
confiscate the weapons, the women (and, less symbolically, the men) of Paris surrounded 
the cannons, the troops refused to fire and the two generals leading the army were shot. 
This was the beginning of the Paris Commune, declared officially after elections from the 
Hôtel de Ville on 26 March. It was modelled on the Commune of 1792 and rejected the 
peace agreements made with Bismarck.30 
 
R. D. Anderson considers the Commune to represent the break between socialism and 
republicanism, the latter being both legal and peaceful.31 Yet it had the democratic support 
of the populous it ruled over and produced very little violence except in its own defence 
during the semaine sanglante, and then in no comparable measure to the indiscriminate 
slaughter unleashed by the Versaillais forces.32 Furthermore, whilst the Commune lasted 
barely a hundred days many of its policies, like the separation of church and state, would 
eventually become synonymous with the Third Republic.33 
 
On 21 May, with 70,000 troops freed up in a temporary agreement with Germany, Marshal 
de MacMahon (one of the few commanders from Napoleon III’s original army to survive 
the defeat with his reputation intact) entered Paris.34 Over seven days Paris was taken in 
‘the worst civil violence in Europe between the French and Russian revolutions’ by what 
                                                
29 Tombs estimates that around 50,000 military-aged middle-class men left Paris with their families prior to 
the Commune. Tombs, The Paris Commune, p. 67. 
30 A member of the Commune’s Communal Assembly declared, ‘we are behaving like plagiarists’ when a vote 
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Bertrand Taithe has suggested was a ‘controlled civil war’, planned by Versailles and in total 
rejection of negotiation.35 The figures for those killed by the Versaillais army range 
enormously, increasing from over 10,000 to 22,000 to 30,000, with Taithe’s diplomatic 
range of between 10,000 and 35,000.36 Even figures on those deported to New Caledonia 
vary from 4,000 to 5,000.37 L’année terrible, a phrase much used at the time and taken up by 
Victor Hugo was deserving of its name.38 Thiers had earned his title of the ‘monstrous 
gnome’.39 
 
Republican artistic representations of the Paris Commune from the Third Republic tend to 
emplot the semaine sanglante into the romantic republic narrative of revolution versus 
counter-revolution.40 This guerre franco-française discourse is evident in Hugo’s novel 
Quartrevingt-treize, played out through the characters of the reactionary Lantenac and the 
revolutionary Cimourdain.41 Hugo himself felt stuck in between these two forces; the 
novel’s opposing depictions of the revolutionary guillotine and the feudalistic tower ‘are 
identically horrible.’42 Hugo’s politics were somewhat stranded in the face of Commune 
which he was ‘for in principle, but against it in practice.’43 In the character of Gauvin he 
placed ‘a spirit of clemency’; calm and rational, Gauvin was Hugo’s plea for the middle 
ground, an ideal he shared with Gambetta.44 
 
Albert Boime, in his study of impressionism in the Third Republic, has identified the likes 
of Edouard Manet, Claude Monet, Edgar Degas, Auguste Renoir, Paul Cézanne and 
Gustave Caillebotte as republicans whose paintings reflected a reserved sympathy for the 
Commune, a condemnation of the semaine sanglante and a desire for peaceful reconciliation 
in the aftermath of civil war.45 Thus, for Boime, the peaceful bourgeois promenade in 
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Monet’s Boulevard des Capucines and Caillebotte’s Rue de Paris, temps de pluie (Figures 1 and 2), 
a vast painting of seven by ten feet, retrace ‘the damaged sites of the Commune…and 
represent them as bright, flourishing spaces… [Impressionism] glosses over the ruins and 
minimizes the tension of the post-war culture, promoting the official ideology’ of 
reconciliation in a conservative republic.46 Caillebotte’s painting is seen to literally wash 
clean the pavements, with the replaced paving-stones showing no sign of the barricades of 
1871.47 For the impressionists in Boime’s interpretation, there is a need to paint over the 
guerre franco-française which the semaine sanglante represented in order to rebuild a calm and 
conservative France under a republican regime. There is a sense of reclaiming space and 
order for the Parisian bourgeoisie, a process begun by the Haussmann under Napoleon III. 
This is particularly evident in Caillebotte’s street scene in which the boulevards and 
buildings which stretch into the distance are products of the slum clearance and 
Haussmanisation of Paris; the semaine sanglante essentially completed Haussman’s work of 
eradicating the working classes from the centre of the city.48 
 
 
Figure 1. Claude Monet, Boule va rd  de s  Capucines , 1873. 
                                                
46 Ibid. p. 45. 
47 Boime, Art in an Age of Civil Struggle, pp. 764-765. 
48 Several authors have made this allusion. See for example, T. J. Clark, The Painting of Modern Life: Paris in the 
Art of Manet and his Followers (London, 1984) pp. 46, 68-69; Christiansen, Paris Babylon, p. 359. 
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Figure 2. Gustave Caillebotte, Rue d e Par is ,  t emps  de  pluie , 1877. 
 
Boime also considers the frequent depictions of the Parisian railways and the surrounding 
countryside in his thesis on the impressionists but it is rather a leap to suggest that a 
painting of bourgeois leisure on the Seine is a political reaction to the Commune. 
Nevertheless, whilst Boime’s thesis may be reading too much into the political banality of a 
hayfield, the opposing argument also seems somewhat unrealistic. Arnold Hauser and 
Alfred Cobban have both suggested that for the impressionists, 1871 was ‘of merely 
passing significance in the history of France’ and, whilst Bernard Denvir concedes that the 
revolutionary upheavals from 1848 up to the Third Republic shaped the lives of the group 
of painters, he considers there to be a continuity between their work before and after the 
Commune.49 It seems inconceivable that the extreme civil violence of the Commune could 
have failed to have an effect on artists and writers who considered Paris both an artistic 
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and an actual home; Paris was, after all, ‘the political, intellectual, cultural and artistic focus 
of the nation.’50 
 
There is perhaps a middle ground. In his consideration of art and representation, E. H. 
Gombrich argued that ‘the true miracle of the language of art is not that it enables the artist 
to create the illusion of reality’ but that it teaches us ‘to see the visible world afresh’.51 This 
is particularly relevant in his analysis of impressionism: 
 
With impressionism the popular notion of the painter became that of a man 
who paints blue trees and red lawns and who answers every criticism with a 
proud ‘That is how I see it.’ This is one part of the story but not, I believe, the 
whole. This assertion of subjectivity can also be overdone. There is such a 
thing as a real visual discovery, and there is a way of testing it despite the fact 
we may never know what the artist himself saw at a certain moment. 
Whatever the initial resistance to impressionist paintings, when the first shock 
had worn off, people learned to read them. And having learned this language, 
they went into the fields and woods, or looked out of their window onto the 
Paris boulevards, and found to their delight that the visible world could after all 
be seen in terms of these bright patches and dabs of paint. The transposition 
worked. The impressionists had taught them, not, indeed, to see nature with 
an innocent eye, but to explore an unexpected alternative that turned out to 
fit certain experiences better than did any earlier paintings.52 
 
This is an eloquent way of saying that whilst the impressionists had a tendency to paint 
seemingly banal pictures of bourgeois life, there was a little more to them than that. So 
although Hauser may enjoy suggesting that impression was ‘the climax of self-centred 
aesthetic culture and signifies the ultimate consequence of the romantic renunciation of 
practical, active life’, the influence of the most violent episode in modern France’s history 
did impinge upon such a life.53 There is a juncture in French art which both T. J. Clarke 
and Philip Nord note and whilst Clark reserves pinpointing his historical context, he argues 
that ‘[s]omething decisive happened in the history of art around Manet which set painting 
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and the other arts upon a new course. Perhaps the change can be described as a kind of 
scepticism, or at least unsureness [sic], as to the nature of representation in art.’54 
 
Whilst the majority of the impressionists maintained an aloof bourgeois stance towards 
politics, the violence which raged through their spiritual home and between their fellow 
countrymen did not go entirely unnoticed in their methods of representation.55 For Monet 
and Caillebotte, and indeed Degas, Cézanne and Renoir, the discourse of the guerre franco-
française was one they painted over, either unable, unwilling or uninterested in confronting 
the contemporary history of the city in which they based themselves. The same was not 
true for Manet who Denvir considers to have been the impressionists’ leader ‘in spite of 
himself.’56 In an in-depth consideration of Manet’s politics, Nord argues he was far more 
radical than other commentators have suggested and more so than his fellow 
impressionists, based upon both his associates and the subjects of his paintings, pointing 
particularly to his admiration for Gambetta and Clemenceau.57 Whilst Nord concludes that 
he was a conciliator rather than a supporter of the Communards, his sympathies lay with 
the Commune as an ideal rather than the conservatism which bordered on reaction of 
Thiers and the Versailles government; he was a radical rather than a liberal republican.58 
 
Manet was novel amongst the impressionists in representing the guerre franco-française very 
directly, and indeed of baring witness to it; his 1871 lithograph, La Guerre civile (Figure 3) is 
thought to be based on a scene he witnessed during the semaine sanglante on his return to the 
capital.59 The finality of the violence is striking, the picture is very still; there is no saving 
this revolution for Manet. Boime has made particular note of the picture’s title which he 
considers a reference back to the recent American Civil War of which Manet had been 
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particularly concerned.60 Such a connection serves to emphasise the scale of the violence of 
which this picture bares small witness, as well as evidencing the guerre franco-française 
discourse in contemporary culture. 
 
 
Figure 3. Edouard Manet, La Gue r re  c ivi l e , 1871. 
 
There is a degree of intertextuality in La Guerre civile which suggests an affiliation with a 
longitudinal guerre franco-française discourse. The similarities with Ernest Meissonier’s La 
Souvenir de la guerre civile (Figure 4), a representation of the June Days of 1848 with which 
there can be little doubt that Manet was familiar, are striking.61 They share a stillness, the 
representation of death rather than battle, of the vanquished rather than the heroic.62 
Meissonier’s employment of red, white and blue insist on a connection with the 
Revolution, providing a continuous thread of guerre franco-française discourse running 
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through the paintings. There is some comfort in this intertextuality with a representation of 
an earlier event; Maurice Samuels understands the trend for realism in the nineteenth 
century as coming from ‘a desire to ground Revolutionary and post-Revolutionary 
identities in a stable vision of the past…the new spectacles of history purported to reassure 
spectators that a difficult past could be known and mastered.’63 In this sense at least, 
Manet’s La Guerre civile need not represent an end of republicanism, only of the radicalism 
for which he held a cautious sympathy.64 The inclusion of a barricade wrought out of 
paving stones is a part of this connection with previous revolutionary moments. As Tombs 
has argued, barricades held ‘a symbolic power’ beyond their purpose of stopping an enemy 
advance: ‘Barricades turned streets and neighbourhoods into protected spaces, and their 
inhabitants into a garrison…Barricades were rallying points… Their construction was often 
a community act, in which neighbours or passers-by would contribute a paving stone.’65 
This symbolism was enacted through previous Parisian uprisings, the spirit of which is part 
of both Manet’s and Meissonier’s pictures. 
 
A later painting by neo-impressionist Maximilien Luce (Figure 5) also features a barricade 
and bears a great resemblance to both Manet’s and Meissonier’s compositions, as well as 
featuring the tricolour in its pallet akin to Le Souvenir de la guerre civile. Both the temporal 
distance between Luce’s painting with the event it represents, and his anarchist politics, 
makes La rue de Paris en mai 1871 a much more radical painting than Manet’s La Guerre civile 
but continues the discourse of la guerre franco-française.66 Like Meissonier but unlike Manet, 
Luce depicts a working class suburb of Paris rather than the bourgeois domination of his 
predecessors. This is a street not a boulevard and the woman’s dress, particularly, ensures 
the interpretation of the group of vanquished fighters as workers.67 Most notably, unlike 
                                                
63 Maurice Samuels, The Spectacular Past: Popular History and the Novel in Nineteenth-Century France (London, 2004) 
p. 8. 
64 Manet’s conclusion to the romantic guerre franco-française is perhaps emploted as tragedy rather than 
reconciliatory comedy, which, as White explains, need not be ‘regarded as totally threatening to those who 
survive the agonic test. There has been a gain in consciousness for the spectators of the contest.’ White, 
Metahistory, p. 9. 
65 Tombs, The Paris Commune, p. 166. 
66 Karine Varley also notes the connections between the three paintings. Varley, Under the Shadow of Defeat, p. 
95. 
67 Boime has identified the setting of La Guerre civile between the boulevard Malesherbes and the rue de 
l’Arcade with the railings and columns in the background being those of the Madeleine. Wright has identified 
the area in Luce’s painting as a working class suburb. Boime, Art in an Age of Civil Struggle, p. 733; Alastair 
Wright, 'Mourning, Painting, and the Commune: Maximilien Luce's A Paris Street in 1871', Oxford Art Journal 
32 (2009) p. 226. On the anarchist sympathies of Luce and other neo-impressionists, and the paintings of the 
working class suburbs see Roslak, Neo-Impressionism and Anarchism, pp. 45 and 113-133. 
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either of the previous paintings, Luce paints in the weaponry of his fallen fighters.68 
Although the artists may differ in their definitions of republicanism, all emplot the 
romantic guerre franco-française within their paintings.69 
 
 
Figure 4. Ernest Meissonier, Souven ir de  l a gue r re  c iv i l e , 1851. 
 
                                                
68 The neo-impressionists tended to be much more direct in their representations of the Commune than their 
forefathers being both more radical in their politics (many were anarchists and thus favourable to the 
Communards) and having a decree of temporal distance between them and their subject. Georges Seurat, for 
example, confronted the destruction of the Commune in his Les Ruines de Tuileries in 1882. See Boime, Art and 
the French Commune, pp. 169-176. 
69 The Commune and the semaine sanglante were recurring themes in Luce’s work even into the First World 
War period. His paintings, Louis Michel à son retour de Nouméa (after 1880), Un Versaillais blessé (early 1900s) and 
L’Exécution de Varlin (between 1910-1917) are all on display at the Musée d’art et d’histoire in Saint-Denis, an 
area that itself features regularly in his work. 
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Figure 5. Maximilien Luce, Un ru e de  Pari s  en  mai 1871 ,  1905.70 
 
Manet’s second lithograph of the semaine sanglante contains an intertextuality both closer to 
and further away from home but which again engages the longitudinal nature of the guerre 
franco-française discourse. La Barricade (Figure 6) depicts the shooting of a Communard by a 
group of Versaillais soldiers but directly references his earlier painting, L'Exécution de 
Maximilien (Figure 7). Maximilien was the French-supported Mexican emperor during 
Napoleon III’s Second Empire but was abandoned by France following the North’s victory 
in the American Civil War (in which Napoleon III had passively favoured the South but 
Manet the North), and was subsequently shot by his own countrymen in a fratricidal 
conflict.71 The replication of the executioners’ positions make this connection evident (in 
mirror-image because La Barricade is a lithograph) and one which is surely intentional; these 
are both civil wars. 
 
                                                
70 Picture taken by the author at the Musée d’Orsay, January 2010. The date differs from that offered by the 
Musée d’Orsay which gives a range of 1903-1906 as it was exhibited first at the Salon des Indépendents in 
1905. Wright, 'Mourning, Painting, and the Commune', p. 225. 
71 In one of the five versions of the picture, Manet painted the executioners in uniforms which resembled 
that of the French army, firmly implicated who he felt was to blame for Maximilien’s death. See Nord, 'Manet 
and Radical Politics', pp. 453-454; Boime, Art in an Age of Civil Struggle, pp. 712-715; Milner, Art, War and 
Revolution, p. 22. 
Algeria in France 
 213 
 
Figure 6. Edouard Manet, La Barric ade , 1871. 
 
 
Figure 7. Edouard Manet, L'Exécu t ion  de  Maximil ie n , 1867-68. 
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Manet’s political allegiances with the radical republicans and his distaste for Thiers’ 
conservatives, is also apparent through the intertextuality of La Barricade and L'Exécution de 
Maximilien with Franciso de Goya’s El Tris de Mayo (Figure 8). This renown Spanish 
nationalist painting depicts the execution by Napoleonic troops of defiant Spanish 
republicans and in composition can be seen to have influenced Manet’s later works. Whilst 
by reference to Goya’s work, L'Exécution de Maximilien is, as Milner has suggested, mocking 
of Napoleon III’s connections to his more famous (and militarily more successful) uncle, 
its intertextuality with La Barricade illustrates where Manet’s sympathies lie: with the 
executed.72 La Barricade represents the deadly reality of the civil war to which Manet bore 
brief witness. 
 
 
Figure 8. Franciso de Goya, El  Tris  de  Mayo , 1814 
 
Manet shared his desire for a middle ground, between the Communards and the Versailles 
government, with Hugo and Quatrevingt-treize’s Gauvin. In 1871 and 1874, when they had 
                                                
72 Milner, Art, War and Revolution, p. 23. Stephen Bann also draws the connections between these three works 
and notes that Manet saw Goya’s painting in Madrid two years prior to painting L'Exécution de Maximilien. 
Stephen Bann, The Inventions of History: Essays on the Representations of the Past (Manchester, 1990) pp. 177-178. 
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produced their works, this middle ground was still unstable and neither Hugo’s nor 
Manet’s works represent much confidence in it; the comedic conclusion is not yet present. 
By the 1890s, the republic was on much firmer ground as the republicans had been in 
power for over a decade, key policies involving secular schooling were in place and the 
Communards had been amnestied, no longer considered a threat. In such an environment, 
the anarchist martyrs of Luce’s pictures were acceptable and unthreatening. The guerre 
franco-française could be represented very directly even by committed republicans, because 
retrospect allowed the implication of a new dawn. This explains the differences in endings 
between Quartrevingt-treize and Zola’s 1892 La Débâcle.73 Whilst in Hugo’s novel the guerre 
franco-française is at once removed from the present by being represented through the war in 
the Vendée, it also is not yet at an end. Indeed, Sandy Petrey has argued that there is a 
‘general stasis of the civil war from the beginning to the end of the novel’; in its broader 
narrative, nothing actually happens.74 In 1874, Hugo is not yet satisfied with the state of the 
Third Republic and his own opinions on the Commune were, to use Petrey’s word, 
‘contradictory’.75 Thus the civil war, for Hugo, whilst not overt, was still ongoing as 
republicans wrestled to take control of the regime. Similarly, Manet’s lithographs do not 
suggest a future in their narratives because it is still uncertain. In contrast, La Débâcle ends 
in expectation of a bright future. 
 
The discourse of the guerre franco-française is at its most acute in the microcosm between La 
Débâcle’s two central characters, Jean and Maurice. Such a method of representing the final 
days of the Commune effectively brings the longitudinal nature of the guerre franco-française 
to the fore; these are individual citizens embodying the Revolutionary ideals which ‘called 
upon the nation to play an active role in the making of history’.76 As such, whilst Jean 
joined the Versaillais and accidentally killed his brother-in-arms, Maurice, who had joined 
the Communards, there is no doubt about Jean’s republican credentials and the republican 
future he will build. Zola uses the culmination of a personal story to conclude a historical 
event.77 In the roughly democratic and republican environment of the 1890s, such a 
                                                
73 Émile Zola, La Débâcle (Paris, 1892). Collette Wilson has argued that the earlier novel’s in Zola’s Rougon-
Macquart series, whilst being set in the Second Empire, make reference to the Commune through the 
topography of Paris. Colette E. Wilson, Paris and the Commune, 1871-78: The Politics of Forgetting (Manchester, 
2007) see Chapter 4. 
74 Petrey, History in the Text, p. 15. 
75 Ibid. p. 105. 
76 Rigney, The Rhetoric of Historical Representation, p. 6. 
77 Robert A. Rosenstone, 'The Historical Film: Looking at the Past in a Postliterate Age', Marcia Landy (ed.) 
The Historical Film: History and Memory in the Media (London, 2001) p. 55. See Chapter 2, section 2.3b. 
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method is present in La Débâcle. As individuals meet their enemies at very close quarters, 
the guerre franco-française is a war between brothers, but one man can also represent the 
future of the republic. 
 
This analysis of some of the prominent contemporary artistic representations of the Paris 
Commune illustrates how the discourse of the guerre franco-française is not restricted to 
current historiography of modern France, but one which has pervaded republican culture. 
Whilst many of the impressionists painted over such a discourse, it was present in the work 
of Manet, Hugo, Zola and Luce. Furthermore, through references to earlier works and 
periods, the guerre franco-française was represented as being part of a longitudinal 
understanding of republicanism, a long-term romantic emplotment of good versus evil. As 
such it is represented as a trait of French history, a line which can be traced from the 
Revolution to the contemporary Third Republic. For Zola, as for François Furet, this line 
terminates with the Commune of 1871; the Revolution and its acolyte, civil war, has 
concluded in a reconciliatory comedic mode with the Third Republic as the natural and 
inevitable outcome of the previous century of struggle. The implications for the 
interpretation of French history after the Third Republic’s demise are the subject of the 
next section. 
 
3.1c  The ending  of  the  Revoluti on and Vichy  exceptional ism 
Furet is not alone amongst twentieth-century historians in asserting that the Third Republic 
was the culmination of the Revolution. It is a view shared with Eugen Weber whose 
Peasants into Frenchmen saw in the Third Republic the ascendancy of the ultimate republican 
model.78 Both are unapologetically celebratory of the Third Republic’s achievements. As 
noted in the previous chapter, such claims suggest that from this point on, the French are 
natural republicans which lends legitimacy to the teleological narrative inherent in 
republican universalism. In this instance, it also has a further effect: if republicanism is the 
natural state for the French from the 1870s then such a narrative assumes the Vichy 
government to have been an unnatural imposition, both un-French and doomed to failure, 
                                                
78 Furet, Revolutionary France 1770-1880, p. 537; Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural 
France 1870-1914 (London, 1977). Most recently, Sudhir Hazareesingh has implied a similar argument, 
specifically in terms of democracy which, as Chapter 1 has made clear, is quite absent in 1870. Hazareesingh, 
'Conflicts of Memory: Republicanism and the Commemoration of the Past in Modern France', French History 
23 (2009) p. 194. See also Philip G. Nord, The Republican Moment: Struggles for Democracy in Nineteenth-Century 
France (Cambridge, 1995). 
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precisely de Gaulle’s interpretation. Most significantly, in this narrative Vichy was not the 
responsibility of the French people. This interpretation rejects the possibility of French, 
indeed republican, influences in the Vichy state. Furthermore, it suggests a strong element 
of inevitability in the victory of the republic over its occupiers. Such a view of history thus 
exonerates the French from their accountability for the shameful actions of the Second 
World War and avoids analysis of why the Revolutionary values of equality and assimilation 
were entirely rejected for four years. By claiming the Third Republic marked the end of the 
Revolution, both Furet and Weber establish a narrative that dismisses the Vichy era as 
insignificant in the development of republicanism and avoids the continuation of the guerre 
franco-française discourse beyond the nineteenth century. As such the Vichy era, and all the 
difficult questions it raises in terms of citizenship, race and the values of the Revolution, 
can be viewed as an un-French blip, a blot on the republican landscape made by the Nazi 
invaders. 
 
The historiography of the Vichy era has moved on significantly from this kind of 
representation as the work of Stanley Hoffman, Robert Paxton and Henry Rousso has 
been integrated into the broader histories of French republicanism.79 Elements of Vichy 
may have been anti-France but they were no longer simply an ‘un-French aberration, a 
German imposition.’80 The proclaimed end of the Revolution has shifted and the guerre 
franco-française has been resurrected for the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
The Third Republic itself is considered to have had several flare-ups of the guerre franco-
française which threatened its existence. Both the Dreyfus and Boulanger affairs of the 
1880s and 1890s witnessed the mobilisation of forces antagonistic and overtly threatening 
to the republic. France (the republic) versus anti-France (the reactionary army hierarchy) of 
the Dreyfus and Boulanger affairs confirmed the republicans’ contemporary fear and added 
fuel to the guerre franco-française narrative of republican historians.81 A further flare-up is 
                                                
79 Stanley Hoffman, 'Collaborationism in Vichy France', Journal of Modern History 40 (1968); Robert Owen 
Paxton, Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944 (London, 1973); Henry Rousso, The Vichy Syndrome: 
History and Memory in France since 1944, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (London, 1991) [1987]. 
80 Martin S. Alexander, 'Historians and the Peculiarities of French History', Martin S. Alexander (ed.) French 
History Since Napoleon (London, 1999) p. 17. See also Nicholas Atkin, 'Renewal, Repression and Resistance: 
France under Nazi Occupation, 1940-44', Martin S. Alexander (ed.) French History Since Napoleon (London, 
1999). 
81 In terms of actual violence, the Dreyfus Affair was marked by anti-Semitic attacks the most vicious of 
which were outright pogroms in Algeria. Despite encountering more civil violence than Paris during the 
Affair, few of the republican histories give any space to this flare-up (Tombs mentions it in passing but none 
of the other works discussed above mention it). Such recognition would lead to difficult questions as regards 
assimilation and equality in republican Algeria (even discounting the majority of its unenfranchised 
population). Thus, even whilst being evidence of the guerre franco-française at its most acute, not least because of 
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noted with the Parisian riots of 1934 instigated by the rise of the right-wing leagues, this 
time largely in reference to the rise of the Popular Front of 1936 and thus representing a 
progressive shift in republicanism.82  
 
With a rejection of the Third Republic as marking the end of the Revolution, and the 
revisionist history of the 1970s and 1980s, Vichy became the primary focus of modern 
historians and the discourse guerre franco-française became entrenched. Jean-Pierre Rioux, 
who has traced the use of the phrase ‘guerre franco-française’ by historians, considers its 
‘archetype’ to be the Vichy era.83 However, what is included in this newly-focused discourse 
is exclusive, and has raised a new problem: that of Vichy exceptionalism. The use of the 
guerre franco-française discourse in relation to the Second World War excludes an outbreak of 
civil violence in Sétif in 1945. Algerians, despite donning French uniforms and liberating 
the metropole, were not considered French enough to be included in the guerre franco-
française discourse when their protests were brutally suppressed by French troops who had 
fought alongside them in the liberation of France. For Algerians, these uprisings now mark 
the beginning of the struggle for independence. For post-1962 republican historians, this 
explanation also suits; the repression at Sétif is part of the decolonisation discourse 
embedded in which is the narrative of a mission civilisatrice: Algerians were un-French rather 
than anti-France, and thus not part of the guerre franco-française.84 In 1945, according to such 
a narrative, Algeria was not yet ready to become independent and further paternal guidance 
of the ‘colony’ was needed. To see the repressions as part of the guerre franco-française would 
thoroughly undermine the post-1962 consensus that Algeria had never been ‘an integral 
                                                                                                                                          
the dominance of the professional army in the area, it barely features in such a discourse. Tombs, France 1814-
1914, p. 463. See section 3.2b for a more detailed discussion of the republic-army divide. 
82 Brian Jenkins, 'The Six Fèvrier 1934 and the Survival of the French Republic', French History 20 (2006). 
83 Jean-Pierre Rioux, 'La Guerre Franco-française', Michael Scriven and Peter Wagstaff (eds), War and Society 
in Twentieth-Century France (Oxford, 1991) p. 284. It is only since the mid twentieth-century that historians have 
used the actual phrase, ‘guerre franco-française’, to describe internal conflict, although such a narrative is clearly in 
evidence much earlier, as the previous section has shown. Michael Kelly considers the guerre franco-française to 
have pervaded ‘all the images and stories’ of modern France, which may be over egging the pudding 
somewhat but it is certainly a recurring theme in French culture. Michael Kelly, 'French Cultural Identities', 
Jill Forbes and Michael Kelly (eds), French Cultural Studies: An Introduction (Oxford, 1995) p. 2. 
84 As Todd Shepard has also argued, the ‘invention of decolonization’ allowed the French to portray 
Algerians to be ‘so different, as a group, from other French citizens that they could not be accommodated 
within the French Republic. This was what the FLN had always proposed, arguing that Algeria formed a 
nation, defined by Arab culture, Berber roots, and Islamic tradition, that needed an independent state. Yet 
until the final years of the Algerian War, French leaders energetically rejected this contention.’ That the later 
interpretation suited both the French and the Algerian governments meant that its dominance was difficult to 
challenge, as the experience of the harkis has shown. Todd Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian 
War and the Remaking of France (London, 2006) p. 6, see also p. 11. 
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part of France’.85 The absence of any discussion of a guerre franco-française in the historical 
representations of Sétif further sustains the notion that such an emplotment is reserved by 
and for French republicans. The exclusion of Sétif from the guerre franco-française discourse is 
part of the wider trend in the republican narrative of French history which rejects the 
impact Algeria has had on the shaping of French identity.86 
 
On the phenomenon of Vichy exceptionalism, Rioux himself follows the same line as 
those historians in his study when he identifies Vichy as the last real flare-up of the guerre 
franco-française. Alongside the demise of the ‘great, all-encompassing ideologies’ over the 
course of the century (a debate he calls ‘glib’ but appears to concede to), the divisive nature 
of French society is tamed.87 Rioux makes no assertion as to whether such an end is 
positive or negative, but he is quite clear in his assertion that the great ideological battle 
between the republic and its enemies is at an end.88 Such a conclusion conforms to the 
trend in republican historiography which has shifted the end of the Revolution from the 
Third Republic to the Fifth and the figure of de Gaulle marrying the two old enemies, 
republicanism and Bonapartism.89 As Tombs, a key purveyor of this narrative, has argued, 
‘De Gaulle’s Fifth Republic, the first political system since the Revolution to have attained 
practically universal acceptance, is a new version, shorn of dynastic complications, of the 
Bonapartist formula of the “republican monarch”.’90 Even Furet has since rearranged his 
finale to the Fifth Republic.91 
 
This does not undermine the celebratory space which the Third Republic occupies but 
rather suggests a gradual, and teleological, evolution of republicanism from 1870 which 
results in the strong executive constitution of the Fifth Republic. This is reminiscent of the 
Gaullist narrative noted in the previous chapter: there is no cyclical and revolutionary 
rebirth beyond the Third Republic but a linear path of evolution into the final stage of 
                                                
85 See Chapter 2, section 2.2a. 
86 This exclusive exceptionalism also allows Weil to argue that only in the Vichy era have racist citizenship 
polices been pursued, an assertion which both his own study and this thesis disprove. Patrick Weil, Qu'est-ce 
qu'un Français ? Histoire de la nationalité française depuis la Révolution (Paris, 2002) p. 183. 
87 Rioux, 'La Guerre Franco-française', p. 287. 
88 Rather bizarrely he leaves his conclusion open, leaving it to ‘optimists’ and ‘pessimists’ to make such a call. 
Ibid. pp. 289-290. 
89 For other historians who have concluded that 1958 marks the end of the Revolution with the marrying of 
republicanism and Bonapartism, see Albert Cobban, A History of Modern France, Volume 3: 1871-1962 (London, 
1965) p. 210; Tombs, France 1814-1914, pp. 130, 487-489; Pilbeam, Republianism in Nineteenth-Century France, 
pp. 1, 23; Hayward, Fragmented France, p. 183; Baycroft, France: Inventing the Nation, p. 69. 
90 Tombs, France 1814-1914, p. 489. 
91 François Furet, Jacques Julliard and Pierre Rosanvallon, La République du centre: la fin de l'exception française 
(Paris, 1988). 
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Gaullism.92 Whilst Michelet’s romantic emplotment of the Revolution ended in tragedy, as 
he wrote during the July Monarchy, republican histories written during the Fifth Republic 
draw their romantic modes to a close with comedy, a conservative reconciliation.93 As 
Alfred Cobban has written, the ‘Fifth Republic seems to draw the threads of modern 
French history together. It has already concluded much hitherto unfinished business.94 As 
such, whilst 1958 may be represented as the end of the Revolution, it is not represented as 
a revolution in and of itself, rather it is a conservative conclusion. It is this thesis’s 
argument that such a narrative conceals the revolutionary alterations to French 
republicanism which occurred during the Algerian war under de Gaulle’s presidency. 
 
 
3.2 The guerre franco-française: Algeria through the eye of Vichy 
The second part of this chapter argues that the place of Algeria in French republican 
history has been undermined by the tendency, of both artists and historians, to represent 
the war as being of secondary importance to the Vichy era. Whilst on some occasions this 
is done very overtly, it is more regularly seen through more subtle methods of emplotment, 
as discussed above, and comparison through transference. This transference, which is 
particularly in evidence through the employment of rhetoric associated with fascism in the 
context of the Algerian war, is most acute in representations of torture and of the OAS.95 
Here the rhetoric is used to draw a distinct binary of France and anti-France in relation to 
the republic and the professional army.96 Before turning to the analysis of such republican 
cultural representations, it is first necessary to expand upon the historiography which so 
frequently represents the Algeria war through the vector of Vichy and often employs 
uncritically the rhetoric of fascism in this process. 
 
Whilst much historiography has challenged the binary of fascism and resistance present in 
the early histories of the Occupation, the rhetoric is powerful and tenacious.97 The 
                                                
92 In his study of republican intellectuals of the Third Republic, Hazareesingh considers republicanism to 
have moved from being revolutionary to conservative. Sudhir Hazareesingh, Intellectual Founders of the Third 
Republic: Five Studies in Nineteenth-Century French Republican Thought (Oxford, 2001) p. 2. 
93 White, Metahistory, pp. 152-153. 
94 Cobban, A History of Modern France, vol. 1, pp. 7-8. 
95 My thoughts on the analytical possibilities of rhetoric and the phenomenon of transference stem from two 
essays by Dominick LaCapra, although I tread only lightly in his footsteps. Dominick LaCapra, History and 
Criticism (London, 1985) pp. 15-44, 71-94. 
96 I expand on this distinction in section 3.2a. 
97 See for example, Robert Aron, Histoire de Vichy 1940-1944 (Paris, 1954). 
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prominence of the Vichy era in both the historiography and the French public imagination 
has developed into the period being viewed as exceptional, an ‘obsession’, ‘un passé qui ne 
passe pas’.98 The Occupation as the ‘archetypal’ guerre franco-française is part of this 
exceptionalism.99 Its rhetoric, particularly that relating to fascism, has been transferred to 
historic and artistic representations of the Algerian war. That there is a relationship 
between the Occupation period and the Algerian conflict is a rather banal suggestion, not 
least because there is barely a decade to separate them and they share many of the same 
actors. As Benjamin Stora has noted, ‘la guerre d’Algérie éclate dix ans seulement après la 
Seconde Guerre mondiale. Le discours dominant, celui de la IVe République, laisse alors 
entendre que les Français, mis à part une poignée de traîtres, ont été des résistants, ou des 
fidèles silencieux du général de Gaulle.’100 Whilst historical periods are discursive 
constructions rather than concrete realities, these two wars are clearly two different events 
which occurred at separate times. In other words, transference between the two events is 
to be expected but it is at the same time an analysable phenomena for the historian.101 
 
The republican discourse of the guerre franco-française requires a France (of which the 
republic is synonymous) and an anti-France; they are connected opposites in the Derridean 
sense.102 The anti-France is not un-French as it must have an intimate connection with 
France to be its opposite in a civil conflict. In 1958, for the first time in the history of 
France, the Fifth Republic enacted universal suffrage; all French adult citizens were 
enfranchised. Until this point, despite officially being French citizens, the vast majority of 
those of Algerian origin who came from any of the départements on the south side of the 
Mediterranean, were disenfranchised. Their liberté in terms of freedom of movement and 
freedom to work had also been tightly restricted, and they had no egalité before the law 
given that they were subject to different and more repressive laws than their European 
peers. From 1954, the French army was fighting a war against its own citizens in Algeria 
and from 1958 they were fighting citizens who had, on paper at least, equal rights, even if 
                                                
98 Rousso, The Vichy Syndrome; Éric Conan and Henry Rousso, Vichy, un passé qui ne passe pas (Paris, 1996). 
99 Rioux, 'La Guerre Franco-française', p. 284. 
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those citizens rejected their official nationality. Yet, the conflict between the French army 
and the FLN is not imbued with the discourse of the guerre franco-française because the post-
1962 republican historical narrative rejects the idea that Algerians were ever French. Rather 
they had always been Algerians and France had aided their progress towards independence 
through the mission civilisatrice. Algerians, then, are un-French and cannot be, in the 
republican narrative, anti-France.103 The guerre franco-française cannot apply to the conflict 
between the French army and the FLN.104 
 
In the republican narrative of French history, the founding of a new republic, and 
particularly one which ended the Revolution by uniting the conflicting traditions of 
Bonapartism and republicanism, needs a guerre franco-française. But this end is treated as an 
evolutionary progression, not a revolutionary rebirth. As such, the guerre franco-française in 
the Algerian war is drawn as a continuation of the republic’s conflict with fascism, at least 
rhetorically. This narrative is particularly Gaullist, compatible with his refusal to declare the 
new Fourth Republic in 1944 because, he argued, the republic had never ended. Whilst the 
rejection of his executive-led governing model in 1946 showed the republic was still 
evolving, de Gaulle’s return in 1958 brought it to its final stage. The discourse of the guerre 
franco-française during the Algerian war draws the distinctions between France and anti-
France using the Vichy-inherited rhetoric of fascism and applies it to an anti-France 
familiar to the Third Republic: the professional army. In the cultural representations of the 
war, this equivocation of the professional army with fascism is most notable in 
representations of torture and is supplemented by the founding of the OAS by deserting 
generals.105 The power of the fascist rhetoric, aided by the perceived exceptionalism of the 
Vichy era, allows an unbalanced focus on the period following the Generals’ putsch in April 
1961 by which time the government of the Fifth Republic had settled on a policy of 
‘decolonisation’. Algerians are missing from this narrative entirely and the difficult 
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questions of Frenchness, race and assimilation which Algeria has posed since becoming 
part of France in 1848 are avoided. 
 
Such a narrative conceals the revolution which occurred in 1958; rather than being a 
revolution, the new Fifth Republic simply fought against republicanism’s traditional 
enemies: fascism and that nineteenth-century thorn, the reactionary elements of the 
professional army. Michel Wincock displays this narrative most blatantly when he lists the 
dates of France’s ‘revolutionary moments’ as ‘1830, 1848, 1871, 1934, 1936, 1944 and 
1968’.106 1958 is strikingly conspicuous in its absence and he is far from novel in missing 
(or avoiding) it.107 Martin Evans begins to argue that ‘the phenomenon of empire has been 
underestimated within mainstream histories of modern France’ but then fails to go further 
or suggest it has actually had a fundamental impact on modern France, and particularly on 
French republicanism.108 Even Patrick Weil in his analysis of changes in citizenship law, 
skirts around the changes which occurred with the fall of the Fourth Republic and the rise 
of the Fifth.109 It is an extremely convenient narrative, ignoring as it does the entire 
Algerian population’s involvement in the war, the violence pursued against them and the 
French refusal to consider independence as a viable option for a full six years of the 
conflict, the investigation of which would force awkward questions about impact of the 
history of the Franco-Algerian relationship and particularly its influence on the racial 
definition of French citizenship since 1962. 
 
3.2a The republ i c  and the  army 
Before turning to artistic representations which utilise the guerre franco-française discourse in 
reference to the Algerian war, it is necessary, given that a national army would usually be 
considered a symbol of patriotism and loyalty, to provide some context for the assertion 
that, in the republican narrative of the war, the professional army is drawn as anti-France. 
There are several initial points to assert: that the Republic is synonymous with France in 
this narrative; that the professional army is traditionally considered to be anti-republican; 
and that there is a strong distinction made between the professional and the conscript 
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army. Only the latter, as Chapter 1 suggested, are framed as citizen soldiers in the tradition 
of those participants in the levée en masse of 1792, regardless of whether they have 
independently rallied to arms in defence of the republic or been conscripted by the state. 
 
The division and mutual suspicion between the republic and the army was in existence 
from the First Republic. As Alan Forrest argues, Jacobin reforms of the army were inspired 
by ‘a strong inherent distrust of the officer class, from a belief that men born into privilege 
were likely to betray their trust, to emigrate abroad, or to support the cause of monarchies 
and empires.’110 Such a distrust was further entrenched when the republic was overthrown 
by the career soldier, Napoleon Bonaparte. Robert Tombs’ identification of paranoia and 
conspiracy as a theme of modern France is applicable here and helps further understand 
the binary element of the republican narrative. He argues that, 
 
[c]onspiracy theories perpetuated the ‘language of civil war’ in politics. They 
portrayed not a society pluralistically divided by legitimate beliefs and 
interests, but a ‘binary divide’ between a united, patriotic and wholly legitimate 
‘us’, and a diverse unholy alliance of traitors and criminals – ‘them’. The 
struggle was dramatized into a historic battle for the soul of France and the 
future of the word. For each side, the struggle finally was one between “one 
true France” and an ‘anti-France’.111 
 
In such a description, romantic plotting is much in evidence; an uncompromising good 
versus evil struggle.112 For republicans, this binary discourse helped ensure that a fear of 
Caesarism became entangled with that of ‘aristocratic, Catholic and royalist plots’.113 As 
such, republics tended to ‘maintain some form of conscription even after its military 
usefulness appeared to have been outlived’ in order to provide an armed balance to the 
officer class.114 
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With both its predecessors abolished by the militaristic Bonaparte family, the Third 
Republic took many precautions against the power of the professional army class. In 1872 
military personnel were disenfranchised, forbidden from standing for parliamentary 
election, belonging to political parties, giving public speeches or writing for publication 
without ministerial approval.115 In 1874, conscription was re-introduced.116 Whilst an 
unpopular measure, it addressed the concern that the professional army was not 
republican. This paranoia was not without due cause: the higher ranks of the military ‘were 
an almost solid conservative, monarchist, and Catholic monopoly’ during the early Third 
Republic.117 The Boulanger affair certainly did not help to ease the politicians’ suspicions 
when an apparently republican general removed his mask to reveal a monarchist stooge. 
The Dreyfus affair cemented the army’s reputation as anti-republican, anti-democratic, 
anti-freemason and anti-Semitic, the outcome of which would be to pin the birth of the 
‘new’ nationalist extreme right of the twentieth century onto its coattails; many of the right-
wing leagues of the 1930s styled themselves as anti-Dreyfusards. 
 
The experience of the First World War, at least in retrospect, was perhaps the heyday of 
the republic and army’s relationship; the rare occurrence of a unified victory no doubt 
aided the détente. In the absence of the guerre franco-française discourse, Tombs asserts an 
evolutionary narrative in suggesting simply that its upheaval was another step towards 
ending the Revolution.118 In terms of the Second World War, Jack Hayward has argued that 
the Vichy regime was the culmination of the army’s anti-republicanism and notes the 
dominance of officers in senior political and administrative positions.119 The reality was not 
as convenient. Marshal Pétain became head of the French state precisely because he was a 
republican hero, the Victor of Verdun. Furthermore he was elected into power by the same 
parliament that had formed the Popular Front of 1936. Prior to Pétain’s election, Édouard 
Daladier had been ruling by decree since October 1938 ‘with little respect for legal 
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niceties.’120 However, in 1940 the choice between armistice and capitulation, was essentially 
one between the government and the army, as Julian Jackson has explained: 
 
An armistice was a political act engaging the responsibility of the government 
to end the hostilities in all French territories. The alternative was capitulation 
where the government would leave metropolitan France, take whatever forces 
could be salvaged, and allowed the army to capitulate in the field and sign a 
cease-fire. This solution, which had occurred in Holland, was proposed by 
Reynaud. Weygand objected on the grounds that it shifted responsibility for 
the defeat to the army.121 
 
It was the analysis to which Hayward adheres, however, that became the popular 
republican interpretation after the war; the republic was once again betrayed by the army. 
 
This is the crux of the republican narrative of the guerre franco-française; the professional army 
is the republic’s most frequent enemy in the ongoing civil war but also a useful 
scapegoat.122 For René Girard, the scapegoat comes from within the community rather 
than from without: ‘the sacrificial process requires not only the complete separation of the 
sacrificed victim [the scapegoat] from those beings for whom the victim is a substitute but 
also a similarity between both parties.’123 The scapegoat must be similar enough to the rest 
of community for the blame to stick, but with a differentiating feature so as to exclude the 
rest of the community from blame.124 Hence, as members of the army, there is no denying 
that the professional soldiers are French, but they can be painted as anti-republican and (by 
the republican logic of the republic being synonymous with France) anti-France; these two 
positions are necessary rather than contradictory in Girard’s understanding.125 Secondly, the 
scapegoat is a highly visible and distinguishable member of the community, frequently in a 
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position of authority; a high ranking uniformed man of the armed forces clearly possesses 
both of these qualities.126 
 
Scapegoating, as both a political and cultural process, removes blame from a society for a 
canker in their midst. But the scapegoat is not simply a tool of distraction from the real 
issues, it has a rather higher purpose. For Girard and within the republican narrative 
considered here, the scapegoat allows the divisions present in a society at war (whether 
with itself or with an external enemy) to be transferred and amputated; the scapegoat 
becomes a vessel for the divisions which would otherwise tear the society apart. As such, 
the ‘sacrifice serves to protect the entire community, offered up by the members 
themselves. The sacrifice serves to protect the entire community from its own violence…The 
elements of dissension scattered throughout the community are drawn to the person of the 
sacrificial victim and eliminated, at least temporarily.’127 The wider shift in historical 
narrative from violent romantic to reconciliatory comedic emplotment is aided by the 
scapegoating process. It is about avoiding violence, specifically internal violence and is 
designed ‘to restore harmony to the community, to reinforce the social fabric.’128  
 
The failure of the First and Second Republics can be easily pinned upon the treachery of 
the two Napoleons but the scapegoating of the professional army as anti-France is deeper 
than mere anti-Bonapartism. As Wolfgang Schivelbusch has put it, in France, ‘everyone 
who loses a battle is a traitor’ and the tradition of ‘holding generals responsible for lost 
battles and premature capitulations’ is a tradition dating back to the First Republic.129 This 
trend is certainly played out in the republican artistic representations of the Franco-
Prussian war, particularly in La Débâcle. To blame the rank-and-file citizen soldiers for the 
defeat would be impossible for a republic, and given the generals were anti-republican, 
scapegoating them as either incompetent or traitorous was straightforward.130 
Responsibility is very firmly placed at the top ranks of the army from the defeated Marshal 
Bazaine to gaunt and sickly Napoleon III himself.131 In Zola’s naturalist drama, these are 
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the rotten elements dragging France down and are the antithesis of the conservative 
republic, which will rise at the end of the novel embodied in Jean. The citizen soldiers 
suffer the brunt of the army’s incompetencies in every possible way: the lack of supplies 
through logistical ineptitude, the exhaustion and low morale due to lack of purpose, and 
the needless deaths caused by out-dated methods of fighting a war with an army desperate 
for glory; as Maurice and Jean exclaim watching the annihilation of a French cavalry 
charge, ‘Tonnerre de Dieu, ça ne sert à rien d’être brave !’132 
 
The division between the citizen soldier and the high command is driven home by the 
endless marching and retreating with poor supplies set against Napoleon III’s entourage 
requisitioning an old lady’s house laden with ‘la vaisselle d’argent, et des bouteilles de vin, 
et des paniers de provisions et du beau linge, et de tout !’133 This, followed immediately by 
news of Marshal Bazaine’s incompetency, is almost a caricature of such a narrative. The 
division is also evident in the republican narrative of the Vichy era, whether in artistic or 
historic representations, like that of Hayward’s. As Chapter 1 has shown, the citizen soldier 
as the embodiment of the republic slips easily into the role of resister. This is notable even 
in the employment of francs-tireurs in the name of a resistance group, harking back to the 
tradition of an auxiliary republican army which also makes an appearance in La Débâcle. 
 
The same tradition exists in the representations of the Algerian war. Indeed Philip Dine 
divides his study of novels into those that deal with the paratroopers and colonels, and 
those that tell stories of le rappel.134 It is also a division frequently noted by historians, 
particularly with regard to the differing attitudes to the war between the conscripts and 
their superiors. This assertion is often made in reference to the relationship with the 
settlers which for the conscripts was considered to be frequently antagonistic, or in 
reference to the experience of the professional army in Indochina and the commitment to 
colonialism which was not shared by the conscripts.135 The division between the 
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professional and conscript army becomes particularly noticeable with General Massu’s 
Battle of Algiers in which torture was used most famously and systematically by 
paratroopers to break down FLN networks. The discourse of the guerre franco-française is 
especially aided by the rise of the OAS in the latter stages of the war. Made up of ex-
generals and usually rich settlers, the existence of the OAS aids the scapegoating of the 
professional army as enemies of the republic. 
 
3.2b Trans f erence ,  tor ture  and the  OAS: the  c oncealment of  the  
revolution 
This section will look first at artistic representations of torture, focusing particularly on 
three early works published between 1958 and 1962 which help establish the pairing of the 
transference and scapegoating tendencies. A brief consideration of later works will serve to 
illustrate the tenacity of this trend. Representations of the OAS have furthered and even 
facilitated this trend, although they are less pronounced. In all these representations, the 
fascist rhetoric from the Vichy era aids the separation of the republic and the army. By 
applying a fascist rhetoric to the actions of the professional army in Algeria, they are made 
anti-French, even treacherous like their collaborationist counter-parts in the Occupation, 
and thus are transformed into a suitable scapegoat. The moral hierarchy of labelling their 
opponents ‘fascist’ allowed the republic to justify ‘decolonisation’ in moral and progressive 
terms. Such a narrative avoided questioning the political shifts that led to the pursuit of 
such a policy and the changing assumptions it required in terms of race and assimilation. 
 
Whilst viewing one historical period through the context of another is neither unusual nor 
necessarily problematic – as T.G. Ashplant notes, the ‘memory of heroic victory or 
suffering endured in a previous war may act as the template through which later conflicts 
are understood’ – the tendency to invoke a transference of the rhetoric of the Vichy era is 
overbearing, effectively removing the Algerian war’s own context.136 The analysis of 
cultural representations of the Algerian war illustrates the pervasiveness of the rhetoric of 
Vichy-era fascism transferred into representations of the Algerian war and illustrates how 
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such a transference enables the concealment of a revolution in French republicanism by 
representing the Algerian war as a continuation of the guerre franco-française of the 
Occupation. Transference in this case works like White’s understanding of metaphor and 
particularly of the metonymic type. Fascism in relation to representations of the Algerian 
war is often metaphoric but rather than purely ‘representational’, it is metonymic and thus 
reductionist; with the transference of the fascist rhetoric, ‘one can simultaneously 
distinguish between two phenomena and reduce one to the status of a manifestation of the 
other.’137 Due to the exceptional weight given to the Vichy period in the public perception 
and dominant republican narrative of French history, this transference undermines the 
impact of the Algerian war on republican history by suggesting its importance is usurped by 
the earlier Vichy regime.138 With a transference of the fascist rhetoric, the Algerian war and 
the longer Franco-Algerian relationship has become an unimportant blip in French 
republican history, apparently baring little influence on the evolution of republicanism. 
 
The three initial texts which, through a rhetoric of fascism, incorporate the guerre franco-
française and identify a scapegoat, are biographical and autobiographical works. Published 
during or immediately after the war, they represent episodes of torture as perpetrated by 
the French and had a noticeable impact in the French public sphere at the time.139 Henri 
Alleg’s La Question (1958) is perhaps the best-known testimony to be published on the 
Algerian war.140 Alleg was the editor of the banned communist newspaper Alger républicain, 
supporter of the FLN and Jewish in origin. He was arrested in the summer of 1957 during 
the Battle of Algiers and systematically tortured by paratroopers and police.141 La Question is 
a document of his experiences and additionally an accusation: he names his torturers and 
directly implicates them in the murder of the mathematics professor and his personal 
friend, Maurice Audin. The book was written in code, smuggled out of prison by his lawyer 
and published by Editions de Minuit. Selling 65,000 copies in the first five weeks of 
publication, Alleg’s work was seized by the French government only to be published again 
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with a preface by John-Paul Sartre which had begun life as an editorial in his journal, Les 
Temps modernes.142 It also caused a ruckus in the national press as references to it and 
published extracts resulted in the seizure of several newspapers, causing several indignant 
covers by L’Express, fiery rhetoric in Esprit and even carefully worded criticism in Le 
Monde.143 
 
Unperturbed by the government’s reaction to La Question, Editions de Minuit published 
Saint Michel et le Dragon in 1961.144 Written about his experiences as a paratrooper in North 
Africa between 1954 and 1957, Pierre Leulliette’s book contains graphic depictions of rape, 
pillage and torture carried out by the French army against the Algerian population. During 
the course of his narrative, Leulliette moves from being a naïve young adventurer to a 
disillusioned intellectual, heavily critical of the policies enacted by the professional French 
army of which he had been a part.145 The book was initially seized by the police and 
Editions de Minuit’s director, Jérôme Lindon, was brought to trial whilst Leulliette was 
chastised by the Ministry of the Interior. The book was republished only to be seized again. 
In March 1962 it finally went on sale without further hindrance. During this time Lindon 
had been forced to move house following an attempt on his life by the OAS.146 
 
Finally, completed before but published just after the Evian Accords which ended the war, 
Djamila Boupacha (1962) recites the experience of a twenty-three year old Algerian woman 
who was arrested, tortured and raped with a bottle by French paratroopers in February 
1960.147 Boupacha came to French pubic attention initially as a court case taken on by 
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Gisèle Halimi, a lawyer of Algerian descent from metropolitan France, and rapidly gained 
the attention and support of Germaine Tillion and Simone de Beauvoir. Introduced by de 
Beauvoir, the majority of Boupacha’s testimony is told by Halimi with the final pages 
containing testimony from a variety of public figures including Alleg, Françoise Sagan and 
Jules Roy. The book is essentially the tale of Halimi’s involvement in Boupacha’s legal 
struggle both as defendant against the charges upon which she was arrested (the planting of 
a bomb in an Algiers café) and as prosecutor in the struggle to bring Boupacha’s torturers 
to justice. Halimi’s writing is an extended expression of frustration and disgust at the 
farcical nature of the Algerian justice system, and a comparatively favourable account of 
the French courts. 
 
The obvious problem with considering La Question and Saint Michel et le dragon to be 
republican representations of the war is that the republic attempted to censor them. They 
were not, by any means, the first revelations on the use of torture to reach metropolitan 
France. That honour went to an article be Jean-Marie Domenach in Esprit in December 
1954, and the left-leaning press regularly printed, or attempted to print, details of French 
torture almost as soon as the war began but particularly from the Battle of Algiers.148 
Whilst there is no doubt that La Question’s publication caused a stir, it was not entirely 
revelatory. Its attempted suppression occurred primarily in the period before the change in 
government policy, from maintaining Algérie française to the ‘Invention of Decolonization’. 
Indeed, Tanya Matthews pointed out that André Malraux, who would go on to become de 
Gaulle’s Minister of Culture, was one of four authors to protest its seizure in April 1958.149 
She also noted that when the book reappeared in 1960, neither author nor publisher were 
prosecuted.150 Certainly, there is an element of it being more trouble that it was worth 
attempting to suppress an already notorious book, but a change in regime, and a shift in 
policy, also meant it was less of a threat for the Fifth Republic. Saint Michel et le dragon was 
published when peace talks were already underway with the FLN and the actions it 
describes occurred under the Fourth Republic, yet it was still seized upon publication. The 
                                                                                                                                          
une couverture blanche’ in L’Express, (8 February 1962) p. 15. This edition of Les Temps Modernes also carried 
extracts of Halimi’s testimony which appeared in the subsequent book. 
148 L’Express, France Observateur (which became the Nouvelle Observateur part way through the war) Esprit and 
Témoignage chrétien all spoke out against French methods in Algeria, and also often employed fascist rhetoric in 
their condemnations. See Hayward, Fragmented France, p. 325; Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization, p. 66. 
149 Tanya Matthews, War in Algeria: Background for Crisis (1961) p. 67. 
150 A similar fate met La Gangrène, a book written by five Algerian students who detailed their experiences of 
torture. Seized on the day of its publication in 1959, neither authors nor publishers were prosecuted and the 
book was reprinted in 1960 with no further action taken. Ibid. pp. 68-69. 
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reasoning here is perhaps one of diplomacy; igniting passions against past misdeeds whilst 
in talks would certainly not favour the French government’s negotiating position. Most 
significantly, however, is the aforementioned OAS attack on the novel’s publisher; 
censorship was now an issue of national security as preventing attacks by the OAS became 
paramount.151 It is safe to include these texts in the thesis’s definition of ‘republican culture’ 
because whilst they may have not been bedtime reading for the government of the Fifth 
Republic, they follow the same republican narrative in which the guerre franco-française is used 
to draw distinctive divisions between those who perpetrate torture and those who are 
‘truly’ French. 
 
In La Question, Alleg employs the rhetoric of fascism, specifically Nazism, but attributes 
this transference to his torturers who use it as a way both to boast and to mock. Just after 
being confronted by his friend Audin in a desperate state, Lieutenant Erulin, in a fit of 
anger at Alleg’s refusal to talk, shouts ‘“Ici, c’est la Gestapo! Tu connais la Gestapo?”’152 
Alleg does not respond but simply notes that his convictions were clearly worthwhile 
against ‘ces brutes qui se flattaient d’être les émules de la Gestapo.’153 Nearly a month into 
his ordeal, Alleg is taken to Captain Faulques, a legionnaire and captain of the paratroopers 
who introduces himself proudly as ‘“le fameux capitaine SS”…chef des tortionnaires de la 
villa Sesini, particulièrement réputé pour sa férocité.’154 Faulques then proceeds to rant at 
Alleg, promulgating his disparaging opinion on Communists, liberals and intellectuals 
generally, his wish for the war to spread across North Africa and his regret regarding the 
failure of the Suez campaign, all very typical complaints of the French extreme right at the 
time. Lieutenant Erulin had expressed similar sentiments previously although condensed 
into simply calling the republic a ‘putain’.155 
                                                
151 Several writers have commented on the lack of representation of torture in films and the detrimental effect 
censorship had on this kind of film production. Certainly the threat of censorship is likely to restrain the 
making of a film far more than the writing of a book, simply given the costs and work involved. As a result, 
few films about the war were made until its end and the lifting of censorship, or the threat of censorship. In 
terms of torture, the only film made depicting it during the war was Jean-Luc Godard’s Le Petit Soldat, which 
was banned from release until 1963, a fate shared with Muriel and Le Combat dans l’île, discussed below. Whilst 
the representations of torture in the Algerian war tended to be on the fringes of cinema they were 
nevertheless in existence and uncensored. Benjamin Stora has identified a selection of ‘films documentaires et 
militants’ that were censored under the Fourth Republic, alongside Stanley Kubrick’s Les Sentiers de la gloire 
which portrayed the French as pacifists in the First World War. Benjamin Stora, Imaginaires de guerre: Algérie - 
Viêtnam, en France et aux Etats-Unis (Paris, 1997) pp. 116-117, 122-123.  
152 Alleg, 'La Question'. [“This is the Gestapo here! You know the Gestapo?” Henri Alleg, The Question. With a 
new afterword by the author. Preface by Jean-Paul Sartre., trans. John Calder (London, 2006) [1958]] 
153 Alleg, 'La Question'. [these brutes who flattered themselves they were like the Gestapo’] 
154 Ibid. [“the famous SS captain”…head of the tortures at the Villa Sesini, whose reputation was particularly 
bloodthirsty.] 
155 Ibid. 
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Through the powerful use of fascist rhetoric, Alleg’s torturers are not only anti-republican, 
they are, apparently by their own admission, party to the beliefs and practices of the 
republic’s most recent and powerful nemesis – Nazi Germany and Vichy collaborationists. 
Jean-Paul Sartre’s preface to La Question is even more stark. Taking possession of the 
language of the Vichy era to an extent which Alleg never reaches, he opens his piece with a 
discussion of the torture performed by the Gestapo at Rue Lauriston in Paris. For Sartre 
the paratroopers are the Gestapo and Alleg is the Resistance. His equation is blunt, 
unapologetic and fundamentally in defence of the republic. He is proud that Alleg is 
French but takes no such national possession of his torturers, indeed he states that torture 
‘is neither civilian or military, nor is it specifically French: it is a plague infecting our whole 
era.’156 Alleg’s torturers are thus severed from the republic in his book by a transference of 
fascist rhetoric. They are the ‘sacrificial victims’, the scapegoats, in the republican narrative 
of the war which is imbued with the discourse of the guerre franco-française. 
 
With his own position as part of the professional army and without Alleg’s overt 
ideological convictions, Pierre Leulliette’s book is a more complex portrayal of the 
relationships between the republic, the army and himself. Saint Michel et le dragon is written 
as a journey of self-discovery. At the beginning of the novel in 1954, Leulliette shares a 
naïve, ill-prepared desire for adventure and sport with his fellow parachutists, but his spirit 
for adventure which begins by uniting him with his regiment, gradually evolves over the 
course of the book to become something which distances him from them. He goes for 
solitary jaunts in the most dangerous of Algerian streets, seeking out those places where the 
troops are expressly told not to go, gaining thrills from the knowledge that his life hangs by 
a thread. Graham Dawson, in his study of the British soldier hero in biographies and 
autobiographies, notes that the portrayal of the adventurer is as ‘an idealized figure whose 
actions render him superior to other characters and to the environment in which he 
moves.’157 Leulliette’s consistent survival despite his risk taking coupled with the very 
physical separation of being alone on these trips allows Leulliette to represent himself as a 
distinct individual outside the collective of his regiment. This sense of individuality and 
independence, however futile it ends up being, is a characteristic he shares with Noël in 
                                                
156 Jean-Paul Sartre, 'Preface: A Victory', Ellen Ray (ed.) The Question. With a new afterword by the author. 
(London, 2006) pp. xxxi and xxxvi. 
157 Graham Dawson, Soldier Heroes: British Adventure, Empire, and the Imagining of Masculinities (London, 1994), p. 
55. 
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René Vautier’s Avoir 20 ans dans les Aurès.158 Here, too, is a character that has voluntarily 
joined the French army to fight in Algeria but subsequently distances himself from the 
camaraderie of his regiment and, in Noël’s case, deserts with a prisoner. 
 
The separation of himself from his parachutist comrades is further entrenched by the 
method in which Leulliette refers to the other men in his unit. For the most part they are 
represented only as a collective entity, ‘nous’ or ‘vous’ depending on his level of 
involvement. Of the individuals of his own rank, most remain nameless, their existence 
merely a passing stage in the novel. Such representation of his assumed close compatriots 
adds to the sense of isolation Leulliette is forming in relation to the army. The one 
exception which breaks Leulliette’s solitude is in his friendship with Marc R., a lovelorn 
poet who sings Rimbaud, Baudelaire and Valéry to himself. In contrast to his detachment 
to the other men in his regiment, Leulliette states his friendship openly: ‘Je compris 
cependant que je m’étais fait de lui un ami. Le plus grand qu’il me fût jamais donné 
d’avoir.’159 Of an evidently intellectual bent, Marc R. shocks the whole company when, ‘les 
yeux écarquillés par la fureur’, he physically pulls a senior lieutenant away from a prisoner 
he was in the process of beating.160 Marc R. possesses the qualities, both intellectual and 
moral, that Leulliette represents himself developing, the exact qualities at odds with the 
other paratroopers.161 
 
Torture first makes an appearance in the passage in which Marc R. stands up to his 
lieutenant. Having already associated himself with Marc R., Leulliette has separated himself 
from those involved in the torture.162 His journey from green parachutist to moral 
intellectual continues as he quotes Baudelaire whilst describing the torture of a prisoner by 
his fellow paratroopers, a contrast which separates him from their actions.163 Saint Michel et 
le dragon does not then return to torture per se until close to the end of the book and only 
after Leulliette has decided not to re-enlist. The parachutists are now part of the Battle of 
Algiers and ‘chaque compagnie a sa propre petite salle de torture.’164 Once again Leulliette 
                                                
158 René Vautier, Avoir 20 Ans dans les Aurès (France, 1972). See also Chapter 1, section 1.3b. 
159 Leulliette, Saint Michel et le Dragon, p. 60. [I realized then that I’d made a friend of him. The greatest I’ve 
ever had. Leulliette, St. Michael and the Dragon] 
160 Leulliette, Saint Michel et le Dragon, p. 62. [his eyes wide open with rage] 
161 Towards the end of the book, Leulliette also begins to quote famous intellectuals, the diverse likes of 
Malraux, Talleyrand, Nietzsche, Rimbaud, Brecht and Sartre. 
162 Leulliette, Saint Michel et le Dragon, pp. 62-63. 
163 Ibid. pp. 104-106. 
164 Ibid. p. 307. [each company had its own little torture chamber] 
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distances himself from the actions of his fellow Red Berets. He identifies the torturers 
specifically as Sergeant T. and an Alsatian sergeant ‘à la monstrueuse musculature, célèbre 
au corps pour sa dureté en cours d’opération et la lenteur de son esprit.’165 This latter 
character is Leulliette’s intellectual antithesis. His place of birth is emphasised, always being 
referred to as ‘the Alsatian’. Leulliette also attributes the running of Villa Sesini (Alleg and 
Audin’s place of torture) to Alsatians, whom he calls Germans with their Gestapo methods 
and their SS pasts.166 Unlike Alleg, Leulliette is not a victim of torture but a witness, and a 
witness who does not actively intervene. Thus, he creates a divide between himself and his 
fellow parachutists through a very overt creation of the torturers as ‘foreign’. Through his 
transference of language and assumptions from the Vichy era, Leulliette is able to separate 
himself by depicting himself as truly French, a patriotic intellectual worthy of any republic, 
and in contrast to the torturers. 
 
Saint Michel et le dragon possess a tension in its narrative which La Question does not: 
Leuillette is a professional parachutist, an identity which would usually place him at odds 
with the republic in a guerre franco-française discourse. Yet Leulliette’s story is one of 
realisation rather than dogmatism. He represents himself as an ideal republican citizen: a 
patriot, adventurer, intellectual and moral saviour, whilst gradually distancing himself from 
his fellow parachutists. He would be the archetypal republican citizen soldier if he were 
fighting a republican war but the book is clear in this: the Algerian war is not one France 
should be fighting. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
Kirsten Ross discusses the mechanical nature of torture in Algeria, in reference to these ‘torture houses’ 
particularly in relation to Alleg’s experience and his reference to ordinary domestic objects becoming sinister 
in such an environment (the kitchen sink where he is drowned, the telephone used to electrocute him). She 
sees them as symbols of modernisation in her theory of the connection between decolonisation and 
modernisation discussed in the previous chapter, particularly modernity’s obsession with cleanliness. 
Raphaëlle Branche has drawn similar conclusions in that she argues that torture was more about power and 
control than extracting information and the use of electricity was symbolic of power over modernity. Such 
symbolism and metaphor is not new in French representations of war and defeat as Bertrand Taithe has 
shown in his identification of the proliferation of body metaphors and medical terminology, especially 
amputation, in relation to the Franco-Prussian war. Kristin Ross, Fast Cars, Clean Bodies: Decolonization and the 
Reordering of French Culture (London, 1995) pp. 108-114; Raphaëlle Branche, La Torture et l'Armé Pendant la 
Guerre d'Algérie, 1954-1962 (Paris, 2001) pp. 423-425; Taithe, Defeated Flesh, especially Chapter 8. 
165 Leulliette, Saint Michel et le Dragon, p. 308. [with huge muscles, famous in the battalion for his toughness on 
operations and his slowness of mind.] 
166 Ibid. p. 307. This is a particularly acute insult to the patriotism of Alsatians after the Second World War 
because Alsace was incorporated into the German Reich in 1940 rather than being considered as part of 
Occupied France. As such Alsatians were conscripted into the German army. Most poignantly, Alsatian 
soldiers were amongst those who committed a massacre of 642 inhabitants of Oradour-sur-Glane, near 
Limoges in June 1944. In 1946 it was declared a historic monument, a martyred town. In 1953, fourteen of 
the Alsatian soldiers involved were tried in Bordeaux but were amnestied. For further discussion see H. R. 
Kedward, La Vie en bleu: France and the French since 1900 (London, 2005) pp. 300-301 and 621-622. 
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As his comrades gradually partake in more and more disturbing acts of brutality against 
their enemies, Leulliette distances himself from them, setting himself up as a renegade 
individual, a resister against the soldiers’ increasing collaboration with the reactionary 
settlers. Near the novel’s close, with his convictions against the practice of torture at their 
strongest, Leulliette draws distinct comparisons with the Second World War. He writes of 
his desperation to inform French civilians of the horrors that he witnessed so they could 
never claim to have not known: ‘A-t-il jamais cru vraiment aux crimes de Dachau et 
d’Auschwitz ? A-t-il jamais compris que, ne pas savoir, c’est alors aussi une façon d’être 
coupable ?’167 This is not the first time in the novel that the earlier war gains a mention but 
it is the first time that Leulliette uses it in one of his own comparisons. Having just referred 
to the Algiers police as French only in inverted commas, Leulliette has drawn together the 
European settlers with the professional army and placed them in direct relation to the 
Holocaust.168 By separating himself from those who perpetrate torture in his book, 
Leulliette is drawing a distinction between the French who could no more support the 
army’s actions in Algeria than they could those of the Nazi government, and those that 
perpetrate torture who he suggests cannot be seen as truly French. His use of this rhetoric 
and such emotive comparisons gives authority through precedent to his division between 
the French Republic and the perpetrators of torture. 
 
De Beauvoir, in her preface to Halimi’s text of 1962, draws comparisons between Nazis 
and the practice of torture in Algeria akin to Alleg. And like him, she attributes the initial 
link connecting the two eras to someone else, in this instance M. Michelet, the minister of 
justice. She quotes him as saying ‘“C’est du nazisme que nous vient cette gangrène ; elle 
envahit tout, elle pourrit tout, on n’arrive pas à l’enrayer.”’169 De Beauvoir registers her 
shock at this statement given that it was a clear declaration from a well-placed official that 
there was no doubt torture had taken place, but she does not challenge his association. 
Instead it serves a purpose in laying the seeds for the comparison she draws at her closing. 
This writing of Nazism into the text builds into her concluding paragraph and is 
intrinsically linked to her conception of the army: 
                                                
167 Leulliette, Saint Michel et le Dragon, p. 319. [Did they ever really believe in the crimes of Dachau and 
Auschwitz? Did they ever realize that ignorance was another form of guilt?] 
168 Ibid. p. 318. 
169 Beauvoir and Halimi, Djamila Boupacha, p. 6. [“The Nazis are responsible for this canker in our midst. It 
spreads everywhere, and corrupts all it touches.” Simone de Beauvoir and Gisèle Halimi, Djamila Boupacha: 
The story of the torture of a young Algerian girl which shocked liberal French opinion, trans. Peter Green (London, 1962) 
[1962]] 
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Il n’existe qu’une alternative : ou bien vous qui pleurez si volontiers et si 
abondamment sur des malheurs anciens – Anne Frank ou le ghetto de 
Varsovie – vous vous rangez parmi les bourreaux de ceux qui souffrent 
aujourd’hui. 
… 
vous ne pouvez plus continuer à balbutier : ‘Nous ne savions pas…’170 
 
De Beauvoir is simultaneously constructing an attack on the professional army, separate 
from the French republic, and a call to arms to her fellow citizens. To do so she is 
employing the rhetoric and imagery of the recent past which helps frame her argument and 
to help legitimate it. The transference tendency enables the framing of the professional 
army as a figure of blame by placing it in direct conflict with the French republic. 
 
Such rhetoric only became more urgent after the publication of La Question and Saint Michel 
et le dragon because of the method in which the Fifth Republic was founded and the status 
of the man who led it. General de Gaulle returned to politics with the backing of his fellow 
generals in Algeria in the belief that he would maintain Algérie française. The use of fascist 
rhetoric, but specifically rhetoric from the Second World War in which de Gaulle 
disobeyed the army high command to set himself up as leader of the resistance in exile, is 
particularly useful in rationalising how de Gaulle was able to place himself on the side of 
the republic in opposition to his old supporters in the guerre franco-française. By the time of 
Djamila Boupacha, the rupture between the republic and the professional army had become 
extreme, with the Generals’ putsch of April 1961 and the formation of the OAS. The 
professional army became the enemy even of the president. Thus de Gaulle, head of the 
Fifth Republic, was not in control of the army or its methods: ‘L’homme à qui elle a prêté, 
en mai 58, l’apparence de l’autorité, n’a pas été capable, à travers ses manœuvres, ses 
atermoiements, ses équivoques, de briser sa souveraineté ; il la [l’armée] subit et il nous la 
donne à subir.’171 De Beauvoir, hardly the president’s greatest supporter, nevertheless uses 
the context of the Second World War to separate de Gaulle from the professional army. 
 
                                                
170 Beauvoir and Halimi, Djamila Boupacha, pp. 12-13.  [Either – despite your willing and facile grief over such 
past horrors as the Warsaw ghetto or the death of Anne Frank – you align yourselves with our contemporary 
butchers rather than their victims… You can no longer mumble the old excuse ‘We didn’t know’.] 
171 Ibid. p. 11. [The man on whose shoulders it placed the mantle of authority in 1958 has proved, despite all 
his shilly-shallying intrigues and equivocation, incapable of breaking its [the army’s] absolute power.] 
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In Halimi’s own text, the reference to a Muslim prisoner with special status as a kapo, the 
‘méthodes para-nazies’ of the ‘SS’ (that is, the Section Spéciale) in a resettlement camp and 
the ‘jeunes fascistes’ who interrupted the Djamila Boupacha Committee, all form part of an 
underlying rhetoric of fascism in Djamila Boupacha.172 It also has an opposing rhetoric of 
resistance which serves to enhance the power of the transference between the Algerian and 
Second World wars. At its most direct this simply involves those famous for their work in 
the Resistance being cited as having involvement in Boupacha’s struggle for justice.173 Of 
the hundreds of letters the Djamila Boupacha Committee received in support, Halimi 
quotes those from former Resistance members.174  
 
After Halimi’s narrative ends, there is a collection of ‘testimonies’ from supporters and 
members of the Djamila Boupacha Committee whose authors also refer back to the earlier 
period. General de Bollardière (who was recalled to France when he protested against the 
use of torture during the Battle of Algiers) includes in this section two letters he wrote to 
Mme. Postel-Vinay who played a central role in the campaign. In them he pays respects to 
her status both as a ‘Compagnon de la Libération’ and as a former deportee of the Nazi 
regime.175 Doctor Jean Dalsace and Jacques Fonlupt-Esperaber both interpret an evolution 
of torture from the Gestapo to Algeria whilst Jules Roy draws a distinction ‘entre la nation 
et les S.S. qui se sont déguisés sous l’uniforme française.’176 Nefissa, Djamila’s sister, is 
quoted as having been just as astute in her division between the French Republic and the 
enemy: 
C’est alors qu’elle voulut faire la distinction fondamentale entre les Français de 
France, qui ont souffert de la Gestapo (‘Dieu ne peut pas leur avoir donné 
l’oubli’) et ceux d’ici, méprisants, barbares (‘Ils veulent les choses faciles, le 
soleil… Ils veulent nous empêcher d’être libres…’).177 
                                                
172 Ibid. pp. 59, 146 and 148. 
173 André Schwarz-Bart, Elsa Triolet (wife of Louis Aragon) and Vercors all sat on the Djamila Boupacha 
Committee. Louis Aragon, a life-long member of the Communist party and renown for his activities in the 
Resistance also drew comparisons been Nazis and French soldiers in Algeria in his own writings: ‘Aragon 
vous parle: d’un certain empoli du mot France’, France Nouvelle, no. 729 (15 October 1959). See Angela 
Kimyongür, Memory and Politics: Representations of War in the Work of Louis Aragon (Cardiff, 2007) p. 122. 
174 Beauvoir and Halimi, Djamila Boupacha, p. 66. 
175 Ibid. pp. 239-240. 
176 Ibid. pp. 243-244, 247-248 and 276. [between the nation and the SS troops who have disguised themselves 
in French uniform] 
177 Ibid. pp. 47-48. [It was at this point that she insisted on the fundamental distinction between the French in 
France, who had suffered at the hands of the Gestapo (‘God cannot have let them forget,’ she said) and the 
arrogant, barbarous colons of Algeria, who wanted an easy life in the sun, and were determined to prevent 
Algeria from winning its freedom.] 
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Across these three books, the repetitions of Vichy-era rhetoric in relation to torture is 
evidence of an association between the two periods in such a way that the discourse of the 
former can displace blame for the worst aspects of the latter. This usage is what gives the 
transference between the two events its purpose, enabling those involved in torture to be 
separated and ostracised from the French Republic akin to the collaborator-resister binary 
of the post-Second World War period.178 
 
There are various commonalities, beyond the transference-scapegoating trend, which these 
three texts share. None of them implicate conscripts in the practice of torture, whether as 
witnesses or participants. They are not present at all in either Alleg’s or Halimi’s texts 
where the army is one made up of ‘généraux, colonels, parachutistes et légionnaires’.179 In 
Saint Michel et le dragon they are then seen only in the field of combat and never as torturers. 
Leulliette is disparaging of the conscripts as soldiers and also represents them as either 
apathetic or against the war, in contrast to the parachutists.180 Settlers are portrayed very 
negatively in all three texts; identified as torturers, often in the guise of Algiers police in La 
Question and Saint Michel et le dragon, whilst in Djamila Boupacha they appear most frequently 
as members of the Algiers court system which is Halimi’s nemesis, and directly contrasted 
with the efficient justice system she eventually finds in the metropole. As the analysis of 
later representations in the two previous chapters has shown, these two trends did not 
endure. Chapter 1 noted, in reference to the films of Alain Resnais, René Vautier and Yves 
Boisset, that conscripts do become instigated in the practice of torture, although usually 
with peripheral or unwilling involvement.181 Settlers, meanwhile tend to become more 
complex and more sympathetic characters, like those in Le Coup de sirocco and Cartouches 
Gauloises.182 
 
During the war, and particularly in representations of its early stages (these three works 
cover 1954 to 1959 and were published between 1958 and 1962), avoiding implicating 
conscripts in torture was plausible. Such representations would not be so viable in the long 
                                                
178 Robert Aron’s history of the Occupation period draws this simplistic binary which has largely been 
debunked by the work of Robert Paxton and others. Aron, Histoire de Vichy. 
179 Beauvoir and Halimi, Djamila Boupacha, p. 12. 
180 Leulliette, Saint Michel et le Dragon, p. 335. 
181 See Chapter 1, sections 1.3a and 1.3b. Alain Resnais, Muriel, ou le temps d'un retour (France, 1963); Vautier, 
Avoir 20 Ans dans les Aurès; Yves Boisset. 'R.A.S.' (France and Italy, 1973). 
182 Alexander Arcady, Le Coup de Sirocco (France, 1979); Mehdi Charef, Cartouches Gauloises (France, 2007). 
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term and did alter early on in culture, as with Resnais’s Muriel, although here the act of 
torture remains unseen.183 Pierre Vidal-Naquet, a frequently vocal critic of French policy in 
Algeria, wrote passionately against the attempts to single out a few perpetrators and thus 
negate the systematic and widespread use of torture. In a tract from 1975 titled ‘Ce petit 
livre est donc destine à rappeler les crimes de l’armée française’, he wrote : 
 
Je dis bien de l’armée française, non de quelque officiers… Et j’entends bien 
que l’armée n’est pas la seule coupable. On pourrait faire, et on a dans une 
large mesure fait, des recueils analogues qui pourraient s’appeler les 
crimes…de la justice française, de la police française.184 
 
By the late 1970s, with Vautier’s and Boisset’s films, as well as a cinematic adaptation of La 
Question, torture, often involving French men at all levels of the military, was on the big 
screen as well as in novels.185 Nevertheless, the use of fascist rhetoric remained in order to 
distance those responsible from the French republic.186 Even whilst taking part in acts of 
torture, conscripts like those in Vautier’s Avoir 20 an dans les Aurès are still represented as 
victims of their superior (and fascistic) officers, as Chapter 1 has shown, and thus do not 
possess the agency which would demand they take responsibility for their actions.187 
 
The change in the representation of settlers, from pure cruelty in these early texts, to a 
much more complex understandings of their loyalties and experiences in later novels and 
films, became a necessary discursive shift following the Evian Accords and the exodus in 
the summer of 1962. Todd Shepard has noted the change in the representation of settlers 
in popular magazines like Paris Match, from fascist and Vichyite terrorists to young, hopeful 
and very French families.188 With a pressing need to be integrated into France after 
successive generations of helping Algeria to civilise, so the republican narrative decrees, 
                                                
183 The representation of French-perpetrated torture in film was certainly not a rare occurrence in French film 
after the war, as became abundantly clear during the primary research for this thesis. It is also a conclusion 
reached by both Pascal Ory and Pierre Guibert. See Pascal Ory, 'L'Algérie par écran', Jean-Pierre Rioux (ed.) 
La Guerre d'Algérie et les français (Paris, 1990); Pierre Guibert, 'La Guerre d'Algérie sur les écrans français', 
Laurent Gervereau, Jean-Pierre Rioux, and Benjamin Stora (eds), La France en Guerre d'Algérie (Paris, 1992). 
184 Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Les Crimes de l'armée française: Algérie 1954-1962 (Paris, 2001) [1975] pp. 6-7. [I mean 
the French army, not just some officers… And I understand that the army is not the only culprit. One could, 
and in many ways one has gathered an analogous collection of what could be called crimes…of the French 
justice system, of the French police.] 
185 Laurent Heynemann, La Question (France, 1977). 
186 See also Dine, Images of the Algerian War, p. 229. 
187 Chapter 1, section 1.3b. 
188 Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization, pp. 89, 224-226. 
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republican artistic representations of the settlers could not place them on the wrong side of 
the guerre franco-française. 
 
The tendency to transfer the rhetoric of fascism, and particularly language associated 
directly with the Occupation, was not restricted to the early artistic representations of the 
Algerian war, but is present in the press, in histories and in later representations, frequently, 
although not exclusively, in the context of French-perpetrated torture. Paul Clay Sorum in 
his study of intellectuals during the Algerian war has found that it was a tendency employed 
by former resisters, aiding the comparison’s impact and legitimacy.189 Further studies of 
literature, newspapers and official correspondence have all identified the same comparison 
present during the war itself through to the twenty-first century.190 As William Cohen has 
stated, the ‘use of the Nazi parallel for describing the [Algerian] war was a permanent 
fixture.’191 By transferring the rhetoric of the earlier period, these cultural representations 
are aided in their identification of a ‘sacrificial victim’, a morally bankrupt minority whose 
ideals oppose that of the republic’s. That these scapegoats are not necessarily the right-
wing anti-republicans which they are represented as, or that the republic shares in their 
responsibility is not of concern; as Girard explains, ‘[s]acrificial substitution implies a 
decree of misunderstanding.’192 The transference of the fascist rhetoric helps to conceal this 
misunderstanding by drawing a very solid moral divide between the professional army and 
the republic.193 
 
This division, and thus the credibility of the scapegoating, was aided by the Generals’ putsch 
and the formation of the OAS in 1961. With these events, there was a tangible threat from 
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an organisation set up by former generals to directly and violently challenge the authority 
of de Gaulle’s Fifth Republic. Furthermore, the OAS was largely considered, by its 
contemporaries and by historians, to be on the right wing of politics, thereby aiding the 
transference of the fascist rhetoric. That it was founded in Franco-ruled Spain, a country 
where some of its members also lived in exile after the war, only served to further such 
comparisons.194 It allows the likes of Benjamin Stora to construct 1961 as the date when 
the Algerian war really became a civil war, with the OAS targeting the president of the 
republic.195 
 
Despite this useful addition to the guerre franco-française discourse, there are few 
representations of the OAS in republican culture for sometime after the war. Both Jean-
Luc Godard’s Le Petit Soldat and Alain Cavalier’s Combat dans l’Île make it the subject of 
their films but neither refer to the OAS by name.196 Cavalier’s film essentially becomes a 
battle between old friends who have grown up to occupy different extremes of the political 
spectrum and die at each others hands. Such a close portrayal of the guerre franco-française is 
reminiscent of the relationship seen between Maurice and Jean in Zola’s La Débâcle. 
Nevertheless, neither film represents a clear notion of the OAS or the Algerian war. Stora 
has described Le Petit Soldat (a film so confusing that it was even interpreted by some on 
the left to be fascist) as a, 
 
film [qui] attrape au col des morceaux de réalités contradictoires, les organise 
dans un récit à la première personne, où l’on découvre l’engagement et le 
désengagement ; l’anarchisme de droite, et la conscience de gauche ; la valse 
hésitation des sentiments ; et surtout, le balancement d’un camp à l’autre, de 
l’OAS au FLN. Le sujet du Petit Soldat, c’est bien la confusion d’une situation 
que la conscience tente de rendre cohérente sans y parvenir. Au moment où la 
guerre est sur le point de s’achever, le film a l’air de renvoyer tout le monde 
face à face, dos à dos. Impossible consensus par l’image.197 
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There are certainly no heroes in Godard’s film, and seemingly only fools in Cavalier’s. 
Neither offer a clear representation of the war or the OAS’s part in it. References to the 
OAS do punctuate later films, from the coming-of-age Les Roseaux Sauvages to the more 
recent French blockbuster, Mesrine, where it is used as short-hand for fascistic criminality, 
but its story is not told as a whole.198 
 
Whilst the OAS’s existence is an aid for the guerre franco-française discourse in relation to the 
Algerian war and particularly in relation to the transference of fascist rhetoric, it seems only 
to be designated a minor role in the republican narrative of the war. Jean Lacouture has 
hinted at a possible reason for this. Lacouture argues that de Gaulle did not return in 1958 
with a ready-made idea of independence for Algeria. Rather, his change in policy and his 
eventual rejection of the supporters of Algérie française who had brought him back to power, 
was a key factor in the rise of the OAS. He writes, ‘le déchaînement de l’OAS…fut d’un 
certaine façon le fruit détestable de l’insuffisante attention portée par Charles de Gaulle à 
cette spécificité européenne dans la spécificité algérienne.’199 The OAS, whilst a useful tool 
for the guerre franco-française discourse, is also a reminder of the betrayal which those in the 
OAS felt towards the Fifth Republic, a sense of betrayal that could serve as a reminder that 
Algérie française was what the republic had also been fighting for originally. To focus on the 
OAS would force the Gaullist government to engage in ‘sustained explanations or 
discussion of why Algeria should be independent’, a discussion which would naturally force 
a recognition of the war and question the teleological narrative of decolonisation.200 
Maintaining the transference of the rhetoric of fascism in relation to the OAS thus keeps 
its ‘Frenchness’, possibly even its republicanism, removed from representations.201 
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Identifying a scapegoat is about avoiding responsibility as much as it is about stemming 
internal violence. For the republic, the identification of the professional army was an 
obvious choice of ‘sacrificial victim’ because of the traditional antagonism between the two 
institutions. This is by no means a phenomenon novel to France. As Robert Moeller has 
argued, in German cultural representations of the Second World War, a small minority of 
people are held responsible for the crimes of the Third Reich, especially through the 
Nuremberg trials, leaving the majority, including the soldiers of the Wehrmacht to be 
victims of the regime.202 Thus, in ‘the public memory of the 1950s, only a handful of 
Germans appeared as perpetrators, the overwhelming majority were victims, and no one 
was both: guilt and innocence were mutually exclusive categories.’203 Such an argument is 
familiar in terms of the French conscripts being considered victims of the Algerian war in 
republican culture, but it also illustrates the binary and thus unyielding nature of such a 
narrative. An either/or approach cannot aid our understanding of such a complex conflict. 
  
The transference tendency is embedded in the very figure of de Gaulle, president of the 
Fifth Republic and head of the Resistance. As Paul Sorum has argued, ‘since French 
atrocities were constantly condemned by the top authorities, the French could take some 
comfort in the fact that, even if French soldiers might behave like Nazis, at least France 
had not made the perpetration of atrocities into a principle of its warfare.’204 The added 
tradition of the republic-army antagonism adds legitimacy to such representations. The 
transference tendency undermines the complexity of the war and has aided the avoidance 
of justice: the blanket amnesties of those involved in torture and OAS members in the 
years immediately following the war had much in common with those handed to 
collaborators following France’s liberation.205 The republican government is left 
unaccountable. 
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Yet the transference of the discursive traditions of the Occupation has done more than 
absolve the republic of responsibility in relation to the use of torture or the formation of 
the OAS: it has usurped the importance of the Algerian war in the republican narrative and 
in so doing has been detrimental to the understanding of the war and its aftermath. As 
Cohen has suggested, ‘France’s main concern with its history in the 1960s and for a couple 
of decades thereafter was not the Algerian War, but its record during World War II. The 
preoccupation with France’s role in World War II…was a means by which to delay a 
reckoning with the more recent Algerian War.’206 As though to illustrate the veracity of 
Cohen’s statement, Claude Journes has gone so far as to suggest that the violence 
witnessed within the metropole during the conflict, which the next section will consider, 
was merely a ‘set back’ for an otherwise steady decline.207 The transference of the rhetoric 
from the Occupation thus not only serves to exonerate the republic from responsibility but 
also to disregard the Algerian war from having had any impact on the republic; at most it is 
a continuation of the struggles unleashed in the earlier conflict.208 In this sense, Paul 
Ricoeur is partly right when he states in relation to Rousso’s work on obsession, ‘seeing 
one thing is not seeing another. Recounting one drama is forgetting another.’209 But the 
Algerian war is not forgotten; the transference tendency places it in a secondary position to 
that of the Vichy period, it makes it an inferior partner in a metonymic association, and 
undermines its significance in the national narrative. The Algerian war has been utilised as a 
vector to talk about Vichy.210 
 
 
                                                
206 Cohen, 'The Algerian War and the Revision of France's Overseas Mission', p. 230. LaCapra has also noted 
the French preoccupation with the Vichy era. Dominick LaCapra, History and Memory after Auschwitz (London, 
1998) p. 94. 
207 Claude Journes, 'The Decline in Police Violence in the Maintenance of Order in France', Jan Windebank 
and Renate Günther (eds), Violence and Conflict in the Politics and Society of Modern France (Lampeter, 1995) p. 115. 
208 Some historians, in consideration of ‘revelations’ about torture in the early twenty-first century have 
suggested that the ‘obsession’ of Vichy has now become one with Algeria. Putting aside the notion that such 
revelations actually revealed little not already well known, such a historical narrative only serves to evidence 
the inability of historians to consider the Algerian war in its own right rather than always in comparison with 
the previous conflict. See Robert Aldrich, 'Imperial Mise en Valeur and Mise en Scène: Recent Works on French 
Colonialism', The Historical Journal 45 (2002); Neil MacMaster, 'The Torture Controversy (1998-2002): 
Towards a 'New History' of the Algerian War?', Modern and Contemporary France 10 (2002). 
209 Paul Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (London, 2004) p. 452. 
210 This usurping of Algeria by Vichy is present in the films Muriel and Les Parapluies du Cherbourg as noted in 
Chapter 1, section 1.3a and 1.3c. 
Algeria in France 
 247 
3.3 17 October 1961: Paris and the guerre franco-française 
The guerre franco-française is a discourse which is part of the republican narrative of French 
history, an expression of the good versus evil battle in its romantic emplotment. Each new 
republic is born out of a period of civil conflict from which France, the Republic, is reborn. 
Each of these flare-ups of the civil war have been Parisian: from the guillotine on the Place 
de la Concorde, to the June Days, the Commune and even the Dreyfus Affair, centred as it 
was on the government and the press. As such, Paris has an important symbolic role in the 
republican narrative.211 The Algerian war was not fought only in the Kabylia mountains and 
the backstreets of the Casbah. With a large population of Algerians, particularly of young, 
male workers, the conflict also flared in the metropole, most notably in Paris. Initially these 
were struggles for power between the MTLD and the FLN, by the end of the war they 
were OAS terrorist attacks, but in the autumn of 1961 a murderous conflict raged between 
the Parisian police and Algerians.212 Only the OAS attacks are consistent with the 
republican guerre franco-française discourse as this chapter has understood it but, since the 
mid-1980s, challenges to the dominant republican narrative of the war have looked to the 
events of October 1961 within such a framework. The final section of this chapter will 
consider artistic representations of the events of October 1961 in Paris, how they have 
attempted to open up the republican guerre franco-française discourse and as such present a 
challenge to assumptions of assimilation and identity.213 Due to the overpowering 
metonymic association of aspects of the Algerian war with the Vichy period, most have 
failed, but there have been suggestions of what a successful challenge may mean for the 
future of French republicanism. This section will begin with a brief sketch of the 
historiography of October 1961, with particular reference to the timing of works and their 
connection to the trial of Maurice Papon, before turning to an analysis of artistic 
representations of the events produced between 1984 and 2010. 
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On 17 October 1961, an FLN-organised protest numbering around 25,000 men and 
women marched into central Paris, largely from the bidonvilles in the suburbs, to protest 
against a police curfew imposed on ‘Muslim Algerian workers’ a fortnight earlier.214 The 
protest was to be strictly peaceful, a policy enforced by the FLN. The police response, well-
organised and executed, was violent suppression. Police were stationed at metro stations to 
prevent the protestors’ arrival into central Paris with buses being requisitioned to transport 
them away; many thousands were held in the Palais des Sports and the Parc d’Expositions 
as well as in prisons.215 Those that did make it into Paris, again many thousands, were met 
with a similar response. The police numbered 7,000 with an additional 1,400 CRS including 
the use of harki auxiliaries.216 Beatings, shooting and drownings all occurred as the police 
retook the symbolic space of central Paris. In the aftermath of the suppression, the figures 
of Algerians who died varied between the official police report of two and Jean-Luc 
Einaudi’s figure of 200.217 Hundreds were immediately ‘deported’ to Algeria. No police 
were reported killed, indicating the success of the FLN in enforcing its policy of peaceful 
protest. It was the most deadly night in Paris since suppression of the Commune of 1871; 
L’Express’s editor Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber titled his 19 October 1961 article, 
‘L’Année Terrible’.218 
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The violence of 17 October did not spring from nowhere. Rather, it was the peak of an 
ongoing battle between the FLN and the Parisian police, under the prefecture of Maurice 
Papon since his appointment by Félix Gaillard in March 1958.219 Papon had introduced an 
original curfew on North Africans in September 1958 in an attempt to prevent the FLN 
collecting revenue from Algerian workers and businesses. Such a blanket racial 
identification encouraged a racist approach to policing equalled by an identification of the 
Parisian police as key enemies of the FLN. The police were also being targeted by the OAS 
from 1961.220 Targeted retaliatory violence on both sides had increased steadily into the 
autumn of 1961.221 In the days and weeks which followed the protest, reports of its 
suppression made it into the French press but moves were made to repress those which 
were critical of police violence.222 Les Temps modernes, the monthly journal run by Jean-Paul 
Sartre, was seized on 19 October for running a petition against the violent suppression of 
the march. It was reprinted in the November issue.223 
 
Little became of the events of 17 October 1961 for over two decades; no one was 
prosecuted, no further protests were held (unlike in aftermath of the suppression at 
Charonne in February of the same year), little was published and no films were made which 
represented the events.224 In 1977, Alistair Horne’s 600 page tome on the Algerian war 
covered the event in two sentences in a section on the OAS in France.225 This lack of 
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coverage is not surprising as the stories of the Algerians killed in October 1961 served no 
dominant narrative in the war’s aftermath; it was certainly not in the French republic’s 
interest to pursue the matter and the new Algerian government had more pressing 
concerns. Furthermore, the struggles of Algerians on their home turf were far more 
important to the Algerian nationalist narrative than those fighting for recognition on 
enemy soil, and it was hardly a heroic story suited to the founding of a new independent 
state.226 The events were not deliberately concealed, but were simply of little interest to 
dominant narratives including the republican one and as such was not imbued with the 
guerre franco-française discourse. There was a mainstream silence on the events.227 The events 
of 17 October were, however, part of culture outside the republican narrative, as the 
research of both Mark McKinney and Seth Graebner has found; they was not ‘repressed’.228 
 
In May 1981, the satirical newspaper Le Canard Enchaîné exposed the then Minister of 
Budget, Papon, for his role in the deportation of French Jews when Secretary General of 
the Girode prefecture under the Vichy regime. This began a slow but cumulative process 
of renewed interest and exposure to the events of 17 October 1961 as Papon became the 
focus of public attention. A detective fiction novel by Didier Daeninckx appeared in 1984 
which opens with Algerians travelling into the centre of Paris for the protest.229 A year 
later, Michel Levine published a testimony-driven narrative of ‘les ratonnades d’octobre’.230 
In 1991, Jean-Luc Einaudi published his first book on the subject and strongly criticised 
the restrictions imposed on the use of archives relating to the events.231 In 1997 Papon 
stood trial for crimes against humanity for his actions during the Second World War, an 
event which led to much greater public awareness of the events of October 1961. This 
increase in public discourse prompted an investigation, the Mandelkern report, and 
inspired further artistic representations. Papon did not face prosecution for his role in 1961 
and the only court appearance he had in relation to those events was his failed attempt to 
                                                
226 Raphaëlle Branche and Jim House, 'Silences on State Violence During the Algerian War of Independence: 
France and Algeria, 1962-2007', Efrat Ben-Ze'ev, Ruth Gino, and Jay Winter (eds), Shadows of War: A Social 
History of Silence in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, 2010) p. 127. 
227 I have taken the idea of silence, rather than overt repression from Branche and House’s article and Jay 
Winter, 'Thinking About Silence', Efrat Ben-Ze'ev, Ruth Gino, and Jay Winter (eds), Shadows of War: A Social 
History of Silence in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, 2010). 
228 Mark McKinney, 'Métissage in Post-Colonial Comics', Alec G. Hargreaves and Mark McKinney (eds), Post-
Colonial Cultures in France (London, 1997); Seth Graebner, 'Remembering 17 October 1961 and the Novels of 
Rachid Boudjedra', Research in African Literatures 36 (2005). The date has also been officially remembered in 
Algeria where it became, rather bizarrely, the ‘Day of Immigration’. Bernard and Stora, '"One of the few 
times..."', p. 236. 
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sue Einaudi for defamation. Nevertheless, his trial for crimes against humanity prompted a 
wide renewal of interest in 17 October 1961.232 
 
In a similar way to the figure of de Gaulle, Papon thus became a symbolic connection 
between the Vichy era and the Algerian war and as such provided an already utilised 
method of representing the later period through transference with the earlier. In addition, 
the Parisian location and republican tradition also offered up the use of a guerre franco-
française discourse. With these tropes in mind a detailed study of Daeninckx’s Meutres pour 
mémoire, three films – Alain Tasma’s Nuit noire, Michael Haneke’s Caché and Rachid 
Bouchareb’s Hors la loi – and finally Leïla Sebbar’s novel, La Seine était rouge, will provide an 
insight into how the events of 17 October 1961 were integrated into the republican 
narrative of the war and how, on rare occasions, they were utilised to challenge such a 
narrative.233 Rather than consider these cultural representations in chronological order of 
their production, they will instead be considered in the light of the narrative they promote. 
 
Tasma’s Nuit Noire and Bouchareb’s Hors la loi were both made and released after the 
furore of Papon’s trial in the late 1990s.234 Tasma’s film takes the events as its central 
narrative and certainly has a feeling of revelation, which is how the mainstream review 
magazine Télérama received it.235 It attempts to represent the complexities of the conflict by 
following different characters – Martin, the honest flic with a young family, Sabine a 
journalist, Abde a young Algerian worker, as well as members of the FLN, racist police 
officers and Papon himself – in the build up to the night of 17 October. Hors la loi, by 
contrast, uses the 17 October as the end point to the film which has followed three 
Algerian brothers from their childhood in Algeria to their residency in Paris during the war. 
The eldest and politically moderate Messaoud has already been killed, and the apolitical 
Saïd survives. Abdelkader is shot by police in an underground station on his way to the 
protest in an image made iconic through Élie Kagan’s photographs of the original event at 
Solférino.236 
                                                
232 House and MacMaster called Papon’s trial a ‘watershed’ moment in the history of 17 October 1961. 
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233 Despite some of these cultural artefacts’ attempts to challenge the dominant republican interpretation of 
the war, I still consider these to be basically republican sources because they are attempting revision not 
revolution, they are certainly not anti-republican. Furthermore, as the analysis will make clear, for the most 
part, this challenge fails and they come to support the dominant narrative, regardless of intention. 
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Representations of the events of 17 October 1961 have an opportunity to pose a challenge 
to the republican narrative of the war, and especially the assumptions of the impermeable 
distinctions between French and Algerian identity in the aftermath of the conflict, by 
integrating the traditional discourse of the guerre franco-française, otherwise considered to be 
relevant only to the sectarian violence of the OAS. This would challenge the assumptions 
about the nature of the historic French-Algerian relationship by recognising the citizenship 
rights and the racial identification of Algerians in the original curfew as inconsistent with 
the republican ideals of assimilation and equality. Neither of these two films attempt to 
challenge such a narrative, instead representing the conflict on the streets of Paris as one 
between non-French Algerians and racist police personnel, more closed affiliated with 
Papon than the republic. Nuit noire does this most blatantly by essentially suggesting de 
Gaulle and the FLN were already in the process of decolonisation in its opening text: 
 
Automne 1961. Le Générale de Gaulle et le FLN tentent de mettre fin à un 
conflit sanglant qui a fait en sept ans des centaines de milliers de victimes. 
Depuis quelques mois, la guerre d’Algérie a franchi la Méditerranée. Dans les 
rues de Paris, les commandos de choc du FLN et les forces de police livrent 
un combat quotidien.237 
 
The film continues to enhance this separation of those perpetrating the violence from the 
republic (in this example, the figurehead of de Gaulle) and the future citizens of Algeria 
through the individual characters it draws. Martin and Abde are not enemies themselves 
but are drawn into the conflict on opposing sides. Martin is always portrayed separately 
from his racist work colleagues, not taking part in the beatings of North Africans in 
custody, staying in the car wincing whilst Abde’s uncle Tarek is killed, silent in the lively 
debate following Papon’s visit. Abde does not involve himself with the FLN, concentrating 
instead on night school, and is critical of Tarek for giving them money. The film makes 
clear, by the murder of a Moroccan man who attempts to avoid marching, that the FLN 
were forcing all to take part in the protest. The sympathetic individuals who represent 
                                                
237 Tasma, Nuit Noire. [Autumn 1961. General de Gaulle and the FLN try to bring an end to the bloody 
conflict which over seven years had produced hundreds of thousands of victims. For several months, the 
Algerian war had crossed the Mediterranean. In the streets of Paris, FLN shock commandos and the police 
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ordinary people are caught up in a sectarian conflict, between a small faction of FLN 
‘commandos de choc’ and hard-line police. 
 
Hors la loi is a little more complex in its portrayal of the police; Abdelkader’s nemesis is an 
intelligent character with a respect for his opponent. But there is never a suggestion the this 
is a Franco-French conflict. The brothers are Algerian and have only ever been victims of 
the French state, from the theft of their family home to Messaoud’s injury in the army and 
their squalid life in the Nanterre bidonville. Bouchareb’s film is a welcome novelty in its 
portrayal of Algerian independence in spite of, rather than because of, the French state and 
thus does not conform to the more celebratory elements of the decolonisation discourse, 
particularly relating to the mission civilisatrice, present in other republican cultural 
productions.238 But because of this, the film also has no interest in highlighting the 
inequality of Algerians as French citizens because it assumes, in a teleological way familiar 
to the decolonisation discourse, that Algerians were never French and would always, 
eventually, win their independence. 
 
Whilst both Nuit noire and Hors la loi are products of the post-Papon trial era, neither 
depend upon his character for their stories. Michael Haneke’s Caché, on the other hand 
relies entirely on Papon’s name to give its otherwise vacuous story depth and historical 
importance.239 Haneke’s thriller, in Elizabeth Ezra’s words is ‘[b]oth fascinating and 
profoundly banal…[with a] deceptively narrow depiction of a world of material privilege 
corroded by psychic unease’.240 Unnerved by videos being sent to him anonymously 
documenting scenes from his everyday life, Georges tracks down Majid, accusing him of 
involvement and is then confronted by his wife, Anne, when a video of his meeting is sent 
to their home. In the only reference to the Algerian war in the whole film, Georges 
describes his relationship to Majid: 
 
Ses parents travaillaient chez nous. Papa les aimait bien… En octobre ’61 le 
FLN a appelé les Algériens à manifester. Ils sont allés à Paris. 17 octobre 
1961. Je ne te fais pas un dessein. Papon. le massacre policier. Ils ont noyé à 
peu près 200 arabes dans la Seine. Il semble que les parents de Majid étaient 
de ceux-là. En tout cas ils ne sont jamais revenus. Papa est allé à Paris pour se 
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239 Michel Haneke, Caché (France, 2005). 
240 Elizabeth Ezra and Jane Sillars, 'Hidden in Plain Sight: Bringing Terror Home', Screen 48 (2007) p. 215. 
3. The One and Indivisible Republic 
 254 
renseigner. Ils lui ont dit qu’il devait être bien content d’être débarrasser de 
ses bougnoules.241 
 
The entire reference to the war and to the possible motives behind the film’s mystery exists 
only in this exchange, relying on the audience to understand the reference to Papon, 
known because of his crimes during Vichy. The Algerian war is represented only through 
Papon’s metonymic connection between Vichy and the Algerian war. Furthermore, the 
only relevance the events of 17 October 1961 are given for modern day bourgeois France 
are the (unfounded, the film eventually suggests) suspicions of revenge enacted by a recluse 
outsider, Majid. The protest is not important in and of itself, its context is irrelevant to film 
and there is certainly no suggestion that those effected by it, those killed, were in any way 
French.242 Furthermore, as Anne and Georges domestic conflict plays out, scenes of the 
Iraq war play in the background, drawing connections between their experience of 
domestic terrorism and the ‘international terrorism’ which inspired the current war. This 
serves to ‘contextualise’ 17 October 1961 – ‘je ne te fais pas un dessein’ – in contrast to the 
on-going and far-reaching ‘war on terror’. As Paul Gilroy has argued, ‘an overly casual 
citation of the 1961 anti-Arab pogrom by Papon’s police in Paris…[an] unmourned and 
unrememebered real event does a lot of narrative work for Haneke... The dead deserve 
better than a passing acknowledgement.’243 The events which effectively destroyed Majid’s 
life are known only through a trial about the Vichy era and considered barely significant in 
comparison to the scope of the war playing out in real time on the television screen; the 
film is far more critical of American-led neo-colonialism than French imperialism. 
 
Whilst the film suggests Georges should take a personal responsibility for his childhood 
actions which were a deliberate scheme to remove Majid from his privileged family home 
(Georges is by no means a sympathetic character), the issue resolves itself without him 
having to compromise his denial as Majid commits suicide. The film ends not with the 
questioning of history but with the unsolved mystery of who really sent the tapes.244 As 
Ranjana Khanna concludes, ‘[t]here is no lesson or anything in particular to be discovered 
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in the disturbingly long establishing shots…in Caché, there is only emptiness and 
spectacle.’245 As with earlier films, Caché maintains the representation of the civilian milieu 
as unaffected by the Algerian War, except where it temporarily interrupts their ordinary 
lives. 17 October 1961 is no civil war; only in Majid and his son’s case is the interruption 
permanent. 
 
Meurtres pour mémoire is somewhat more ambitious in its use of historical context.246 An 
overtly political writer, Daeninckx’s detective novel opens with the protests of 17 October 
1961. Published in 1984, it was the first commercially successful artistic representation of 
the events, allowing Philip Dine to consider it to be ‘a noble effort to penetrate this wall of 
silence.’247 The story weaves together the repression of 1961 with the deportation of the 
Jews under the Vichy regime, but these two events are not given equal saliency. Daeninckx 
uses the protests of 17 October 1961 to open his novel with a degree of controversial 
anticipation and he is clearly critical of the Fifth Republic that oversaw the repression. But 
nothing puts crimes against humanity into perspective quite like the Holocaust, and whilst 
October 1961 begins the story, it is the French complicity in the deportation of Jews which 
is at the centre of the plot. The novel’s mystery is the murder of a French historian, Roger 
Thiraud, during the FLN protests of October 1961 and his son, Bernard, twenty years later. 
Cadin, the police detective, discovers the former murder during his investigation into the 
latter and makes the connection. Far from being part of the demonstration, its repression 
was used as a cover to kill Roger Thiraud and prevent him finishing his thesis on the 
French complicity in the deportations of Jews. His hired murderer, when confronted by 
Cadin, discloses that he was told Roger was a member of the FLN or the OAS thus 
merging the two organisations in the text. Bernard, having attempted to finish his father’s 
thesis, was shot by the man who had ordered the murder of his father, Veillut. It transpires 
that Roger’s thesis implicated Veillut in the Jewish deportations of the Second World War. 
 
Papon does not feature in Daeninckx’s story but it is clear that Veillut is as close as the 
author dare come to a representation of the former Prefect of Police. Veillut is Directeur 
des Affaires Criminelles in Toulouse by the time Cadin catches up with him, had spent the 
Second World War as ‘Secrétaire aux questions juives de la prefecture de Toulouse’ and 
was head of the Parisian ‘Brigades Spéciales’ in 1961, a career not so far removed from 
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Papon’s.248 Whilst Daeninckx does a commendable service in bringing the events of 1961 
into wider public consciousness, clearly depicting their horror and violence through a 
multi-perspective narrative at the beginning of the book, the massacre on French soil is 
simply a smokescreen distancing the reader from the plot’s solution which is buried in the 
Vichy era and has nothing to do with the events of 17 October 1961.249 The two Algerian 
characters who begin the novel are never returned to, their experiences beyond Roger 
Thiraud’s death never considered. The suppression of the peaceful demonstration in 1961 
is entirely sidelined in the book’s plot as it turns out to have no relevance to Cadin’s case. 
Instead the focus becomes the deportations, thus the crimes of the non-republican French 
state usurp those of the Fifth Republic. Additionally, the rhetorical joining of the FLN and 
OAS in the text places the republic’s two enemies as one, avoiding the complexities of the 
situation. Whilst critical of the Fifth Republic, its crimes pale in comparison to those of the 
Vichy regime. 
 
As with previous artistic representations considered in this thesis, in Daeninckx’s novel 
Vichy usurps the importance of the Algerian war. The Papon-Veillut figure is pivotal to 
this: his crime is rooted in the Vichy era and the Algerian war is purely a useful 
smokescreen for the detective novel’s plot. Whilst Daeninckx has brought the Algerian war 
into Paris, the guerre franco-française is only relevant to the earlier period, with both Roger and 
Bernard’s murders an ongoing flare-up of the Vichy era. The Algerian war has had no such 
long-term consequences for the novel. In this sense, it sits comfortably with the republican 
narrative in which the Algerian war is not an equal partner in the transference relationship. 
This undermines the importance of the Algerian war and the effect it has had on French 
identity and citizenship. Given the dominance of the Vichy era in twentieth-century 
France, in public discourse, in politics, in cultural representations and commemorations, 
the metonymic transference can initiate a concealment of the Algerian war, unable to 
compete with the saliency of the Occupation. 
 
The case of Papon certainly brought the events of October 1961 back into the French 
public sphere after decades of silence, but at the same time it has undermined its 
significance in comparison to the crimes against humanity for which Papon was being 
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prosecuted. Additionally it has led to the writing of histories which depend too much on 
the historiography of the Vichy period. Golsan has argued, the trial which saw the ‘same 
sort of pseudo-revelations which repeatedly provoked flare-ups of the Vichy Syndrome 
according to Henry Rousso and Éric Conan, was now provoking similar flare-ups where la 
guerre sans nom was concerned as well.’250 This transference of the idea of a syndrome, as the 
introduction to this thesis has argued, has not aided a nuanced understanding of the 
conflict or its aftermath in France. As Golsan continues, ‘while the brutality and racism in 
both cases are certainly deserving of comparison and condemnation, the historical contexts 
are in reality different, and it is this difference that risks being overlooked.’251 House puts a 
similar argument in reverse: ‘Very often, we have seen the figure of Vichy haunt and 
complicate these separate but interrelated histories, providing a vital comparative link to 
other forms of racism.’252 As this thesis has attempted to argue, the Algerian war has been 
undermined in its significance to modern French identity because it has not been 
considered an important part of the republican narrative of history. On some occasions, 
however, rather than further undermining it, the transference between Vichy and the 
Algerian war has complemented the latter’s relevance.253 Whilst the focus on Papon’s 
involvement in the events of October 1961 may have been inspired by the desire to further 
deface the criminal’s character rather than provide some recognition or even justice for 
those caught up in the violence of October 1961, the result was still to end the silence. 
 
Leïla Sebbar transfers imagery of Vichy in her novel, La Seine était rouge: Paris, octobre 1961, 
but rather than see the former usurp the latter in its importance, it serves to insist upon the 
relevance of 17 October 1961 not only to those involved, but for the understanding of 
modern France.254 This novel shares the tropes of other republican cultural representations 
in its transference of rhetoric from the Vichy era to the Algerian war and in its employment 
of the guerre franco-française discourse, but it also challenges the republican narrative’s 
assumption of irrelevance of the events in the making of contemporary republican identity 
within France. In La Seine était rouge the transference metaphor is synecdoche rather than 
metonym, which is to say that it is integrative rather than reductionist.255 
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Sebbar was born in Algeria to an Algerian father and French mother (an unusual pairing in 
French Algeria) and has spent her adult life in France. La Seine était rouge, whilst by no 
means the first novel to represent the events of 17 October 1961, is the first to make them 
the central part of its narrative.256 The transference of rhetoric and symbolism from the 
Occupation to the Algerian war pervades the narrative, which is set in 1996. Amel and 
Louis have known each other since birth because their mothers, Noria and Flora are 
friends and, alongside Noria’s mother Lalla, took part in the FLN’s march on 17 October 
1961. Omer knows Amel and Louis because he and his mother, Mina, are staying with 
Flora having left Algeria because of the civil war which broke out in 1992.257 
 
The novel is multi-vocal and multi-perspective. In the contemporary chapters it is written 
in the third person but with a focus on the thoughts of one or other of the main characters. 
Other chapters, written in the first person, document the experiences of a variety of people 
on the night of 17 October 1961: ‘le patron du café, L’Atlas’, ‘le harki de Papon’, 
‘L’Algérien sauvé des eaux’, both an ‘amant français’ and an ‘étudiant français’, ‘le flic de 
Clichy’ and so forth. The novel’s narrative drive is one of discovery, as Amel learns of what 
occurred on that day through a variety of means and a variety of voices, but not, notably, 
from her mother. The novel thus pursues an interpretation of the events coming to light 
through the curiosity of the second generation; a search for identity through the events 
which their parents have remained silent about. Such an interpretation, which is shared by 
several historians, removes the dominance of Papon in the ending of the silence, a 
tendency which has forced an unhelpful comparison with the Second World War to the 
detriment of an understanding the significance of the events of 1961.258 Thus, whilst Papon 
                                                
256 Anne Donadey, 'Retour sur mémoire: La Seine était rouge de Leïla Sebbar', Michel Laronde (ed.) Leïla Sebbar 
(Paris, 2003) p. 190. 
257 All but Louis and Flora are of Algerian origin, although Amel was born in France. Flora was involved with 
the FLN in Paris during the Algerian war. 
258 Jim House sees the anti-racist movements of the 1980s as stimulating the re-emergence of the events of 17 
October 1961 (and the repressive measures against North Africans more generally before, during and after 
the war) into public discourse. The work of Graebner offers an example of the roots of this re-emergence. 
Others have also made a similar argument in relation to the previously silent harki milieu in which it has taken 
the actions of their children to force the injustice they faced into public discourse. House, 'Antiracist 
Memories', p. 356; Graebner, 'Remembering 17 October 1961', pp. 172-175; Stora, La Gangrène et l'oubli, pp. 
261-265; Richard L. Derderian, 'Algeria as a lieu de mémoire: Ethnic Minority Memory and National Identity in 
Contemporary France', Radical History Review 83 (2002) p. 4; Claire Eldridge, '"We've Never Had a Voice": 
Memory Construction and the Children of the Harkis (1962-1991)', French History 23 (2009). Fatima Besnaci-
Lancou makes and embodies this argument, being the daughter of a harki and a historian of the harkis. Fatima 
Bensnaci-Lancou and Gilles Manceron, eds, Les Harkis dans la colonisation et ses suites (Ivry-sur-Seine, 2008). 
Algeria in France 
 259 
plays his part in the narrative, he does not control it. This helps to prevent the deportations 
of the 1940s usurping the significance of the 1961 massacre. 
 
To be a novel about discovery, it is also necessarily one about silence.259 Amel’s mother and 
grandmother have not told her about their war-time experiences. The novel opens: 
 
 Sa mère ne lui a rien dit ni la mère de sa mère. 
Elles se voient souvent, la mère et la fille, elles bavardent en française, en 
arabe. Amel ne comprend pas tout. Elle les entend de sa chambre. Si elle 
demandait ce qu’elles se disent dans l’autre langue, ‘la langue du pays’ dit Lalla, 
sa grand-mère lui répondrait, comme chaque fois : ‘Des secrets, ma fille, des 
secrets, ce que tu ne dois pas savoir, ce qui doit être caché, ce que tu 
apprendras, un jour, quand il faudra. Ce jour viendra, ne t’inquiète pas, ce jour 
viendra et il ne sera pas bienheureux pour toi…’260 
 
Thus, book begins with a rejection of the idea of forgetting, repression or amnesia and 
instead embraces the idea of a silence through an inability to translate the experiences, 
figuratively and literally, to the generation who did not live through them. What the novel 
does make clear is that such a silence can only be temporary precisely because the war, 
including the events of 17 October 1961, have a direct relevance to contemporary France 
and the identity of those who have lived only in their aftermath. La Seine était rouge shares a 
coming-of-age theme with Élise, ou la vraie vie and Les Roseaux Sauvages but rather than 
coming-of-age and leaving the war behind, for Amel the war is central to her adult identity 
and understanding her place in France.261 For Amel, 17 October 1961 did represent a part 
of the guerre franco-française. There is a sense of return, of rebirth, rather than the linear 
narrative of progress present in the other two works. Like most teenagers, Amel feels she is 
ready to come-of-age, to know her mother’s secret, before her mother is ready to talk 
about it. 
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Amel learns of her mother’s and grandmother’s experiences partly through a film Louis is 
making about 17 October 1961 in which he has interviewed Noria. The novel presents her 
testimony in individual chapters titled ‘La mère’ scattered throughout the book. It is 
evidence that the events have not been forgotten, but also that they are painful for those 
involved to talk about; much like the ‘porteurs de mémoire’ of conscripts identified by 
Benjamin Stora and discussed in Chapter 1, they are directly passed on only between those 
who have shared the experiences.262 It is also reminiscent of Patrick Rotman’s interviews in 
La Guerre sans nom in which the ex-conscripts were more open with a stranger and a camera 
than with their own wives and children.263 It is through Noria’s testimony to Louis’s camera 
that Amel learns of the fate of her grandfather, ‘refoulés’ to Algeria.264 
 
Sebbar’s novel is extremely rich in its historical references, particularly (although not solely) 
Vichy. Yet, rather than be diminished by such references, the Algerian war is integrated 
into the narrative of French history through them. Omer, more familiar with the history of 
17 October 1961 than Amel, acts as her reluctant guide through key points in Paris. At La 
Défense, as Amel describes the route of the march across the esplanade which she has 
learnt about through Louis’s film, she stops to read the statue which commemorates the 
defence of Paris in 1870-1. Much like the novel’s multi-voiced interpretation of the 
Algerian war, it is unclear what this statue is commemorating: ‘Elle tient un drapeau, 
l’étendard de la victoire? De la défaite?’265 Amel continues to merge the two periods, 
suggesting correlations between the repression of the Commune and the 1961 protest. 
With her self-identified joint French-Algerian heritage, Amel compares the quintessential 
guerre franco-française  of 1871 with the suppression of 1961 with no feeling of contradiction 
or torn loyalties; her grandparents were members of the FLN fighting for the 
independence of Algeria but the suppression of the protest was one of French police 
against French citizens. For Amel in the 1990s to be a French citizen and to favour an 
independent Algeria are not mutually exclusive positions. 
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Omer makes different connections. He is more radical and more critical than Amel and, in 
an exchange with Louis, makes it clear that he considers himself to be Algerian, not 
French.266 A plaque by La Santé prison reads: 
 
 EN CETTE PRISON 
 LE 11 NOVEMBRE 1940 
FURENT INCARCERES 
DES LYCEENS ET DES ETUDIANTS 
QUI A L’APPEL DU GENERAL DE GAULLE 
SE DRESSERENT LES PREMIERS 
CONTRE L’OCCUPANT.267 
 
Omer paints next to it a different commemoration, carefully replicating the other’s 
language, for Louis to include in his film: 
 
 1954-1962 
 DANS CETTE PRISON 
 FURENT GUILLOTINES 
 DES RESISTANTS ALGERIENS 
 QUI SE DRESSERENT 
 CONTRE L’OCCUPANT FRANÇAIS268 
 
To recognise the legitimacy of Omer’s graffiti, a ‘voiture de police qui passe ne remarque 
rien.’269 Before he paints, Omer takes note of ‘Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité’ marked above 
the door of the prison. He is openly critical not only of the actions of the republic in ‘1954-
1962’, but of the contradiction of their own stated values. Both Amel and Omer choose 
their own identity, regardless (particularly in Omer’s case, as a political refugee) of the 
opinion of their chosen nation. 
 
                                                
266 Ibid. pp. 28-29. 
267 Ibid. p. 28. [On November 11 1940 in this prison were held high school and university students who, at 
the call of General de Gaulle, were the first to rise up against the Occupation.] 
268 Ibid. p. 29. [1954-1962 in this prison were guillotined Algerian resisters who rose up against the French 
occupation.] 
269 Ibid. p. 29. [police car passing by doesn’t notice anything unusual.] 
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Noria makes another historical connection whilst at the same time dismissing its 
importance. Her memories of the police charging at them in 1961 are intermingled with 
May 1968, but it is an event that she does not identify with. In 1961 she felt fear and 
witnessed beatings, in 1968 she saw the protests only on television; in 1961 they sheltered 
from the police behind trees, in 1968 the students cut the trees down; 1961 is only now 
being told to Louis’s handheld camera, in 1968 ‘les manifestations, les barricades, on a tout 
vu à la télévision.’270 Noira clearly feels that October 1961 has not been given the due 
recognition it deserves in the public sphere and at the same time does not feel part of other 
events which have. It takes the next generation, embodied in Amel, to integrate October 
1961 into French history.271 In Sebbar’s novel, the intertextuality between the Algerian war 
and other flare-ups of the guerre franco-française throughout republican history is integrative 
rather than reductionist much like the intertextuality present in Manet’s paintings.272 It 
serves to give meaning and significance to the events rather than usurp them. 
 
In his recent review of La Seine était rouge, House described it as ‘highly multi-vocal’, ‘inter-
generational’, ‘multi-directional’ and representing ‘a complex over-layering of personal and 
historical memory.’273 It is these factors which both integrate the Algerian war, particularly 
the events of October 1961, into the republican narrative of French history, whilst at the 
same time, challenging its assumptions about identity. With different voices of varying 
generations and backgrounds, the republican discourse of the guerre franco-française is applied, 
rejected, reworked, reapplied and removed. For Amel, the discourse applies to October 
1961 without a problem, for Noira silence retains the tension between civil war and the 
fight for independence, for Omer the discourse applies to contemporary Algeria, not to 
France. These differing views are tied to different identities: Louis is French, Omer is 
Algerian, Amel feels affinity to both; to Noira the harkis are not French, to the ‘harki de 
Papon’, Noira’s distinction is nonsensical.274 If there was civil war, for Noira and Lalla it 
was between the FLN and the MNA, felt personally through the killing of Noira’s uncle.275 
 
                                                
270 Ibid. p. 104. [we saw the demonstrations, the barricades, all of that on TV.] 
271 This concern for public recognition of the Algerian war is a running theme through the book, particularly 
in the focus on commemorative plaques which Omer graffitis and Louis films. 
272 See section 3.1b. 
273 Jim House, 'Leïla Sebbar, The Seine was Red. Paris, October 1961: A Novel', H-France 10 (2010). 
274 Sebbar, La Seine était rouge, pp. 43-46. 
275 Ibid. pp. 42-43. 
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Sebbar’s novel captures the complexity of the differing identities tied to French history but 
it is not simply a cacophony of unfocused voices; at the end of the book, as Louis prepares 
to make another film, Omer asks, ‘“Et c’est qui ton héroïne ? Tu le sais déjà ?” “Oui, c’est 
Amel…”’276 Amel’s quest to understand 1961 is tied up with her understanding of French 
history and she employs the republican discourse of the guerre franco-française as effortlessly 
to the Algerian war as to the Commune and the deportation of the Jews during the Second 
World War. The novel is Amel’s coming-of-age story in which the events of 17 October 
1961 are reborn, not only from their violent repression over thirty years previously, but 
from their subsequent long silence. La Seine était rouge employs the republican tropes this 
thesis has identified to challenge the republican version of history. Sebbar insists upon the 
intimate connection between France and Algeria, not only in the past but in the present. 
Whilst Omer, perhaps against his wishes, illustrates the connection between contemporary 
France and Algeria through Algeria’s adoption of civil war and revolution, it is Amel who is 
the figurehead of that connection; Amel is the challenge to the revolution in republicanism 
come to fruition. 
 
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has developed the theme of concealment to identify how republican France 
has maintained its claim to be ‘one and indivisible’ whilst at the same time overseeing a 
racial and exclusionary alteration in the application and recognition of citizenship. It has 
been argued that the discourse of the guerre franco-française is a republican one and is present, 
often endemic, in both historical and artistic representations of French history. Whilst this 
is inherently contradictory to the notion of the ‘one and indivisible’ republic, it co-exists 
through a series of subtleties. The ‘one and indivisible’ is part of the teleological element of 
republican universalism in which an anti-France may threaten or disrupt the republic, but 
will inevitably lose; the republic remains ‘indivisible’. Centred on Paris, the symbolic home 
of revolution, the romantic emplotment supports the teleological element of republican 
universalism through a progressive and consistent struggle against anti-France in its various 
guises. 
 
                                                
276 Ibid. p. 125. [“And who is your heroine? Do you know yet?” “Yes, it’s Amel…”] 
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The teleology of the republican narrative is most notable in histories of France which 
proclaim the ‘end of the Revolution’. This proclamation has shifted from marking the 
Third Republic to identifying the Fifth. In coordination with the previous chapter’s 
identification of the theme of cyclical rebirth in artistic representations of the Third 
Republic in contrast to the linear modernisation narrative present in the Fifth, the ‘end of 
the Revolution’ has resulted from an evolution of republicanism since the Third Republic, 
rather than the revolutionary struggles of the nineteenth century. Historical representations 
of the Algerian war and the founding of the Fifth Republic thus followed a romantic 
emplotment with the guerre franco-française, concluding with a comedic mode which insists 
upon the end rather than a renewal of republicanism’s (r)evolution through a reconciliation 
between France and anti-France (the republic and Bonapartism), effectively concealing the 
revolutionary impact of the Algerian war. 
 
The second part of this chapter returned to the study of artistic representations of the 
Algerian war and identified the tendency to utilise the fascist rhetoric of the Vichy period 
in relation to the French use of torture during the Algerian war. This transference created a 
guerre franco-française between the republic (France) and the professional army (anti-France) 
using the language of fascism and resistance from the previous period. By representing the 
guerre franco-française using the rhetoric of the Second World War, the discourse played a part 
in the concealment of the revolution in republicanism which occurred between 1959 and 
1962 by supporting a narrative of continuity between the two periods; the conflicts of the 
Algerian war were simply shadows of the Vichy era rather than new conflicts which would 
challenge the republic. It also displaced blame for the most heinous aspects of the Algerian 
war. The metonymic aspect of the transference further undermined the significance of the 
latter war, usurped by the Vichy era in both its violence and its importance to 
republicanism and French identity. 
 
The drawing of a guerre franco-française binary denies the complexity of the Algerian war. Its 
teleological element also undermines the very real struggle by Algerians for their 
independence. By commandeering the guerre franco-française discourse to represent a civil war 
between the republic and elements of the professional army, its use in relation to the 
republic and its Algerian citizens is rejected. This in turn complements the decolonisation 
discourse which insists upon the historically un-French nature of Algeria. It has been 
neither in the interest of the French republic, nor independent Algeria to challenge such a 
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conclusion. As such, there have been aspects of the war which have been largely absent in 
republican representations, both in histories and in art. These absences or silences, like that 
of October 1961, are not evidence of a national collective amnesia, however, as they have 
continued to be present in narratives external to the dominant republican one. 
 
The events in Paris, the symbolic home of civil war and revolution, in the autumn of 1961 
involving French citizens and the police, have offered a glimpse of the potential for the re-
working and reclamation the guerre franco-française discourse in a way which can question the 
racial assumptions implicit in the Fifth Republic’s definition of citizenship. Through a 
multi-vocal yet coherent artistic representation of the events of 17 October 1961, Leïla 
Sebbar has begun to interrogate the complexities of the relationships between France and 
Algeria and to reconsider the history of Algeria in France, rather than as a metonymic 
footnote to the Vichy era. Representations of the violent events of October 1961 have the 
potential to expose the revolution in republicanism by exposing the contradictions in 
citizenship assumptions that derive from republican history’s own romantic emplotment; 
to represent Algerians as part of the guerre franco-française rejects the post-1962 republican 
narrative of Algerians being un-French. 
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Conclusion 
 
Blind idealism is reactionary. 
- Franz Fanon 
 
The Republic has been the ruling regime of France for all but four of the past one hundred 
and forty years. In many respects the republic has become France, as it always professed to 
be. In its various different guises, governed by monarchists, communists and all those in 
between, it has maintained a claim to be the rightful heir of the French Revolution. This 
inheritance insists upon republicanism’s universal appeal and application, a belief originally 
encapsulated in the Rights of Man and the Citizen. For much of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, this commitment to the universalism of French republicanism both 
drove and justified French colonialism. Fundamentally, it made sense of Algérie française, 
indeed Algérie française could be seen as its culmination. As such, the loss of Algeria had the 
potential to undermine the historical foundations of republicanism. This thesis has argued 
that between the beginning of the Fifth Republic and the end of the Algerian war (1958-
62), citizenship took on a racial dimension which undermined the Revolutionary ideal of 
assimilation and fundamentally altered the nature of republicanism. Furthermore, by 
employing familiar republican tropes and narrative strategies, the revolutionary changes 
which occurred in republicanism between 1959 and 1962 were concealed. 
 
This thesis has reconsidered the place of the Algerian war as part of modern French 
history, rather than only as an end of empire narrative or as a footnote to the Vichy era. In 
tracing a longitudinal republican narrative of war and defeat, I have identified the impact of 
war on the republican understanding of France. This understanding is so powerful because 
it is not restricted to the political sphere. Whilst Todd Shepard’s work identified an 
‘Invention of Decolonization’ as part of the republican political narrative of the Algerian 
war, through study of republican culture I have identified a complementary interpretation 
in a wider republican sphere – a republican mentalité – which helped to shape and bolster 
the idea of decolonisation in reference to Algeria.1 The longitudinal nature of this study 
also helped to identify other interlinking republican tropes beyond the decolonisation 
discourse – the mission civilisatrice, the teleological narratives of rebirth and modernisation, 
                                                
1 Todd Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France (London, 2006). 
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and the romantic emplotment of the guerre franco-française – all of which have been used to 
conceal the revolutionary changes which occurred in relation to citizenship between 1959 
and 1962 through an apparent allegiance to historical continuity. 
 
Through an analysis of a body of cultural sources, largely literary and cinematic but also 
encompassing painting and historical writing, this thesis has argued that the Algerian war 
marked a turning point which was both wider and deeper than a purely political 
understanding of republicanism. This study of artistic artefacts identified tropes familiar to 
the dominant republican narrative of French history and considered their use and purpose 
in relation to representations of the Algerian war. The republican mentalité pervades history 
writing, nineteenth-century novels and twenty-first century films. Republican tropes in 
Michelet’s history writing reappear in coming-of-age films from the 1990s. In identifying 
these tropes within a longitudinal study, the thesis unearthed anomalies in representations 
of the Algerian war that contradict republicanism’s overt ideals of universalism and 
assimilation, suggesting a revolutionary change, albeit concealed, in republicanism itself. 
 
Central to this revolution has been an altered understanding of citizenship, as Chapter 1 
identified. By considering the representation of war and defeat in republican historic and 
artistic culture on a longitudinal scale, the common trope of the citizen soldier became 
noticeably absent in the Algerian war. The replacement of the citizen soldier with an 
agency-less conscripted victim suggests an avoidance of responsibility for military policy 
pursued in Algeria. However, given the prominence of the citizen soldier figure in earlier 
republican understandings of citizenship, its absence suggested a more profound shift. 
Artistic representations of Algerians used tropes similar to nineteenth-century republican 
conceptions of the peasantry to paint a sharp distinction between them and the French. 
Yet, unlike the malleable peasant, this othering was based on an inflexible racial 
identification; the route of assimilating ‘into Frenchmen’ was not open to Algerians.2 
 
Such an understanding of citizenship is clearly at odds with the universalist doctrine of 
French republicanism and particularly the belief in assimilation as a method of obtaining 
citizenship. Yet this very clear move away from a key value inherited from the Revolution 
has been concealed within the republican narrative of French history, aided by the 
implicitly teleological element of universalism. By relying on the assumption of inevitable 
                                                
2 Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France 1870-1914 (London, 1977). 
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progress (present at the core of universalism), the discourse of decolonisation allowed the 
mission civilisatrice, which had justified the appropriation of Algeria in the nineteenth century, 
to become the justification for ‘decolonisation’ in the twentieth.3 In Chapter 2, the 
longitudinal nature of this thesis highlighted three different stages in the relationship 
between the French republic and the Algerians which have all been encapsulated under the 
supposedly consistent doctrine of the mission civilisatrice. From 1848-1954, Algeria was a part 
of France in the sense that those of European origin (and Jews from 1870) could be 
assimilated into the republic as part of the mission civilisatrice. Between 1954 and de Gaulle’s 
announcement of self-determination in 1959, the mission civilisatrice saw the republic actively 
engaged in policies to encourage the assimilation of Algerians although not, until 1958, 
including mass enfranchisement. Finally, following de Gaulle’s announcement of self-
determination, the mission civilisatrice altered even more fundamentally to mean creating a 
civilised and independent Algeria rather than ‘an integral part of France’. 
 
Unlike previous representations of new republics which have frequently used the metaphor 
of rebirth, a false continuity was implied through a linear narrative of modernisation within 
France, complemented by the mission civilisatrice in relation to France’s relationship with 
Algeria. In so doing, the impact of the Algerian war and Algeria’s subsequent independence 
on the Fifth Republic is denied any significance. In effect, the revolution in citizenship is 
concealed by a narrative of inevitable progress. This narrative has been compounded by the 
obsession of republican historians with marking the end of the Revolution. 
 
Until the exodus of 1962, a front remained that Algerians who assimilated into France 
could become French. With this front removed as settlers became ‘repatriated’ and harkis 
became ‘refugees’ freshly stripped of French citizenship, assimilation became overtly 
exclusive to those identified by the Fifth Republic as being racially (because the category of 
the FMA was based on race not religion) un-French. By implying that an independent 
Algeria was always the republic’s intention through the mission civilisatrice, the teleological 
narrative of universalism enabled the concealment of its own corruption; it no longer 
meant that those who assimilated could become French. Rather, ‘decolonised’ Algerians 
                                                
3 Rony Brauman has warned that this continued affiliation with the mission civilisatrice has uncritically affected 
France’s foreign policy in the realm of intervention. Rony Brauman, 'Indigènes et indigents: de la "mission 
civilisatrice" coloniale à l'action humanitaire', Pascal Blanchard, Nicolas Bancel, and Sandrine Lemaire (eds), 
La Fracture coloniale: La Société française au prisme de l'héritage colonial (Paris, 2006). 
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would become republicans in their own nation.4 This too is a revolutionary alteration in the 
historical understanding of French republicanism and its interpretation of universalism, and 
is specifically tied to the absence of the citizen soldier in representations after the Second 
World War. Algerian soldiers were never considered to be citizen soldiers, and thus never 
applicable for citizenship on the basis of assimilation through their participation in the levée 
en masse. They were not considered equals even when in uniform.5 The absence of the 
citizen soldier figure in republican representations of the Algerian war is intrinsically linked 
with the denial of Algerians as equals. Without a racial distinction, the part played by 
Algerian soldiers in the liberation of France and the role of the harkis during the Algerian 
war would have been worthy examples of citizen soldiery, achieving Frenchness through 
assimilation. The creation of the legal category, FMA, was late in codifying the racial 
element of republican citizenship that had been culturally assumed since the colonisation of 
Algeria.6 
 
The republican teleological narrative of the Algerian war effectively conceals the ways in 
which the French republic has been shaped and altered by its relationship with Algeria. 
Kirsten Ross is not alone in identifying this concealment (or ‘denial’) as ‘the basis of the 
neoracist consensus of today.’7 To acknowledge this would be to accept the racial 
disqualification for assimilation and the failure of universalism, thus undermining 
theoretically integral elements of republicanism. However, by concealing this revolution, 
the history of the Algerian war – particularly the more difficult aspects of the settlers’, 
army’s and harkis’ experiences that are incompatible with the linear narrative which 
dominates republican interpretations – has become the domain of the extreme right. 
William Cohen has argued that the republic’s discrimination towards those of Algerian 
origin stems from the ‘French mentality’ not being ‘fully “decolonized”’, but the problem is 
                                                
4 Additionally, this denies any agency to Algerians for winning their independence as the new Algerian 
republic existed only in the French republic’s shadow. 
5 Myron Echenberg, 'Morts pour la France; The African Soldier in France During the Second World War', The 
Journal of African History 26 (1985). 
6 Gilles Manceron has noted the long-term racial distinctions made by the French republic between Algerians 
and Europeans that was enhanced with the narrative of the mission civilisatrice in the nineteenth century. He 
argues that ‘la doctrine républicaine a été polluée par le racisme official de la IIIe République.’ Manceron, 
Marianne et le colonies: Une Introduction à l'histoire coloniale de la France (Paris, 2003) pp. 10-12, 159-175 and 308. 
7 Kristin Ross, Fast Cars, Clean Bodies: Decolonization and the Reordering of French Culture (London, 1995) p. 196. 
Ross does not appear to consider ‘neoracism’ in the same vein as Silverman’s ‘new racism’, which is better 
understood as cultural prejudice. See also Gregory Flynn, ed., Remaking the Hexagon: The New France in the New 
Europe (Oxford, 1995) p. 6. 
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perhaps more accurately stated as one of the republic decolonising too effectively.8 If, as 
this thesis has argued, the discourse of decolonisation is part of the concealment of a 
revolution in republicanism that includes a shift from cultural to racial discrimination, then 
decolonisation essentially denies the importance of the relationship between France and 
Algeria. David Howarth has claimed that ‘in France nobody questions the relevance of the 
past to contemporary debates in itself. Rather, disagreement arises as to what the right 
interpretation of the past is, and this is what feeds political debate.’9 However, the 
republican narrative of the past has shown itself to be unwilling to engage with the 
experience of empire and the legacy it has left to generations of French people, not least 
those whose identities are directly connected to Algérie française (the settlers, harkis and 
professional army). As such, it has left space for the extreme right to lay sole claim to both 
the relevance of empire and pride in it, and offer their own interpretation of its effect on 
French society.10 
 
With the republican narrative failing to critically engage with the issues the Algerian war 
raised for its assimilationist model, the extreme right have been able to attack the very ideal 
of integration: 
 
While acknowledging lesser errors on its own side, it [the extreme right] places 
the primary responsibility for imperial failures on misguided, assimilationist 
policies promoted by the mainstream parties of the Third, Fourth and Fifth 
Republics. By denouncing the politicians and bureaucrats in Paris, but praising 
the qualities of many of those who served in the colonies, it uses the empire 
as a source of negative and positive justifications of the extreme right’s own 
positions.11 
 
By not critically engaging with its own interpretation and practice of assimilation, the 
French republic is, and has proven to be, unable to counter the overt and potentially 
violent racism of the extreme right and instead has felt the need to pander to such 
                                                
8 William B. Cohen, 'Legacy of Empire: The Algerian Connection', Journal of Contemporary History 15 (1980) p. 
115. 
9 David R. Howarth and Georgios Varouxakis, Contemporary France: An Introduction to French Politics and Society 
(London, 2003) p. 4. 
10 See Chapter 2, section 2.2b. 
11 Christopher Flood and Hugo Frey, 'Questions of Decolonization and Post-Colonialism in the Ideology of 
the French Extreme Right', Journal of European Studies 28 (1998) p. 85. 
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sentiments.12 The implication for the some four to five million Muslims currently living in 
France is clearly one of concern.13 
 
The extreme right consider Muslims, largely of North African origin, to be unassimilable. 
The legacy of the republican narrative of the Algerian war has meant the republic has been 
unable to challenge this assumption of unassimilability effectively because the same belief is 
integral to their own interpretation of ‘decolonisation’. Through this narrative the Muslim 
population in France represent a colonial problem within the metropole, unassimilable 
because the mission civilisatrice of universalism had created an independent Algeria and drawn 
a distinction between French and Algerians (and by association, other North Africans). The 
racial definition of the FMA was originally used by the republic to tackle discrimination and 
aid assimilation, but the need for a consistent discourse of decolonisation which rejected 
the recent past allowed the extreme right to make use of the legal distinction for their own 
more exclusionary agenda.14 Shepard has come to similar conclusions as he argued that the 
ideological clash over the war’s close ‘was between those who relied on historical 
determinism [the republican narrative] and others who looked to republican legalism [the 
extreme right].’15 However, Shepard is wrong to assert that this claim to ‘republican 
legalism’ negates the idea that there is a clash between republicans and anti-republicans; the 
extreme right’s selective application of ‘republican legalism’, the distinction of the FMA, is 
a purely cynical one. The republican linear narrative of inevitable modernisation and 
decolonisation has, as Glassie warned, fallen ‘into alliance with the forces of oppression’.16 
Unable to counter the racial distinction now present in its own discourse without returning 
                                                
12 Richard Vinen has written very convincingly on the shift of focus for the extreme right from the figure of 
the Jew to the figure of the Muslim. Vinen, 'The End of Ideology? Right-Wing Antisemitism in France, 1944-
1970', The Historical Journal 37 (1994). Maxim Silverman has been critical of the republican response to racism 
which has focused on a demonisation of Jean Marie Le Pen as a way of avoiding a recognition of its origins in 
the colonial policy of successive republics. Silverman, Deconstructing the Nation: Immigration, Racism, and 
Citizenship in Modern France (London, 1992) pp. 69 and 110. 
13 Dominique Maillard, 'The Muslims in France and the French Model of Integration', Mediterranean Quarterly 
(2005)p. 62. Figures from the French High Council of Integration with Muslim being defined by ‘culture’ 
rather than religious observance. 
14 Both Pierre André Taguieff and Silverman have noted the need to engage with group identity within the 
republic in order to tackle the racism which feeds off such a distinction; the colonial policy of republicanism 
created the distinctions and it now needs to recognise them to deal with the consequences. Pierre André 
Taguieff, La Force du préjugé: Essai sur le racisme et ses doubles (Paris, 1988); Silverman, Deconstructing the Nation, pp. 
8-9 and 122-123. 
15 Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization,  p. 83. 
16 Henry H. Glassie, Material Culture (Bloomington, 1999) p. 39. See Chapter 2, section 2.1b. 
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to a pre-1959 understanding of assimilation, the republic has enabled the extreme right to 
effectively control the race and immigration agenda.17 
 
The republican tropes identified in this thesis have largely been used to conceal the 
revolutionary changes which occurred in relation to citizenship. Yet, as Leïla Sebbar’s novel 
La Seine était rouge has shown, these tropes can also be employed to offer a more inclusive 
narrative and, most importantly, a constructive alternative to a racially-defined citizenship 
in a decolonised republican France. Just as this thesis set out to do, Sebbar placed the 
Algerian war into a broader history of republican France. To do so required the utilisation 
of republican tropes – of rebirth and of the guerre franco-française – and enabled a more 
inclusive understanding of identity. An attachment to a blinkered, if not blind, republican 
idealism has led to a reactionary and racist conception of French citizenship and identity. 
Confronting this idealism by allowing space for more challenging aspects of the past has 
the potential to provide an alternative dialogue to that of the extreme right; as Jean Jaurès 
rather more eloquently put it, ‘take from the altars of the past the fire, not the ashes.’ 
                                                
17 President Nicolas Sarkozy’s speech and public debate on national identity are worrying examples of this 
trend. See Robert Marquand, 'France President Sarkozy drops national identity debate', Christian Science 
Monitor, 9 February 2010 [accessed 13 August 2011] http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2010/ 
0209/France-President-Sarkozy-drops-national-identity-debate. For the text of his 2009 speech see Nicolas 
Sarkozy, 'Speech by Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the Republic, La Chapelle en Vercors', French Embassy, 12 
November 2009 [accessed 13 August 2011] http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/President-Sarkozy-s-La-
Chapelle-en.html. 
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